Q&A: It Is a Tannaitic Dispute
It Is a Tannaitic Dispute
Question
Is the dispute between Rabbi Michi and Shalom Tzadik basically the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda?
I am of course referring to the dispute over whether the main thing is the religious act itself even when there is no intention or commitment, or whether the main thing is the intention and commitment, and without that the religious act has no value at all.
There is the meta-halakhic dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda in several places over whether we go by intention or by the act in practice (Sabbath, facilities that gentiles made for themselves and Jews also derive benefit from them, etc.).
Seemingly this is similar. But perhaps the Rabbi could argue that his position holds even according to Rabbi Yehuda, since Rabbi Yehuda spoke about something that has practical benefit, except that it is uncertain whether the person intended it, but regarding an act that has no practical value at all and only religious benefit, he would agree with Rabbi Shimon. (For example, lulav, tefillin, etc.)
I would be glad to hear what the Rabbi thinks.
Answer
People make such a connection regarding the disputes between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about the law of an unintended act and constructive labor not needed for its own purpose. You can see that Rabbi Shimon goes after intentions and Rabbi Yehuda does not, and likewise regarding the reason for the verse.
But these are not explanations, only associations. The same applies here. The formulation is too general, and it cannot be applied sweepingly everywhere. With regard to fulfillment of commandments, faith, and commitment, this is a condition for fulfillment that has religious value. There is no question here of what is primary and what is not. Both are required, and neither has value without the other. It is true that I hold this also regarding morality: in practice there is no moral value if it is not done מתוך commitment to morality (Kant).
The connection to the tannaitic dispute is on your responsibility alone. If your intention is to argue that according to Rabbi Yehuda (whose view is the halakhic ruling) I am mistaken, that is of course a Purim quip.
Discussion on Answer
I am not arguing here with Shalom Tzadik, if only because I do not know his position. You presented his position, and I am responding to that. If he argues that this has value but there is no commandment here and no religious value, then I can agree, regarding moral acts. Regarding ritual commandments, no. Like Maimonides’ distinction in chapter six of the Eight Chapters.
I agree with the Rabbi a priori. Halakhically, maybe it is possible to connect the disputes, and even then it would not necessarily pose a difficulty for the Rabbi, because Rabbi Yehuda might concede regarding a purely religious act.
By the way, I am also not sure that Shalom Tzadik means purely religious acts as well. He argues that the Torah gives us the proper way to act, and someone who arrived at it even without the Torah—good for him, his behavior has value. That still does not mean that some Indian who happens to take 4 plants on Sukkot and wave them around casually out of boredom gives his act any value. (Those are ritual commandments that have value only if you are a Jew and observant; other nations perhaps have their own “way” of performing ritual commandments.)
But apparently I need to be more precise in everyone’s words before I go making declarations.