Q&A: The First Existent and Logic
The First Existent and Logic
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Isn’t the claim that God is incapable of things that have no logic already presupposing logic as something prior to God, as a first existent relative to Him, and as something separate from Him? After all, if we assume that God is the primary cause of everything, then we are also assuming that logic is a result of Him, and it doesn’t sound reasonable to me to think that God created logic and then denied Himself the option of overcoming it.
Now, you could come and say that the very statement that God can act contrary to logic is meaningless, and I agree, but does that solve the contradiction? If so, I’d be happy to know how. As I understand it, at most it would mean that perhaps the very discussion of God is meaningless by virtue of His being prior to logic (since all our thinking takes place only within it).
Thank you.
Answer
Logic is not a thing, neither outside God nor inside Him. And indeed, talking about something outside logic is meaningless, and after writing that, you go on to do exactly that. Get a grip. See, for example, my article here: https://mikyab.net/%d7%9b%d7%aa%d7%91%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%a2%d7%9c-%d7%aa%d7%95%d7%a8%d7%aa-%d7%94%d7%a7%d7%95%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%98%d7%99%d7%9d-%d7%95%d7%98%d7%a2%d7%a0%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%a1%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%a8%d7%aa%d7%99
Discussion on Answer
To the best of my understanding, I wasn’t talking here about the thing itself that is outside logic. All I did was present the seemingly logical contradiction between the definition of God as the first existent and the assumption that logic precedes Him. I wasn’t coming and claiming that it’s possible for God to be outside logic, because I agree that this is a sentence that says nothing. I don’t see any difference between presenting this contradiction and presenting any other logical failure.
Now regarding your statement that logic is not a thing, I’d be glad if you could explain what that means. Why doesn’t logic meet the definition of “a thing” for the substantive issue of the above contradiction? And how does that solve the above logical contradiction? (If at all.)
I answered everything. See also the article I linked to above.
In my humble opinion, the assertion that “logic is not a thing” is based on the assumption that ***verbal*** statements (like this assertion itself) are bound solely by formal logical conditions and are empty of content. That is, this assertion itself has no content or meaning. And that, as I understand it, is what happened to the early Wittgenstein.
I argue that logic is definitely "something," and therefore one can speak about it and about its boundaries.
I am of course not claiming that logic does not have necessary status. I am claiming that we must assume there are necessary conditions that precede even it.
(This is where one should add, "And let us say amen…," Michi)
Do you recognize that the content of words is separate from logical form? We can grasp the same content in an intuitively vague way even before we apply the laws of logic to it. Of course, once we apply them, the game is over and then everything is "logical" and defined in a sharp, positive way. But that doesn’t contradict the fact that we also have a pre-logical awareness, and in any case we can talk about it (albeit in a "logical" way).