A proposal for a majority in the court of law as a Dalit Kaman

Hello Rabbi,
Following on from the last lesson on doubt and statistics – I wanted to ask about the opinion of the education and the explanation that the rabbi rejected regarding the majority's perception as "Lita Kaman".
Is it possible to suggest that the truth that the Jewish Jurisprudence reaches according to education is not the truth in reality but rather a legal truth? If we define legal truth as a process of demand and investigation, the application of halakhic methods and rules of jurisprudence – we can examine the functioning of the Jewish Jurisprudence in experiments (even in a thought experiment).
Clearly, there is a lot of room for error here (even in case law, there is a lot of discretion that cannot be measured, and therefore my proposal neutralizes most of the value in the case law process and leaves only a "procedure" or dry algorithm of investigations in the court of appeals, and yet – even in that one can make mistakes, for the sake of argument. The rabbi mentions many times in the context of the relationship between halacha and law that even in halacha there are things that are "acceptable" and there are things that are clearly "impossible to do"), but is there any reason to define the majority in the court of appeals that we are looking for in this way?