Justification – Inductive Thinking and Deductive Arguments

Hello Rabbi
I really enjoyed your first book in the trilogy. But one significant issue remained unclear to me: at the beginning of your book, and in general at the foundation of your method – you prove that intuitions, which are a way of knowing that is not through direct observation, are the basis of all science and rational thinking. Therefore, they are an integral part of the rational space.
On the other hand, in your concern with theological evidence from epistemology and morality, you claim that it is not possible to be an atheist and also to trust epistemology or moral judgment – and remain rational. But I do not understand why – and after all, trust in epistemology and morality are among the most basic human intuitions (at least in the obvious or statistical sense: probably more so than belief in G-d). And if so, why do they require justification at all in order to be rational?
It is true that morality has no (reasonable) meaning without God, and therefore belief in morality necessarily means belief in a Creator. But regarding the argument from epistemology: an atheist can claim that his most basic intuition gives him confidence in this, and even though the chance that such a trustworthy world will be created by chance is almost zero – it nevertheless exists for the sake of reason, and his intuition teaches that such a world is at stake here. Why does he need to add another justification to this? Indeed, it can be argued that if such a world is at stake, then it is more likely that God created it than that it was created by chance – but in all this we have returned to an inferential argument (which can be objected to despite its plausibility) and not to a revelatory argument.
 
With thanks,
Uriel