Morals and Halacha of Cherub

My question is this: Does circumventing a moral problem by defining a moral problem as a "time of urgency" / "great need" (which allows one to rely on individual opinions that have not been ruled on by halakhah but have not been completely rejected by the evidence) actually solve the problem?
Let's say that in fact I rule as an individual opinion and thereby reach a halakhic result that is consistent with morality. Is this called the halakhic being moral (because in practice the bottom line is moral, and thus I will only do moral acts with my body) or is it neither higher nor lower (because the morality of the halakhic depends on the range of *legitimate* opinions within it and not just on the bottom line)?
Isn't this also true – even in matters that were initially ruled by the law (due to the majority) as a moral opinion and against which there is a single, non-moral opinion – is the morality of the law determined by all that credibility of the correctness of the ruling?
And I will add and ask – even regarding an amina that is rejected by evidence, assuming that it is rejected by logical evidence and not by moral rejection * – does this mean that the halakha legitimizes that very amina, which means that to the extent that amina is immoral, this is what I decide according to the degree of morality of the halakha?
 
* It is clear that "we did not see" is not evidence, and the Tosafot in places excuse this type of question by saying that, on the contrary, if they did not reject this, then they would reject it. But come on, in the case of Didan, this was probably not true.