Second-order desire

In your book, 'The Sciences of Freedom,' you presented the problem of weakness of will as one that stems from the degree of the will to will. "That is, when a person chooses, he acts on two levels, and each of them is important for the success of his action: 1. He decides what is proper, and hence what he wants; and 2. He decides how much force to exert in order to realize his decision. The second level is nothing more than a choice to choose." But in a footnote you added that "this is not a complete solution to the problem, since now a similar question can be raised regarding the choice to choose. If the person wanted to exert enough force, then why didn't he exert it? And if he didn't want to exert enough force, then it's no wonder he failed. Here it's easier to find a solution, but I won't continue to discuss the issue for fear of infinite regression." Can the rabbi explain what solution he meant and how he really deals with the infinite regression that this type of confrontation creates?