Kant's critique of the ontological view

About two weeks ago, I raised a question here regarding Anselm's ontological view, and we corresponded until things became clearer to me (remember?)
During the correspondence there, I claimed that I recognize a difference between the usual skeptical claim that tells us that there is a correspondence between a conclusion I reach in my head and reality itself and the way it operates, and the application of this claim to the law of gravity, for which it can also be argued that the fact that I reach the conclusion that the law of gravity is true does not mean that this is how reality itself really works.
My argument there was that "this is not a correct comparison. Because I formulate the conclusion about the law through an encounter (some) with reality itself in addition to the thought processes of my consciousness that lead me to it."
"In contrast, everything happens inside me without any interaction with the outside reality, so the basis for doubt is more reasonable in my opinion."
 
Is this Kant's criticism in fact? That in his opinion only synthetic-transcendental sentences have value, and not pure logic, which derives factual claims without integrating experience with reality?
Do I understand him right?