Justification – Inductive Thinking and Deductive Arguments

In the SD
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask according to the Rabbi's method, because the justification for our inductive thinking is based on a "prior/revealed" belief that we did not know about before (for example, God as a correlate or ideational evidence).
Doesn't this type of justification have a flawed purpose?
For example, when we see something and consequently assume that that object is in the external world, then this fits well with our clear assumption that the eyes are reliable. And from his point of view, there is no need to give this an additional explanation, otherwise it is skepticism and we fall into regression. And because we start from a "fundamentalist" view that assumes that understanding relies on indefensible foundations of thinking, a kind of evidence. In any case, we see no need to give this an additional reason.
But when we conclude, following our assumption, that inductive thinking is justified, or that inductive thinking patterns are justified in general, then we "add" a factor external to us, which correlates between thinking and the world, for example God.
But the belief in that external factor is not our basic premise, but rather an inference that follows from the fact that we assume that we are truly right in our inductive thinking patterns, but that they are in fact correct only to the extent that that correlating factor exists. In fact, this is a circular and pragmatic argument.
(That is, if we cannot truly know that those thought patterns are justified in theology, but only by adding the assumption about that factor from which we inferred it. Then in any case, they cannot be regarded as basic assumptions that can serve as a basis for constructing a valid (theological) argument from the assumption about the reliability of the thought system for the existence of the correlating factor.)