Negative defense of "common sense" against skepticism

In the SD
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I would like to ask briefly,
I'll start with a didactic question: Questions often arise such as: How can we know that the sun will rise tomorrow or maybe not? Descartes' demon, etc.
All of these examples give the explanation of the commence X a logically feasible alternative Y.
And I think the main point of the negative response lies in the fact that one must distinguish between logical possibility and feasibility and epistemic feasibility, and there is no reason at all to assume that there is an identity between the categories. Because epistemic feasibility requires an additional assumption regarding coordination between thinking (or what produces the logical possibility) and reality itself.
moreover,
Because the assumption of epistemic possibility requires an implicit assumption of a correspondence between our understanding and reality, so as long as we lack this assumption, there is no reason to connect the two.
And it sounds like even the skeptic (who is not an extremist) would not claim that we *experience* and assume a "coordination assumption" towards the skeptical hypothesis (which we may not be aware is coordinated).
For example, that the demon correlates between our thinking about the demon and its existence.
But if we do not have the direct, immediate assumption regarding the sense of coordination, then even if as part of the logical possibility we claim that we have some kind of unconscious assumption about it, but as long as it is indeed unconscious, there is no reason to assume that the skeptical hypothesis has any chance regarding reality itself. (Otherwise, a chance of 0 assuming that all explanations are uniform, or an impossible probability, or this discussion also depends on the level of coordination and is essentially unanswered at best).
If so, this significantly dulls the sting of the skeptical question, even if it doesn't eliminate it entirely.
Because the skeptic can indeed ask about this, who said that you are really coordinated, maybe you are ….. but he will not really be able to complete the sentence because any such completion assumes that a logical possibility has epistemic plausibility, but this assumption is possible only in a framework that has the assumption of coordination behind it. Because at most it allows the skeptic to be satisfied with the coordination of this, current system. But it does not allow him to give any other alternative explanation that has even a certain plausibility for it.
Questions:
0. Do you think the argument is valid?
1. Does the situation of partial coordination briefly mentioned above undermine this argument?
Because it seems that in the parts that we believe we are not coordinated, we don't speak, like if someone asks questions about topics we don't know, let's say the number of people in country X. We usually won't return an answer or assume that it has a certain validity.
2. Is the logical possibility that assumes that the same subversive hypothesis also exists behind it a certain coordination factor, but together with the agreement that the person without familiarity with it is truly epistemically implausible? Which is essentially the sting in the argument.
3. Are there also more positive arguments for accepting the assumption of commensality, apart from the (conscious or revealed) belief in coordination? In addition to the assumption that this is what is reasonable by its very definition.