Women's testimony

Sorry it appears in two parts.
 
Regarding Rabbi Uziel's response, he writes at the end
 
"And all of this is in the testimony of money, but in the testimony of holiness and purity, and also in the matter of shame, it is forbidden to amend such a regulation, and even if they were to amend their regulation, it is null and void, since in this testimony there are many divisions of law and doubts and sides to lenient, the woman is suspected of lenient in them, and this is very similar to what Rama wrote: But in doubt whether there is no prohibition etc. here or there is a prohibition that has sides to lenient, there is no faithful woman whose opinion is easy to lenient (Yora Deah, section 127, section 3) and wherever there is suspicion, there is no regulation, since this is nothing but a mistake and lawlessness."
 
Is Rabbi Uziel's explanation on this point reasonable? Up until now, he has crossed the line by holding onto the claim of accuracy and trustworthiness in various matters. Why, in the laws of Gittitin and Kiddushin, do we not expect people to have extensive knowledge of Gittitin and Kiddushin when they are witnesses?!
 
So what do we care if women who can be meticulous in our day and age testify in these laws? Is Rabbi Uziel afraid of a slope, or is this a special danreita? It is not reasonable to say that, after all, he permitted testifying in murder and other matters of money (by the consent of the congregation).
 
So I wonder why he stopped at this point?
 
What do you think?