From the Wilderness, a Gift – 5761

It is stated in the Talmud, tractate Ta’anit (5b):

Rabbi Nahman and Rabbi Yitzhak were sitting at a meal. Rabbi Nahman said to Rabbi Yitzhak: Let the Master say something. He said to him: Thus said Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not converse [The letter samekh appears in the source; perhaps the intent is also distraction from the meal.] During the meal, perhaps the windpipe may precede the esophagus, and he may come into danger. [And Rashi there comments: …and therefore I will tell you nothing. — ‘…and therefore I will say nothing to you.’] After he had eaten, he said to him: Thus said Rabbi Yoḥanan: Our forefather Jacob did not die. (“Rav Nahman and Rav Yitzhak were sitting at a meal. Rav Nahman said to Rav Yitzhak: Let the master say something. He replied: Thus said Rabbi Yohanan: one does not converse during the meal, lest food enter the windpipe rather than the esophagus and one come into danger. After the meal, he said to him: Thus said Rabbi Yohanan: our patriarch Jacob did not die.”)

He said to him: Was it for nothing, then, that the eulogizers eulogized, the embalmers embalmed, and the buriers buried? He said to him: I am interpreting a verse, as it is stated: “Do not fear, My servant Jacob, says the Lord, and do not be dismayed, O Israel, for behold I will save you from afar, and your offspring from the land of their captivity” (Jeremiah 30). The verse equates him with his offspring: just as his offspring are alive, so too he is alive. (“He said to him: Was it for nothing that the eulogizers eulogized, the embalmers embalmed, and the buriers buried? He replied: I interpret a verse, as it is said: ‘Do not fear, My servant Jacob, says the Lord, and do not be dismayed, Israel, for behold I will save you from afar, and your offspring from the land of their captivity’ (Jeremiah 30). He is compared to his offspring: just as his offspring are alive, so he too is alive.”)

Rabbi Yehonatan wrote, Many saw and likewise wondered. (“Many have seen this and likewise wondered”): from where did Rabbi Yitzhak know that the statement that our patriarch Jacob did not die was something novel to Rav Nahman? Rabbi Yehonatan explained that since Rav Nahman did not know that one does not converse during a meal (for he had asked that a word of Torah be said during the meal), it is clear that he also did not know that our patriarch Jacob did not die. The explanation is as follows.

It is stated in the Talmud, in the chapter ‘One Who Hires Laborers’: it is permitted to depart from the truth for the sake of peace, for the Holy One, blessed be He, altered the wording for the sake of peace and said (when quoting Sarah’s words) and I have grown old (‘and I am old’), whereas Sarah actually said and my lord is old (‘and my lord is old’).

Hizkuni objected, according to Rashi’s view, who explained and he did not bring bread (‘and he did not bring bread’) as meaning that from here we learn that Sarah had resumed menstruation: if so, how could she laugh and say After I have withered, shall I again have delicate skin? (‘After I have grown old, shall I again know youthful vitality?’)? [If she had resumed menstruation, that is a sign that she could still bear children.] Hizkuni answered that in truth her main astonishment concerned Abraham. That is, regarding herself she said that after her old age she had again experienced vitality—calmly, not as a question—but Abraham was old and no longer fit to father children. By contrast, Nachmanides explained that her astonishment in fact concerned herself as well, and that she had not resumed menstruation at all, contrary to Rashi.

Now, according to Rashi, since her astonishment concerned Abraham, the Holy One, blessed be He, indeed altered the wording for the sake of peace [quoting her as and I have grown old instead of and my lord is old]. However, according to Nachmanides, who holds that Sarah also wondered about herself, the Holy One, blessed be He, did not alter anything at all [He simply did not quote her second remark about Abraham], and therefore it is not proven from here that one may depart from the truth for the sake of peace.

Now, Ba’al HaTurim writes that and they ate and they said (‘and they ate and they said’) alludes to the rule that one does not converse during the meal. However, according to Nachmanides, one may say that bread too was brought (since Sarah had not resumed menstruation), and therefore it is possible that and they said refers to Grace after Meals. But according to Rashi (for whom bread was not brought), we are indeed forced to say that and they said refers to conversation after the meal, as Ba’al HaTurim explains. It follows from this that according to Rashi there is an allusion here that one does not converse during the meal, whereas according to Nachmanides there is no allusion to this here at all, and on his view it is likewise not proven that one may depart from the truth for the sake of peace.

Now, it is well known that our patriarch Jacob did not die because he did not depart from the truth when he said to his father I am Esau, your firstborn. (‘It is I; Esau is your firstborn’). This makes sense if it is permitted to depart from the truth for the sake of peace and yet he nevertheless did not do so; then he deserves to receive his reward. But if it is forbidden to depart from the truth even for the sake of peace, then there is nothing at all remarkable in what he did, and he would not merit the reward of not dying. It therefore clearly follows like Rashi, that it is permitted to depart from the truth for the sake of peace.

This nicely explains the Talmudic passage from Ta’anit cited above. From the fact that Rav Nahman did not know that one does not converse during the meal, it follows that he did not learn from Ba’al HaTurim’s allusion. This is because he understood like Nachmanides, that Abraham did bring bread and that and they said refers to Grace after Meals. According to this, nothing is proven from there about the permissibility of departing from the truth for the sake of peace, since on Nachmanides’ view Sarah did not resume menstruation and her astonishment concerned herself as well, not only Abraham; thus the Holy One, blessed be He, did not alter the wording, and so it is not proven from there that one may depart from the truth for the sake of peace. From this Rabbi Yitzhak knew that for Rav Nahman the rule that one may depart from the truth for the sake of peace was novel. These are the words of Rabbi Yehonatan Eybeschutz, and they are indeed most ingenious.

In fact, I wanted to stop here. We have made the acquaintance of a form of interpretation that is not customary in our circles (the pilpul method). But, as befits students of Yeshivat Yeruham, one cannot do without discussing a substantive question (preferably a fateful one).

At first glance, this is pilpul of the standard sort. On the other hand, as with every good pilpul (and there are pilpulim that are truly works of art), the question arises: what is the boundary between pilpul and ordinary interpretation? Seemingly, every stage in Rabbi Yehonatan’s reasoning above is proper and reasonable. True, the very posing of the basic difficulty (and no less in the language Many saw and likewise wondered.), namely: from where did Rabbi Yitzhak know that the eternal life of our patriarch Jacob was a novelty for Rav Nahman, is characteristic of the pilpul method, for there is not even the faintest scent of a difficulty here (and therefore, were I not hesitant, I would say that not even a few people wondered about this).[1] But beginning from a difficulty is only a method. One could have begun without a difficulty, for example: ‘It seems possible to explain the continuation as follows…’. One link that perhaps appears weak in the argument is the claim that according to Nachmanides, Ba’al HaTurim’s allusion is not compelling—especially since there is reliance here on an allusion rather than on actual interpretation (even though an interpretation of this kind could easily appear as a full-fledged homily in the Sages, and then perhaps we too would say that according to Nachmanides it is not compelling). At first glance, it seems that overall we have here an elegant and persuasive interpretation, and it would appear that the diagnosis that this is pilpul is not based on such difficulties. So why is this pilpul? And perhaps it is not? And in general, is ‘pilpul’ simply a label for an incorrect interpretation? It would seem not, for there were great scholars who studied and taught this way.

A central feature of this kind of interpretation is the linking together of homilies. Usually, it is accepted among us to examine each homily on its own terms, and not to raise an objection from one homiletic teaching against another in order to build a complete picture (One does not challenge a homiletical interpretation. — one does not refute a homiletic exposition). In fact, the Talmudic passage cited above contains precisely such an attitude: I am interpreting a verse. — ‘I am interpreting a verse’; do not confuse me with facts. The homilist detaches himself from ordinary interpretive considerations, and especially from the plain meaning, and withdraws into his homily alone.

According to this, pilpul is a serious engagement with every homily (and even with an allusion), on the assumption that this is an entire tapestry that must be constructed coherently—without ignoring facts, the plain meaning, or parallel homilies. Is this not the proper way to approach the words of our Sages?…

[1] It seems to me that such hyperbolic language was intended by the author precisely to indicate that what we have here is pilpul and not interpretation.