With God's help

From the Wilderness to Mattanah – 5764

A.

In our patriarch Jacob's blessing to Judah, the following verse appears:

His eyes are red from wine, and his teeth white from milk. (His eyes are red from wine, and his teeth white from milk.)

The Talmud in Ketubot 111b expounds the verse as follows:

Lest you say there is no taste in it? Scripture says: 'His eyes are red from wine'—every palate that tastes it says, 'more, more.' And lest you say it is good for the young but not for the old? Scripture says: 'and his teeth white from milk'—do not read 'white of teeth' but 'white of years.' (Lest you say there is no taste in it, Scripture says: 'His eyes are red from wine'—every palate that tastes it says, 'more, more.' And lest you say it is good for the young but not for the old, Scripture says: 'and his teeth white from milk'—do not read 'white of teeth' but 'white of years.')

This is the homiletic exposition of the verse. The Talmud then asks what the plain sense of the verse is, and explains:

What does the verse speak of in its plain sense? When Rav Dimi came, he said: The Jewish people said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the universe, smile at me with Your eyes, for that is sweeter than wine, and show me Your teeth, for that is sweeter than milk. (What does the verse speak of in its plain sense? When Rav Dimi came, he said: The Jewish people said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the universe, smile at me with Your eyes, for that is sweeter than wine, and show me Your teeth, for that is sweeter than milk.)

This supports Rabbi Yohanan, who said: Better is one who whitens his teeth to his fellow—that is, shows him a smiling face—than one who gives him milk to drink, as it is said: 'and his teeth white from milk'; do not read 'white of teeth' but 'whitening of teeth.' (This supports Rabbi Yohanan, who said: Better is one who whitens his teeth to his fellow—that is, shows him a smiling face—than one who gives him milk to drink, as it is said: 'and his teeth white from milk'; do not read 'white of teeth' but 'whitening of teeth.')

Commentators have already asked why the Talmud, while seeking the plain sense of the verse, offers a suggestion so homiletic in character. What kind of 'plain sense' is being stated here? How is it different from the previous explanation in the Talmud, which is called a homiletic exposition?

The author of Torah Temimah ad loc. (and likewise Maharsha's Hidushei Aggadot there) explains that what is at issue here is plain sense and homiletic exposition at the level of the words, not of the meaning of the verse as a whole. The first explanation, the midrashic one, wrenches the words out of shape. The second, the plain-sense one, explains the words in their more straightforward meaning. He notes that in tractate Hullin we find two additional cases of a similar character.

In Proverbs 23 the following verse appears:

When you sit to dine with a ruler, carefully consider what is before you, and put a knife to your throat if you are a man of appetite. (When you sit to dine with a ruler, carefully consider what is before you, and put a knife to your throat if you are a man of appetite.)

The Talmud in Hullin 6a asks, What does the verse speak of in its plain sense? (What does the verse speak of in its plain sense?), and answers: it speaks of a student who sits before his rabbi. If he knows that when he asks he will receive from him the reasoning of the law, then he should ask; if he knows that the rabbi will not answer him, he must strengthen his impulse and not ask—that is, he must 'put a knife to his throat.' And if he wants to ask about the reason for the matter, he should separate from such a rabbi.

And similarly regarding the verse in Proverbs 25:

Like one who removes a garment on a cold day, or vinegar on natron, so is one who sings songs to a troubled heart. (Like one who removes a garment on a cold day, or vinegar on natron, so is one who sings songs to a troubled heart.)

Here too the Talmud in Hullin 133a asks, And what does the verse speak of in its plain sense? (And what does the verse speak of in its plain sense?), and answers: it refers to one who teaches a student who is unworthy.

However, it seems that the explanation of the author of Torah Temimah does not solve our problem. After all, the plain sense (!) of the Talmud is that it is seeking the plain sense of the verse, not the plain sense of the individual words. If so, we are still left with the question: what is the plain sense of the verse? Beyond that, it is not clear why the Talmud's explanation is considered plain even at the level of the words, since it too contains a 'do not read… but…' reinterpretation that alters the words of the text.

We will therefore try to understand the relation between the two explanations in the Talmud somewhat differently. Let us first note that a similar structure appears in three other places in the Talmud:

Regarding the verse in Exodus 27:

The length of the courtyard shall be one hundred cubits, and the width fifty by fifty. (The length of the courtyard shall be one hundred cubits, and the width fifty by fifty.)

The Talmud in Eruvin 23b asks, What does the verse speak of in its plain sense?, and answers: place the Tabernacle at the edge of the fifty, so that there will be fifty cubits before it and twenty cubits on each side.

And similarly regarding the verse in Deuteronomy 13:

If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you. (If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you.)

Concerning it, the Talmud in Kiddushin 80b asks, What does the verse speak of in its plain sense?, and answers: The verse states the less obvious case. It goes without saying that a paternal brother, who may hate him and give him bad advice, may do so. But even a maternal brother, who does not hate him—one might have thought he would listen to him—therefore the verse teaches us otherwise. (The verse states the less obvious case. It goes without saying that a paternal brother, who may hate him because he diminishes his inheritance, may give him bad advice. But even a maternal brother, who does not hate him, one might have thought he would listen to him; therefore the verse teaches us otherwise.)

And similarly regarding the verse in Psalms 36:

            Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains; Your judgments are a great deep. (Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains; Your judgments are a great deep.)

The Talmud in Arakhin 8b asks, What does the verse speak of in its plain sense?, and the Amoraim dispute whether the meaning is that, were it not for His righteousness, which is like mountains, who could withstand His judgments, which are a great deep; or whether His righteousness is like mountains because His judgments are a great deep. See there for the precise point of their dispute.

What is common to these three places, as also to the previous two, is that there is a problem with the simple reading—the ostensible 'plain sense'—of the verse. Sometimes the problem is one of logic, as in the case of 'Your righteousness…', where there is apparently a contradiction between the two halves of the verse, or in the case of 'If your brother entices you', where it is not clear why the verse speaks specifically of a maternal brother and not a paternal brother (as explained there in the Talmud). Sometimes the words of the verse are not understood, or at least their relation to one another is not, as in the case of 'The length of the courtyard.'

Accordingly, in all these cases the Talmud tries to clarify what the 'plain sense' of the verse is. In all these cases, the ostensible 'plain sense' is unsatisfactory, and therefore the Talmud assumes that it is not in fact the verse's true plain sense. Sometimes the Talmud finds a genuine plain-sense interpretation, close to what we would call the straightforward meaning of Scripture, and that indeed suffices. That is the situation in the last three cases. But in the first three cases, it is difficult to treat the explanation proposed in the Talmud as a plain-sense interpretation. On the other hand, in those cases it is not clear whether the verse has any truly literal meaning at all.

As noted, the problems in the verses above divide into two types: the problem in our verse, as well as in the two parallel passages in tractate Hullin and in the example from Eruvin, is of the second type—the connection between the words is not clear at all. By contrast, the problem in the last two cases is a problem of logic.

The solutions likewise divide into two types: some solutions nevertheless find a reasonable interpretation by way of plain sense, while in others, for lack of choice, the homiletic reading becomes the plain sense.[1]

If we return to our verse, it seems that the problem lies in a failure to understand the connection between the words (and even the meaning of the individual words themselves), and the proposed solution is that the homiletic reading becomes the plain sense of the verse. This is not the literal plain sense (what is called 'its simple meaning according to its wording'), but it can certainly be regarded as the straightforward interpretation of the verse.

B.

We have a tradition that the Torah has seventy facets. We also have a tradition that the Torah should be interpreted on four parallel levels: plain sense, allusion, homiletic exposition, and esoteric meaning. Here we see cases in which the Talmud argues that a verse has no plain sense, only homiletic interpretation. There are additional examples of this.

1. At the beginning of Nachmanides' commentary to Genesis, he writes that the verses of creation have no plain sense, only esoteric meaning, and in his words:

For the act of creation is a deep secret; it is not understood from the verses, nor can it be known clearly except by received tradition back to Moses our teacher from the Almighty, and those who know it are obligated to conceal it… (For the act of creation is a deep secret; it is not understood from the verses, nor can it be known clearly except by received tradition back to Moses our teacher from the Almighty, and those who know it are obligated to conceal it…)

Because of the difficulties in the plain sense, and the difficulties inherent in any simple description of the processes of creation—which by its very nature cannot be fully described in the language of created beings—we choose the esoteric meaning as an alternative to the plain sense.[2]

2. I remember that when I was young I saw in Beit Yosef, Yoreh De'ah, sec. 228 (and see Menuchat Ahavah, vol. 2, p. 332 n. 67), and this is also cited in the name of the Hazon Ish, that it is preferable to force the language than to force the logic. Here too the 'homiletic' interpretation, which fits the reasoning better, is offered as an alternative to the plain sense.
3. I later found in Rashba to Hullin 3b, s.v. and tents (also cited in Rabbi Yosef Karo's Kelalei HaGemara, sec. 572), that it is preferable to construe a Mishnah in a way that is difficult linguistically than in a way that is difficult in terms of the law; see there carefully.
4. Rashi, who presents himself as a commentator committed to plain-sense exegesis, sometimes finds it appropriate to cite rabbinic midrash in his commentary. Such a case points to a difficulty in the plain sense, and therefore Rashi concludes that the homiletic reading is itself the true plain sense.

In all these cases, the decision about the most plausible interpretation is made not on the basis of the linguistic plain sense (= the simple literal meaning) but on the basis of the interpretation demanded by logic or by the law (= the plain sense not according to the wording).[3]

C.

These situations raise several questions.

1. In almost all these places, we find a plain-sense interpretation proposed by Rashi and the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). If so, it is unclear how the Talmud did not find that interpretation acceptable. The reverse is difficult as well: if the Talmud did not find a clearer plain meaning, how do the medieval authorities allow themselves to interpret the verse that way?
2. One must also consider: when we force the language rather than the logic, we must ask ourselves what reason led the author, in this place, to choose such strained wording.

It should be noted that this question is not identical to the question whether there is a simpler plain meaning—one that follows the literal wording. Here we ask ourselves: after concluding that this is indeed the simplest interpretation of the verses, why did the author nonetheless choose so implausible a way of expressing that intention?

Seemingly, this proves that whenever we adopt interpretive methods that do not follow the literal wording, we must also implicitly assume that there were additional factors behind the arrangement of the language that we are trying to explain. Ordinarily the assumption is that the sole factor in choosing a formulation is the wish to convey the message. But here we encounter situations in which the message can indeed be understood, yet if that really was the message, the author could have conveyed it more simply. That itself is a refutation of the claim that what we have found is in fact the straightforward interpretation intended by the author—unless we conclude that there were additional factors that led the author to choose precisely this form of writing.

To be sure, in the language of the Torah one can understand that there may be additional considerations in the arrangement of the words, such as esoteric considerations. Likewise in the language of the Mishnah (ellipsis and the like): the Vilna Gaon and the Ari write that the arrangement of the words is also shaped by esoteric considerations, and so too here. But where there is no sufficient explanation for additional considerations in the formulation (even considerations of rhyme and aesthetics in poetry can be a sufficient reason), there seems to be no justification at all for interpreting the text in question in a non-plain-sense manner. In such situations, at most one may have to leave the matter unresolved.

What emerges from all this is that the rule, 'Homiletic exposition and plain sense and homiletic exposition—you may expound only in a way akin to the plain sense,' is certainly a valid rule in the interpretation of the Torah, but it cannot be transferred simply to other contexts.

D.

Until now we have dealt with form. We conclude with a remark that touches on the substance (the content) of the 'plain sense' in our verse.

The Talmud says that it is preferable to show one's fellow a smiling face than to feed him and give him all sorts of things. A well-known example of this principle is brought in the opening chapter of Kiddushin (31a):

Avimi the son of Rabbi Abbahu taught: One person may feed his father pheasants and yet drive him from the world. And another may make him grind at the mill and bring him to the life of the world to come. (Avimi the son of Rabbi Abbahu taught: One person may feed his father pheasants and yet drive him from the world—because he shows him resentment over the meal; while another may make him grind at the mill and thereby bring him to the life of the world to come—because he honors him with comforting words and assigns him the labor gently, showing him that circumstances leave no other way to make a living.)

Rashi there cites two stories from the Jerusalem Talmud, apparently the source of this saying, as follows:

A story is told of a man who fed his father pheasants. Once his father said to him: From where do you get all these? He replied: Old man, what do you care? Chew and eat. (A story is told of a man who fed his father pheasants. Once his father said to him: From where do you get all these? He replied: Old man, what do you care? Chew and eat—that is, he showed him that giving them pained him.)

And again, a story is told of a man who was grinding at the mill and had an elderly father, and the king sent for his father to come for royal labor. His son said to him: Father, you grind, and I will go in your place to the king's labor, which had no fixed limit. (And again, a story is told of a man who was grinding at the mill and had an elderly father. The king sent for his father to come for royal labor. His son said to him: Father, you grind, and I will go in your place to the king's labor, which had no fixed limit.)

This, of course, is an astonishingly plain meaning. It contains no homiletic element at all. If so, can one nevertheless say that the interpretation the Talmud offers for our verse is indeed on the level of plain meaning?…

Shabbat 63a:

Mishnah. A man may not go out on the Sabbath with a sword, a bow, a shield, a club, or a spear; if he does, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: these are ornaments for him, and the Sages say: they are only disgrace, as it is said, 'And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.' A garter is ritually pure, and one may go out with it on the Sabbath. Ankle-chains are susceptible to impurity, and one may not go out with them on the Sabbath. (Mishnah: A man may not go out on the Sabbath with a sword, a bow, a shield, a club, or a spear; if he does, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: these are ornaments for him. But the Sages say: they are only disgrace, as it is said, 'And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.' A garter is ritually pure, and one may go out with it on the Sabbath. Ankle-chains are susceptible to impurity, and one may not go out with them on the Sabbath.)

Gemara. What is a 'club'? A cudgel. Rabbi Eliezer says they are ornaments for him. A baraita taught: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: If they are ornaments for him, why will they be abolished in the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Because they will not be needed, as it is said, 'Nation shall not lift sword against nation.' But then let them remain merely for ornament! Abaye said: It is like a lamp at noon. This disagrees with Samuel, who said: There is no difference between this world and the days of the Messiah except subjugation to foreign kingdoms, as it is said, 'For the needy shall never cease from the land.' This supports Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, who said: All the prophets prophesied only concerning the days of the Messiah, but concerning the world to come, 'No eye has seen, O God, besides You.' And some say: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: If they are ornaments, why will they be abolished in the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Even in the days of the Messiah they will not be abolished. That accords with Samuel and disagrees with Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba. Abaye said to Rav Dimi—or, according to others, to Rav Avya; and according to others Rav Yosef said to Rav Dimi; and according to others to Rav Avya; and according to others Abaye said to Rav Yosef—what is Rabbi Eliezer's reason for saying they are ornaments? Because it is written: 'Gird your sword upon your thigh, O mighty one, in your splendor and majesty.' Rav Kahana said to Mar son of Rav Huna: But that verse speaks of words of Torah! He said to him: A verse does not depart from its plain sense. Rav Kahana said: When I was eighteen years old and had studied the entire Talmud, I still did not know until now that a verse does not depart from its plain sense. What does this teach us? That a person should first learn, and only afterward reason. (Gemara: What is a 'club'? A cudgel. Rabbi Eliezer says they are ornaments for him. A baraita taught: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: If they are ornaments for him, why will they be abolished in the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Because they will not be needed, as it is said, 'Nation shall not lift sword against nation.' But then let them remain merely for ornament! Abaye said: It is like a lamp at noon. This disagrees with Samuel, who said: There is no difference between this world and the days of the Messiah except subjugation to foreign kingdoms, as it is said, 'For the needy shall never cease from the land.' This supports Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba, who said: All the prophets prophesied only concerning the days of the Messiah, but concerning the world to come, 'No eye has seen, O God, besides You.' And some say: They said to Rabbi Eliezer: If they are ornaments, why will they be abolished in the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Even in the days of the Messiah they will not be abolished. That accords with Samuel and disagrees with Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba. Abaye said to Rav Dimi—or, according to others, to Rav Avya; and according to others Rav Yosef said to Rav Dimi; and according to others to Rav Avya; and according to others Abaye said to Rav Yosef—what is Rabbi Eliezer's reason for saying they are ornaments? Because it is written: 'Gird your sword upon your thigh, O mighty one, in your splendor and majesty.' Rav Kahana said to Mar son of Rav Huna: But that verse speaks of words of Torah! He said to him: A verse does not depart from its plain sense. Rav Kahana said: When I was eighteen years old and had studied the entire Talmud, I still did not know until now that a verse does not depart from its plain sense. What does this teach us? That a person should first learn, and only afterward reason.)

See the book Binat Mikra by Rabbi Menashe of Ilya, introduction, for what he writes in the name of the Vilna Gaon.

[1] Apparently there is no necessary connection between the type of problem and the type of solution. Indeed, in the verse the length of the courtyard ('the length of the courtyard'), where the problem is a failure to understand the words, the solution is to find a plain-sense interpretation. It should be noted, however, that in the examples here we do not find the opposite case: a verse whose problem is one of logic, and whose solution is by way of homiletic interpretation.

The reason is clear: the verse is intelligible, and the relation of the words to one another is reasonable; our problem is with understanding the meaning and the logic (the reasoning or justice of the matter). In such a situation, it stands to reason that the solution will be to find a rationale for the verse in question as it stands, when read according to the plain sense.

If so, there is a dependence between the type of problem and the type of solution, at least in one direction: a problem of the first type (failure to understand the logic—the reasoning or justice) will lead to a solution of the first type (a rational explanation while reading the verse according to the plain sense).

[2] Still, regarding Nachmanides' intent here, one may ask whether he means that the verses have no plain sense at all, only esoteric meaning, or whether perhaps the plain sense is deeply hidden, but after we learn the Kabbalah from Moses our teacher we will understand them according to the plain sense. This requires more discussion than can be given here.

[3] The entire discussion here depends on the question: what, in general, is plain sense? And what is the relation of plain sense to homiletic interpretation? On this matter, see the two articles by David Henshke in HaMa'ayan, 1977, and especially the response by Rabbi Ze'ev Weitman in HaMa'ayan, 1978.

I recently received issue 13 of the journal Tzohar, where a broad discussion is conducted, over several articles, of the relation between plain sense and homiletic interpretation; see there.