Q&A: Certainty, Free Choice, and Knowledge
Certainty, Free Choice, and Knowledge
Question
A. In your book The Science of Freedom, you open with Descartes’ cogito, “I think, therefore I am,” and indeed Descartes was looking for certainty, and you point out that these are facts and that this is the only thing in which there is certainty. I want to ask: if a person punches his friend, would that be considered uncertainty?
B. In the past we discussed the issue of free choice and knowledge, and I told you that His knowledge is His essence, and you asked me: how do you know that? Then, while going through Malbim on Genesis chapter 21, verse 1, I saw that this is indeed what he writes.
C. I do not understand the view of Kabbalah (as brought in the above Malbim), namely that there are two kinds of knowledge: knowledge in the Infinite, and knowledge in providential governance; and in the Infinite there is prior knowledge, whereas in governance there is renewed knowledge brought about through free choice.
1. What are these distinctions—that God has two kinds of knowledge? Isn’t that dualism in God?
2. Even if you divide it this way, we still have not solved the problem, so now the problem is just shifted to the Infinite.
Answer
A. Facts are not certain, because they depend on our cognitive tools. The certainty he was looking for is logical certainty.
B. So what? Now I’ll ask: how does he know that?
C. I haven’t looked at it inside, but two kinds of knowledge are not two gods. He has two kinds of knowledge. But all this verbiage seems contentless to me, and I see no point in engaging with it.
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Questioner:
If the Rabbi could explain to me the difference between logical certainty and ordinary certainty.
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Rabbi:
Logical certainty is necessary. If all human beings are mortal and Socrates is a human being, then he is mortal. By contrast, facts that we have observed are not certain in and of themselves unless we assume the reliability of our cognitive tools (which, as is well known, are not always reliable, and therefore one can cast philosophical doubt on them).