Q&A: Interpreting the Reason for the Verse in Commandments Between Man and Fellow Man
Interpreting the Reason for the Verse in Commandments Between Man and Fellow Man
Question
Hello Rabbi,
It is well known that the rule is that we do not derive Jewish law from the reason for a verse. But recently I thought that perhaps this rule applies only to commandments between man and God, whereas in commandments between man and fellow man it is דווקא permitted—and even necessary—to derive the reason for the verse. For example, regarding the prohibition of interest, the verses commanding this are:
“If you lend money to My people, to the poor person among you, you shall not be to him as a creditor; you shall not impose interest upon him.”
“And if your brother becomes poor, and his means fail with you, then you shall support him, whether stranger or resident, so that he may live with you. Do not take from him interest or increase, and you shall fear your God; and let your brother live with you. You shall not give him your money with interest, nor give him your food for increase.”.
It seems quite clear that the reason behind the prohibition of interest is to help the poor (that is, that this is a commandment between man and fellow man, not between man and God). It may be that the economic reality in those times was that giving interest-free loans was routine (at least among the people of one’s town). In fact, from a quick Google search I saw that interest rates in the days of the Pharaoh dynasties in ancient Egypt were very low—even lower than the near-zero interest we have today in the economy. Therefore, when a poor person asks for a loan, the Torah commands not to exploit his distress by squeezing interest out of him (for because of his poverty he will be forced to agree to a loan on any terms). In such a reality, the prohibition of interest would not harm the poor. But nowadays, it seems that our interpretation of the prohibition of interest creates a reality that blatantly contradicts the Torah’s aim in this matter—helping the poor. The prohibition of interest itself harms the poor, because people prefer to invest their money in an income-bearing channel. Is there no room to limit the prohibition of interest only to interest that exceeds what is customary in the market? That way, in a reality where it is customary to lend without interest to people in your town (or where interest is negligible anyway), the prohibition stands as it does today; but in our contemporary reality, where interest is standard in the economy, the prohibition would begin only if I charge an excessive rate to a poor person while exploiting his condition. But if I lend at the market rate, that would seemingly be fine (for otherwise you end up harming the poor). Of course there are halakhic devices like the heter iska that seemingly make the discussion unnecessary, but it seems to me that even without that, the Torah did not intend for this prohibition to harm the poor. And the same would apply to the other commandments between man and fellow man: if we do not exercise a bit of interpretive freedom—if we do not derive the reason for the verse—we may sometimes find ourselves acting against the Torah’s intent out of excessive conservatism. As for commandments between man and God, there we truly do not have enough understanding to derive the reason for the verse.
Answer
Oren, hello.
- The claim that we do not derive Jewish law from the reason for a verse does not mean that one cannot understand the reasons for the verses, nor even that the Torah does not reveal their reasons. On the contrary: in my article on the fifth root, I showed that Maimonides’ view is that we do not derive Jewish law from the reason even where the reason is explicit in the verses (like the view of the first tanna against Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon). The debate is only over whether to use a purposive consideration—the reason—in interpreting the commandment. Therefore, your claim that the Torah shows that the purpose of the prohibition of interest is helping the poor is not relevant to the discussion. At most, you have shown that this is the reason, but the debate is whether to use it in the halakhic interpretation of the prohibition.
- The distinction between commandments between man and fellow man and those between man and God is problematic. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 21 and parallels) explicitly applies this to the prohibition of taking collateral (“you shall not take the garment of a widow as collateral”), which is a prohibition between man and fellow man. True, with some strain one could argue that this itself is the dispute: according to Rabbi Shimon, who does derive Jewish law from the reason for the verse, one also understands that the purpose of the prohibition is not to harm the widow, and it therefore becomes a prohibition between man and fellow man; but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with him on that very point. But it seems to me that this cannot really be said, because according to that, Rabbi Yehuda would have no category at all of prohibitions between man and fellow man. And what would we do with the Laws of Repentance, which distinguish between them and other laws—since they require appeasing one’s fellow?
- Regardless of what you wrote, we constantly derive the reason for the verse in all kinds of commandments. It is already common in the yeshivot to distinguish between deriving the reason and defining the legal category, a distinction that is very hard to sharpen (if it can be sharpened at all). In any case, there are quite a few examples of deriving the reason for the verse.
- You are identifying the distinction between rational commandments and supra-rational commandments with the distinction between commandments between man and fellow man and those between man and God. There is indeed a correlation, but I do not think they should be identified with each other. There are commandments between man and God that are rational (such as the prohibition of idolatry and belief in the Holy One, blessed be He), and there are commandments between man and fellow man that are supra-rational (such as interest, which according to most opinions is actually perceived as a non-moral prohibition). Professor Haym Soloveitchik already noted this in his well-known book on interest.
Discussion on Answer
If you are asking me about the plain meaning of the verses—definitely yes. If you are asking me what seems logically plausible to me—absolutely not. So regarding changing it, that depends on the reason, about which, as I said, I am uncertain. And it also depends on whether we derive Jewish law from the reason for the verse.
However, if I were convinced that this really is the reason, it would be possible—and even called for—to enact something like Hillel’s prozbul ordinance (because he saw that people were refraining from lending), that would transfer the interest to the religious court or something of that sort.
Why, logically speaking, is the prohibition not socialist?
Meaning, what other explanation would you give for the prohibition?
I do not have another explanation, but this explanation does not seem plausible to me. Why is there a prohibition of interest on every loan? (For example, when a poor person lends to a rich person.) In addition, why is the prohibition only on renting out money and not on other rentals? Why is there no prohibition regarding payment for a sale?
Usually people explain that money is a more fundamental basis for economic growth, but that does not convince me. There is also interest when commodities are lent. And money received as payment for a sale can also serve as a basis for growth. And when lending to the rich, why should I give them such a basis?
Leaving aside the practical implication:
Does the Rabbi agree that the prohibition of interest is a socialist commandment, intended to protect the poor?
Does the Rabbi agree that nowadays the prohibition no longer benefits them, and if we were concerned for their welfare (and were permitted to do so), we would change it?