Q&A: Is Interest Similar to Theft
Is Interest Similar to Theft
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In tractate Bava Metzia 61a it says:
Rava said: Why did the Merciful One need to write a prohibition regarding interest, a prohibition regarding theft, and a prohibition regarding overcharging? They are all necessary. For if the Merciful One had written a prohibition regarding interest — that is because it is novel, since the Merciful One prohibited it even for the borrower. And if the Merciful One had written a prohibition regarding theft — that is because it is against his will, but overcharging — I might say no. And if the Merciful One had written a prohibition regarding overcharging — that is because he does not know and therefore waives it. One cannot be learned from another; perhaps one could be learned from the other two. Which one could be learned? Let the Merciful One not write a prohibition regarding interest, and let it be learned from the others — what is unique about those others? They are without consent; will you say the same about interest, which is with his consent? Let the Merciful One not write a prohibition regarding overcharging, and let it be learned from the others — what is unique about those others? That this is not the normal way of buying and selling. Rather, let the Merciful One not write a prohibition regarding theft, and let it be learned from the others; for what objection could you raise? What about interest, which is novel? Overcharging proves otherwise. What about overcharging, where he does not know and therefore waives it? Interest proves otherwise. And the argument returns: this is not like that, and that is not like this; the common denominator between them is that he deprives him of money, so I too will include theft! They said: Indeed, so too. Then why do I need the prohibition regarding theft? For withholding a laborer’s wages. But withholding a laborer’s wages is explicitly written: “You shall not oppress a hired laborer who is poor and needy”! — To make one liable for two prohibitions. Then let it establish it in interest and overcharging as well, to make one liable for two prohibitions! — Something learned from its context, and the context there is about a laborer.
From this passage it seems that the Sages understand the prohibition of interest as an interpersonal prohibition, one belonging to monetary law, since they compare it to overcharging and theft, and even try to argue that the prohibition of interest could be derived from them. Moreover, they say that the common denominator of the prohibition of interest and the prohibition of overcharging is the element of theft within them.
Seemingly, from here one could conclude that the prohibition of interest depends on the social/economic context: in the time of the Sages it was considered an act involving theft, whereas nowadays it is not perceived as an act involving theft but as a tool with economic logic, through which the economy prospers more. The question is whether it would be correct to say that in such a situation, in our times, the prohibition of interest would apply only to loans to the poor, in accordance with the plain meaning of the verse. In addition, would it then be possible to stipulate around it like any monetary condition (for example, stipulating that a paid custodian is like an unpaid custodian)?
Answer
This Talmudic passage is extremely difficult, and I’ve long thought it needs a bit more in-depth analysis.
In general, interest is a completely different kind of prohibition from theft and overcharging, since it belongs to Yoreh De’ah. At first glance, one might perhaps go in one of two directions: 1. The “necessity” discussion is about the prohibition, but not about the monetary obligation to pay. Meaning: there is a prohibition in theft, and it is from the same family as interest, but the obligation to return stolen property is a legal matter of monetary law, unlike interest. 2. There was an initial thought to derive one from the others, but in the conclusion they were all in fact written because these are different prohibitions.
One should remember that if there is a prohibition on interest, then it is obvious there would also be a prohibition in Yoreh De’ah on theft and overcharging.
As for the question of applying this nowadays: even if this is a monetary-law prohibition, one could still argue that nowadays the situation is different and there is no reason to prohibit it — especially if we are speaking of loans not made to the poor. I don’t think this depends on the question of monetary law versus Yoreh De’ah. Seeing it as monetary law only makes it possible to stipulate around it (because with monetary matters, a stipulation is valid), but interpretation and change in light of changed circumstances are possible even with prohibitions in Yoreh De’ah.
A stipulation regarding interest is impossible, since every interest-bearing loan is exactly such a stipulation (this is what is called fixing the terms between lender and borrower), and nevertheless there is still a prohibition. That itself is proof that this is not a legal/monetary-law prohibition.
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mk (another questioner):
To the question of how it could even enter the Talmud’s mind to derive interest from theft, one may add and ask: after all, taking interest from a gentile is permitted, whereas stealing from a gentile is forbidden. So we see that interest is not theft.
And one may answer, by first citing Rashi’s words: Why do I need a prohibition regarding interest, a prohibition regarding theft, etc.? — Let them be learned from one another, for in all of them there is monetary loss, as one causes his fellow to lose money.
On page 60b, the Talmud clarifies that there are two overlapping prohibitions: the prohibition of neshekh and the prohibition of tarbit. Neshekh is the prohibition against causing the other party monetary loss through a loan, and tarbit is the prohibition on the lender increasing his wealth through a loan. There is no case in which only one of the two prohibitions applies; they always both apply, and they were stated separately only so that one would violate two prohibitions.
Accordingly, one may say that when the Talmud asked, “Why do I need a prohibition regarding interest,” it was never asking about the prohibition of tarbit, since that is not a prohibition of causing monetary loss, but of increasing one’s money in a forbidden way. That is to say: tarbit certainly has to be written explicitly. But once it is written, why is there a need to add the prohibition of neshekh in order to violate two prohibitions? After all, an additional prohibition could already be learned from theft, because since the lender is forbidden to take the interest due to the prohibition of tarbit, if he were to take it he would violate the prohibition of theft — so why write a separate prohibition of neshekh?
This also resolves the question from interest taken from a gentile. The entire Talmudic question, “Why do I need a prohibition regarding interest,” concerns only what is forbidden under the prohibition of tarbit, where one can say that theft is relevant — and not interest from a gentile, which was never forbidden.
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Rabbi:
I don’t see what the split between neshekh and tarbit adds to the discussion. Even the causing of monetary loss to the borrower (the prohibition of neshekh) is not theft, since it is a prohibition of Yoreh De’ah. And if you distinguish as I did, you can do so even without referring to the distinction between neshekh and tarbit.
To sharpen the point further, you wrote:
That is to say: tarbit certainly has to be written explicitly. But once it is written, why is there a need to add the prohibition of neshekh in order to violate two prohibitions? After all, an additional prohibition could already be learned from theft, because since the lender is forbidden to take the interest due to the prohibition of tarbit, if he were to take it he would violate the prohibition of theft — so why write a separate prohibition of neshekh.
The prohibition against taking interest is not forbidden by the law of theft, but rather like the prohibition against eating pork even though it is mine. The prohibition in Yoreh De’ah does not establish that there is theft here in the sense of monetary law.
And as for the question from interest taken from a gentile — which is of course difficult only according to the views that stealing from a gentile is forbidden by Torah law under “You shall not steal,” and as is known this is by no means agreed upon — that is only after the prohibition of interest was innovated that we understand it does not apply to a gentile.