But the “investment arrangement” has expanded to the point of including loans for personal consumption, day-to-day living, and overdrafts. In most cases this is not a “loan for investment in a business.” That is not what the permitted investment arrangement was originally created for.
Also, the permit is for profit, not loss. And in fact a court in the U.S., and following it also in Israel, rejected petitions by borrowers who had lost money on the grounds that this was a religious solution (the court argued that the borrower knew in advance that he was supposed to repay the loan), and thus they effectively nullified the agreement and bypassed it. What meaning does the agreement have if there is no intention to honor it in full?
Doesn’t uprooting an explicit command of the Torah amount to an admission of the Torah’s failure to bring about a certain ideal reality?
What meaning is the Torah supposed to have if it is uprooted from its plain sense? In other words, what do you think the real meaning of the commandments is supposed to be?

That is exactly what I wrote. In consumer loans it really is problematic.
But one has to distinguish between the discussion of whether the permit is valid and the discussion of whether it is legitimate to use permits (even valid ones). Regarding the second question, which is what we were dealing with here, I answered yes. The first question is not our concern here, because that is simply a halakhic question.

If I understood correctly, you agree that this amounts to an admission of the Torah’s failure to reach a certain reality that it is aiming toward.
If so, then why should one keep the Torah? After all, every time there is an obstacle, the sages will uproot Torah-level laws without a formal dispensation, and the Torah will move even farther from its original purpose. In that situation, a new Torah is effectively created that is essentially different from the original Torah and aimed at a different goal.
In other words, there is a drifting away from the path and the goal that the Torah set for itself.
Even in the case of using a valid permit, this leads to “strange” or “negative” phenomena like the ones I mentioned. It also changes the public’s consciousness or perception regarding that particular value. For example, today the attitude toward lending with interest among the public is very different from the Torah’s original attitude.

I do not agree. There are situations in which the Torah’s prohibition is not relevant. That does not mean the Torah gives up. It warns us not to reach such situations. There is a prohibition against desecrating the Sabbath. Suppose we reach a situation where everything can be done without desecrating the Sabbath—would the Torah then be unnecessary? It warns us not to end up in a situation involving Sabbath desecration.
I once suggested that this is the meaning of “the commandments will be nullified in the future to come.” A situation will arise in which the prohibitions will not be relevant (for example, if meat and milk are grown in test tubes, then there will be no prohibition of meat and milk, and so on).
The public’s attitude does not necessarily change. What is permitted regarding the prohibition of interest is in situations where there is no prohibition. And even in such situations, it is permitted only where there is great need (otherwise such legal fictions of various kinds are forbidden).

I didn’t understand what is meant by a prohibition not being relevant. When the sages uproot a Torah-level prohibition without a formal dispensation, that is an uprooting of the Torah and a change in its purpose.
I’m not talking about cases like technological developments that reduce the possibilities of desecrating the Sabbath, or kosher laws, where that is clear, but about cases where they change the Torah even though the prohibition still stands and exists.
And if the sages can uproot a Torah prohibition, then there is a deviation from the path. Especially when there is no valid permit.

In the case of the permitted investment arrangement, it is obvious that the intention is not that if the borrower loses money he is exempt from the interest, and it is also obvious that the religious public sometimes uses loans unnecessarily and thinks there is no prohibition in that, unlike a Jew from a few centuries ago, for whom the prohibition of lending with interest was a red line.

I already explained that you are mixing together two discussions that have nothing to do with each other: the question whether the permit is valid, and the question whether one should use the permit even if it is valid (because it departs from the spirit of the Torah). This discussion is not going anywhere.

I don’t understand where I’m mixing them up.
I spoke about 2 things.
1. What meaning does the Torah have if the sages can uproot Torah-level laws? And doesn’t that change the Torah’s original intent?

2. In the case of a valid permit, there is a change in the public’s attitude toward that law. In our case, lending with interest.
Once it was a red line; today the average person does not relate to it as a severe prohibition the way people did in the past.
Isn’t the use of a valid permit a kind of “slippery slope” and an opening to problematic actions—in this case, forbidden loans?

You spoke about both things, but in a mixed-up way. That is what I wrote.
As for your actual points: if the permit is valid, then the sages uprooted nothing. And if the permit is not valid, then the problem is not that they uprooted something, or what people’s consciousness is, but rather that they made a mistake and what they did is not halakhically valid.
The sages can uproot a matter from the Torah by passive omission (and the medieval authorities wrote that in extreme cases also by positive action) when the time demands it and for specific considerations, as in blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath (according to the Babylonian Talmud). Only in such a case is this called uprooting.
The slippery slope is a consideration, but that belongs to the topic of legal fiction. One does it when the time demands it and when the damage of not doing so outweighs the benefit of guarding against the slippery slope.

Why, in the case of a permit that is not valid, is that not also a problem? There is a drifting away from the goal that the Torah is aiming at.

I didn’t understand the question. I wrote that when the permit is not valid, the problem is not only people’s consciousness and the drifting away from the Torah’s values, but that the permit itself is incorrect. That is a mistake and one should not listen to it. The whole discussion can take place only where the permit is valid.

I meant the drifting away from the Torah’s goal in the case of a permit that is not valid. (I attributed the problem of people’s consciousness to valid permits—the slippery slope.)

But in the case where the sages can uproot something from the Torah (for example, by passive omission), is that considered a valid permit?
Because after all, there is uprooting here. Granted, one can argue that the sages have such authority, but it is only as a temporary emergency ruling.
There, certainly there is no harm to the goal the Torah is aiming at, because afterward they “go back to aiming at the goal again.”
In practice, with the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, the uprooting is for generations.

When the sages decide to uproot something, they have a rationale that overrides the Torah value. That is why they were given such authority. I explained this.