Q&A: A Rejection of Gaunilo in the First Notebook
A Rejection of Gaunilo in the First Notebook
Question
In the context of Gaunilo’s argument that the structure of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God can also be “assembled” onto the greatest lost island imaginable: in my humble opinion, the examples are not at all similar. The reason is that the concept of “great” is being used here as two completely different terms in each example. When one says “the greatest island that can be conceived,” the meaning is that the island is physically the largest. True, it is in our consciousness, but the reference is to the island itself being large. And if we then come to conceive of the greatest island that also exists, it will not be physically larger, nor will there be any addition to its greatness in our mind. But when dealing with the existence of a supreme being, the very definition of the “greatest thing” is purely in our mind. The greatest thing that “we can conceive” is great in our mind. Therefore, when we assume that it “exists,” it will be greater in our mind, since it is harder to conceive of a great thing that exists. And that is exactly the point of the effort to define God as something in thought, and not as “omnipotent” or simply as “the most perfect thing,” but rather as “the most perfect and greatest thing in our mind,” because unlike a physical thing, here the very definition is in thought and not in physical reality. Is there anything to what I’m saying?
Answer
That is what I wrote in the first notebook, chapter 18. See there. Just note that the more precise objection speaks about the greatest lost island that exists (!).
Discussion on Answer
If I understood your intention correctly, that’s what I wrote there.
I understood from you that the emphasis is on whether what exists is more “perfect,” and I want to argue that existing does not make it more “great,” only more so in the mind.