Q&A: The Ontological Proof and GMI
The Ontological Proof and GMI
Question
In the first book of the trilogy [138] you wrote that with a greatest possible island there would be no problem, since it proves the existence of an existing entity. According to this, can one also prove the existence of the greatest possible teapots and spaghetti monsters? In rejecting the proof from GMI, you explained that if it is not necessary, its existence cannot be proved; but before that you explained quite convincingly that if it is proved that I think of something as existing, then I also have to think that it exists, if I am not a skeptic?
Answer
But not if I merely conceive of it as existing. Only if I arrive at the conclusion that it exists.
Incidentally, as far as I remember, I gave several refutations there.
Discussion on Answer
You did not understand correctly. I repeat: conceiving something is not a conclusion that comes to mind. I can imagine some entity as existing, or reach the conclusion that the entity exists. Those are not the same thing.
I’ll try to let Anselm know that he should be embarrassed, if and when I meet him. In the meantime, read it again, because you didn’t understand.
Why does it matter what exactly “conceiving” means?!?! Whatever it is, why does it apply to God and not to islands, teapots, and witches?? According to this argument you can prove anything!! What is the difference between necessary and non-necessary?!?!
Have you met him already? I understood that he meant some kind of prayer, so there’s no reason to take a jab at him for nothing.
Maimonides has an annihilative proof: “And if it could enter the mind that He does not exist, then no other thing could exist.” Since that can enter the mind, it follows that nothing exists. 🙂
If I understood correctly, the whole essence of the ontological proof is about what I conceive in my mind [not what I say in my heart], and if I am not a skeptic I am supposed to accept that it is also so in reality.
[Another refutation you wrote was that for GMI, existence is not part of its perfection, unlike with God. That's just prophecy. Maybe because of your view that existence is not part of perfection you said it, but there is no difference between an island and God in this respect.]
A greatest possible island [not a lost one] can also be proved,
and Anselm failed with a serious fallacy, since by means of his proof one can prove absolutely anything. In my opinion it's embarrassing to present this argument.