New numbering:
1. Does your first remark mean that the distinction I made between legislation and interpretation is irrelevant, but the division between A1 and A2 is correct? Or do you mean that A1 and A2 are the same thing (as you remarked about section B)?
2. Why are B1 and B2 the same thing? They sound to me like two completely different arguments.
3. Regarding the last question—you wrote in the book that the area of “aims and purposes” and the area of morality are conceptually possible. I’d be glad to understand why. Seemingly one could say about them too that this is a question of right or wrong, and therefore authority cannot determine what the correct aims or purposes are. The same goes for morality: is it possible for authority to determine what the correct morality is? I understand that there could be a situation in which the Sanhedrin would derive some halakhic action from its outlook on the purposes of the world, but as long as that is not the case, what does authority have to do with aims and purposes, which are basically God’s will for us, and likewise morality.

1. Argument 1 does not exist, so it isn’t identical to any other argument. There’s no point in hairsplitting about it.
2. You can’t force someone to think something because we’re dealing with facts.
3. In those areas the demand is to do something, not to think something, and therefore there is no conceptual contradiction in such a demand. Even if in my opinion it is very moral to cross the street on an orange light, the legislator may demand that I not do so. Demands are impossible in the realm of thought and possible in the realm of action. That isn’t because there is no truth in the realm of thought. Even if there is truth, you still cannot demand there that I think what I do not think.

1. I didn’t quite grasp what you meant. The fact (or the claim…) that sages throughout the generations created independent philosophical doctrines—isn’t that an argument against authority in aggadah? In one form or another you wrote this in the trilogy.
2. Indeed, the starting point is that matters of thought are facts, but it seems that the argument based on this is twofold: 1. We are compelled by our opinions. 2. A ruling cannot change reality. Isn’t that so?

1. No. That is an argument against essential authority. They are not experts because they have no knowledge beyond what we have. We are talking about their own reasoning.
2. No. Nobody claims that a ruling changes reality. The argument is that a ruling cannot change our opinion.

Hello,
True, two months have passed… but I’ve been thinking about it, and I wanted to raise a difficulty. Regarding what you wrote in the last line, that “nobody claims that a ruling changes reality”—if nobody claims it, then I’ll try to claim it 🙂
Seemingly one could say this:
The argument against formal authority in matters of aggadah/thought is based on the fact that there is no authority regarding facts. However, there are two kinds of facts:
A. Physical, concrete facts—and regarding them we ask questions like: Is the earth round or flat? And there it is clear that formal authority/command cannot apply, because we are compelled by our opinions.
B. Spiritual, abstract facts—about which, seemingly, the logic also does not allow the concept of command, but perhaps one could say that once the Sanhedrin / the majority of halakhic decisors (assuming there is such authority of a majority), and the like, rule that there is free choice (for example), then that is thereby what is decided in Heaven, just as people commonly say that if the sages determined that a certain vessel is impure and the like, then that is also how it is decided in Heaven (even though in Heaven they would in principle have decided otherwise).

Thank you.

You are confusing spiritual facts with normative determinations. In normative determinations, of course there is authority, but regarding reality, physical or otherwise, there is no logic at all to such determinations. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that sages, through their words, can change reality, and anyone who wrote that was merely offering a bare speculation with no basis.

Thank you.

So in summary, if I understood correctly, the reasons there is no authority in the world of thought/aggadah, briefly, are as follows:

A. In everything connected to facts (issues of providence, corporealism, free choice, why the righteous suffer, and the like):
1. One cannot speak conceptually about authority, because we are compelled by our thoughts.
2. In any case, we have not found that authority was granted in this area.
3. There is also no essential authority (authority of experts), since there is no tradition and interpretive process; rather, each thinker creates his own conceptual framework.
B. In everything connected to norms (intellectual conceptions of aims and purposes):
1. Conceptually, one can speak of authority.
2. In practice, it seems that authority was not granted in this area.
3. I don’t recall an explicit discussion of your own regarding essential authority in this context, but I assume it is no different from the previous point 3. Is that right?

Was I accurate?
Thank you very much

B. 2 — It was certainly given. “Do not deviate.” To the Sanhedrin and perhaps to the Talmud as well (from below).
3. There definitely is essential authority. Are there no experts in Jewish law?

In section B I’m not talking about Jewish law but about the subcategory of aims and purposes within the world of thought (the word “norms” slipped in on me). That’s the distinction you made in the trilogy. And I quote: “These are not simple factual claims, but neither are they merely practical instructions. At least on the conceptual level, there is room here to speak about authority (in my numbering—B1). But the question still remains whether the sages were indeed given authority in these areas. I am very doubtful (in my numbering—B2).” And that is why I asked about B3, because you didn’t address it.

If that’s what you mean, then correct. In my opinion there is no authority in areas outside of Jewish law.

Hello!
In the second book of your trilogy you divide things up (as Ben Moshe noted here) between principles that concern facts, aims and purposes, and moral principles.

Aside from factual principles of thought, which I think I understood, I’m having trouble understanding what lies behind the definitions of “aims and purposes” and “moral principles” (despite your explanations in the book, which were not clear to me).

1) Following this excellent clarification here, I’d be happy if we could continue with these 2 categories—
What falls into them and what does not?
For example—is the commandment that “murder is forbidden” a moral principle from which Jewish law is derived?
Within “aims and purposes,” can I place everything connected to the status of women—from Torah study to everything attributed to women by the sages regarding the aspiration to marry as early as possible, and the presumption that she will always prefer not to divorce and to remain married?

2) You also discussed the difference between spiritual facts and normative determinations—what are normative determinations?

Thank you

According to my view (see column 16, and in more detail at the beginning of the third book), the commandment that murder is forbidden is not connected to morality. It is a religious law. The moral prohibition of murder is a moral prohibition and has nothing to do with Jewish law.
The status of women and the rest of the examples you gave are definitely meta-halakhic, intellectual principles or broader tendencies.
Normative determinations are forbidden, obligatory, and permitted. Facts are true versus false.

Hello Rabbi,
I’m coming back to ask another question here, because it is on the same topic, but I’m bringing the relevant details here so that you won’t have to scroll back up.

Question 1)
Introduction: You were asked why in the trilogy you wrote that the area of “intellectual principles dealing with facts” is not conceptually possible and has no authority over it, whereas the areas of “aims and purposes” and morality are conceptually possible and do have authority over them (after all, those too are matters of thought, so how can someone there force me to believe some fact?), and you answered that in those areas the demand is to do something, not to think something, and therefore there is no conceptual contradiction in such a demand, and that demands are impossible in the realm of thought but possible in the realm of action.

The question: Even in factual principles such as foreknowledge and free choice, and Israel’s special spiritual quality, there are Jewish laws that were ruled (even if there was no ruling to think this or that way, practical laws were certainly derived from that mode of thought). For example: prayer. As I understand it, you yourself ultimately adhere to Jewish law and pray (even if you make changes that in your opinion are possible within the framework of Jewish law). So what is the point of the distinction between “intellectual principles dealing with facts” and “aims and purposes”? In both, one cannot rule what we must think, but one can rule what we must do even if we do not agree with the reasoning behind the ruling. What is the difference between the question of “foreknowledge and free choice” and the question of “the purpose of woman in the world”?

Question 2)
Introduction: In the continuation of the discussion it was asked whether one cannot say that a ruling changes reality (if I understood correctly, then if it is in the area of broader purposes, they rule that one should indeed desecrate the Sabbath in order to save a gentile because his life is worth no less than mine, and that is also how they will think in Heaven; and if it is in the area of morality, they rule that it is moral to speak slander in such-and-such a situation, and indeed that then becomes the case in Heaven). To this you answered:
“You are confusing spiritual facts with normative determinations. In normative determinations, of course there is authority, but regarding reality, physical or otherwise, there is no logic at all to such determinations. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that sages, through their words, can change reality, and anyone who wrote that was merely offering a bare speculation with no basis.”

The question:
What is the difference between spiritual facts and normative determinations?

1) I did not write that they are possible or impossible. I dealt only with the question whether one can speak of formal authority with respect to them. When there are practical Jewish laws ruled on the basis of intellectual principles, it depends. If it is clear to you that the intellectual principles are incorrect, then there is also no obligation to observe the practical instruction. That is a mistaken ruling. Like halakhic rulings based on incorrect scientific determinations (absorption into vessels, worms generated from putrefaction, and the like). But if it is not clear to you that it is a mistake, then the practical instruction remains in force until proven otherwise.

2) I didn’t understand the question. A ruling does not change reality (for example, in the well-known discussion regarding a three-year-old girl, whose virginity returns), and neither does it change normative reality. But there may be a situation in which we will have to do something wrong (that does not fit the normative fact).

1) So I still don’t understand the whole point of the distinction you made in the trilogy (second book, first discourse) between “intellectual principles dealing with facts” and “aims and purposes.” In both, one cannot rule what we must think, but one can rule what we must do even if we do not agree with the reasoning behind the ruling (and that is where the issue you just explained comes in). What is the difference between the question of “foreknowledge and free choice” and the question of “the purpose of woman in the world”? What reason did you find to distinguish between them, if in the end both deal with facts and Jewish laws are derived from both?

2) My question was what the *conceptual* difference is between spiritual facts and normative determinations. In your answer here to the question whether rulings change reality, you distinguished between them, and I did not understand at all why—what is their definition?

Aims and purposes are not facts. Therefore, in principle, formal authority is possible there. But since this is not Jewish law, in practice there is no authority here either (because for this matter we did not accept the Talmud upon ourselves).

Aims and purposes like the State of Israel as “the beginning of redemption,” or the role of man and woman in the world—isn’t that a factual question? Why not? Aren’t these matters of truth and falsehood / yes and no?

Everything was explained, and it is also explained in the book.

Rabbi, I read the book and tried to do so carefully. The questions here I’m asking in light of my attempts to summarize and process the material I learned. That is why I’m asking you, because there are things I still do not understand, and I think at least that they are not written clearly, or are not written in the book at all.

I can’t understand why you define, for example, the two aims and purposes I gave in the previous question as questions that are not questions of fact. As far as I understand, these are yes/no questions and not permitted/forbidden questions—so why do you place them under “aims and purposes” and claim that they are not facts? I can’t quite get to the bottom of what you mean.

I really don’t understand what is unclear.
When I say that the status of women ought to be lower than that of men, or equal to that of men, what does that have to do with a fact? That is a norm, not a fact. Therefore, with regard to that, one can demand that people behave in a certain way even though they do not agree. Not so regarding facts, where one is demanding that people think in a certain way even though they do not agree—which is an oxymoron.
None of this has anything to do with whether the question can be answered yes or no. The question whether murder is forbidden can also be answered yes or no, and still one can demand of a person not to murder even though in his opinion it is permitted. But one cannot demand of a person that he think the Messiah will come if in his opinion he will not come.

If sages say that “the status of women ought to be lower than that of men, or equal to that of men,” they are making an essential claim, a metaphysical claim about reality. As I understand it, this is not a normative matter; rather, they are claiming that this is an actual essential fact (that’s just an example; they also do not really claim this outright, it may only be implied by their words, and I know this is also a separate issue that you already discussed in the third book, but that is not what I mean here).
So again: I must observe the Jewish laws derived from this, but as I understand it that is exactly like my having to pray even though I do not agree with the factual claim of individual providence.

I understand why, if there were a halakhic ruling that “you must believe that woman is inferior to man / there is individual providence,” that would be an oxymoron. But as I understand it, that is not the case in any of these examples (after all, the Thirteen Principles, for example, are not a halakhic ruling, as you explained in the book).

So I do not understand why you divided the world of thought into “intellectual principles dealing with facts” and “aims and purposes,” and proposed a different attitude toward each one.

**I’m not arguing with what you say here or offering a different interpretation; I want to get to the root of your view in order to resolve what does not fit together in my understanding of your words**