Q&A: Authority and Decision-Making in Matters of Belief
Authority and Decision-Making in Matters of Belief
Question
1. Your argument that there is no authority in matters of belief indeed seems very compelling (and even necessary), since they concern fact and not norm. However, many great Torah sages held otherwise, and I tried at least to find some rationale for that. I came up with two possibilities (with difficulties), and I’d be happy to hear your response:
A. The Holy One, blessed be He, changes His conduct and creation according to the Jewish law determined in our world. That is, God wanted us to decide these issues, and He will change reality accordingly. For example (with regard to His conduct), whichever opinion we decide on in the question whether there is a messiah for Israel will become the correct one. First, this does not sound plausible at all and therefore requires proof. Second, in the passage about the Sanhedrin, which is the sole halakhic authority, it explicitly says in which matters one turns to the Sanhedrin: “If there arise a matter too difficult for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between plague and plague, matters of dispute within your gates” (Deuteronomy 17:8). It should, however, be noted that in the Jerusalem Talmud the word “matter” is interpreted as including aggadic matters.
B. Since we are dealing with extremely complex issues, there is concern that the vast majority of the public will arrive at mistaken understandings, problematic both in themselves and because of the division and disputes they generate. Therefore, God established that the public is obligated to think that what is correct is, for example, what most of the sages of Israel think, even though this may actually be mistaken in understanding God’s conduct or creation. At least statistically, most people will then think correctly. Still, this novel conception requires proof. It is also implausible: it is very strange to think that God would command us to deny the facts.
2. Another point: assuming there is no authority in matters of fact, what about authority in matters of fact that bear on practice? For example, some claim that it is forbidden to go up to the Temple Mount for ideological reasons. Say they were to bring proofs from an authoritative source (the Talmud) — would we be obligated to listen to them? Another example: if proofs are brought from the Talmud that, in the view of the Tannaim, we are at the beginning of the redemption, and that requires certain actions, are we bound by that by force of authority even if we do not think this is the beginning of the redemption? And so on with matters of fact that affect action and not only belief or theory (like the issue of corporealizing God).
Answer
A. Completely implausible. Moreover, even if it were true, how would anyone know that this is so? And the Shakh’s well-known comment regarding a three-year-old girl whose virginity returns says something along the lines of what you wrote, but that is of course absurd and unnecessary in every way.
B. That doesn’t help at all, because you can’t command someone to think what he does not think. At most, you could say that we were commanded to mislead fools who think there is Jewish law in matters of fact.
2. In matters that affect practice, there can be authority. A Sanhedrin can determine that it is permitted to kill a louse on the Sabbath even though you think it is forbidden. It is not telling you what to think, but what to do. In a case like the louse, however, it is more likely that they said this because that is what they thought, and since it is quite clear that they were mistaken, this has no halakhic validity. All this business about the “beginning of redemption” and the like is, of course, utter nonsense. No one can know such things (and in my opinion no one is even clear on what these concepts mean), and today there is no body that has authority even in the realm of Jewish law, so certainly it cannot impose its view in matters of belief even if they bear on practice.
Discussion on Answer
What is the question? I already answered it. If there were a Sanhedrin today that determined that it is forbidden to go up to the Temple Mount (whether its considerations were matters of belief or anything else), then it would be forbidden. We would not have to accept the reasoning, but we would have to accept the conclusion. In order to deviate from their ruling, the conditions for one who errs in the commandment to obey the words of the sages would have to be met. I think that is unlikely to apply here.
The example about the beginning of redemption was not meant as a principled one. In any case, I understood from your words that in matters of belief that affect practice, there indeed is authority.
Just to sharpen the point: what about the Temple Mount example? If they were to bring an ideological reason against ascending it (for example, that this is not the right time and that it somehow harms holiness) from an authoritative body — and of course that is not the actual situation — would we then be obligated because of that authority? On the one hand, this belongs to aggadic matters; on the other hand, it affects practice.
Also, what is the rationale for this?
Seemingly one could suggest that every halakhic ruling embeds, to one degree or another, some worldview in its determination or interpretation, and therefore a ruling based entirely on aggadah should not be any different.
Thank you very much for the response!