But does the Rabbi agree that there can be a norm that commands us to adopt a fact? For example, the existence of God, which Jewish law relates to as a fact that one must adopt. And so it falls within the halakhic domain. As for the inner power of persuasion a person needs in order to adopt it—he has to make an effort. No doubt. Like with any novel fact. If they tell me that the Shin Bet is listening to me, I can dismiss this “fact” and I can adopt this fact. In short, the fact in halakhic usage is subjective, and Jewish law does not deal with the objective aspect at all.
Good night.

And what about the determination that so-and-so is a heretic and should be killed?

No. That’s what I wrote in several places. Regarding the existence of God, several commentators on Maimonides have already commented on his first positive commandment. There I am not alone. Though I extend this to all facts.

The determination that so-and-so is a heretic and liable to punishment is normative and not factual, and therefore in principle (conceptually) it can exist. That is not a command about facts. I am talking about the prohibition against being a heretic, not about a command to society regarding how to treat a heretic.
That said, personally I do not accept such a command even though it is conceptually possible, because if his heresy is genuine (that is really what he thinks), then it stems from coercion in thought. In such a situation he is coerced, and certainly there is no punishment upon him.

The truth is that such a heretic, of the kind the Rabbi is talking about, really has no punishment—but he also has no reward. The assumption is that we are speaking about heresy that comes from choice. A person indeed has no choice over what his eyes see, but he does have a choice whether to believe what his eyes see or not to believe it—to deny it. However, in such a case it certainly makes no sense to speak about punishment, because one who denies what his eyes see will go crazy and lose his reason, and on that it makes no sense to command, because that precedes the command itself (if you see the commander with your own eyes, then who says He exists?). And this is basic decency that preceded the Torah, and also a kind of transcendent truth (undermining it undermines thought itself).

But all the beliefs spoken of in the Torah and by the sages are beliefs in realities that the eyes do not see (and not denial of what they do see—for example, the magnetic monopole). And there too they are limited in time (it is impossible to believe forever without arriving at seeing and knowing). Faith in the very existence of the commander is problematic, and I think Maimonides did not mean that either, but certainly one who does not believe in the resurrection of the dead will not rise in the resurrection of the dead, because that does not happen on its own but is attained after work whose purpose is resurrection itself. Certainly one who does not believe in resurrection will not be able to work toward it, because he will not do the actions required, and therefore he will not rise. That is, this is not a punishment but cause and effect. It is like someone who does not believe he will succeed in his actions indeed not succeeding in anything, because he will not even try to do anything. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

And in practice, it seems to me that the Torah’s punishments in such a case are not punishments of revenge or justice but of correction. Like a punishment when a father sends his child to his room if he did something wrong. That is, in such a case (that of resurrection of the dead), the lack of reward (from the Torah’s perspective) is worse than an active punishment of Gehinnom, so it would be preferable for him to spend time in Gehinnom or return in reincarnation just so that at some point he will believe in resurrection (after many sufferings; eventually he will stop banging his head against the wall) and in the end will rise. And similarly with the other beliefs.

And the truth is that in this sense one can speak about commandments. And also about Maimonides’ first commandment. In Maimonides there are also commandments that are not commands but realities. Like the commandments of impurity and purity (“that one who touches a corpse becomes impure”) and the laws (the law of the ox and the pit). So in that sense, every action that has an effect on reality (that is, a “punishment” if one does not do it or does not accept it as true—believe in it) can also be counted as a commandment. That is, commandment 1 is the commandment of the reality of God’s existence (he phrased it as “to know that there is a God.” But to phrase it as “there is a God” would have sounded a bit strange even to him).

Who was talking about punishment? I agree that there can be consequences for someone who denies facts.
As for commandment 1, I too thought that in the past (that it was a declaration and not an actual command), but I was told that he includes the commandment to believe in his list of constant commandments, and it is thereby proven that he intended it as a commandment that must be fulfilled.