Q&A: Does the Rabbi Beg the Question?
Does the Rabbi Beg the Question?
Question
When I was leisurely reading the responsa of Rabbi MDA, may he live long, about intellectual authority, a question for a giant arose in my poor mind, and here it is: Rabbi Michi keeps saying that the Sages have no authority in the realm of thought, and his proof is very puzzling, since it is based on the fact that the Sages have no authority in the realm of thought (it is based on—if I may say it out loud—independent thinking, Heaven forbid). Rabbi Michi himself presented in the series “God and the World” a proof of a person’s inability to replace another’s criterion of thought by means of someone else’s criterion (to recall: if a person has criterion a and I have criterion not-a, and from my criterion b follows while from his it does not, I will never be able to convince him of b, because one of two things must be true: if I try to convince him by means of criterion not-a, he does not accept it and that is the end of it; if I try to convince him by means of criterion a, then it does not prove b, and that is also the end of it). If I accept that the Sages do have authority even in the realm of thought, that is, in the realm of logical inference, then if you present me with a logical proof (for example, that I am compelled to think that 1+1 equals 2 even if the Sages were to rule that this is nonsense), it is based on my already accepting that the Sages have no authority in matters of intellectual decision-making, since the proof is based on the fact that I think something (= that there is a contradiction in demanding that I accept the intellectual authority of the Sages) contrary to the view of the Sages, whereas that is precisely what the dispute is about in the first place. The Rabbi assumes that I adopt his criterion, and on that he builds his proof of that very criterion. And if the Rabbi shows a source in the words of the Sages that one must think independently, then all my “independent thinking” is based on accepting the authority of the Sages, and it turns out that I still accept their authority.
If Rabbi Michi had not presented this as a proof to others that the Sages have no intellectual authority, that would be fine, since then it would just be a formulation for himself and for anyone who accepts his criterion (and then it would be rather unnecessary). But since the Rabbi brings this as a claim against those who bring proof from the Sages, that is very puzzling. I would be glad to understand how the Rabbi can make such an error, if indeed he does.
Answer
Expound and receive the reward due giants. Truly a bizarre piece of pilpul. Everything you write is just the claim about the emptiness of the analytic, namely that every logical argument begs the question. See my article on the praise of begging the question.
My claim that there is no authority in the factual realm follows from the definitions of the concepts “fact” and “authority,” not from sources in the words of the Sages or from one assumption or another. A fact is a claim about the world. The concept of authority means accepting someone’s determination even though it is not correct, simply because he said it. That does not apply to facts, only to norms. That is all.
A person can say that according to his assumption 1+5 = -13, and then you will not be able to prove anything to him. Very true. Such a person should simply be hospitalized, not argued with. The same applies to authority regarding facts. This is a pure logical claim, and one who does not accept it is like someone who does not accept that 1+5=6. Indeed, you cannot prove anything to him, but you also do not really need to prove anything to him.
Discussion on Answer
I said that it depends on the definition of fact and the definition of authority. If I reached the conclusion that they know everything and therefore I set aside my own view, that is perfectly fine. But that is not authority. Authority is obeying even though, in your opinion, it is not correct. I distinguished there between substantive authority and formal authority.
I did this in the second and third books of the trilogy, and in lecture series that dealt with authority (here on the site). You can try searching the site for “substantive and formal authority,” and I think you will find it here too.
I just read the Rabbi’s article (the short one, the one on the site) about “the praise of begging the question,” but now it seems even more puzzling to me, because the Rabbi uses that same proof against those who come to him with claims. That is, if we assume that there is a Jewish law that determines that the Sages have intellectual authority in the formal sense—meaning that I must obey even if in my opinion it is not correct (let us set aside the logical problematic; for example, let us imagine we opened the Laws of Character Traits in the Mishneh Torah and found this stated before our eyes)—how can Rabbi Michi try to convince some crazy religious guy that this law is not valid? There is only one logical possibility, but he can rule it out a priori by virtue of its being logical—for in the possibility of logical clarification he accepts nothing (like that child who plugs his ears and sings “na-na banana”). Certainly such people need hospitalization; my question is why the Rabbi tries to prove it to them instead of sending them to Abarbanel.
I will answer one more time and finish. I am addressing those who understand the definitions of the concepts. Whoever does not understand, or does not maintain logical consistency, should go to Abarbanel. That is all.
I would appreciate, if it is not too much trouble for the Rabbi, a link to the article mentioned. I still have not understood your answer. You claim: “My claim that there is no authority in the factual realm follows from the definitions of the concepts fact and authority,” but the dispute is precisely about your ability to define concepts. It may be that if I define resurrection in a systematic way I will arrive at a contradiction, and therefore I was forbidden to define it systematically. The claim is not that a fact is not a claim about the world, but that the Sages knew all the facts and we do not, and in such a case we must nullify our view of the facts before theirs (in other words, they never say mistaken things; we simply do not know which things are correct). There is no problem with rejecting what I wrote here (it really is nonsense in concentrated form), but the question is how one can convince another person that it is not correct (for the reasons I explained). On that point, it seems to me, the Rabbi did not answer.