The claim: let us define: Light — every predicate of the Creator that does not belong to Him essentially, that is, it can be denied of Him without a contradictory contradiction.
Source — the substance that Jews call “the Creator of the world,” through the veil of predicates by which we know it, the subject, the essence.
World — a set of certain predicates p that belong to the entity called “Creator” (this is the world after the contraction; before that it was an entity).

What I mean is that the world was initially part of the Creator, meaning there was no difference between the predicates and the subject—they were the same thing. Whereas the contraction is that the set of predicates p called “world” became synthetically composed onto the subject rather than analytically, meaning it can be denied of the Creator without contradiction.

And the proof: the sun is a metaphor for the source, and its light is a metaphor for light. Therefore, since the sun is not located on planet Earth, the essence is not either; and since its light is indeed present, the Creator’s light is indeed present. And how do I know this? Because there is a verse saying that the heavens declare the glory of God, therefore everything I see in the heavens and liken to God is logically valid.

I liked the phrase “a contradictory contradiction.”
The problem is that predicates of something are not entities, so I do not understand how they can fill an infinite space, or a partial one, or any space at all.
Light is not a predicate of the sun. It is an effect caused by it, but it is an entity that exists in its own right.
In short, we haven’t gotten anywhere.

For example: if we posit an object one of whose properties is “being red,” then we can look at the predicate—that is, examine the “being red” as standing on its own (and that is contraction). On the other hand, we can examine the predicate together with the object (and then that is the predicate as belonging to the object, and that is non-contraction). My claim is that the substance “Creator” has a predicate “created beings” (in the spirit of Kabbalah we can say that this is a set p of 10 predicates). When the emphasis is on the predicate, that is contraction, and then there is no reference to the substance (even though the object is still the subject, just as there cannot be a reality of the color red when there is no object that bears it, at least not in the real world). When the emphasis is on the fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, that is what it means that there is no contraction. In other words, the distinction is epistemic. If we are speaking of a “knowing entity,” then the problem of “who is looking at the predicate ‘created beings’?” is also solved, just as I can contemplate my own predicate and thereby isolate it logically, so too the Creator does.

I do not understand a single word here. “Being red” is not an entity. So what does contraction or non-contraction have to do with it? Is the world the Holy One, blessed be He’s “being red”? I do not understand these words.

If I am a red person (and only I am red in the world by some magical logical necessity), and I examine the predicate red by itself, then this is my epistemic separation between predicate and subject. My claim is that this separation is my contraction away from the red. At first, the idea of myself stood before me, and I denied from it all its properties except “red”; I contracted myself away from the red. Now let us imagine a predicate called “created beings,” and I will argue that the contraction is the withdrawal of all the properties in order to examine the predicate on its own. By the predicate “created beings” I mean that one of the Creator’s properties is that He is the place of the world, and part of the characteristics of this property is “world”; when “He” withdraws, only the world remains for examination.