Q&A: Trilogy
Trilogy
Question
Dear Rabbi, hello,
I am studying your second book in the trilogy on Jewish thought, in the second discussion on tsimtsum. There the Rabbi writes that if tsimtsum is not meant literally, there are two possibilities: a. pantheism, b. idealism. And afterward the Rabbi suggests an idea (supposedly your own): there is a divine spark in each person, but we exist, and the divine part exists separately. הרי the middle position is neither pantheism nor idealism. And the Rabbi asks there why neither the Hasidim nor their opponents discussed the philosophical problems caused by the view that tsimtsum is not literal. And I am very puzzled: let the Rabbi look in the book Tanya, where it explicitly says what the Rabbi is saying—that there is a divine element and there is physicality, only all physicality depends on the divine element, and they are two separate things ??????
Thank you
Answer
I am not sufficiently expert in that literature, and as I recall I was speaking about academic and Torah-based articles that deal with the topic, not about the primary sources. In any case, even without knowing it, I am sure it solves no problem at all. As is their way.
Discussion on Answer
Do you mean that Rabbi Steinsaltz also wrote unclear words that say nothing on this topic? Or are you claiming that if Tanya wrote a few unclear words about it, then the Rebbe can be satisfied with having learned Tanya and write whatever comes into his head, even if those are nonsensical things that completely ignore the difficulties?
How did I not think of all this? Tendentious as I am!
If you insist, I’ll bring Rabbi Steinsaltz’s wording. And this is what he says: “The world exists within divinity and draws life from it, but in itself it always remains on a different level, essentially other; whereas the human soul, in its innermost core, is a divine manifestation, and more than that, it is a part of God.” End quote. I think these are really the Rabbi’s own words as well. And the Rabbi should ask Hasidim (I think Chayuta Deutsch’s husband is a student of Rabbi Shagar), and they’ll tell the Rabbi that this is an explicit view.
In short, I admit that there are vague descriptions, but not here. And it is very strange to write an article about something the Rabbi did not study seriously. Who knows—maybe you would even have been convinced.
Well? Do you see here that he is claiming that the tsimtsum is literal, even according to Chabad? So then what is the dispute with Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin about? Manifestation that manifests. Mere word games. There is no need to read everything said there, because an a priori analysis leads you straight to the conclusion.
If your intention was to strengthen my position that there is no need to read all these word games and a conceptual analysis is enough, then you succeeded. More power to you.
A. There is a practical implication for a woman’s betrothal.
B. Even if there is no practical implication between Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin and Chabad, still they are one and the same, as is explained explicitly. And it is a shame that the Rabbi writes that according to the Rebbe of Chabad the whole world is imaginary, so what is the difference between the Rebbe and Spinoza? (See your book, pages 121–122.) That is really a distortion, and in my opinion, since the Rabbi holds the banner of objectivity, this discussion should be revised in a proper and truthful way. And I am not pestering the Rabbi in order to provoke, Heaven forbid, because I really enjoy the book—but I enjoy the truth even more.
Thank you.
P.S. I will probably ask many more questions about the book. I hope the Rabbi will relate to them seriously, just as I relate to the book seriously.
The Rabbi asked regarding the dispute—it does not seem to me that this is what the dispute is about. And as the Rabbi himself asked, what practical difference is there? After all, in practice there is nothing. From here it is proven that they disagreed about other things.
Look in Rabbi Steinsaltz’s book Thirteen Petals, page 59, where he explains it explicitly this way, and it is also explained explicitly in Tanya—I just don’t remember where.
The Rabbi wrote that Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin held this way, and the Rabbi wondered about the Rebbe of Chabad why the philosophical problem didn’t trouble him—and that is really funny, because of course the Rebbe also learned Tanya. This part of the book is blatantly tendentious, so much so that I thought I had found an objective rabbi; do you know how hard it is to find such people at all?