Q&A: Bread That Comes as Kisnin
Bread That Comes as Kisnin
Question
It is explained in the Shulchan Arukh that there are three opinions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) as to what “bread that comes as kisnin” is: bread filled with sweet things, bread kneaded with fruit juice, or dry cracker-like pastries that are nibbled for enjoyment. It seems from there that according to each opinion, the other types are full-fledged bread, over which one recites “Who brings forth bread from the earth,” and afterward Grace after Meals, even without an amount that satisfies. But in practice it is ruled that over all three of these types one recites “mezonot” and “al ha-michyah” when less than an amount that satisfies was eaten, because in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient (Grace after Meals from an olive-sized amount up to an amount that satisfies is rabbinic).
My question is: what is the law in a case where someone ate two different types of bread that comes as kisnin, more than an olive-sized amount but less than an amount that satisfies? In such a case, would he nevertheless recite Grace after Meals, because according to all opinions he ate a type of bread that is full-fledged bread?
There is really a question here about the methodology of halakhic ruling: is the doubt among the opinions, where I follow the lenient view, a doubt as to which opinion is the correct one in Jewish law? If so, in our case—where no matter which opinion is actually correct, he ate bread—he should recite Grace after Meals. Or perhaps the doubt is about the food item itself: since there are opinions that it is bread that comes as kisnin, there is reason to say that it is not full-fledged bread regardless of the opinion that held that. If so, then even if he ate two types, he still ate two types of bread that may not be full-fledged bread, even though there is no such opinion as a practical ruling?
Answer
You are right regarding the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But in the Shulchan Arukh it is commonly understood that he ruled like all three, and not out of doubt. See the Biur Halakhah there.
Discussion on Answer
If so, then it seems you are right. I think common practice is not like that.
Here’s an interesting novel idea (not agreed upon, but interesting): according to Or LeTzion (Rabbi Ben-Zion Abba Shaul), if a person eats burekas / rugelach or anything else where it is doubtful whether it is bread that comes as kisnin, and wants to drink a beverage, he should not recite a blessing on the beverage. After all, it is possibly bread, and although we say that because of uncertainty regarding blessings one recites mezonot, it still may be bread—and when one eats bread (an olive-sized amount), one does not need to recite a blessing on the beverage.
That sounds very strange to me. The exemption from another blessing is not because of eating bread but because of the blessing on the bread. If someone eats bread without making a blessing, does that exempt him from another blessing?
The more accurate comparison is: if I recited mezonot on bread, have I fulfilled my obligation, and have I exempted the other foods and drinks? And the halakhic ruling is that I have fulfilled my obligation, and it does exempt them.
That is indeed what the Biur Halakhah brings in the name of the Ma’amar Mordekhai, but in the Beit Yosef itself it is explicit that he rules leniently like all three because in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient, and that is also what the Shulchan Arukh HaRav writes. According to their approach, the above question comes back.