Q&A: The Validity of the Moral Command
The Validity of the Moral Command
Question
If I understood your words correctly in The First Existing, you argue that the existence (or validity) of morality in itself constitutes evidence for the existence of a legislator (let us call him, for the sake of discussion, God), and that this is unrelated to God’s other roles in relation to the world. At the same time, at the end of your remarks you argued that the absoluteness of the obligation to the divine command stems from what you called “ontological gratitude,” which depends on God’s role in relation to the world as Creator. Given this distinction, from where does the validity of the moral laws that stand on their own derive, without bringing in God’s role as Creator? Would they also be valid in a world in which you assume our coming into being was without a creator? And if indeed the basis of the obligation to the service of God is that same ontological gratitude, then in a case where this conflicts with the laws of morality (or even, for that matter, if the legislator who grants validity to the moral facts had no relationship whatsoever to the world, and the creator were a separate entity that did not see itself as bound by moral law), would the validity of God’s command by definition override?
Answer
Obligation to a command is a matter of obligation to Jewish law. Morality is not a divine command but His expectation. A command is meaningless unless God commanded it; by contrast, morality obligates not by virtue of a command. True, without God it has no validity, but in terms of its content it has meaning not only because of the command. Everyone understands that murder is forbidden, but not everyone understands that eating pork is forbidden unless there was a command. True, once I understand that morality is binding and I ask myself why, I reach the conclusion that there is someone at the basis of morality’s validity, someone who created the moral norms—God. Identifying Him with God the Creator is an identification I make after I have reached the conclusion that there is a Creator God.
In a world in which there were no creator, I do not know what moral feeling, if any, would have nested within us, and therefore I do not know how to answer. If there were such a feeling as there is today, it would probably lead me to the conclusion that it has its basis in a legislating entity, even if not a creating one.
Discussion on Answer
If it were imprinted in me like morality, then perhaps I would be obligated by it like morality. But it is not imprinted in me that way. And it may be that this is not accidental, that it is not imprinted in me, because it is not possible for it to be imprinted in me that way, since with the commandments the content really is not independent of God (the service is a higher need, meaning the commandments are done for His sake), as opposed to morality, which is for human beings.
Rabbi, if the statement “murder is forbidden” is binding even without a command, how is that different from the naturalistic fallacy?
You only have two possibilities: is or ought. There is no third possibility. Here it seems you are trying to create one.
I did not understand the question. The statement does not obligate anything; it describes a norm.
I’m not sure I understand the difference here, in your view, between Jewish law and morality—for after all, you do not claim that the commandments have meaning (even if not binding validity) only because they are a divine command, since in your view they are needed for the sake of perfection. Rather, without the command we would not know them, but theoretically it certainly would have been possible to imprint the knowledge of the higher need for those commandments through some sense, similar to the moral sense. In any case—would that legislating but non-creating entity obligate you? If so, by what force, if not one connected to the ontological bond?