Q&A: The Moral Command versus the Divine Command — Coming to Teach and Ending Up Learning?
The Moral Command versus the Divine Command — Coming to Teach and Ending Up Learning?
Question
Good evening, Rabbi Michi,
Regarding the assumption that one is obligated to fulfill a "divine command" by virtue of its being a divine command—
in your YouTube lectures (and presumably in line with The First Existent) you explain this through moral obligation:
You ask: what would be the answer to a person who asks why there is an obligation to behave morally, independently of the very definition of what moral behavior is.
Your answer is that a person who asks such a question does not really understand the concept of "morality," because the concept itself, by definition, not only says that there is such a thing as moral behavior, but also says that this is how one ought to behave.
From there you move to the divine command, which also, by its very definition, obligates one in practice to act in accordance with the command.
I wanted to ask you:
In practice, you yourself seemingly are the very person who argues that the mere fact that there is a concept of morality does not obligate you, and you wonder where the duty to act in practice according to the moral imperative comes from. From there you arrive at the assumption of "the revealing argument"—that apparently you hold an overt or implicit belief in God, and that He is what gives morality its force.
In other words, you yourself do not accept the claim that the concept of morality has practical force on its own.
If so, how can you try to explain the obligation to obey the divine command by means of morality?
Answer
Of course it has force, because it is a divine command. Therefore this argument is revealing, not creating. When a person understands what morality is, it obligates him. But that understanding also says that at its root there is a divine command. If there were no divine command, this would not be morality but only a neutral definition (without any motivation to action).
In short, the argument goes like this: Reuven is obligated to morality. He does not ask himself why he should act this way, since that is the definition of morality—that it is also obligating (and not merely a definition). But he does ask himself where morality comes from and why it obligates (that is, why it is morality and not just a definition). Notice: he is not asking whether it obligates, but why it obligates. That is why this is a revealing argument, not a creating one. And the answer is the divine command.
Discussion on Answer
That is not called obligating; at most it is worthwhile. The result is a fact, and a fact cannot generate an obligation (the naturalistic fallacy).
That is why, earlier, in the fourth lecture of Part 3, I discuss the definition of morality, and in Column 456 I rely on moral realism.
Okay, first of all, that fact really can obligate; the fact that a person does not act on it does not mean it is not obligating. Why should God's command obligate? There are people who do not recognize Him, or who do recognize Him and think that He commands immoral things—but let's set that aside.
You could ask it this way: why should you act morally? Or maybe: what is supposed to cause you to act morally? Without that command, would you act differently? What is the added value?
Incorrect. A fact obligates nothing. Only an ethical fact that has a divine command behind it obligates. Without that command, perhaps I would act the same way, but only because I feel like it. There would be no obligation here, and if I thought there was, that would be a mistake. Beyond that, if there were no divine command, there would be no binding ethical facts, so I do not know what I would do in such a world. That is a hypothetical question that there is no way to answer.
Interesting. You probably mean “obligating” at the level of a law—like you are not allowed to run a red light, even though you can, but it is simply not right to do so because it would disrupt order on the road. But do you obey that law only because it has a legislator? No—you obey it because you understand its importance.
Maybe morality works that way. It is not some law of nature that cannot be violated, but it obligates in the sense that otherwise things will not work. So yes, it obligates, just not by force of some person behind it. That is not a paradox.
Although a divine command definitely does give morality more significant force, and on a personal level it is comforting to think that there is someone to whom one must give an account, that every injustice that has happened or will happen “will not pass in silence.”
God does not function as the giver of reward or punishment, but as the authority that obligates. That is a different function, and it is the essential one for the definition of morality. Without that, perhaps you will behave morally because you feel like it, but you have no basis for making claims against someone who behaves immorally. It has no binding force without a command from an authority.
But you could answer the question of why it obligates in other ways too—for example, why is murder forbidden? Because it harms the social order and its stability, and the continuation of orderly, proper life. You can demonstrate that. You can distinguish between societies that behave less morally and those that behave more morally and compare them objectively. You can show why it obligates—that is, obligates at a sufficiently strong level, to the point that it becomes almost impossible not to, because society would fall apart. Also, there are things naturally ingrained in us; most normal human beings do not need to be persuaded not to murder—they do not even think of doing it at all.
So why does the resulting answer still have to be a divine command?