Observing the Commandments, Lesson 4

Table of Contents

• Commandment as dependent on command and faith
• Commandments require faith versus commandments require intention
• Charity and interpersonal commandments without commitment to the Torah
• The distinction between the person and the object/result, and its practical consequences
• Beyond prohibitions: intention is irrelevant, but faith is
• A moral-social implication: attitude toward a person who does not believe
• Testing the claim through liability for a sin-offering: inadvertent sin, coercion, intentional sin
• Action versus intention: the case of a nazirite and “he intended to eat pork”
• The distinction regarding sin-offerings and the discussion in Afikei Yam and the Ran
• An alternative position: the sin-offering comes for the error, not for the act
• Application to a person who does not believe: inadvertence, coercion, and a child captured among the gentiles
• “Do not place a stumbling block” and causing someone to fail when the main problem is lack of knowledge
• Moral commandments, fines, and the Rashba in Shevuot
• Conceptual summary and a pointer to the practical continuation

Summary

General Overview

The text argues that commandments receive religious value only when they are done מתוך commitment to the command, and therefore someone who observes commandments for merely humanistic or national reasons does not fulfill a commandment in the halakhic sense, even if the act itself was done. The central claim is that commandments require faith according to all opinions, and the debate over “commandments require intention” is a separate and more secondary question. Some explanations of “commandments do not require intention” rely on the presumption that an unspecified act is presumed to have been done for its proper sake, and that does not apply to someone who does not believe. From this it is argued that the same rule applies not only to positive commandments but also to prohibitions, to the point of saying that someone who does not believe is outside the whole realm of commandments and transgressions. That has implications for how we relate to such a person and for questions like “do not place a stumbling block,” through a fundamental analysis of liability for a sin-offering and of the case of a child captured among the gentiles.

Commandment as dependent on command and faith

The text cites Maimonides in Laws of Kings at the end of chapter 8, where he states that a person must fulfill commandments because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai. If he does so because reason compels it, he is among the wise of the nations of the world, but not among their pious. The text defines this as having human moral value but no religious value, because a commandment has to be done out of commitment to the command. The text states that someone who keeps commandments like Ahad Ha’am — “the Sabbath has preserved the Jewish people” — is not fulfilling a commandment. And if someone recites Shema for Ahad Ha’am-style reasons and then later repents, he would need to recite Shema again, because he did not fulfill his obligation.

Commandments require faith versus commandments require intention

The text distinguishes between the dispute over whether “commandments require intention” and the more fundamental claim that “commandments require faith,” which, in his view, is agreed upon by everyone. The text explains that some later authorities explain “commandments do not require intention” along the lines of the presumption that an act is for its proper sake, based on the Talmudic text at the beginning of Zevachim, where the circumstances show that the act was done for the sake of the commandment even without explicit awareness. The text argues that this explanation fits ritual commandments, like putting on tefillin in a synagogue, but it does not apply to someone who does not believe and is not committed to commandments. So there is no basis for saying that his default action counts as intention for the commandment.

Charity and interpersonal commandments without commitment to the Torah

The text refers to the Talmudic text that says, “on condition that my son will live” and “on condition that I merit life in the World to Come,” and still treats it as a commandment. It explains that the uniqueness there is on the level of intention, not on the level of faith, because the very formulation presupposes faith in the Holy One, blessed be He. The text expands this to say that interpersonal commandments that a person feels morally obligated to perform, independent of the Torah, are a “good deed,” but “it is not a commandment” if they were done without commitment to the command. The text states that someone who circumcises his son so that he will be healthy and not get diseases has not fulfilled a commandment, even though the question of the son’s status as circumcised is a different discussion and may perhaps involve drawing covenantal blood.

The distinction between the person and the object/result, and its practical consequences

The text emphasizes the distinction between the question of whether the person fulfilled a commandment and the question of whether a result was produced in practice, calling this the distinction between the person and the object/result. The text gives the example of betrothal in the case of a secular couple and says: “they are married,” but as for a commandment, he certainly has none. This is presented as a paradigm in which the halakhic result can exist even without fulfillment of a commandment by the one who acted. The text notes that this possibility exists with circumcision as well: the child can be circumcised, but the father has no commandment of circumcision. It even mentions the far-reaching possibility that, “in this conception,” perhaps even the child would not count as circumcised.

Beyond prohibitions: intention is irrelevant, but faith is

The text states that with prohibitions, intention is irrelevant. A person does not need to intend “for the sake of Heaven” in order not to eat pork, and he also does not need to intend a transgression in order to count as a transgressor when he eats pork — with a qualification that will come later. The text tells an anecdote about a barbershop in Bnei Brak that posted a sign saying that whoever is there should have in mind five commandments, including prohibitions, and it defines this as a mistaken novelty, because “prohibitions do not require intention according to all opinions.” The text then proposes a parallel claim to the one made regarding positive commandments, namely that “prohibitions require faith,” and concludes that someone who does not believe, “his prohibitions are not prohibitions,” and therefore “he cannot commit transgressions,” just as he cannot fulfill commandments.

A moral-social implication: attitude toward a person who does not believe

The text clarifies that this does not mean there is no point in bringing such a person closer to awareness of obligation so that he will then observe commandments. Rather, it means that in his current state, his actions have no religious value, even though they may be good deeds on the moral plane. The text argues that precisely because his actions are not commandments and transgressions, he does not appear as a criminal, unlike someone who commits transgressions defiantly or out of appetite within a framework of obligation. The text argues that someone who does not belong in the category of “your fellow in observance” is not someone toward whom obligations are removed; rather, he is “fully coerced,” and therefore “our obligation toward him remains fully in force.” It even raises a paradoxical remark that according to this, a person struggling with his inclination might think it would be worthwhile to “turn himself into a non-believer.”

Testing the claim through liability for a sin-offering: inadvertent sin, coercion, intentional sin

The text suggests testing the halakhic claim through the question of liability for a sin-offering rather than through philosophy, and sets as its starting point the principle that “for intentional violation the punishment is karet or stoning; for inadvertent violation, a sin-offering.” That teaches that even inadvertent sin contains an element of transgression, unlike coercion, which is entirely exempt. The text explains that a sin-offering expresses “a dimension of guilt,” and that inadvertent sin is described as parallel to negligence. The text discusses whether “the act is the transgression” and awareness is merely a condition for liability, presenting two conceptions: one according to which even under coercion there is a transgressive act but no guilt, and therefore no punishment; and another according to which coercion is an act not attributed to the person at all, like someone who was thrown onto another person and killed him.

Action versus intention: the case of a nazirite and “he intended to eat pork”

The text cites the Talmudic text in Nazir about someone who intended to eat pork and what came into his hand was lamb meat. It explains that the straightforward reading is that there was no halakhic transgression because the act was not done, even though atonement is still needed for the inner mental dimension. The text mentions the Brisker Rav, in his stencil novellae on Nazir, who writes that this is a real transgression and only there is a scriptural decree that one is not punished without an act — but it defines that as a difficult reading of the Talmudic text. The text compares this to attempted murder in Jewish law, and says that in Jewish law there is no category of “attempted murder” — only murder. Therefore someone who fired a shot and the firing pin broke is not a murderer for purposes of punishments by a religious court, and he is not disqualified as a kohen with regard to the priestly blessing, even though he is dangerous and a religious court can punish him extralegally.

The distinction regarding sin-offerings and the discussion in Afikei Yam and the Ran

The text asks: if the transgression is the act, then someone who did five prohibited acts under the same single error should have to bring five sin-offerings, yet the Jewish law is that he brings only one. The text cites Afikei Yam, part 2, sections 5 and 6, which proposes two possibilities: either the first sin-offering atones for all of them within that same error, or the actions are considered one act so long as there was no intervening recollection that divides them. The text cites the Ran in Nedarim 17, regarding naziriteship dependent on eating, where warnings are required between one olive’s bulk and the next in order to divide the acts of eating. It interprets this as an indication that the role of warning or recollection is to divide the actions, and not only to create guilt for punishment. It also notes that separate dishes divide as well, because they turn the eating into distinct acts.

An alternative position: the sin-offering comes for the error, not for the act

The text argues that the reading of Rashi and Maimonides is simpler and different from the model of Afikei Yam: the offering comes “for the error, not for the act.” The text explains that one is liable for only one sin-offering for five acts of eating in one lapse of awareness because “I forgot once,” and therefore “the number of forgettings determines the number of sin-offerings.” The text points to the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter Kelal Gadol in Sabbath, and explains that someone who forgets the very principle of Sabbath and performs many labors over many Sabbaths is liable for one sin-offering, because there is one error; whereas someone who knows the principle of Sabbath but errs regarding particular Sabbaths is liable for one sin-offering per Sabbath, because the Sabbath-errors are separate. The text brings Rashi’s explanation that the days in between serve as knowledge that divides, because it is impossible that he did not hear that that day had been Sabbath. It also cites Tosafot, who disagrees and defines it as a scriptural decree that “there must be observance for each Sabbath,” while presenting Rashi and Maimonides as grounding the main liability in the error itself.

Application to a person who does not believe: inadvertence, coercion, and a child captured among the gentiles

The text presents the non-believer as someone who falls into the category of being inadvertent in his faith, but raises the question whether this is inadvertence, coercion, or intentional sin when he argues and refuses to accept. On the conceptual level, the text determines that this is coercion, and that one who does not believe is “fully coerced” and “removed from this whole domain.” The text describes a child captured among the gentiles as someone who grew up in an atmosphere in which faith and obligation to the commandments sound absurd, and cites the dispute of the amoraim: Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish exempt him from everything, while Rav and Shmuel obligate a sin-offering. Jewish law is ruled in accordance with Rav and Shmuel, and according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim), the liability applies to every type of prohibition.

“Do not place a stumbling block” and causing someone to fail when the main problem is lack of knowledge

The text argues that if the sin-offering comes for the error, then causing a secular Jew to drive on the Sabbath does not add any transgression in a meaningful sense, because the transgression is the lack of knowledge and not the action, and “he has already been liable for a long time” on account of that same error. The text argues that adding one more act within the same error does not increase sin, because “it is not a sin” in that sense. It illustrates this with the absurdity of counting “and another one, and another one” when you cause a driver to press the brake and light yet another bulb. The text cites a quantitative consideration from halakhic decisors via the Ritva on selling an animal to a non-Jew who in any case already breeds animals, according to which when the prohibition is already being committed there is no “do not place a stumbling block” in adding one more instance. It uses this to support the intuition that quantitative pettiness is not suitable here.

Moral commandments, fines, and the Rashba in Shevuot

The text raises a difficulty from fines in theft, and answers that the double payment is a fine, and the question of its foundation may be moral and not only religious — though it qualifies this by saying that perhaps the law would change in one single lapse of awareness, and it does not decide the matter. The text argues that the common assumption is that for moral commandments there is no law of a child captured among the gentiles, because every person understands their prohibition. The text cites the Rashba in Shevuot 18, about one who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual time, where expected periods are rabbinic, and he is liable for a sin-offering when he withdraws and she sees blood during intercourse. The reason is that the very violation of the warning of the Sages prevents him from claiming coercion with respect to the Torah-level prohibition. From this the text concludes that moral awareness or prior warning can remove a claim of lack of knowledge in matters like theft.

Conceptual summary and a pointer to the practical continuation

The text concludes that the same principle stated regarding positive commandments also applies to prohibitions: where a person is not aware of his obligation, “his transgressions have no meaning,” and his commandments have no meaning as well, and he is not a transgressor in the halakhic sense of commandments and transgressions. The text emphasizes that a child captured among the gentiles is not merely a leniency on the level of punishment, but a state of being removed from the categories themselves. The text notes that the continuation of the discussion will deal with practice and with different types of non-believers, and with cases where a person “causes” another to commit a transgression and not merely assists him, referring to Maimonides at the end of Laws of Kilayim and to other places in order to complete the practical map.

Last time we talked about how to relate to the commandments and transgressions of Jews who are not believers. And I’ll just briefly remind you: I brought Maimonides in Laws of Kings, at the end of chapter 8, where Maimonides says that a person has to keep commandments because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai, and if he does it because reason compels him, then he is among the wise of the nations of the world but not among their pious. And in translation, it seems to me at least that this is the correct translation, there is value to that—you can call it human morality—but it has no religious value. Meaning, it is not a commandment. Because a commandment has to be done מתוך obligation to a command. Meaning, if someone keeps commandments like Ahad Ha’am, that the Sabbath preserves Israel and so on, then it’s not a commandment. Meaning, as I also said last time, if someone recites the Shema for cultural-national reasons and then repents a little afterward, he has to recite the Shema again. Meaning, he has not fulfilled his obligation.

Now, I also said that this has nothing to do with the law of whether commandments require intent, where there is a dispute—whether commandments require intent or not, both in the Talmud and among the halakhic decisors. Because here I’m talking about something more fundamental, and that is: commandments require belief. And my claim is that according to all views, commandments require belief. The dispute is whether commandments require intent, but that commandments require belief—that is according to all views. And the reason is that according to the one who says commandments do not require intent, at least according to some explanations, some later authorities (Acharonim) explain that this is because of a logic like an unspecified act being presumed to be for its proper purpose. There is a Talmudic passage at the beginning of tractate Zevachim that discusses the question of what happens if I did not intend what I was supposed to intend, I didn’t think what I was supposed to think when I offer a sacrifice. The question is whether an unspecified act—that is, where there was no explicit intention at all—is regarded as though it was done with the proper intention, or whether an unspecified act is not good enough. The Jewish law there is that an unspecified act is presumed to be for its proper purpose. And what they usually explain is: look, if you do this act the way Jewish law commanded, even if you didn’t think about it explicitly, behind your consciousness the intention was certainly there. Why are you sitting in the Temple and starting to offer sacrifices, doing all this procedure? You didn’t consciously think that this was for God’s sake or for the sake of the sacrifice—there are six things for whose sake the sacrifice has to be offered—but clearly that is what it was for. In other words, the circumstances prove that that is what it was for; otherwise what are you doing there? So therefore an unspecified act is presumed to be for its proper purpose.

Many explain that commandments do not require intent because of that logic of an unspecified act being presumed to be for its proper purpose. Meaning, if you put on tefillin in the morning—now you didn’t intend and you didn’t think “for the sake of the commandment” and so on. Fine, but why are you in synagogue in the morning? You are there because you understand that this is a halakhic obligation. So since that is the case, then in essence you did intend it. You intended it in a way that was not explicit—that is, it wasn’t in your conscious awareness, but in the end there was intention here. But for someone who does not believe at all or is not committed to the commandments, you can’t say such a thing.

But that applies to ritual commandments. What about charity, for example? Okay, someone pointed this out last time: the Talmud says, “on condition that my son will live,” “on condition that I merit life in the World to Come,” and the Talmud says that this is a commandment. I don’t remember the exact wording, but simply it seems that this is a complete commandment. Fine—but you need intent. So that’s exactly what I’m saying: “on condition that my son will live”—that’s not intent? “On condition that my son will live,” or “that I merit life in the World to Come”? But even there, what does it mean that my son will live and that I’ll merit the World to Come? Behind that sits belief in the Holy One, blessed be He; otherwise how would my son live because I gave charity? Or how would I merit life in the World to Come? Right, but that’s belief and you’re talking about intent. That’s exactly what I’m saying. So there really is something unique about the commandment of charity, and the Talmud explicitly says it: “on condition that my son will live,” but that uniqueness is on the level of intent, not on the level of belief. Because as for belief, the Talmud does relate to it as if it is there. Since what does “on condition that my son will live” or “that I merit life in the World to Come” mean? So there really is charity, and according to some views charity really is unique in this matter, meaning this is a special rule said about charity.

And there are other examples where this remains true for all commandments between man and his fellow man, where a person feels morally obligated toward them independent of the Torah. Yes, so that’s what I’m saying about all those commandments: for those commandments I say, it is not a commandment. It’s a good deed if you do it that way. But it is not a commandment. Yes, it is not a commandment.

So if a person circumcises his son in order that he be healthy, in order that he not get diseases, then he has not fulfilled a commandment. Correct. Whether his son is circumcised is another question, that is a different discussion; maybe one would need to draw covenantal blood again, but he has not fulfilled a commandment. It’s like marriage betrothal—I mentioned this. Someone asked me after I wrote this article: so tell me, what about the marriage betrothal of a person who doesn’t… okay, it’s a secular couple, the husband betroths his wife. Fine, so they’re married. A commandment? If there is even such a thing as a commandment of betrothal—no, clearly it is only preparation for a commandment—but a commandment he certainly doesn’t have, right? The same here. Sometimes you have to distinguish between the person and the object, between the question whether the person fulfilled a commandment and the question whether some result occurred. That is a different discussion. It may be that the child is circumcised but the father has no commandment of circumcision, and it may even be that the child is not circumcised according to this conception. That is more far-reaching.

Anyway, okay, so that was regarding positive commandments. And I said at the end that I wanted to move on and make the same claim regarding prohibitions. Regarding negative commandments, one thing is clear on the level of intent: it’s not relevant. You don’t need intentions in order not to violate a prohibition. When I don’t eat pork, I do not need to intend for Heaven’s sake when I don’t eat pork. And conversely, when I do eat pork, I’m not supposed to intend a transgression in order to be considered a transgressor, although today I’ll qualify that a bit. Yes, I mentioned, I think, that story about the barber shop in Bnei Brak that I walked into. So I mentioned that it was written there on the wall that anyone who is here should have in mind five commandments. One of them was “on that day you shall give him his wages,” “do not delay,” “do not round off the corners of your heads,” and all kinds of things of that sort. A refreshing innovation from the barber—that one has to intend in prohibitions—but there is no such thing. Prohibitions do not require intent according to all views.

What I do want to claim, though, is that prohibitions require belief. Meaning that someone who does not believe—even his prohibitions are not prohibitions. Not only are his commandments not commandments, he also cannot commit transgressions. Not only can he not do commandments, he also cannot commit sins. He is excluded from this whole matter of commandments and transgressions.

Now I’ll say in advance, because I also got many furious responses about this, that I do not mean to say that there is no issue here—that he is basically a gentile, and there is no point at all in his keeping commandments. There is a point. There is a point in bringing him to awareness of his obligation, and then that he keep commandments. There is no point in the commandments as he performs them in his current state. They simply are not commandments. Maybe good deeds, maybe a moral matter, but not a religious matter. On the contrary, I claim that precisely because his commandments and transgressions are not commandments and transgressions, I also do not see him as a criminal. As opposed to a person who is a real transgressor—say someone who violates commandments out of spite, or out of appetite, doesn’t matter—but he violates commandments, then maybe the interpersonal obligations toward him no longer apply, because only someone who acts as one of your people carries the obligations between man and his fellow man, but someone who does not act as one of your people does not carry those obligations. But I am now claiming that if this person is not considered someone who does not act as one of your people—he doesn’t belong in that category, he is completely coerced—meaning his commandments are not commandments and his transgressions are not transgressions, then our obligations toward him remain fully in force.

So this leads to a kind of conclusion that if someone reaches the conclusion that he cannot stand up to his inclination and he is going to commit sins all his life, then it would be better for him to work very hard on himself so as to turn himself into a non-believer. Exactly, right. There is a famous question: someone, say a doctor, who has to work on the Sabbath as a doctor—may he switch with a secular Jew so that the secular person will take another day, which most halakhic decisors say is forbidden? Right, I hope to get to that at the end too. Yes, correct, it definitely has implications for that issue. Fine. For example, a soldier who has duty at the base on the Sabbath—the question is whether it is preferable that secular soldiers be assigned to it and you stay on base? That is the question. Yes.

Okay, so how can we really examine this claim regarding prohibitions? That prohibitions too require belief. Granted, they do not require intent, but they do require belief. So I think you can examine this on a genuinely halakhic level; you don’t need to resort to philosophy and theological writings. And in order to examine this matter I want to touch a bit on the question of liability for a sin-offering in Jewish law. A captured infant, liability for a sin-offering—what exactly, how exactly does this whole thing work? And from there try to examine it.

Our starting point is really that the Torah obligates, at least for certain transgressions—those for which deliberate violation carries karet and stoning—that if they are done unintentionally, their unwitting violation requires a sin-offering. And this basically means that even when a person commits a transgression unintentionally, there is some dimension of transgression here. Say if he does it under coercion, then he is completely exempt. Say if he does it deliberately, then he is liable for the punishment the Torah gives for it. If he did it unintentionally, then he is liable for a sin-offering. That means that in an unwitting act there is a criminal dimension. That is really the point, the fundamental point that needs to be examined. Because in essence—and I’ll already say how it connects to us—the claim would be that even if the person is unintentional, a person who doesn’t believe, he doesn’t know—but still there is some criminal dimension here. Meaning you have to understand how I can still claim what I claimed before.

Wait, a believing person or a non-believing person? What? A believing person? Fine, so then it’s even more surprising. A person who doesn’t believe is also a kind of unintentional offender; he is mistaken in his belief. That one doesn’t know that you have to keep the Sabbath, and this one doesn’t know that there is a Holy One, blessed be He. The question is what the difference is. That is exactly the topic of the captured infant. A kind of coercion. Okay, but that too is coercion. And if I don’t know that you have to keep the Sabbath, isn’t that coercion? What is the difference? If lack of knowledge is coercion, then that too is so—both are lack of knowledge, only one is a broader lack of knowledge.

Why does the very obligation to bring a sin-offering prove that there is a criminal dimension? I’ll give you an example of coercion. Someone who had a seminal emission has a set of corrections to do, even though he has not become a criminal. No, there is no set of corrections to do. Jewish law does not recognize a set of corrections for someone who had a seminal emission. Ah, yes, not corrections—you know, to say some “repair of the covenant” prayer and things like that. Fine, okay, someone impure also has to immerse, there is no prohibition in impurity, but that’s not a correction, it is restoring the previous state. Incidentally, he doesn’t have to immerse—if he wants to be pure, let him immerse.

In any case, the very existence of the sin-offering does not prove that there is a criminal dimension. I didn’t understand. Why not? What is the difference from coercion? A sin-offering doesn’t return you back; it’s not like immersion. In immersion, you were impure, you immersed, you became pure. You’re right, the example isn’t good, but in what way does the very existence of the sin-offering prove that there is a criminal dimension? I didn’t understand. The Torah, Jewish law—when you bring that sin-offering, you repent. So what does that prove? Bringing the sin-offering is part of the process of repentance. What is the difference between unintentional violation and coercion otherwise? That in unintentional violation there is some dimension of guilt. In coercion there is no guilt, so you are not liable for anything, not even a sacrifice. You see that the person’s intention plays some role in the consideration of whether he is a transgressor or not. So if he is unintentional, then of course he is less of a transgressor than if he acted deliberately, but there is still some criminal dimension here.

Now the question is—parallel to negligence? Yes, right, exactly, it is a kind of negligence. Now the question is how to understand this obligation of a sin-offering. Among the later authorities (Acharonim) there is a discussion, though not a very broad one—this is, by the way, a very complicated topic: obligations of sin-offerings and distinctions among sin-offerings, one of the most complicated topics I know. There are several discussions of it among the later authorities, mainly in Afikei Yam, part 2, sections 5 and 6. He is, it seems to me, the only one I saw who really almost put his finger on the point—but in my opinion, still not quite.

He discusses the question of what really obligates the unintentional offender to bring a sin-offering. The accepted view is that the act itself is the transgression. Once you desecrated the Sabbath, that is the transgression. It’s just that if you were coerced, then you are not guilty of the transgression. If you acted unintentionally, then you are a little guilty of the transgression, and since that is so you have to bring a sacrifice. If you acted deliberately, then of course that is punishment for deliberate violation. So basically the act is the transgression, and intention is only a condition in order for you to be liable to a sacrifice. But the fact that you performed the act—that is the transgression. So why isn’t coercion the same? That is exactly the obvious question. So why isn’t coercion the same? Either because the condition still has not been met—the condition is that there be some dimension of guilt in you—but the transgression is the very fact that you did the act. Here the condition is not met.

From this we arrive at one conclusion—and this is a dispute among the later authorities—we arrive at one conclusion that coercion too is essentially a transgressive act, only there is no guilt at all, so you cannot punish for it. In contrast, there is another conception that answers exactly that question, saying that coercion is simply an act not attributed to you. An act that a person performs under coercion is not an act in which he has any part. Think of someone who takes me and throws me onto someone, and that other person dies. So it’s not that I killed him under coercion; it’s not that I killed him at all. It’s that someone used me as an instrument to kill. So here this is not an exemption; it’s not that I have an exemption. I didn’t perform the forbidden act at all. But it’s still a transgression? The act itself is a transgression? The act itself, yes indeed—so those are two possibilities. I raised two possibilities here. In both of them the act still… no, not anyone’s transgression, not mine. It is a negative act, but not mine. Yes, exactly, but not mine, right.

So then what about saving lives? I desecrated the Sabbath to save lives. Lives that one is allowed to save, and I performed the act of desecrating the Sabbath. No, there that’s a big question. The discussion whether it is fully permitted or merely overridden apparently deals with this. “Overridden” means that the transgression remains in place even though not only was it permitted—you were obligated to do it—but there is still some transgression in the background that you had to violate. And “fully permitted” apparently says that there is no transgression here at all. Fine, I think that is a somewhat simplistic formulation, but I’ll leave that for another time.

In any case, yes, so that is the accepted view. The accepted view is that the act is the transgression, except that there are conditions. Meaning, if you are coerced then no condition is met; if you are unintentional then that is enough for a sin-offering. But the basic assumption is that if you desecrated the Sabbath, regardless of intentions, awareness, anything—first of all there is here an act of transgression. The act of transgression is the desecration of the Sabbath.

I think I once brought the Talmud in Nazir: someone who intended to eat pork and it turned out to be lamb. So the Talmud says there that he needs atonement. He intended to eat pork. Not only is he wicked, but he is even unlucky—meaning he wanted to eat pork and couldn’t even manage that; he ate lamb. So what is the status of such a person? The Talmud says he needs atonement. In the accepted conception—I think that is the simple reading of the Talmud—the point is that he did not commit a transgression, because in the end he did not eat pork. It doesn’t matter that the whole criminal dimension in the psychological sense was there, but practically he did not eat pork, so there is no transgression here. Meaning, Jewish law begins to speak to you only once you have performed the act. Now we’ll start seeing what intentions you had, how aware you were. If you didn’t perform the act, there is nothing. Atonement you need—fine, do some atonement before Yom Kippur—but it is not a transgression in the halakhic sense.

There is, however—I’ll just say parenthetically—the Rabbi of Brisk, in his novellae on Nazir in stencil edition, writes there that this is a full transgression, only there is a scriptural decree that one is not punished if there was no act. But the transgression is absolutely a transgression; it is a Torah prohibition, you completely violated a Torah prohibition. Very hard to read the Talmud that way, I think, but that is what he writes.

Anyway, the simple assumption is that the act is the transgression. Yes, when we think about attempted murder—that is basically the same thing as intending to eat pork. I take a rifle, aim at someone, pull the trigger, the firing pin is broken. Fine, so what? In terms of how wicked I am, I am perfectly, elaborately wicked, right? Meaning, I did everything an ordinary murderer does. Except what? There was a malfunction not dependent on me. I’m unlucky. He is coerced. Exactly. So what happens in such a case? He is not a murderer, right? Meaning, in terms of Jewish law, if you didn’t do the act, there is no transgression. So the accepted assumption is that first of all you need the act; now we can discuss what your intentions and awareness were in order to see what you are liable to suffer for that act which you did. But the transgression is the act.

Here it is the result, not the act, in the case of murder. That is called the act, yes, the act is pulling the trigger. So yes, I pulled the trigger. But the question is: according to Jewish law, one who fired and the firing pin was broken did nothing, right? Even though under Israeli law he might sit seven years in prison. Fine, there is attempted murder. But in Jewish law there is no attempted murder; there is murder. In Jewish law the act is the transgression, fine.

Again, he needs atonement; I wouldn’t recommend giving him the haftarah of Jonah, fine. But he is a dangerous person—right, a dangerous person. So lock him behind bars. But punishment in the halakhic sense, capital punishment—no. A religious court also deals with dangerous people who do not deserve formal punishment. A religious court may flog and punish not according to the strict law. No problem. You have to deal with such a person in order to protect yourselves, or perhaps even to punish him in the human-legal sense. But halakhically he is exempt. Meaning, he is not a murderer; he is not a murderer. In principle he would still raise his hands in the priestly blessing if he is a priest. A priest who killed a person does not raise his hands. He would raise his hands halakhically—meaning, he is not a murderer. Not sure I’d want to be under his blessing, but okay.

In any case, the assumption that the act is the transgression raises a major question regarding what is called distinctions among sin-offerings. If, for example, we do the same transgression itself under the same unwitting error—meaning, we forgot that selecting is forbidden on the Sabbath and we did five acts of selecting on that same Sabbath—fine, what happens in that case? Are we liable for five sin-offerings or one? No, one. There is no dispute; one. Yes, at the beginning of the chapter Klal Gadol, and also in tractate Keritot and in various places.

Why? If indeed the act is the transgression, and the intention or the error—the fact that this is not coercion, I mean—that your being unintentional is only a condition, because without your being unintentional you can’t make you liable for the act, but you are liable for the act—I think it should have been five sin-offerings. Because you did five acts, and in all of them the condition of unintentionality was met, right? It was the same error, so what? Still you should be liable for five sin-offerings.

You said the sin-offering is part of repentance. Okay, so what? Then repentance is not about the act, repentance is really about the intention. Fine, so why? Because the transgression is the intention. Good—then you’re backing away from the initial definition. I’ll get to that in a moment. I also want to get there, but I think that then you have already given up on the idea that the act is the transgression.

So apparently there should have been five sin-offerings here. Because he committed five transgressions; all were done unintentionally, not under coercion. The condition that he be unintentional is met. So he should have to give five sin-offerings, but he gives only one.

And here comes in the Afikei Yam that I mentioned earlier. Afikei Yam suggests several possibilities. He says one possibility is that in the laws of a sin-offering, if this was done in one error, then even though there are five transgressions here, the sin-offering for the first one atones for all of them. There is such a rule in the laws of sin-offerings: if you bring one sin-offering and there is no distinction in terms of the errors—that is, it was all done in one error—then one sin-offering atones for everything. A second possibility he says is that if you did not remember in the middle, it is considered one act of selecting and not five acts of selecting. And then indeed there is only one transgression. The transgression is the selecting, but if not—the remembering in the middle divides the actions and turns them into five. If you did not remember in the middle, there is some such rule—not entirely clear why—that it is one action.

And is that a condition in the Talmud? What? Yes, a Mishnah. A Mishnah at the beginning of Klal Gadol. That he has to—not remember in between? Yes. Even if this spreads across several Sabbaths? What? No, several Sabbaths—wait a second, I’ll get to that in a moment. I’m talking about the same Sabbath. How does that fit with the function? Wait, wait, I haven’t said it yet. In a moment after I say it I’ll also try to sort it out. But Afikei Yam doesn’t sort it out. Why? Because he says that as long as the state of mind has not changed, it counts as one sin-offering. So what difference does it make if the days divide? I’ll get to that in a moment. I’ll get to that in a moment.

So those are the two possibilities he raises. He brings Ran in tractate Nedarim 17, where the Ran discusses what happens if someone vowed Naziriteship on the condition that he would eat something—doesn’t matter, eat bread. So he says that for every olive-sized piece the person eats, he incurs yet another Naziriteship. Meaning, he is a Nazirite five times if he ate five olive-sized pieces. For example, if he violated his Naziriteship, became impure or something like that, he would have to bring five sacrifices for five Naziriteships.

And then he explains it—look how he explains it. Notice: this has nothing to do at all with punishment and with a sin-offering. Not related at all. That is the point; that is why this Ran is important. So he says, since he said, “Behold, I am a Nazirite,” one that contains two elements, and so on—he explains the Talmud—and this is its meaning, and it seems to me that this is why we require warning between every olive-sized piece and every olive-sized piece. He has to be warned between each olive-sized piece, that if he eats another olive-sized piece he will once again become a Nazirite. Meaning, if he eats it without being warned in the middle, says the Ran, then it is not several Naziriteships, it is one Naziriteship. Because these eatings are no greater, in creating Naziriteship through them, than they are in creating sacrifice liability and lashes when he swore not to eat this loaf. And just as to incur a sacrifice or lashes we require a division between every olive-sized piece and every olive-sized piece—regarding lashes, through warning; regarding a sacrifice, through two separate lapses of awareness—so too when we count Naziriteships through them, we require warnings that divide.

What did he actually say? He says that clearly he has to be warned between each olive-sized piece, because if he eats them continuously and is not warned in the middle, he is liable only for one Naziriteship, because it is exactly the same thing as liability for punishment—say lashes for eating, if someone vowed then he would be liable for lashes—or a sacrifice for an unwitting act. But why would you need warning at all for Naziriteship? What? You don’t need warning for Naziriteship, but he says—that’s exactly the point, which is why this Ran is an indication for our issue. Strictly speaking, you don’t need warning for Naziriteship. You don’t need warning in order to violate or not violate a vow. You need warning in order to be punished. Here it’s not about punishment; it’s about his becoming a Nazirite, that’s all. It is permitted to become a Nazirite. It is permitted to vow this. Everything is fine. He doesn’t have to receive punishments for that. The whole question is simply how many times he becomes a Nazirite. Correct. And if they didn’t warn him, and didn’t tell him after the first olive-sized piece? One time. He will be a Nazirite one time. That’s what he says. Now why—for the first one you don’t need warning at all? What? For the first one you don’t need warning. What’s the difference?

Okay, so I’ll explain. Sorry? Yes. Sorry, although here this is a bit different from the laws of sin-offerings, because here he says “for every olive-sized piece that I eat.” No, no, he doesn’t say “for every olive-sized piece”; he says “if I eat an olive-sized piece I will be a Nazirite.” “Behold, I am a Nazirite if I eat.” He doesn’t even necessarily say an olive-sized piece; “eating” means an olive-sized amount. Sorry? Yes. Sorry, it’s not clear. Meaning, according to reality, even though people don’t talk this way, a person eats regularly all the time, so all his life he’s a Nazirite because maybe once he didn’t mean it? No—so long as he hasn’t stopped. Once he says, “That’s it, I’m eating today,” or something like that, fine, then clearly at some point we cut it off. But you know what—even if not, then all his life. Fine? He will be a Nazirite for every olive-sized piece he eats. If a person like you or me eats more olive-sized pieces than he has sets of thirty days left in his life, then he won’t manage at all. So what’s the problem? Then he won’t be able to complete all the Naziriteships he incurred—so what’s the problem? I told you, this is technical, fine. So he uttered the vow. Or he said only “for this day,” fine, “if I eat an olive-sized piece on this day,” that would solve the problem. That’s not the point.

How can this model work when in vows we follow common human language? Okay. Here it is so far from common human language, and yet that is entirely the law here. Wait—okay, first I’ll explain what he is comparing, and then we’ll see.

Look, what he is actually saying is this: really, you do not need warnings in order to become a Nazirite. You don’t need warnings in order to violate or not violate a vow. You need warning in order to be punished. Here we are not talking about punishments; we are talking about his becoming a Nazirite, that’s all. It is permitted to become a Nazirite, permitted to vow this; everything is fine. What do warnings have to do with this? The Ran says: it is no different from the warnings required for punishment. Suppose someone eats an olive-sized amount of pork, then he is liable for lashes. If he eats five olive-sized amounts of pork, then if there was no warning between one olive-sized piece and the next, he is liable for lashes only once. If there was warning between one olive-sized piece and the next, then he is liable for lashes for each time he was warned.

No, but here too for the first olive-sized piece you need warning. Right, right—but here you don’t. Wait. Now the same thing with unwitting violation. He says that in cases of error, if someone eats forbidden fat unintentionally, for example, for which one must bring a sin-offering, then he has to remember after every olive-sized amount of forbidden fat that it is forbidden to eat forbidden fat, then forget it again, then once again eat the forbidden fat—or forget that it is forbidden fat, doesn’t matter—but he has to remember and forget each time in order to become liable for sacrifices. So both for lashes and for sacrifices you need division—division for sin-offerings or division for lashes.

And the Ran, for some reason—and I agree with all the questions raised here—but the Ran claims that the same thing applies to this case too, even though it has nothing to do with punishments and nothing to do with anything. Afikei Yam says: from this Ran we see that the warnings required for each olive-sized piece—not talking about the first warning—the warnings required between one olive-sized piece and another, or the remembering required for unwitting violations between one olive-sized piece and another, are intended to divide the acts from each other, to turn them into five acts and not one. So if that is so, then in Naziriteship too, if he performs one act of eating he becomes a Nazirite once. For him to become a Nazirite several times, there have to be several acts.

What do we see? That the remembering in unwitting violation or the warning in deliberate violation functions to divide the acts from each other. Meaning that if, say, instead of warnings he recited Grace after Meals, finished the meal, left, and then ate another olive-sized piece—then theoretically that could also divide. Theoretically, yes, but it won’t. And regarding sin-offerings it doesn’t divide. But yes, you’re right on the conceptual level. Conceptually, if there is something else that divides the cases from one another, that something does not have to be connected to his guilt or to his unwittingness. It does not have to. For example, different dishes divide. If he eats from different dishes—there are disputes, but different dishes divide. Why? Because those are different acts of eating.

So we see that the Ran’s conception is that everything… clearly the liability is liability for the act. The only question is how many acts you did. Were there one act or five acts here? The remembering or warnings between one olive-sized piece and another simply tell us how many transgressive acts you performed. And that is indeed the conclusion of the Afikei Yam. His claim is that according to most views at least—he cites some disputes on this—but according to most views, the act is what creates liability for a sin-offering, and when there are five different acts in the same lapse of awareness, in one unwitting error without remembering in the middle, one is liable only once simply because the acts are considered one act. They are not divided from one another. That’s all.

This leads to many complications in the topic of dragging, for those who know it. Never mind, that too is a very complicated topic in this whole area of sin-offerings. This is not a simple subject. And in my opinion, this is also not the correct explanation of this topic. What do you mean, not correct? Meaning, the Ran probably did learn that way, but it is quite clear from several medieval authorities (Rishonim), from Rashi, from Maimonides, that they did not learn that way. And the explanation is much simpler for the whole topic of sin-offerings, and I think that this is Rashi and Maimonides: the reason is that if you eat five olive-sized amounts in one unwitting lapse of awareness, one lapse of awareness, you are liable for one sin-offering because the sin-offering comes for the unwitting error, not for the act.

The assumption is that in Jewish law the act is the transgression, and the unwittingness—whether you are unwitting or not unwitting—is a condition for whether it is possible to make you liable for that act or not. And why all of a sudden? In an unwitting act, what you were unwitting about, what you did not know—for that you bring the sacrifice. Not that it is a condition. You bring the sacrifice because you desecrated the Sabbath, only there is a condition that you be unwitting. No, no—you bring the sacrifice because you did not know. For that you bring it. Now look, it’s very simple. Once there are five… I ate five olive-sized amounts in one lapse of awareness—why am I liable for one sin-offering? Because I forgot once. The number of forgettings determines the number of sin-offerings. That’s all.

But how does that leave the problem you raised about selecting done across different Sabbaths? No, wait—we’ll see different Sabbaths in a moment. If it’s still one unwitting error? The same here. It really would be that across different Sabbaths, if he did not remember in the middle, I claim he would be liable for one sin-offering. Just one? Yes. Even though most… Rashi writes this on the Mishnah in Sabbath in Klal Gadol, and Tosafot challenges him, but that is exactly the point. I think that is what Rashi says.

Wait, wait, wait. There is something unclear here. A person who did not know something. He only becomes liable if it comes to a transgression. Only if it comes to a transgression does he bring the sacrifice. So what does it matter whether he knew or did not know? Right. If he does not do the act, he does not bring a sacrifice. But usually they understand that the act is the transgression and the unwittingness is a condition. And I say the reverse: the unwittingness is the thing for which he brings the sacrifice; only if it comes to practical expression, if he did the act after that unwittingness, then he is liable for the sacrifice. But only because… But that still constitutes a condition. The transgression itself is the unwittingness, the fact that he did not know.

Yes, but something is missing here. Didn’t you say at the beginning—I asked you why bringing a sin-offering teaches us that there is a criminal dimension, and you said yes. Okay, accepted. If the transgression is the unwittingness, are you also now claiming that unwittingness itself has a criminal dimension? From the fact that I don’t know an obscure law, there is a criminal dimension in that even if I didn’t do anything? Correct. And Nachmanides writes this in the portion of Vayikra—yes, that is a standard explanation. This is not my innovation. It is more or less agreed upon—agreed upon. A transgressor just because you don’t know? Correct. That’s what I’m claiming: the transgression is the forgetting itself. About Nachmanides one could have said no, the act is the transgressive act, only why aren’t you considered coerced? Why do you bring a sacrifice? He says because forgetting contains some criminal dimension. You understand? That is agreed upon; it has nothing to do with what I am saying here. Everyone agrees. I am claiming not only that it has a criminal dimension; that is the transgression for which one brings the sin-offering. Not that it is a condition for bringing it for the act—the opposite. I bring it for the unwittingness. There has to be an act, because without practical expression one does not become liable for a sin-offering, but that is only… the condition. The condition is that there be an act, not that the condition is the unwittingness.

But why? Why shouldn’t he bring a sin-offering without practical expression? For what? For the thought that he didn’t know? Because thoughts are not… First of all, it’s not practical. It’s not practical because what—every time I forget something I’ll bring a sin-offering? You can’t define it. When… how do you know when you forgot, and how many times you forgot? Did you remember or not remember? Every time you do some transgression, that is known. There are people who see it too, or you see it. But at least that, okay?

Now where do I see this? Look, there is a Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter Klal Gadol in tractate Sabbath. Notice—this goes against both sides of the Afikei Yam; I just want to make this clear. The Afikei Yam raises two possibilities. Say I ate five olive-sized amounts of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness. One possibility is that the sin-offering for the first piece of forbidden fat atones for all the pieces of forbidden fat because there is such a rule in the sacrifices of unwitting violation. The second possibility is that the action is considered one action, and therefore only one sin-offering has to be brought. Which derives from that same basic assumption that the act creates liability for the sacrifice—that is, he assumes both possibilities, and proves from the Ran something like one of the two. But his second possibility too assumes that that is indeed the accepted conception.

But if you think about all the laws of the sin-offering through these lenses, you’ll see that everything fits. You don’t need all these pilpulim that the action becomes one action, or that there is some rule in the sin-offering that the sin-offering for the first olive-sized amount atones for all the others if there was no remembering between them. You don’t need to get there. The sin-offering is for the unwittingness, that’s all. The simplest thing in the world. And that is how Rashi explains the Mishnah in the chapter Klal Gadol.

“A great principle was said regarding the Sabbath,” says the Mishnah. “Anyone who forgets the fundamental principle of Sabbath and performs many labors over many Sabbaths is liable for only one sin-offering.” If he did not know at all that there is Sabbath in the Torah, okay, and he did many labors over many Sabbaths, he is liable for one sin-offering. Why? Very simple, of course—because there is only one unwitting error. “One who knows the fundamental principle of Sabbath and performs many labors over many Sabbaths is liable for one sin-offering for each and every Sabbath.” For each and every Sabbath—not for each labor on each Sabbath, but for each Sabbath one sin-offering. It is not clear here what he knew and what he forgot; the Mishnah does not say explicitly. But in the end clause it says it, and from that you can understand the middle clause. “One who knows that it is Sabbath”—meaning that before, the intention was apparently that he did not know that today was Sabbath, right? Because now they begin discussing the case where he… meaning, before, why does he bring several sin-offerings, one for each Sabbath? The unwittingness is unwittingness about Sabbath, not unwittingness about the labors. Meaning he forgot that today is Sabbath, but he knew that on Sabbath all these labors are forbidden. The following Sabbath he again forgot that it was Sabbath, so again he knew all the labors—therefore he brings one sin-offering for each Sabbath. Again, the number of errors, right?

Now: “One who knows that it is Sabbath”—now this is unwittingness about the labors—“and performs many labors over many Sabbaths is liable for each primary category of labor.” Meaning, he knows it is Sabbath and is mistaken about the labors; he is liable for each labor and each labor. For each labor and each labor on each Sabbath, or for each labor and each labor over all the Sabbaths? Surely on all the Sabbaths. Surely on every Sabbath? On every Sabbath? Why? Because that follows a fortiori from the previous case. Why is that a fortiori? There he forgot that today is Sabbath but knows there is Sabbath. Why does he bring one for each? He brings only one, because it is not the same unwittingness—so certainly, because different forgettings of Sabbath are separate. But here he knows it is Sabbath today and only forgot the labors; that is one unwitting error. So the question is whether Sabbath divides.

So Rashi there writes—I’m citing this from Tosafot, who disagrees with him—“The commentator explained: even though he was not informed in the meantime, we say that the intervening days count as awareness to divide, because it is impossible that he did not hear in the meantime that that day had been Sabbath, only that he did not remember the labors.” He is speaking about the middle clause. Meaning that when he forgot that today is Sabbath, he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every Sabbath. Rashi explains why for each and every Sabbath: because in the meantime there were six weekdays. What, does someone not know there is a weekday in between? There is no doubt that in the middle he already understands where he is, and if the following Sabbath he again forgot, that is another forgetting.

Meaning, Rashi tells us in the middle clause that when he forgot that today is Sabbath and this is unwittingness about Sabbath but deliberate regarding labors—if he forgot that today is Sabbath, and the following Sabbath he forgot that today is Sabbath, and he did not remember in the middle—then it would be one sin-offering, right? This is not talking about a case where, say, his days shifted—say he thinks every day is exactly one day off. Rashi says no: if there were such a case, someone walking in the desert and his days got shifted, he would be liable for one sin-offering according to Rashi. That’s the point. And Tosafot attacks him on this, raises all sorts of difficulties, and finally he resolves it—he disagrees with Rashi and says in the end: here too regarding Sabbath, even if he did not hear, the intervening permitted days count as awareness to divide, because it is a scriptural decree that there be observance for each Sabbath. Again he brings in a scriptural decree because something here is not logical, but he says it is a scriptural decree that even though he did not remember on the days between one Sabbath and another, he is therefore liable for two sin-offerings. But Tosafot himself understands that there is some strain here—a scriptural decree and so on. He has difficulties; it doesn’t fit smoothly. Rashi does fit the difficulties. Maimonides follows Rashi here as well, and Maimonides also writes that the number of unwitting errors determines the number of sin-offerings.

And therefore I think the simple explanation in Maimonides and Rashi is that one really brings the sacrifice for the unwitting errors, not for the acts. There has to be practical expression of the unwittingness in order for one to become liable for a sacrifice. So there has to be an act. But the unwittingness… the sacrifice comes for the unwitting errors.

Now let’s return to our issue—this was just background. Let’s return to our issue. What happens in the case of a person who does not believe? He basically falls into the category of an unwitting offender. How many unwitting errors does he have? At most one, right? He doesn’t know at all that there is a Holy One, blessed be He, that there was a revelation at Mount Sinai—or he doesn’t recognize it, whatever. So essentially he has one unwitting error. Right, this is like forgetting the fundamental principle of Sabbath. But why define it as unwitting error? Ah. Now here this is indeed a subtle point. A person who sits and argues with you, and you explain to him that there is and this and that and so on, and he says: I heard you, I don’t accept it, I don’t believe—so what should that be? Is that not unwittingness? And if not, then what? Coercion or deliberate. You immediately take it in both directions. Okay, so I think it is coercion. On the conceptual level. I think this is coercion, and as I told you before, someone who does not believe—for him commandments and transgressions are irrelevant. Commandments require belief. He is fully coerced. He is excluded from this whole matter.

In the Talmud, the distinction is not believer or non-believer. There are many people you meet in… No, so I’ll speak—I said I’ll speak later about types of people. At the moment I’m speaking in a somewhat theoretical way, about a certain archetype, okay? Some person, a non-believer. He does not accept the whole business of Mount Sinai at all, maybe even the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He. Afterward we’ll see the case of the atheist. And this is also an intellectual matter—meaning, if he has some vested interests that maybe… meaning, his judgment when he argues with you, maybe he has some vested interests that affect him. Could be. And maybe not. No, right, right. But maybe that too… meaning, he really hears what you are saying… Fine, let’s leave that discussion for when I get to the types of non-believers. Right now I want to talk about the conceptual framework. Suppose there is someone—Elijah the Prophet comes to me and tells me: this man believes in nothing. Fine? I know that he does not… how am I supposed to relate to him? Afterward we’ll see how we relate to concrete people, real people. Fine?

So with regard to a captured infant, this is how people generally view secular Jews today, although today there is a tremendous resistance to that classification. Unjustly, I think, because it is a very simple classification. What does “captured infant” mean? Someone who grew up in an atmosphere where he has no remote possibility at all of looking at it differently. Meaning, it sounds completely absurd to him. This whole business sounds like nonsense from some strange group of people. So he is a captured infant.

What does that mean, a captured infant? There is a dispute of amoraim in the chapter that follows, in Klal Gadol. Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish say that he is exempt from everything; he does not have to bring any sin-offering. He is coerced. And Rav and Shmuel say that he is liable for a sin-offering, and according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim), a sin-offering for every type of prohibition. Liable for a sin-offering for every type of prohibition. For every type—not every time he violated the prohibition, but for every type. Meaning, he has to bring the number of sin-offerings that exist in the Torah. The number of sin-offerings that exist in the Torah.

The question is how to understand that. So according to Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, it seems to me, the picture is very clear. Meaning, it turns out that the captured infant is really fully coerced. He does not… he does nothing. His transgressions are not transgressions, his commandments are not commandments, he is exempt from a sin-offering—there is nothing. But in Jewish law we rule like Rav and Shmuel. And Rav and Shmuel hold that he does indeed have to bring a sin-offering for every type of transgression. And the assumption is that there are here 613 forgettings, yes? Meaning, every… 613 according to the number of commandments, but not… he has 613, only for some of them one brings a sin-offering. Meaning, he does not know each and every one of the commandments. That is considered multiple ignorances.

And one should remember that when we talk about forgetting the Sabbath and being deliberate about the labors, that is treated as one forgetting. Meaning, he brings one sin-offering for that—I’m talking right now about one Sabbath; let’s leave next Sabbath aside. On one Sabbath, I forgot that today is Sabbath. All the labors I did obligate me for one sin-offering. There is a novelty regarding the Sabbath labors, that they are divided for sin-offerings, even though they all derive from “you shall not do any labor,” one prohibition. So there, even if he did 39 labors on that Sabbath—say if he managed to violate all of them—he still brings only one sin-offering.

But what happens if he eats forbidden fat and blood and desecrates the Sabbath, and he forgot that the Torah was given on some day? Fine? Then he would bring one for each and every prohibition. You have to be careful. Meaning, in principle there is no such thing as forgetting everything. Forgetting everything means forgetting each one of the clauses. That is called forgetting everything. On Sabbath there is, why? Because on Sabbath the 39 labors are all a result of one warning, of one verse, and therefore all the divisions for sin-offerings are the novelty. Once you forgot “you shall not do any labor,” that is one forgetting, not more than one forgetting. Even if it’s Sabbath and a Jewish holiday on the same day? Then it’s two. On a holiday there is no sin-offering, but yes, then it’s two; for a holiday it would be lashes.

In any case, the problem is that halakhically we rule like Rav and Shmuel. And Rav and Shmuel say that a captured infant is not coerced; he is liable for a sin-offering. But notice what follows according to what I said before. I said that he is liable for the sin-offering for what? For not knowing, for the forgetting—not for the act he does. Now suppose you take a person—let’s go back to “do not place a stumbling block,” causing a secular Jew to sin. Fine? Take a secular person who does not know that it is forbidden to drive on the Sabbath, or does not agree that it is forbidden to drive, doesn’t matter—yes, for me that is called not knowing. And you cause him to drive on the Sabbath, you invite him to your house. Fine? Not in order to bring him back to repentance and all the usual excuses. You invite him because you want to talk with him, eat with him, and he’s pleasant company, he’s your friend. Fine? You invite him on the Sabbath and he drives to you on the Sabbath. Have you violated “do not place a stumbling block”? I claim not.

Why not? Because the transgression here is that he didn’t know. I did not cause him not to know. All I caused him to do was another act in which his ignorance appears in the world. So at most I caused him to become liable for a sin-offering. But he was already liable for that sin-offering long ago. Meaning, he had already done these acts regardless of me. So adding one more act under the same unwitting error did nothing. It has no significance. The whole problem is only that he does not know. But there is also the issue of not increasing sin in… But there isn’t. You did not increase sin, because that is not the sin. That’s the point. The sin is not the act. So you have to leave our usual mindset. We’re used to the different mindset in which every act of Sabbath desecration is a sin, and now we have to check whether I am coerced or not. I say no. In the context of unwitting violations, the acts are not what are sinful. What is sinful is the awareness relating to the acts, and of course actual performance—meaning, without actually desecrating the Sabbath, that does not count, it is not enough to incur a sin-offering.

The problem would be if he still had not done an act before that on the basis of the same unwitting error. So I say: if he had not done another act—what do you mean, he was born? You met him at thirteen Friday evening? If he did—if he had not done such an act before, one second. If he had not done such an act before and you are the first one who causes him to do so, then you still have to remember: if you are talking about Sabbath, then in any case, if he forgot the fundamental principle of Sabbath he is liable for one sin-offering; it doesn’t matter whether he did this act or didn’t. The desecration of Sabbath… Here there is the matter of forgetting. He is not liable because of forgetting. A captured infant is liable because of lack of knowledge. Not just lack of knowledge—there is some one guilt that he did not know. Why did he not come to know? Why did he not learn? That is the transgression. Correct. Exactly. That is forgetting—that’s what I call forgetting.

Maybe you are causing him—by inviting him, you are somehow adding that he remain on a path where he will not come to recognition. Why, what? Do you really think that if he stays home—if you have such a strange friend that if he stays home he’ll sit there and bring himself to repentance all by himself instead of driving to you? Fine, but I think that usually that is not the case. Everybody really doesn’t do this, and suddenly this person comes and invites me to do it, so there isn’t something here? If you think—again, I said—if you think that will happen, then maybe there is room to be stringent. It seems to me a very remote concern. Let’s say if you follow the majority you can be calm. Again, if there really is such a person, the same here. That’s why I say: once we get into practical questions we have to discuss each case on its own. At the moment I’m talking about the conceptual aspect.

Yes. If it’s according to what you say about prohibitions, then about prohibitions… then I go and steal lots of animals from many different places. Why is there a double-payment fine on all of them and not only on the first? Because the double payment is for the damage. A fine. It is not punishment on you, it is compensation for the damage. The fine—isn’t the fine compensation? It is… no, payment for damage. Payment, yes, but it is not in the category of a sin-offering for our purposes. It is a payment that is not in the category… About the extra payment. About the extra payment. Meaning, about the extra payment, no—if you steal in one lapse of awareness you won’t be liable for double payment? For all of them, I’d say maybe, I don’t know. Interesting question. There may be room to think about that. Maybe.

What happens with a captured infant in theft? Although the assumption is that in moral commandments the law of captured infant does not apply, because every person understands that one has to be moral. That is the accepted assumption. But I don’t know—if you know someone who happened really to be one of those born, I don’t know… It doesn’t matter if I think it’s not moral. I’m punished for a transgression. The Sages ruled against me for the halakhic transgression. No, but that’s the question: whether you think that the fine in theft is really for the halakhic dimension. If so, then maybe you are indeed right. And maybe for multiple thefts there would be no double-payment liability in one lapse of awareness. But maybe here, since morally it is clearly forbidden to do it, therefore he would be liable for the fine as well.

I’ll tell you more than that. There is a Rashba in tractate Shevuot 18. Rashba says: what happens if someone has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual time? Expected times we rule are rabbinic. Fine? And someone has relations with his wife close to the expected time—that is, on the date when one must be concerned—and she saw blood during the act. Rashba says that he has to bring a sin-offering. Why? He is completely coerced. Meaning, if it happened on another day, a day that is not the expected day, then it is coercion—meaning he would not have to bring a sin-offering, okay? But if it is on the expected day, even though expected times are rabbinic, he has to bring a sin-offering. Why? So Rashba says—it’s in the Talmud, not Rashba; Rashba explains the Talmud there—that since the Sages warned him and told him, look, close to the expected time today it is forbidden for you to have marital relations with your wife, and he violated that warning, he can no longer say that he was coerced regarding the Torah prohibition, even though the warning was a rabbinic warning. So here I say: here there was a moral warning. You can no longer say, look, I didn’t know it was forbidden to steal. At least morally you knew it was forbidden to steal. For us, that is enough for you to be considered deliberate. Fine?

Okay, so now, what does this actually mean? When we look at causing such a person to sin, I think there is no significance to the question whether you add another transgressive act for him, because the act is not the transgression. The forgetting or lack of knowledge is the transgression. And he did not know; he still does not know without me. So even if I caused him the first time to act, I didn’t really cause him to transgress. I caused him the condition to be met that makes him liable for a sin-offering for the transgression. But not the transgression itself. Not to mention if I cause him the second time. If I cause him the second time, then what did I do at all? I did nothing.

So this whole discussion about the transgressions of secular Jews and causing secular Jews to sin needs explanation. Right now I’m saying “secular Jews” because that is a code name for many types of people, and we still need to talk about that. But first of all, on the conceptual level, my claim—and I’ll summarize here and maybe continue next time—my claim is that the same thing we encounter regarding positive commandments we encounter also regarding prohibitions. Meaning, in a place where a person is not aware of his obligation—not aware, does not know, forgot, does not agree, denies, whatever, all kinds of such things, and I will still get into those distinctions—his transgressions have no significance. His transgressions have no significance; his commandments have no significance. We talked about the swamp-drainers and so on, the pioneers, right? And the same goes for all sorts of supposed great transgressors who are seen by us as terrible sinners—they are not transgressors at all. They know nothing, they do not believe in it, they do not think it is true, and therefore they do it. And therefore the whole category of captured infant is a category that does not just speak on the level of punishment. That is what I want to claim. He is not a transgressor with whom we are lenient only on the level of punishment. My claim is that “captured infant” means he is excluded from this whole world of commandments and transgressions.

Isn’t there a question whether if he does the commandment and refrains from doing the transgression that too would be valueless? Is it valueless? Meaning, when he gets to Heaven they’ll say to him: you have one transgression? Right. Right. And someone who keeps commandments they’ll say to him: you have such and such. Right. Because that is indeed true. He really is more of a transgressor. If that other person truly—that was the calculation he made—he reached the conclusion that he does not believe, yes? But about that we’ll talk: maybe he did one commandment before death, and for him that is the Garden of Eden. Next class.

Yes? On the conceptual level, you invited the secular Jew to your house for the Sabbath. You told him not to drive. He got to the house and the Sabbath timer went off. Okay? Now are you allowed to tell him to turn on the Sabbath timer, or must you prevent him from doing it? So about that I intend to speak further on, because for the map to be complete we still need Maimonides at the end of the Laws of Diverse Kinds and in other places. In a situation where you cause someone to commit a transgression—not assisting, as in “do not place a stumbling block,” or not preventing, but actually cause him to do it—it could be that that is your transgression, not his. No, so that’s why I completed it. Do you have to prevent him? I said: we need to distinguish between the different questions you asked, but for that I need a few more things. Next class is important because in the end I want to know the practical outcome—I have friends. I’ve really been torn about this for many years.