חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם

Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 44

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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Table of Contents

  • The beehive topic as a landmark and defining the halakhic problem
  • A square inside a circle and the required size of a round beehive
  • Mathematical approximations, knowledge, and imprecision in the Sages and the medieval authorities (Rishonim)
  • Source from Eruvin: “them and their diagonal” and four cubits in the public domain
  • Area versus dimensions and the question of fitness for use
  • Abaye and Rava: throwing a beehive and the height of the reed edges
  • Use, domain, and object: does it depend on function?
  • Rashi’s approach: 5.6 versus 6, “he was not precise,” and stringency regarding the circle
  • The Rashba’s objections to Rashi
  • The approach of Rabbeinu Chananel and the Rif: six including the walls and calculating the fifths
  • Net versus gross: the height of ten, the roof, and the reed edges
  • Tosafot against Rabbeinu Chananel: adding wall thickness to area and the proof from the rings of a pit
  • The Rashba reconciles Rabbeinu Chananel: a mat does not combine like a thick wall
  • Framework for what follows: two main points for discussion

Summary

General Overview

The text presents the “beehive topic” in tractate Shabbat as a clear case in which a large object is thrown, large enough that it may be viewed as a “domain” and not merely an “object.” This raises the question whether throwing it from a private domain to a public domain incurs liability or exempts one from liability. The explanation relies on the rules for the dimensions of a private domain—four by four and a height of ten—and on how one calculates the required size in the case of a round beehive by means of an inscribed square and its diagonal, using the approximations of the Sages: pi as three and the square root of two as approximately 1.4. Along the way, questions are raised about mathematical precision among the Sages and the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and about the distinction between “net” measurements (the inner space) and “gross” measurements (including walls/margins), as a basis for understanding the dispute between Abaye and Rava and the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about the meaning of the measure “six” and the basis of the exemption.

The beehive topic as a landmark and defining the halakhic problem

The topic is described as a famous passage with a recognized name, similar to the “mustard-seed topic” in Bava Batra, and is presented as a landmark in the world of lomdus, even if there is no need to see it as the most complicated one. The main case is the throwing or carrying out of a large object that can be treated as a kind of domain, and the question is whether such an act counts as carrying out/transporting in a way that incurs liability when it involves moving from a private domain to a public domain, or throwing within the public domain itself.

A square inside a circle and the required size of a round beehive

A private domain is basically defined as a minimum area of four by four and a minimum height of ten, and the question is how this is measured when the cross-section is circular. According to Rashi and all the medieval authorities (Rishonim), one does not require a circular area of 16 square handbreadths. Rather, one requires that it be possible to inscribe within it a square of four by four. The diagonal of a four-by-four square is the diameter required for the circle, and the Talmud assumes that “a cubit and two fifths is its diagonal,” meaning the square root of two is 1.4. Therefore the diagonal is 4×1.4 = 5.6 handbreadths, and that is the diameter the beehive needs in order to contain an inscribed square of four by four.

Mathematical approximations, knowledge, and imprecision in the Sages and the medieval authorities (Rishonim)

The text emphasizes that the Sages use approximations such as pi = 3 and the square root of 2 = 1.4, and raises the question how much of this is intentional approximation as opposed to actual lack of knowledge. An example is brought from the Rashbam in Bava Batra (around folio 102), who equated a 5×5 square with a 4×6 rectangle based on perimeter, and Tosafot responded that the areas differ, while according to the correct calculation it is actually the diagonal of 4×6 that is greater than that of 5×5. From this it is argued that there are places where medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not fully employ mathematical tools such as the Pythagorean theorem, even though the Talmud itself uses principles that correspond to it, and the Talmudic calculations are sometimes described as area-comparisons and cut-and-paste reasoning rather than a systematic application of Greek mathematics.

Source from Eruvin: “them and their diagonal” and four cubits in the public domain

A passage is cited from Eruvin 51a in the name of Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov, according to which “one who carries four cubits in the public domain is not liable until he carries both them and their diagonal,” and it is explained that some approaches understood four cubits to mean, in effect, 5.6—the diagonal of a four-by-four square. The discussion there also cites a clarification by Rav Pappa in the name of Rava concerning a round pillar in the public domain that is ten high and four wide, and the ruling is that “them and their diagonal” is required, so that in a circle one needs a diameter that allows a four-by-four square to fit within it.

Area versus dimensions and the question of fitness for use

The text raises the intuitive possibility of measuring a circle by area—16 square handbreadths—and rejects it in keeping with the tradition of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). It then suggests a functional explanation of “fit for habitation/use,” which prevents a very thin strip from being considered a domain merely because of its cumulative area. It also proposes an alternative conceptual possibility: that Jewish law does not measure “area” as such, but requires that each dimension separately have the significance of four handbreadths, and therefore 2×8 or other irregular shapes do not satisfy the requirement for a private domain even if the total area is similar. The discussion is linked to an earlier question about the height of ten: whether it is a halakhic measure from Sinai or a functional measure, as in the case of a “foul dwelling” in Sukkah 4. From that, it is suggested that four by four too may be understood as a principled measure and not merely a practical usability condition.

Abaye and Rava: throwing a beehive and the height of the reed edges

Abaye states: “If one threw a beehive into the public domain, if it is ten high and not six wide, he is liable; if it is six wide, he is exempt.” The explanation is that when it is not six wide, it is still just an “ordinary object,” and therefore one is liable for carrying out, whereas when it is six wide, it is considered a domain and therefore throwing it exempts one from liability. Rava says: “Even if it is not six wide, he is exempt,” because “it is impossible for the reed edges not to rise above ten,” so the upper part protrudes above ten handbreadths and therefore the placement is not within the area of the public domain. It is suggested that Rava does not necessarily disagree fundamentally with Abaye’s principle of exemption for “throwing a domain,” but adds that in practice there is always an additional technical exemption because of the reed edges, so Abaye’s exemption may be theoretical in practical terms.

Use, domain, and object: does it depend on function?

The question is asked whether every object measuring four by four and ten high is called a private domain even if it is not used for anything, and the answer given is that the definition of a private domain does not depend on actual use or on the identity of the user, but on the structure of the dimensions and the separation from the public domain. The distinctions concerning use that were discussed earlier relate to issues such as public traffic breaking through or definitions in the areas of impurity and Sabbath, and not to the question of what one does inside the internal space.

Rashi’s approach: 5.6 versus 6, “he was not precise,” and stringency regarding the circle

Rashi explains that a Torah-level domain in the case of a circle depends on the possibility of inscribing a four-by-four square, and therefore requires a diameter close to six—that is, 5.6—in accordance with the rule “them and their diagonal.” Rashi interprets Abaye as “not being precise” and saying “six” instead of 5.6, emphasizing that this is an imprecision adopted for stringency in order to separate people from Sabbath violation. Thus, between 5.6 and six there is a rabbinic prohibition, while for purposes of a sin-offering one does not bring one when the diameter is 5.6 and above, because that is like “throwing a domain.” According to Rashi, the upward rounding of the circle is meant as practical guidance for ordinary people making simple measurements, whereas liabilities involving a sacrifice are examined precisely in religious court so as not to bring unconsecrated animals into the Temple courtyard.

The Rashba’s objections to Rashi

The Rashba objects that the language “liable” implies a sin-offering/stoning, and if Abaye “was not precise,” that could lead to a “stringency that results in error,” namely bringing a sacrifice unlawfully. The Rashba also objects that when the Talmud is imprecise, it usually raises the question and answers “he was not precise,” whereas here there is no such note, so it appears that Abaye was precise. The Rashba adds a conceptual difficulty from Rashi’s explanation regarding “exempt but prohibited” and the meaning of the distinction between below six and above six in the framework of the laws of sacrifice and capital punishment.

The approach of Rabbeinu Chananel and the Rif: six including the walls and calculating the fifths

The Rashba cites in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel and the Rif that the measure “six” was said “including the walls,” so that one subtracts a fifth for this wall and a fifth for that wall, leaving an internal space of five handbreadths and three fifths (5.6), enough to inscribe within it a square of four by four. According to this reading, Abaye was precise, and the six is an external measure while the required internal measure is 5.6.

Net versus gross: the height of ten, the roof, and the reed edges

An argument is presented that the height of ten must be measured “gross,” because if it referred to a net interior space, Rava would not need the reed edges in order to argue that the object rises above ten. From this it is argued that in the case of the beehive, its status as a domain may be determined by the roof on which one uses it, similar to the law of a house whose interior does not have ten but whose roof completes it. Therefore one can ask whether width too should be measured gross (including walls), just as height is measured gross. The discussion sharpens the point that these are two different questions: what is required in order to incur liability when one throws an object into the beehive (which depends on net interior space), versus what is required for the beehive itself to be considered a “domain” when it is thrown (which may depend on the roof/gross measurement).

Tosafot against Rabbeinu Chananel: adding wall thickness to area and the proof from the rings of a pit

Tosafot cite Rabbeinu Chananel’s interpretation and reject it, arguing that the thickness of the rings of a pit combines with the interior of the pit to make four, because it is fit for placing something on and using. Therefore, in a beehive too, the thickness of the walls should have to combine toward the measure of width. According to Tosafot, if height is combined on the basis of an embankment of five and a partition of five, then one should also combine in the thickness of the area, and therefore their conclusion returns to Rashi’s interpretation that the “six” is not exact.

The Rashba reconciles Rabbeinu Chananel: a mat does not combine like a thick wall

The Rashba is puzzled by Tosafot’s objection and brings proof from the topic of “a pit ten deep and eight wide,” where throwing in a mat that divides the pit exempts one from liability because “the placing of the mat and the removal of the partition happen simultaneously.” This implies that the thickness of the mat does not combine with the area so as to prevent the “removal of the partition.” The Rashba concludes that one does not combine thickness in every partition, but only in “thick walls” made to cover and be used upon, and not in a mat or a beehive. He suggests that for this reason Abaye mentioned a “mat” rather than a “board,” and a “beehive” rather than a “box or chest,” because these were typically made in a way that did not allow use upon their thickness.

Framework for what follows: two main points for discussion

Two points are defined as requiring further clarification in continued study: the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) over the measure of the beehive and whether “six” is exact or rounded and what is measured including the walls; and the question of the basis for the exemption in throwing a beehive—whether because “one who throws a domain” is exempt, as Rashi maintains, or for other reasons that not all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) accept. The lecture ends with guidance to review Tosafot, Rabbeinu Chananel, and the Rashba in order to follow the stages of the reasoning, and raises the question of how a mat that does not combine with the area nevertheless divides the pit into two parts that are not a private domain.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the beehive topic. As I wrote to you at the beginning, this is a very famous topic. It has a name like that—“the beehive topic.” There are several such topics in the Talmud; just in general, it’s worth knowing the accepted jargon. There are a few well-known topics like this in the Talmud: there’s the mustard-seed topic in Bava Batra, there’s the beehive topic in tractate Shabbat, Chanina the deputy High Priest—there are a few topics like this that have names and are kind of well known. So beehive is one of them. Some claim it’s also among the more complex and difficult ones. I’m not sure about that; I’m not especially impressed in that direction. There is complexity here, but it doesn’t really seem to me to justify special status. Fine, but in any case, that’s just so you know that right now we’re dealing with a piece of history, so to speak. In other words, we’re at some sort of landmark in the world of Talmudic analysis. Okay, so basically we’re dealing with a situation where a person carries out, throws—and later we’ll see whether there’s a difference between those—something large, meaning something that can itself be treated as a kind of domain and not as an object. And then the question comes up whether transferring such an item from place to place, from a private domain to a public domain, or throwing it in the public domain itself, involves the prohibition of carrying out or transporting, and so on. So that’s the background we’re in. Beyond that, there’s also the question of circles and squares here, yes, the problem of squaring the circle. And the rule, as Rashi explains here, is that basically a private domain is supposed to have a minimum area of four by four and a minimum height of ten; we’ve already seen that. What happens when the area is circular? So in principle, one might have said that for a circular area we would want the area to be 16 square handbreadths. Right? Divide by pi—pi is 3 in the Talmud—so let’s say if 4 squared, 4 squared is 16, then r is the square root of 5, okay, 2 and a bit, so square root of 5. So I would have expected that the minimum area of a beehive—yes, of an object with a circular cross-section—in order for it to be a private domain, would need the area of the bottom circle, of its base, to be 16 square handbreadths. But as Rashi explains here, and as all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say, that’s not so. The rule is that there has to be room to inscribe inside it a square of 4 by 4. In other words, it has to be a circle such that inside it there is a square inscribed in that circle, and that inscribed square is four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Now how do you calculate that? So what is the circle? Right, so we draw the diagonal of the square, which is actually the diameter of the circle, right? The diagonal of the inscribed square—I hope this is simple, but let’s just take a quick look.

[Speaker C] I have a Steinsaltz drawing for this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, can you show it here?

[Speaker C] Can you attach it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’ll attach it in just a second.

[Speaker C] Wait, file—

[Speaker B] You need to approve screen sharing.

[Speaker C] Yes, it’s approved, one second. There, I left it in the chat; whoever wants can open it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe if you just share your screen, no? Okay, yes.

[Speaker C] It’s drawing B. That’s the drawing with the square inside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So everyone can see here that what we have is a circle with a square inscribed inside it that is four by four. The diagonal of the square—

[Speaker B] She can rotate the page.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that doesn’t matter. The diagonal of the square—wait, yes—the diagonal of the square is actually the diameter of the circle, right? Now how do we know the length of the diagonal? So if the side is 4, then the diagonal is actually 4 times the square root of 2. The rule in the Talmud is that the square root of 2 is 1.4. More precisely it’s 1.414, but the Talmud assumes—“a cubit and two fifths in the diagonal.” Meaning, if the square is one cubit, then the diagonal is one cubit and two fifths, 1.4 cubits. If it’s four handbreadths, then four times 1.4, which is one and two fifths, gives 5.6, and therefore the diameter really needs to be 5.6 handbreadths. The diameter of the circle, which is also the diagonal of the square. When we now discuss a round beehive, if we look at the circle, we ask ourselves—and now we’ve already forgotten about the square, the square isn’t there. What we have is a beehive, a round beehive, and we know that its diameter has to be 5.6 handbreadths. That’s basically the principle. By the way, in the Talmud pi is 3 and the square root of 2 is 1.4.

[Speaker C] It’s interesting that they didn’t—I’m curious, in measurements, how far did the precision go? After all, you see it here in the Talmud too—how precise they were in measurements—because pi isn’t 3, and they also knew it wasn’t 3.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, the Talmud assumes that pi is 3 in many places.

[Speaker C] So that means they weren’t precise, they weren’t precise in decimals—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From their standpoint.

[Speaker C] In measurements they were precise up to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, we always have to cut it off, right? We always have to cut it off. It’s an irrational number, so it has infinitely many digits after the decimal point. At some point you always draw the line. So the Sages drew the line after one place after the decimal, meaning 1.4. And with pi they stopped even earlier; with pi it was just the integer, just 3. And how much they really knew that or didn’t know that—that’s an interesting question. I’m not at all sure, by the way. There are at least some sages from Caesarea—in the Talmud there are places where it seems pretty clear that they simply didn’t know; they made basic mistakes there. Among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) it’s even clearer: there are places where it isn’t just imprecision but actual lack of knowledge. I’ll give you an example. There’s a passage in Bava Batra, on folio 102 I think, that deals with measuring distances between graves. That matters because if someone walks within four cubits of a grave, and he’s a priest, then he becomes impure—that’s prohibited. So you need to know how to calculate distances between graves to allow passageways, to mark them, and so on. In the course of the calculations there, the Talmud discusses the relation between a 5-by-5 square and a 4-by-6 rectangle. So Rashbam says there that it’s the same thing. It’s the same thing because 4 by 6 and 5 by 5 both have a perimeter of 20, so therefore the diagonal is more or less the same and therefore it’s basically the same thing. That’s what Rashbam claims. And Tosafot comments on him and says, what are you talking about? A 5-by-5 square has an area of 25 and a 4-by-6 rectangle has an area of 24. So obviously the diagonal of the 5-by-5 is larger than that of the 4-by-6. In other words, he claims that Rashbam wasn’t precise; there’s a small correction, and the diagonal of the 5-by-5 is larger. Now what’s the truth? The opposite, right? The diagonal of the 4-by-6 is larger than that of the 5-by-5. One is the square root of 52 and the other is the square root of—

[Speaker C] And they didn’t know the Pythagorean theorem? The fact is that they knew it here. So how did they get to 1.4? That’s the Pythagorean theorem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I—first of all, I’m talking about Tosafot, not the Talmud. That’s something else.

[Speaker C] If the Talmud knew it, then all the more so Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not clear, not clear. The question is also whether—

[Speaker C] But the Pythagorean theorem is something very old.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, the Pythagorean theorem existed, but they didn’t know it; Tosafot didn’t know it.

[Speaker B] I just want to say that already in the first century they had measured the—already knew the size of the earth, including pi. Meaning, this was already known.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A lot of things were—look, it’s clear. Everyone, for example, knows that there’s a fixed ratio between diameter and circumference. Whether they make it 3 or 3.14, but the very fact that the ratio is fixed—that was known. So in that sense they did know that basic datum. The question is how much else they knew there—that’s not simple. Also, when they do the calculations, they don’t do them using the mathematical techniques the Greeks used. Instead, they make these sorts of calculations by comparing areas. You can see this in the Talmud in Sukkah, in the case of a sukkah shaped like a kiln on folio 8 there, and also in Eruvin in a few places. Meaning, they do the calculations themselves; they don’t have the full mathematical knowledge, even knowledge that already existed then.

[Speaker C] They just knew that the length of the diagonal is 1.4 times the side, and they didn’t know that this was calculated from the Pythagorean theorem? That’s all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so. And you can also see it in the way they carry out the calculations: they don’t use mathematical knowledge in a straightforward way. Instead they keep doing little exercises to show what the area is and what the length of each thing is. They do all sorts of exercises, sometimes interesting ones, interesting comparisons, cutting one part and completing areas. The Chazon Ish, in the laws of sanctifying the new moon, for example, derived a logarithm. But he derived it on his own. Meaning, he simply did the calculation. But he didn’t call it a logarithm. What we today call deriving a logarithm. So he didn’t know that, but he did the calculation and did it himself.

[Speaker C] And sages in Spain—there’s no way they didn’t know mathematics.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the Sephardim generally did know; the Ashkenazim were not immersed in the surrounding culture—the French sages and Tosafot. The Sephardim, of course, knew much more, much more. And in the Talmud itself, I don’t know—it’s hard to know. There are also different sages in the Talmud; there are some who do seem to have known, and some who seem to have made mistakes. I’m saying this to draw your attention to the fact that you don’t need to assume they knew everything, even things that were known in their own time, certainly not things that weren’t known in their time. They were wise people, righteous people, everything is fine, but they didn’t know everything. So you have to look at it soberly. Okay, in any case, coming back to our matter: the Talmud’s assumption is that pi is 3 and the square root of 2 is 1.4. Those are the data we work with. Now coming back to us, the diameter of the beehive therefore has to be 5.6 handbreadths. Okay? Now the interesting point in the background here is why that should be so at all. The source of this is a passage in Eruvin that Rashi also mentions. Just one second, I’ll share it. A passage in Eruvin 51a: Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov said, “One who carries four cubits in the public domain is not liable”—I’m just bringing this for your general knowledge—“until he carries both them and their diagonal.” According to Rabbi Acha bar Yaakov, carrying four cubits in the public domain means carrying 5.6 cubits and not four. It has to be the diagonal of a square of four by four. Okay. Now there are disputes about how to rule and whom to follow, it doesn’t matter right now. But know that at least according to some approaches, when we talk about carrying four cubits in the public domain, there are views that say it doesn’t mean four but 5.6. Four is the side of the square, and we’re talking about the diagonal. Some tie this to the cardinal directions: if you walk in the public domain either north or south, east or west, then it’s four. But if you go diagonally, then it has to be 5.6. All kinds of strange approaches there. Doesn’t matter. In any case, that’s just an interesting anecdote. Now to our issue. Rav Pappa said: Rava asked us—yes, Rava said to us—regarding a pillar in the public domain that is ten high and four wide, and of course this means four by four, does it require “them and their diagonal” or not? What does that mean? He says: suppose you have a pillar whose height is ten, but it is round like the beehive, and its width—what does width mean? Diameter—four, fine? Does it require “them and their diagonal” or not? In other words, does it need its width to be four, or at least to be the diagonal of a four-by-four square? And we said to him: isn’t this Rabbi Chananya? As it was taught, Rabbi Chananya says: “So shall be all Sabbath boundaries.” What does that mean? That’s a passage there a bit earlier; not important, I won’t go into the details. Bottom line: the diagonal has to be 5.6, meaning the circle has to be such that a four-by-four square can be inscribed within it. Okay, that is basically the definition of a private domain, and from there Rashi learns here as well. But notice that the interesting point is that nobody here even raises the possibility—and it’s not even in the question Rav Pappa asked Rava—nobody raises the possibility that it should be an area of four by four, meaning an area of 16. Pi r squared equals 16. Right. Nobody raises that possibility. The question is only whether the diameter is four or the diameter is 5.6—that’s the dilemma—and in the conclusion the diameter has to be 5.6. But it’s always clear that the dimensions we are talking about are one-dimensional measurements; they are not area requirements. They are requirements on each dimension. Therefore, in a circle, the question is whether we require the diameter to be four or whether we require—if you have a private domain whose cross-section is circular—then what is required is that the area of the circular base of that cross-section be 16 square handbreadths.

[Speaker C] And that doesn’t work, but I think that if you say that, then you also start getting into more serious problems. What happens when it’s not really circular? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, what happens if it’s two by eight?

[Speaker C] Or let’s go with shapes like that, or an ellipse, or all kinds of shapes like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The rectangle would be two by eight? The rectangle would be two by eight, so that’s fine—16. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] Because we said that a private domain has to contain a place fit for habitation. If I make a strip one centimeter by 16, a very thin strip like that, it also has an internal area of 16, but it isn’t fit for habitation. And so I think they took into account that the four-by-four, the inscribed square inside, allows this to be some minimal place of a private domain. And when it becomes some kind of prism-like thing that even theoretically—maybe theoretically it might even have no area—wait, area is also something theoretical.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if I were talking about use, I very much doubt that the right definition is really according to dimensions rather than area. So tell me: what area does a person need? It’s true that a centimeter by a very long length isn’t usable, but on the other hand, in a circle, why would I need specifically four by four rather than that the area of the circle allow me to use it?

[Speaker C] Because in a circle, if you make an area of four by four, it comes out much smaller than this square whose diagonal is 5.6, because then you would need a much smaller diagonal. Okay. And I think they mean that this assumption of four by four, these partitions of four by four, really does create some enclosure that is a reasonable size for a private domain. And think about it—purely theoretically, a millimeter by 16, I’ve got 16, so what’s the point? If we go by area, then any strip works too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying, I agree that a millimeter by however much is not an area that can be used.

[Speaker C] Therefore they set four by four of a square inscribed inside. Because there has to be something here that relates also to the partitions, not only—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a circle, I’m not sure they define it through the inscribed area. In a circle you do have an area that is usable; it’s circular and a bit smaller—so what? Why is that less usable too? I don’t know. That’s one possibility, what you’re saying. Another possibility I thought of is that perhaps—or at least one should define a private domain here as an area each of whose dimensions has significance. So it’s not a requirement on the significance of the area or on the size of the area. Rather, first, it has to be an area and not one-dimensional, but what is the requirement on the area? That each of its dimensions be significant. And significance is four handbreadths. So the basic requirements for a private domain are not—these are not requirements meant to achieve area. Rather, the requirement is that it be an area, but the measure is a measure on each of the dimensions of the area separately. And therefore two by eight doesn’t work, only four by four. Or a circle, which also has to—

[Speaker C] Maybe this also depends on whether we look at the partitions from the outside. If we look, as we discussed in the previous lecture, at the partitions from the outside, then once it’s relatively large and each side of the inscribed square is four, then someone standing outside has a barrier. Whereas if we round it, then the perimeter here is smaller.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? The barrier is the same barrier; after all, you have to get into the space.

[Speaker C] The barrier is smaller.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with it? But the barrier blocks off the inside space. So relative to the circular interior, the barrier is perfect. What difference does its perimeter make?

[Speaker C] But relative to the outside space—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the outside space is not part of the private domain. The private domain is the circle inside.

[Speaker C] But we said that a private domain—we define it, the partitions of a private domain have two ways of being viewed. Do they prevent the public from entering inside, or are they viewed from the perspective of the individual?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, but I’m claiming that it meets both definitions. If there’s a circle whose diameter is four, or doesn’t matter, whose diameter is such that its area is four, okay? The diameter is four and something, around four and a half. Okay. So its area is 16, okay? Now I surround it with partitions. Someone trying to get in from outside is completely blocked. It’s an excellent partition from the standpoint of what a person outside sees. I don’t see any problem with that definition. That won’t help us here. I’m saying, what you said before—that may be one possibility. One possibility is really that the usable area we are defining here is basically square area, because an area with a circular cross-section that has the same area is less usable—let’s say, for example, the shape of a person is closer to a square or rectangle than to a circle. Maybe, I don’t know, maybe that’s how they saw it. That’s one possibility, though I’m a bit doubtful that that’s the case. But another possibility is to say that there is a definition here of area, but the requirements are requirements on each dimension separately. Each of its two dimensions has to be significant. The difference is that regarding height we already saw that the requirement of a height of ten really is debated. Is a height of ten a measure given from Sinai, simply ten handbreadths, or is it—as we saw in Sukkah, if you remember, with a foul dwelling on folio 4—really a space you can’t actually use because it’s too low? So if I understand the height requirement that way, then there would be room to understand the area requirement that way too: that the area must allow use. If I understand that the requirement of height is just a measure—measures, partitions, and barriers are a law given to Moses at Sinai—not because of functionality but because there is in fact a height of ten, then maybe in area too the requirement is not one of functionality but one of significance. It has to be four by four; that was given from Sinai. So the requirements of four by four are requirements on each dimension separately, and therefore the requirements are not on area but on each of its dimensions. Okay, so that may depend on the discussion we had about height. Fine, I’m continuing. So the Talmud says here: Abaye said, “If one threw a beehive into the public domain, if it is ten high and not six wide, he is liable. If it is six wide, he is exempt.” Right, so we’re talking about a very large vessel, its height, with a circular cross-section of course, is ten handbreadths, and its width, meaning its diameter, is either less than six or more than six. So Abaye says: if it’s less than six, then he is liable. Why is he liable? Because it’s not a domain; it’s still called a vessel, and not a domain. Therefore carrying a vessel out from a private domain to a public domain makes one liable. If it is six wide, then one has carried out a domain and not a vessel, and therefore he is exempt. Rava said: “Even if it is not six wide, he is exempt.” Why? “Because it is impossible for the reed edges not to rise above ten.” So Rava, on the face of it, doesn’t seem to disagree with Abaye on the fundamental point. He also agrees that if someone carries out or throws a domain, he is exempt. Rather, he argues that if a person is holding a beehive that is ten handbreadths high, then the reed edges—the protruding ends—will rise above ten handbreadths. And then when I set the beehive down, its upper part will protrude beyond the area defined as the public domain. So what will happen here is that it’s not true that you placed it in the public domain. Therefore he says that even if it isn’t six wide, if its height is ten, he is exempt because he did not place it in the public domain. But it’s clear from his reasoning that he accepts, on the conceptual level, Abaye’s principle. The principle that there is a difference between throwing a domain and not throwing a domain. He just says: technically, this distinction simply doesn’t come into play, because even if it’s less than six and therefore not called a domain, you’ll have exemption for a different reason. But if there is—yes.

[Speaker C] If I throw a stick that is more than ten handbreadths high, then according to Abaye—so according to Abaye I’m exempt because the stick is higher than ten?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rava.

[Speaker C] According to Rava, sorry, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because it’s not resting in the public domain. Since the upper part of it is outside the public domain, that’s not considered that you placed the whole stick in the public domain. That’s Rava’s assumption. Okay? Up to this point, there is definitely room here to say: what would happen according to Rava if he throws a beehive that is in fact six wide? Then he is exempt. The question is: why is he exempt? There are two reasons. One reason is because its reed edges rise above ten, right? Just like in the case of less than six, same thing. But the question is whether he also has Abaye’s reason. In that case, even if I somehow managed to cut off the reed edges and they did not rise above ten, Rava would still agree that he is exempt because he threw a domain. All that Rava argues with him about is only what happens in a beehive that is less than six, but it’s not that Rava is rejecting Abaye’s principle that if one throws a domain, one is exempt. That’s what appears from the plain meaning of the Talmud, right? And then it turns out that if the beehive is indeed six wide and ten high, then Rava would exempt for two reasons: first, because the reed edges protrude beyond the height of ten, as with the smaller beehive; but second, he also accepts Abaye’s exemption, and then there is exemption for two reasons. Both because he threw a domain—and throwing a domain is not something that incurs liability. Okay? And then what comes out here is that Rava does not disagree with Abaye’s principle that throwing a domain is something for which one is exempt. So when I now begin to discuss—what?

[Speaker B] I have a question. Is every object that is four by ten, four by four and ten high, called a private domain even if it’s not being used? Meaning, the concept of using a private domain is something that I understand maybe came out of an assumption that an individual uses it? No, no. Not as an independent body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, every object, every object whose dimensions are those dimensions is considered a domain. Four by four by ten. Even if it isn’t used? Even if it isn’t used. It has nothing to do with use. Four by four by ten—if it has an internal space of four by four by ten, then it is a domain.

[Speaker B] So here in this case, say this is an actual beehive, meaning the use is not for a person, the use is for bees. Fine? So then what, so also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has nothing to do with use. Again, I’m saying: if you have a vessel whose dimensions make it count as a domain, then it is considered a domain. It doesn’t matter whether I use it or not, or what I use it for. Okay. Now, what we discussed in the previous classes there, about the definition of the public domain and the private domain, that was about the question whether the public passes through it or not, breaks into it or not. That may introduce a dimension of use, and there too we discussed for impurity, for the Sabbath, whether use plays a role or doesn’t play a role. But that’s not the question of what kind of use is made of the space; rather, if the space is separately bounded, if it is cut off from the public domain, then it is a private domain. I don’t care what is done inside it or who does things inside it. Okay, so from here on I’m basically dealing with Abaye’s view, even though in disputes between Abaye and Rava we usually rule like Rava, but from here on I’m going with Abaye’s approach. And as I noted here, on the principled level it seems from the Talmud that Rava also accepts this. Rava just says it’s unnecessary; this exemption has no practical significance, because every case where you would exempt on this basis, I also have another exemption that would apply there, so this is a theoretical exemption. But on the principled level, Rava also accepts it. That is basically what emerges from the Talmud, and therefore everything we say from here on in Abaye’s view is, in principle, also correct in Jewish law, because Rava also accepts it, even if maybe it has no practical use. Okay, that’s the framework of the discussion. Now I want to enter the two main points here that need clarification, and we’ll see that there may also be a connection between them. The first question is the size of the beehive, the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) around that question of the beehive’s size. The second question is: what is the basis of the exemption? When I throw such a beehive, why am I exempt? Rashi already told us—I already introduced Rashi—that he says that throwing means throwing an object; if one throws a domain, one is exempt. Not all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) accept that definition. So that will be the second discussion: what is the basis of the exemption when throwing a beehive? Okay, so our first discussion is the discussion of the beehive’s size. Okay, so Rashi writes as follows: “Ten high”—that is, even if it is ten high, if it is not six wide in the middle, one is liable. Of course, ten high is not a condition for liability; ten high could perhaps even exempt. He says: even ten high—if it is not six wide in the middle, one is liable. Why? “For it is still just an ordinary object, and is not a domain unto itself.” Therefore he is liable for it. “For it is not a Torah-level domain unless it is ten high and four by four wide.” Only then is it called a Torah-level domain, as we say in tractate Eruvin that “all the measurements of the Sabbath require both them and their diagonal.” That’s what we saw before. “And with a round object, when you square it from within,” when you inscribe a square inside it and remove the circle surrounding the square, “you will not find four square handbreadths in it unless its circle is close to six.” If the circle is not close to six—really 5.6, we did the calculation before—then you won’t succeed in inscribing inside it a square of four by four. “As we say regarding a sukkah made like a kiln, that necessarily there must be found within it the diagonal of a four-by-four square, and every handbreadth in its square is a handbreadth and two-fifths, and its diagonal…” So there you have it: five handbreadths and three-fifths. Okay? That is 5.6 handbreadths, three-fifths. And Abaye says—Rashi says—Abaye was not precise. Abaye, after all, spoke of six handbreadths, not 5.6. Why? He should have said 5.6, not six. Rashi says: Abaye was not precise, and he was not precise in order to be stringent. And it’s not so terrible that he was not precise, because Abaye is being imprecise in the direction of stringency. He is not permitting me something forbidden; he is forbidding me something permitted. In such a case, I’m not disturbed by the fact that there is an inaccuracy in the Talmud, says Rashi. And whenever the Talmud makes these kinds of approximations, when fractions are rounded, we always round them stringently. We are never allowed to be lenient. Why? Because then it would come out that we permit someone something that in principle is forbidden. If we round stringently, then at most we forbid someone something that in principle was permitted. That’s not so terrible. But it cannot be that we permit someone something that on the substantive level is forbidden; that cannot be. So Rashi says here there’s no need to get excited about Abaye’s rounding. Why? Because this rounding means stringency and not leniency. Why? How do I know it’s stringency? Because according to Abaye, what should the real law have been? Up to 5.6 I am liable; from 5.6 and up I am exempt. Abaye says: no—up to 5.6 you are liable, and more than that you are still liable all the way up to six. From six and up you are exempt. So Abaye has actually only made things stricter for us, right? He did not make them more lenient. So that’s fine; he didn’t cause us to stumble into prohibition. Therefore it’s okay. But Rashi says it’s not just that he wasn’t precise; rather, the Sages intentionally were not precise—they instituted here a rabbinic prohibition. For the gap between 5.6 and six there is a rabbinic prohibition. That’s what he says: “And he was not precise in the direction of stringency, to separate people from Sabbath prohibition. Even though there is here a diagonal and it is not six wide, he deems it liable rabbinically until there are six.” “But certainly with regard to a sacrifice, one does not bring one if it is five handbreadths and three-fifths, for it is like throwing a domain.” Rashi is saying the following: if the round beehive has a diameter up to 5.6, you are liable. If you threw it from the private domain into the public domain, you are liable—for throwing an object from the private domain into the public domain. If its diameter is between 5.6 and six, what is the law?

[Speaker C] A rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rabbinic prohibition. There will be no sacrifice for it; it’s not a Torah prohibition where, if done unintentionally, one brings a sacrifice. It’s a rabbinic prohibition. What is the purpose of the rabbinic prohibition? So that we don’t get tangled up. So the rabbis tell you: leave it—we draw the line at six, not 5.6, because that’s hard to measure. We draw the line at six and prohibit it to you up to six. True, if you have already violated the prohibition and threw a beehive of 5.8, now when we come to check whether you are liable for a sacrifice, the religious court will come and start measuring, and if it sees that the beehive is 5.8 it will tell you: don’t bring a sacrifice, because that would be ordinary non-sacred matter brought into the Temple courtyard. It cannot be that we obligate you to bring a sacrifice, because that would be a leniency—we would be allowing you to bring a sacrifice that is in fact ordinary non-sacred matter in the courtyard, and it is forbidden to do such a thing. So therefore this is a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah prohibition. So when you ask yourself whether it is permitted or forbidden for you to throw it, you check whether it is six: up to six, forbidden; above six, permitted. That is simple for the average person.

[Speaker C] But it doesn’t say that above six it’s permitted. It says exempt. It doesn’t say that above six it’s permitted. Why? Because it doesn’t say in the Talmud that it’s permitted. So what does it say? It says exempt—meaning exempt but still forbidden. And here too Abaye says “liable”; after all, “liable” in the language of the Talmud means liable to bring a sacrifice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment, we’ll see in a moment. That’s Rashba’s comment. We’ll see in a moment. But right now I’m reading this according to Rashi, and according to Rashi this is what the Talmud says: for the average citizen, what we want is to make life easier. And therefore, from the citizen’s point of view, he needs to know whether it’s forbidden or permitted. Measure six handbreadths, put your handbreadth one next to the other six times—if it’s six handbreadths, that’s fine. Under six handbreadths, forbidden. That’s all, very simple. You don’t get into the question of whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic; you know forbidden or permitted, simple. But when we come to discuss the case after the fact—you’ve already done it, already committed the transgression, and now we are checking whether you are liable for a sacrifice—that is already a discussion in the religious court. It’s not a discussion for the person who has to make split-second decisions in the field. Here we have time, so the religious court will measure it, move handbreadths around, measure and see. If it’s 5.8, they won’t obligate you to bring a sacrifice. If it’s 5.4, yes, they will obligate you to bring one. Here we have the ability to measure; it’s a religious court, they have the tools, they have the time. No problem—here we can be precise. When we come to instruct people what they are supposed to do in practice, we need to give them simple rules. That’s what Rashi is telling us. And then it comes out like this according to Rashi: up to 5.6 is Torah liability. From 5.6 to six is a rabbinic prohibition. From six and up is permitted. That appears to be Rashi’s view. Okay? Now Hani is right in her comment that… in our Talmud it doesn’t actually say that. What it says is that above six one is exempt. It doesn’t say permitted. And we’ve already seen more than once that “exempt” means exempt but forbidden—a rabbinic prohibition. And that is exactly one of Rashba’s comments on Rashi: if above six it says exempt, then that is a rabbinic prohibition; it implies that below six it is a Torah prohibition. Because if below six were also rabbinic, then what sense would it make to say that above six there is a rabbinic prohibition? Below six there is also a rabbinic prohibition. That is one of Rashba’s difficulties with Rashi. In my opinion, what Rashi would answer is the following. What?

[Speaker E] What? Maybe he would say only up to six, not including six. I didn’t understand. Maybe he would say up to six and not including six.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but still, it’s 5.6, not up to six. That doesn’t help. I think what Rashi is saying is as follows. When Abaye said six, he meant 5.6; he just wasn’t precise, that’s all. And what he meant to say was: below 5.6, it is Torah-forbidden; above 5.6, it is rabbinically forbidden. And he said six instead of 5.6 because the average person is not supposed to measure fractions of handbreadths. He measures whole handbreadths. So he tells him six. But in truth the law is that above 5.6 there is a rabbinic prohibition and upward—including above six as well.

[Speaker B] Two-fifths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Rashba understood that when Abaye said six, he really meant six. But if so, then Abaye was precise. Abaye said six and was precise. But Rashi says that Abaye was not precise. Therefore it is clear to me that what Rashi means is that when Abaye said six, he meant 5.6; he just was not precise. But it does not bother him to be imprecise, because it does not cause ordinary people to stumble into transgression. The ordinary person will not commit a prohibition because of Abaye’s inaccuracy. And therefore he has no problem saying it that way. But truly, above 5.6 it is a rabbinic prohibition, not above six. Okay? It’s hard—

[Speaker C] It’s hard to say that about Rashi, because he has to decide whether Abaye was precise or not precise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said: Abaye was not precise. Abaye said that above six there is a rabbinic prohibition. Not correct—above 5.6 there is a rabbinic prohibition. But Abaye rounded 5.6 up to six, that’s all. And what he really meant to say was that from 5.6 and up it is a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker C] In general, do we see discussions in the Talmud about measurements that are fractions of a handbreadth? And not just halves, but fractions like seven-eighths and things like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Yes. There definitely are such discussions. On the contrary—that is exactly what Rashba comments on Rashi: that everywhere the Talmud is not precise, the Talmud asks, after all this is not precise, and answers: it was not precise. But here there is no such comment in the Talmud, and therefore it does not seem that the Talmud here is really being imprecise. In other words, we see that in other places there is indeed discussion of this imprecision. Anyway, so that is Rashi. So Rashi has told us two things here. First, that the basis of the exemption is whether this thing is considered a domain or whether it is considered an object that is not a domain—a small object. But we’ll talk about that later. At the moment what interests us more is Rashi’s second statement: that the measure established by Abaye is not precise. In fact, he means 5.6 and not six. Rashba is astonished by that. Tosafot already brought the view of Rabbenu Chananel, but I told you to look in Rashba because Rashba gives reasons; he explains the matter as well. So he says as follows: “If it is six wide, he is exempt.” Meaning, because one can square within it a four-by-four. “And it is difficult for you: why do I need six? Five and three-fifths should suffice! For every handbreadth in the square has a handbreadth and two-fifths in its diagonal.” So it comes out to eight-fifths, which are one handbreadth… This is Rashi in short. “But this is not clear.” Rashba continues and objects to Rashi: “For it says, if it is not six wide he is liable.” And “liable” implies that if done unintentionally, a sin-offering, and if done intentionally with warning, stoning. “And on the contrary, this stringency can lead to a problem.”

[Speaker C] Why? Why does it lead to a problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That he will bring a sacrifice.

[Speaker C] Ah, that he will bring a sacrifice he doesn’t need.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. If it’s 5.8, after all, he will bring a sacrifice. Because Abaye tells us that from six it’s a rabbinic prohibition, implying that up to six it’s a Torah prohibition. But according to Rashi, that’s not true. Between 5.6 and six it’s a rabbinic prohibition. So if someone carried out with 5.8, he will now bring a sacrifice to the Temple. A stringency that leads to a mishap—and then he is bringing ordinary non-sacred matter into the courtyard. So I explained earlier that this is not correct. What would Rashi answer to that?

[Speaker B] No, I understood it the opposite way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He—when he comes to decide whether he owes a sacrifice, he will already consult a religious court, and the religious court will update him that at 5.8 there is no sacrifice obligation. Abaye’s instruction is guidance for the layman in the street, who asks himself: am I allowed or forbidden? But when we get to sacrifice and the Temple, there there are already religious courts and priests, and they’ll handle it, no problem; they are experts. There I don’t need to cut corners; there one can make an exact calculation. Yael?

[Speaker B] Yes. No, I’m saying, in learning I didn’t understand it that way; I understood exactly the opposite. Like—not to allow him to make a mistake lest he come to a sacrifice. Meaning, not to make a mistake in the measurements. What you’re saying now is the opposite, like protecting him from a mishap. I thought…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rashba is asking that according to Rashi, Abaye’s words are not a stringency; they can lead to a problematic leniency. That is what Rashba is asking. Why? Because a person can end up bringing a sacrifice when in fact he does not owe any sacrifice at all. Bringing a sacrifice that is not required into the courtyard is forbidden. So Abaye’s confusion is a confusion that can lead to problems. Yes. And that is not “playing it safe.” Rashi says no problem—what’s the problem if Abaye is a little imprecise? That is playing it safe; nothing problematic will come from it. At worst he forbids me something permitted. That’s not a problem. Rashba says: what do you mean? He is permitting me something forbidden—bringing a sacrifice even though I’m not obligated in it at all—that leads to a problem. I already said that this is not correct. Rashi says the religious court doesn’t need help; the religious court knows how to do calculations. It is the person in the street whom we need to help. Therefore it’s not so terrible. And Rashba asks further: “For we are not permitting this ab initio, even if it is six wide, where he is exempt but it is still forbidden, and if so, when we say exempt, we mean to exempt him from death and sacrifice; and when it is not six wide he is liable to death and sacrifice.” That is the difficulty I raised earlier. After all, above six it is a rabbinic prohibition; that implies that below six it is a Torah prohibition. Because according to Rashi, below six is also only a rabbinic prohibition. So why is Abaye telling me that above six there is a rabbinic prohibition? Again, I already answered that earlier according to Rashi. In my view, it’s not difficult at all. And a third question: wherever the measure is inexact—everywhere in the Talmud where there is some measure that is not precise—the Talmud challenges it and explains it. The Talmud notes that it isn’t precise and answers “it was not precise.” But here Rashi says “it was not precise,” while the Talmud itself did not feel there was any issue here that needed handling. Rashba says this is an indication that apparently Abaye’s measure is in fact an exact one. Because if it were not exact, the Talmud would have had to note it and then say that Abaye was not precise. And the Talmud notes nothing. Okay? Therefore Rashba says: “And Rabbenu Chananel and Rabbenu Alfasi”—the Rif—“explained that when he says six wide, he means including the walls.” That when Abaye says here that it is six wide, six does not mean only the cavity, but the cavity plus the wall thickness. “And remove a fifth”—take away a fifth for this wall and a fifth for that wall, and there remain five handbreadths and three-fifths in its cavity, enough to square within the cavity a four-by-four. What are they saying? There is basically a round beehive. Its external diameter is six. But the wall thickness is one-fifth of a handbreadth for each wall. Two walls—take a diameter, so there is a wall at the beginning and a wall at the end, wall thickness and wall thickness. Remove two fifths, and what remains? Five handbreadths and three-fifths—5.6 handbreadths. Right? That is exactly the cavity we are talking about. Therefore, no—Rashi is not right that Abaye was not precise. Abaye was exactly precise. And the six handbreadths he spoke of is indeed a beehive of six handbreadths, only the cavity inside it comes out to exactly 5.6, which is what is needed. Because the walls do not count. Therefore he spoke about six and not 5.6. What does Rashi say about this? According to Rashi, are the walls taken into account or not? Rashi does not take wall thickness into account at all, right? Why? Because you need the area of the…

[Speaker C] The inside area. It’s net, not gross, according to Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So when Rashi speaks about 5.6 or about six, he’s talking about the cavity of the beehive, not its gross external dimensions. Therefore the gross size doesn’t interest him. It is basically the cavity of the beehive—whether it is 5.6 or six or rabbinic or Torah-level, everything we discussed in Rashi earlier. In all of these things, Rashi is not talking at all about the size of the beehive; he is talking about the size of the beehive’s internal cavity. Right? That is what has to come out. Agreed? Yes, yes. Because otherwise—otherwise what was Rashi saying there? What does Rashi want? Then Rabbenu Chananel and the Rif are right. So first of all, this is not precise. Why?

[Speaker B] But wait, there is always a discussion about what the wall thickness is and whether we add it or don’t add it, so why here really does he not take it into account?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m saying: when you speak here about a beehive of six handbreadths, if you had asked me simply without all the medieval authorities (Rishonim), I would have said that the beehive’s overall size, its gross size, is six handbreadths. It is an object of six handbreadths. Right? But in light of this comment of Rabbenu Chananel and the Rif, it appears that Rashi is not talking about that. Rashi is talking about the size of the internal cavity of the beehive. When we say “a beehive of six,” the meaning is a beehive whose internal cavity is six. Which is already really strange. You are not precise about the internal cavity—in other words, you deal only with the internal cavity without the wall, and there you do insist on being precise, but once you’re dealing with the internal cavity, then you say something inexact. So either be precise or don’t be precise.

[Speaker F] Could there generally be—what is that comment in the Talmud there, or of Rava, about the rims? It’s clear he’s talking about the external measure and not the internal one.

[Speaker B] Not Rashi—that’s not Rashi.

[Speaker F] No, what is being discussed in the Talmud—external or internal? If Rashi thinks that in the Talmud it is talking about the internal one, then why take into account at all what is outside, those rims that stick up above ten?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But with height it’s obvious that this has to be above, and we’ll soon see why—because there is a private domain above the beehive, not inside it.

[Speaker F] Fine, if we distinguish between height and width, then that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case you have to make that distinction here. Why? Because the measure of height, ten handbreadths, in Rashi is certainly a gross measure.

[Speaker F] So in my opinion it’s not clear what Rashi means—inside or outside. It could be that he means—and I’ll tell you why, I’ll tell you the logic—there is a difference when we talk about a private domain, about an object that is a private domain as something that contains something inside, or as something we throw from the outside, where we look at it from the outside. Right? Here it has, so to speak, two roles. It could be that as to its dimensions at the moment of throwing, we relate to the external dimensions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it is not a private domain in terms of what one places inside it, then when one throws it as well, one is not throwing a domain. What do you mean?

[Speaker F] So perhaps the perspective can change when…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interesting, but the logic of Rashi is that if this thing is a private domain regarding the fact that if I place things into it I would be liable, then taking it itself and carrying it out makes me exempt. But everything begins with the question whether it is a private domain in itself.

[Speaker C] But it has two ways of being a private domain. One is in terms of itself, inside, and then you need a net height of ten. But there is also another possibility that it is a private domain: inside it is a karmelit, while above it there is a private domain. Those are two different possibilities. Therefore you can’t immediately say that according to Rashi it’s net or gross.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said—so let’s do the calculation and let’s see the two possibilities; that’s what I’ve started doing now. With height, it is obvious that Rashi is talking about the gross measure. Even though in principle we could have said no, that the height measure of ten also refers to the cavity inside the beehive. How do I know this? Because if Rashi were talking about the net measure, about the cavity, then Nechama is right when she says: then why should I care about Rava’s rims? Even without Rava’s rims, the thickness of the beehive itself already exceeds ten handbreadths; there is no need to get to the rims. Right? Rava, in order to disagree with Abaye, needed these protrusions, the rims. If Abaye is talking only about a cavity of ten handbreadths, then when I place this beehive in the public domain, the thickness of its roof already extends above ten handbreadths even without rims; there is no need to get to the rims.

[Speaker C] But that’s not Rashi—that’s from the Talmud itself; it has nothing to do with Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but Rashi is bound by the Talmud. Rashi explains the Talmud—what do you mean?

[Speaker C] No, but anyone can explain it that way; it’s not specifically Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking how Rashi explains the Talmud. How does Rashi explain the Talmud? Rashi comes to explain the Talmud. How does he read the Talmud? In the Talmud, is ten handbreadths talking about a net cavity? That cannot be. You can’t explain the Talmud that way. Therefore Rashi too knows that in the height measure, ten handbreadths is gross, not net. That is clear. Now I’m only asking: what about the area measure, the width and depth, four by four? Is that a net measure or a gross measure? So at first glance it seems that it is a net measure. Right? Although in height it is a gross measure, in the cavity it is a net measure. And then indeed I ask: what about the wall thickness? The wall thickness doesn’t matter because… for defining the domain as a private domain, the wall thickness is irrelevant. But that is a bit difficult to say, because on top of the beehive it is a private domain, right?

[Speaker B] Yes, but we said that if the roof joins—in one of the classes we said that if I have nine handbreadths and the roof adds another handbreadth, then it makes the roof into a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what I’m saying—that…

[Speaker B] Wait, but okay, then maybe as far as height is concerned, according to Rashi that’s fine—the roof joins. But in order for it to be a private domain in a way that creates liability, I need my inner framework, from inside, to be a private domain. It’s only a private domain if I have four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that can’t be. I explained earlier why that can’t be. Because if it were so, then the measure of ten handbreadths in height would have to be net.

[Speaker E] And wait, why?

[Speaker B] But that was the previous case we discussed—meaning, I have four by four and a height of nine. Right. So I take the roof as completing it. But I, from inside, see the four by four as a cavity enclosing me. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I see from inside doesn’t matter; what matters is what happens outside. But ten—yet the cavity enclosing you does not have a height of ten.

[Speaker E] But specifically in the law of hollowing out, we saw that Rashi looks from the outside, while Rabbenu Chananel specifically required a cavity of ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that doesn’t matter, because that is regarding the roof. But that is an explicit law in the Talmud. Inside the cavity it is a karmelit; it is not a private domain if there is no net height of ten. Yes. The whole question is only why. According to Rashi it is because there are no partitions, because he views it inwardly; and according to Rabbenu Chananel it is from the outside, so only because it is an unfit dwelling. That is just the dispute. But it is clear that it is a karmelit and not a private domain.

[Speaker C] But in the discussion itself, everyone agrees with the 5.6—can you say that everyone agrees that the 5.6 has to be net? The whole question here is whether in the Talmudic discussion, when Abaye says six, he means six net or gross. But seemingly everyone agrees that in order for it to be four by four, the diagonal has to be a net 5.6.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m claiming not.

[Speaker C] Why? How do you show that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m trying—I’m trying now to show that. So I say as follows: since the height measure of ten handbreadths is certainly gross, right? It has to be; that is forced by the Talmud. So now I ask: then how will Rashi explain that this thing is a private domain according to Abaye? Because on the roof it is a private domain, right? Not because the cavity is a private domain, but because on the roof it is a private domain. Right?

[Speaker B] So does he have “the wall extends upward”? I don’t know, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either “the wall extends upward” or without “the wall extends upward”—we discussed that—but it doesn’t matter. The roof is a private domain. Yes. Meaning that what defines this beehive as a private domain is not the cavity at all. It is the roof. But if the roof defines it as a private domain, then the wall thickness definitely is taken into account. Because from the point of view of the roof—think about the roof—I’m looking at the area of the underside of the roof. When I stand on the roof, what is the floor area on which I stand? And there, obviously, it’s not just the net cavity; the wall thickness also enters in, right?

[Speaker B] Wait, I want to say something here. In the picture Hani showed us from Steinsaltz, the beehive is built like a rounded cone.

[Speaker C] Steinsaltz does not draw a cone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a cone, it’s a cylinder.

[Speaker B] So she showed us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a cone, it’s a cylinder.

[Speaker B] In Steinsaltz he draws it as a cone, okay.

[Speaker C] In Steinsaltz he draws it as a cone, but you can also think of it as a cylinder.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A cone? What do you mean, a cone? Strange. No, I haven’t seen such a thing.

[Speaker B] That’s why the discussion is like this—we’re a little…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s a cylinder, a cylinder.

[Speaker B] Forget the cone, don’t confuse things. Yes. But in fact Rashi too, it seems to me, says: if in the middle it has ten, if in its middle it has ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I don’t know what Steinsaltz is doing; we’re talking about a cylinder.

[Speaker B] No, and I’m saying now in Rashi at the beginning, or in the Talmud—in the Talmud itself—Abaye says that if in the middle it has ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “in the middle” mean? It’s a cylinder.

[Speaker B] What is the center of the circle?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s a cylinder. A cylinder. It has ten throughout. There is no difference between its middle and not its middle—it’s a cylinder.

[Speaker B] But didn’t we have there “in the middle”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does it say “in the middle”? It doesn’t say “in the middle.”

[Speaker B] “Its middle,” “its middle,” I think in Abaye in the Talmud itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s see. I don’t remember such a thing. “Ten high”—it doesn’t say “its middle” and nothing of the sort. There: “ten high and not wide.” High. That’s it. It’s a cylinder. It’s not…

[Speaker E] But a beehive is not a regular structure; the roof and the walls are secondary to the cavity. I mean, in a beehive it’s not like the structure of a house, and perhaps there the walls and roof are secondary to the cavity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing is secondary, nothing is secondary. On the roof there is a private domain, right? On the roof there is a private domain. Therefore the beehive is called a private domain not because of its cavity, but because of its roof. And I proved that from the height measure—it must be that way. Because regarding the height measure—again, let’s do it step by step, look at the calculation. I’m dwelling on this because afterward we’ll use these points, so I want to do it step by step. According to Rashi, the height measure is gross. Do we agree so far? That’s clear from the Talmud.

[Speaker B] Height measure gross, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise Rava would not have had to get to the rims; no need to get to the rims. The measure is a gross measure. So I ask: in that gross measure, in the cavity itself there aren’t ten if the measure is gross, right? So why is the beehive considered a private domain? Inside it is a karmelit, not a private domain. Because on the roof there is a private domain. Right.

[Speaker C] But if on the roof there is a private domain, then why if it is ten high is he liable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second. And then, if it is ten high, because the roof above it makes it called a private domain, when I throw the beehive I have in effect thrown a domain and not an object, and therefore I am exempt. But why am I liable?

[Speaker C] It says in the Talmud—Abaye says that if it is ten high, he is liable. Meaning that it is not a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If it is ten high and six wide, he is exempt. If it is ten high and less than six wide, he is liable. Right? Because if it is less than six wide, it doesn’t have the area of a private domain, so the roof is not a private domain. We are talking about a case where the beehive is six wide, where it is indeed a domain. That’s the interesting case for us. The ordinary case where there is no six is just ordinary transfer from one domain to another. We are talking about the case where there is six, and then we are carrying out a domain and not an object. That is the discussion in the passage. So now let’s look at that case. In that case, again, first step in the calculation: the height measure, even according to Rashi, is gross, not net. It has to be. That is the move of the Talmud. Because otherwise Rava need not get to the rims, right? If the measure is gross, then the cavity is a karmelit, not a private domain. So why according to Rashi is one exempt when carrying out such a beehive? Why is this called a domain according to Rashi? Because on the roof it is a private domain, not because of the cavity. The cavity is a karmelit, an exempt area. On the roof it is a private domain. Right? But if the roof is what determines whether the beehive is a private domain, then when I look at the area of the beehive, the determining area is not the cavity area but the roof area. What’s the difference? That on the roof, one also takes into account the wall thickness, right? The roof area includes the wall thickness too, not only the cavity area. Do you agree? Yes. So if that is so, then according to Rashi, when Rashi speaks about six or 5.6 and all the other things, he is talking about the gross measure and not the net measure. Do you understand my proof?

[Speaker C] He’s talking about gross with regard to the roof, but with regard to the cavity even Rashi would agree that you need a net 5.6.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no.

[Speaker C] Independently of the roof, how does Rashi define a private domain in the cavity? Does he require a net 5.6, or does that also include—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is certainly true, certainly true, but that is not our topic. Our topic is the beehive.

[Speaker B] But—

[Speaker C] For the private domain, the inside of the beehive—how is it defined as a private domain? It needs a net height of ten and a net width of 5.6. Therefore Rashi too agrees about net; only—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that in our case—

[Speaker C] —he is referring to the roof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is completely true, but it is not related to the passage. Because our passage is dealing with the question of what happens when I carry out the beehive itself from the private domain to the public domain. And now I ask: when is this beehive called a private domain for that purpose? And if the definition of the beehive for that purpose as a private domain is determined by the status of its roof, and not by the status of its cavity, then the thickness of the beehive also has to be determined by the thickness relevant to the roof, and not by the thickness relevant to the cavity. I have a—

[Speaker B] I have a thought, just as a summary. Meaning, basically, once I throw the beehive into the public domain, it occupies a space of ten by six; I don’t care what happens inside. From the point of view of the public domain, it takes away from it… that’s not enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What it takes away from the public domain is not what interests me. I ask whether it itself counts as a domain, a private domain. Not what it takes from the public domain, but whether it itself counts as a private domain. Now I’m saying: ostensibly if it had been from the body itself…

[Speaker B] What if I had a huge cube, if I had a huge box ten high and four by four and I threw it into the public domain—it’s sealed—is it not considered a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not considered one; only its roof is.

[Speaker B] Ah, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the point. What I proved from here is that the cavity is in fact not relevant here at all.

[Speaker B] Not relevant, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if what determines the status of the beehive—when it is called a domain—is only its roof, and from the point of view of the height measure this is apparently proven, then the width measure too has to be stated about the roof and not about the cavity. And if that is so, then when Rashi talks about 5.6 or about six, he is talking about the gross measure, not the net one. Because that is what determines the roof area, right? What determines the roof area is not only the cavity but also the thickness of the walls themselves. All that is under the roof.

[Speaker B] Do we always determine the domain by the roof in the case of a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or only in this case? That is what I have proven. I don’t know—I have now proven that yes. It’s not a given that I came with from home; I am thinking now in light of what I find in the passage. So I say: I do the calculation in the passage, and in the passage it turns out that what determines the status of the beehive is the area of its roof. The height of the roof and the area of the roof, right? But for the roof area, what matters is not the cavity area inside but the cavity plus the wall thickness, because that is what determines the roof area. So if that is so, when Rashi spoke about six or about 5.6, he was speaking about the gross area, not the net one.

[Speaker B] But there is no 5.6 in gross. What? Meaning, there isn’t, if it’s four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is, there is. I’m claiming: what happens in a beehive whose gross measure is 5.6 and whose net measure is 5.2?

[Speaker B] That means that inside it is less than four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He will be exempt. He will be exempt, because it is a private domain by virtue of its roof.

[Speaker B] By virtue of the roof, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine—that’s the claim. I’m saying in the calculation; I’m not bringing prior knowledge from home. I’m looking at the passage and calculating what has to come out, and apparently that is what has to come out.

[Speaker E] But according to the opening of the class, that it has to be an area that allows a person to exist there—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] Didn’t we say that?

[Speaker E] At the opening of the class we said that a domain is set by an area in which a person can be,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also—

[Speaker E] so it needs a cavity of four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—on the roof. There is four by four on the roof; the person sits on the roof, so he can use the area of four by four. We are not talking about a person inside the beehive, but about a person sitting on the roof of the beehive. Do you understand the calculation? Yes. So in the end it comes out that Rashi—all his talk with the six and the 5.6—is really about the gross measure, not the net measure, in our passage. Hani is right that if I had a different question, not our discussion—there is a beehive lying somewhere in the public domain, fine? And now I take an object from the public domain and throw it into the beehive—what size must the beehive be for me to be liable? There Hani is right that according to Rashi it has to be 5.6 by ten net. I agree. But for the question of when I take the beehive itself and carry it out into the public domain, there the measurements are all gross, because what determines it is the status of the beehive’s roof and not the beehive’s cavity. Okay?

[Speaker B] Yes. Fine, let’s go with that.

[Speaker C] We have no choice, you mean.

[Speaker B] Yes. No, it’s a different way of thinking; let’s see whether it leads us somewhere interesting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the calculation in the passage; I’m not trying—

[Speaker B] —to pull a calculation from home, I’m—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —just trying to think through the data.

[Speaker B] But we wouldn’t have reached this by ourselves in class. That’s why there is a class.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now Rashba asks—“And if you say…” Yes, he brought the view of Rabbenu Chananel and the Rif, who disagree with Rashi, and he argues that Abaye was precise. And Abaye basically says that there is six width here, but this is width including the walls, okay? And because the thickness of each wall is one-fifth of a handbreadth, the net measure is exactly 5.6. This now becomes really strange.

[Speaker E] So that’s a sign that here he does care about the cavity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That is why I did the calculation in Rashi, because now we return to Rabbenu Chananel and the Rif. Now how will they learn it? That is really not clear. They are basically claiming that he was precise, that it must be 5.6 net, which is six gross, okay? Why must it be 5.6 net?

[Speaker E] Because what determines it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the cavity. So ostensibly—and what about the height measure?

[Speaker E] Apparently the height too is ten from the inside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the height too is ten from the inside, then why does Rava need to get to the rims? The thickness of the roof already exceeds ten handbreadths; there is no need to get to the rims. Right. The whole calculation I just made in Rashi turns back against us in Rabbenu Chananel and the Rif. Rashba says: “And if you say: if so, then the ten-high that they said also means including the thickness of the rims, just as the wall thickness is included in the six, so too the thickness of the rims is included in the ten; and if so, how is it a private domain?” Right? So how is it a private domain?

[Speaker B] It can’t be, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re telling me that the ten handbreadths is net? It’s gross, sorry. So then how is it a private domain? “It can be said,” says the Rashba, “that it is like a house that does not have ten inside it, but its roof completes it to ten, in that on top of its roof one may use the whole area, and like a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition, which combine.” But then what comes out is that the measure of the ten is a gross measure, and it’s still considered a private domain because of what happens above. But then I go back and ask: so why do you need the width to be six gross? Gross should be enough at 5.6. Are you with me?

[Speaker B] Yes, we think so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, gross it should be enough for the gross measurement to be 5.6, because that gives an area of four by four on top, on the roof. And if the roof is what determines it, then what’s the problem? So whichever way you look at it, Rabbeinu Hananel and the Rif get tangled up here.

[Speaker B] Wait, but according to the diagram, according to the diagram, my net measurement really is 5.6, and I don’t actually need the six. Wait, let’s think out loud.

[Speaker C] Maybe the answer will be—

[Speaker E] That you need it both in the cavity and on the roof.

[Speaker C] So the answer would be that the walls of the hive are too thin, and then you can’t count them—that would be the answer. What? Or maybe they just weren’t exact. The answer would be that not all the walls combine for the roof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. That’s a question—we’ll soon see.

[Speaker B] Let me continue the Rashba for a moment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “But our French masters found this difficult, because now we should combine the thickness of the walls to the width of four by four, since one could place something on it and use it.” Here he asks on Rabbeinu Hananel and the Rif what Tosafot asks, only he spells it out more.

[Speaker B] What did Tosafot ask? The French ones are Rabbeinu Hananel and the Rif?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The French ones are Tosafot.

[Speaker B] That’s Tosafot, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot themselves also bring Rabbeinu Hananel’s interpretation. Let’s read it—let’s do this in order. Look at Tosafot. “If it is six wide, he is exempt”: Rabbeinu Hananel explained that it specifically says six, not imprecisely like Rashi, but exactly, because the walls of the hive have two-fifths, and there must be four handbreadths of airspace inside the hive, and a height of ten, even though the airspace is not ten high except with the rims joining with the airspace regarding height, for the halakhah is that a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition combine.

[Speaker E] Meaning, in width the walls do not combine, but in height the roof does combine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and that is essentially Rabbeinu Hananel’s interpretation.

[Speaker B] Got it.

[Speaker E] What matters is the net, the cavity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says—that’s what Tosafot claims in the name of Rabbeinu Hananel—that the two fifths of thickness do not combine with the cavity, and therefore it needs to be six, because the net has to be 5.6. But in height it does combine, because a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition combine. Notice that the wording here is “a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition,” but he does not talk about use on the roof.

[Speaker B] Right. He doesn’t say that, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Compare, for example, to what the Rashba says: “It can be said that it is like a house that does not have ten inside it, but its roof completes it to ten, so that on its roof one may use the entire area,” with the case of a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition combining. In the Rashba it doesn’t say that one may use the entire roof. He only brings the five-handbreadth embankment and five-handbreadth partition. The way it appears in Tosafot—sorry—in Tosafot it sounds as though he uses the five-handbreadth embankment and five-handbreadth partition in order to argue that inside the cavity it is a private domain, not on the roof. And that is really strange, because from the law of a house we see that this is not true. If a house does not have a net interior height of ten, then inside it is a karmelit, not a private domain. So maybe he means what the Rashba says, I don’t know. And if he means what the Rashba says, then of course the question I asked earlier comes back, because if you determine everything based on the roof, then from the perspective of the roof what is the problem? Combine the thickness of the walls too, and let the gross total be 5.6. So why does Abaye say six? It seems that the wall thickness is in addition to the 5.6—but why? The determining area is the roof area, so if the determining area is the roof area, then why should I care if the walls are included within that 5.6? And look at what Tosafot asks on Rabbeinu Hananel: “Rabbeinu Hananel’s explanation does not seem correct, for the thickness of the rim of the pit also combines with the cavity of the pit to make four, because one can place something on it and use it, as stated in the chapter Window.” What is he saying? Think about a pit that has around it the sand that was dug out of it. Now, the pit is five deep and the height of the sand is five. Altogether I see ten, right? With me? Now the question is: what is the area of the pit? Let’s say the area of the pit itself is only two, not four, but the thickness of the sand wall is another two. So altogether I have four—or if you prefer six if it’s circular, okay? It doesn’t matter, because a pit can be neither circular nor square.

[Speaker B] No, wait, are we talking about height or area? No, I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. I have a pit. Around it there is sand, okay? Let’s say a square pit for the sake of discussion, not a round one.

[Speaker B] A pit that is four by four, okay. That’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, around it there are also piles of sand, okay? Now if the depth of the pit is five handbreadths and the height of the sand is five handbreadths, that’s a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition.

[Speaker B] Okay, fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’m asking: what happens if the pit does not have four by four? It has only two by two. Okay. But the sand has an area of another two in each direction.

[Speaker B] So we talked about this—that if he makes a dug-out space then it counts as the holes of a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—why the holes of a private domain? Not now. The pit itself is two by two. Now the sand around it—the sand around it adds a handbreadth in each direction. That means thickness of a handbreadth, handbreadth, handbreadth, and handbreadth. So from an overhead view, the whole thing becomes four by four, right?

[Speaker E] So the thickness of the walls would be counted according to the sand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now I’m talking about combining the sand and the pit with respect to area, not with respect to height. Tosafot says: “The thickness of the rim of the pit also combines with the cavity of the pit to make four, because one can place something on it and use it.” Think about the hole—what is two handbreadths by two handbreadths? It’s a square, a tile twenty centimeters by twenty centimeters. Okay? So think of it essentially as some kind of pillar on which you put, I don’t know, a book. Okay? In essence it’s a pillar with an area of four by four, it’s just true that in the middle there’s a hole, but that doesn’t matter—I can treat the whole thing as a kind of pillar that has four by four. Right? So Tosafot asks Rabbeinu Hananel: if that’s so, then why does Rabbeinu Hananel say that the thickness of the walls does not combine with the size of the cavity? The thickness of the walls should combine with the cavity so that together they total 5.6. Why, regarding the cavity, does he require a net 5.6? Do you understand the question? No, no—again. It still doesn’t sit right with me. Again. You come to me with a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition. You are basically telling me that the embankment and the partition combine not only for height but also for area. Right? That is essentially what comes out of the sugya of a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition.

[Speaker B] Wait, we’re talking—oh, the embankment is also about height, not only area, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The embankment is the sand around the pit.

[Speaker B] Yes yes, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now that sand has both thickness and height. Its height is five handbreadths, its thickness is a handbreadth. Fine? Now I look at the pit: the pit itself is two by two, and around it there are four such sand walls, each of which has thickness one handbreadth and height five handbreadths. Fine? So together the height of the walls of the pit is ten, right? Five from the pit and five from the embankment. Exactly. And therefore Tosafot says: for this thing to be called a private domain, I am not interested in the area of the cavity of the pit. What matters to me is the gross area, including the walls of the hole. So if we now return to our analogy of the hive, according to Rabbeinu Hananel, what should the diameter of the hive be—gross?

[Speaker B] What should the diameter of the hive be gross?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] 5.6. Exactly 5.6. Not 6. 5.6. Because why should I care that part of those 5.6 is the thickness of the walls? The wall thickness is simply part of the area I see in projection—when I look from above, all I need to see is a circle of 5.6. That’s all. And I don’t care what part of it is cavity and what part is thickness.

[Speaker C] But when he says this, is he talking about the private domain in the cavity or on the roof?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s what I wanted to emphasize to you. After we understood this, here he is talking about the cavity.

[Speaker C] Wait, but it’s clear that it’s the cavity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Pay close attention. This question—one second—this question is similar to what I asked earlier, but not identical. Earlier I asked: if you go by the roof, then the gross should be 5.6, because from the perspective of the roof that gives me an area of 5.6. In Tosafot it doesn’t sound like he is talking about that. When Tosafot attacks Rabbeinu Hananel, he isn’t talking about the roof, he is talking about the cavity. He only argues that the thickness of the walls ought to combine and contribute to the cavity. And if that’s so, then the thickness of the roof should also combine and contribute to the cavity, and in the final analysis the hive is called a domain because of the cavity, not because of the roof. And that is very strange, because in truth it is not a domain from the perspective of the cavity, since net it does not have a height of ten. Are you with me? It’s complicated.

[Speaker C] We said that you can include the walls in the width only if there is a possibility of hollowing it out. Didn’t we say that in the previous sugya?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave the previous sugya aside for a moment. Right now I want us to understand what is happening here. The calculation I made in Rashi was this. I understood that there are two possible ways to discuss this hive. You can discuss this hive in terms of its net measurement, its cavity. If it has four by four by ten, then it is a private domain. And you can discuss it in terms of its roof, in which case it is gross, right? If the height is ten gross and four by four gross, then the roof is a private domain. Now you can decide: do you go by the net, and the status of the hive is determined by its cavity, or do you go by the gross, and the status of the hive is determined by its roof? Right? That is what I have been presenting until now. And apparently the dispute between Rashi and Rabbeinu Hananel is this dispute. Rashi speaks about the gross, and therefore he says what determines it is the roof, and I do not care now about the measure of the internal cavity. The height of ten is the roof plus the cavity, and the 5.6 as well is the thickness of the walls plus the cavity, because the roof is what determines it. That’s how I explained Rashi. The complication begins with Rabbeinu Hananel, because Rabbeinu Hananel says that I require 5.6 in the cavity, that net it should be 5.6. And Abaye’s saying six is simply because he added the wall thickness, but what really determines the domain is the cavity net, 5.6. Then I ask about Rabbeinu Hananel: then tell me, from the perspective of height, how does the cavity become a private domain? Its net height does not have ten. So what will you tell me? That for height we go by the gross height? Ah, so then you too are going by the roof. If you too are going by the roof, then you should already agree with Rashi that gross 5.6 is enough, no need for six. From the perspective of the roof, gross 5.6 is enough. Right? That’s what I asked about Rabbeinu Hananel. Now when Tosafot asks on Rabbeinu Hananel, it does not seem that this is what he is asking. Tosafot understood that Rabbeinu Hananel is talking about the net, and Rabbeinu Hananel claims that the determining size is the size of the cavity. Except that Rabbeinu Hananel has some novelty: since a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition combine, then even though net the cavity does not have ten, since the thickness of the roof completes it to ten, for me it is a cavity of height ten. What do you do with a house? I don’t know. But that is what he says here. So Tosafot asks: even if I accept that, then combine also the thickness of the walls, and then also require only gross 5.6, and the cavity will be a private domain even though it does not have net 5.6. If it has gross 5.6, that is also good. Because in a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition, they are combined also for thickness, not only for height. That is what Tosafot asks him. In other words, Tosafot understood Rabbeinu Hananel to be talking about the domain net, and for some reason Rabbeinu Hananel has some novelty that the height combines with the cavity even to turn the cavity into a private domain, not because of the roof. Tosafot only asks him: if so, then thickness too should combine with the area, to determine that the cavity is a private domain.

[Speaker C] So that contradicts Rabbeinu Hananel, because Rabbeinu Hananel said he meant—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It attacks Rabbeinu Hananel. Tosafot attacks Rabbeinu Hananel. According to your own approach, why do you require a net 5.6? Let gross 5.6 be enough. Because the thickness of the walls should combine just as the thickness of the roof combines. Because if you rely on a five-handbreadth embankment and a five-handbreadth partition, then just as it combines for height it also combines for width. The whole thing makes it seem that Tosafot understands Rabbeinu Hananel as talking about the measure of the cavity net. He just has some novelty that the thickness makes the cavity adequate even though net the cavity does not have enough—it does not have enough area and height. That’s how Tosafot understood Rabbeinu Hananel, and therefore also attacks him. He says: there is a contradiction in your words. In height you say this, and in thickness you do not say this. But how did he understand Rabbeinu Hananel? He understood him as talking about the inside. Okay? Okay.

[Speaker B] It’s complicated, okay. What? Not okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Rashba, when he attacks Rabbeinu Hananel, he says this. Meaning—sorry—before the Rashba, when I attacked Rabbeinu Hananel, I didn’t attack him on that basis. When I attacked this Rabbeinu Hananel, I said: how can you, Rabbeinu Hananel, rely on the roof with respect to height? If you rely on the roof with respect to height, then rely on it also with respect to thickness and require gross 5.6. But not on Tosafot’s reasoning that the embankment combines with the partition, but simply because on the roof there really is 5.6. So what is the problem? Do you understand the difference? Yes. My attack on Rabbeinu Hananel was different from Tosafot’s attack. Tosafot addresses the cavity and asks him: one second, how do you manage with the cavity? I say: you, Rabbeinu Hananel, presumably also agree that we are talking about the roof. If you agree that we are talking about the roof, then why are you not satisfied with gross 5.6? Why should I care that there is thickness? From the perspective of the roof, the main thing is that I have a circle with an area of 5.6, a diameter of 5.6. Do you understand the difference between what I am asking and what Tosafot asked? Yes. Okay. Now let’s see how the Rashba formulates it. “But our French masters found this difficult”—he brings Tosafot’s difficulty on Rabbeinu Hananel—yes—“our French masters, the authors of Tosafot, found it difficult, for we still ought to combine the thickness of the walls to the width of four by four, since if one wished he could place something on it and use it.” This could also be interpreted as I say, that the meaning is that you place something on it because what determines it is the roof, but we already saw that Tosafot themselves probably do not mean that. With the Rashba, I don’t know. “And they brought proof from what is said in tractate Eruvin in the chapter Window,” and so on—these are various proofs: a pit and its rim and things of that sort. And I’ll now finish the whole passage: “and they therefore left it as a difficulty against the words of Rav Hisda.” Therefore they remain with a difficulty against Rabbeinu Hananel. So I don’t know exactly what the Rashba means, but for our purposes there are two ways to attack Rabbeinu Hananel. Either in the way I attacked him, or in the way Tosafot attacked him. The question is what Rabbeinu Hananel means: does he mean the roof or the cavity? That is basically what this depends on. I understood that Rabbeinu Hananel means the roof as well, and so I said: if you mean the roof, then what do you want—the wall thickness is also fine. And Tosafot understood that Rabbeinu Hananel means the net cavity, and therefore asks him: then what is the problem? The thickness of the walls should combine to complete the cavity. Then the cavity will be a private domain, not the roof. Okay? And with the Rashba I do not know which of the two he means. It is not entirely clear. He cites Tosafot; perhaps he means Tosafot. What is Tosafot’s conclusion after rejecting Rabbeinu Hananel’s interpretation? Tosafot says: “Rabbeinu Hananel’s explanation does not seem correct, for the thickness of the rim of the pit also combines with the cavity of the pit, because one can place something on it by hand and use it, as stated in the chapter Window regarding one who filled it entirely with pegs.” Conclusion: “Rather, one must say that the fact that six is mentioned here is not precise, as Rashi explained.” Tosafot’s conclusion is: I join Rashi—not precise. Fine? Because Rabbeinu Hananel does not work; in Rabbeinu Hananel there is a contradiction. And the Rashba ultimately defends Rabbeinu Hananel. I just want at least to complete that. Okay? Give me two more minutes. We didn’t get that far. So the Rashba says: “And I am astonished by their words.” I am astonished by Tosafot’s astonishment. “For it seems explicit in the Gemara that we do not say this. As it says in the chapter Throwing: Abaye said, if there is a pit ten deep and eight wide, and one threw a mat into it, he is liable. If he divided it with a mat, he is exempt, because the placing of the mat and the removal of the partition come simultaneously.” Right? There is a pit that is ten deep and a width of eight. Fine? Eight by four. Now I throw a mat into it, of course I am liable because it is a private domain. But if I throw in a mat that divides it into two pits, the two pits now become four by four and four by four—actually a bit less, because there is the thickness of the mat. Right? So it turns out that each of the two pits is not a private domain, because it does not have four by four. Throwing the mat—it was a private domain, I threw the mat into the pit, and through the very act of throwing the mat I turned the pit into something that is not a private domain. Fine? So here it says he is exempt, because the placing of the mat and the removal of the partition come simultaneously.

[Speaker D] What does “removal of the partition” mean? What does he mean by that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Removal of the partition” means that the moment I placed the mat, the partitions are no longer four by four, so they are removed—it is no longer, it ceased to be a private domain. Fine? And if it is so, asks the Rashba—if Tosafot are right that the thickness combines, like the pit and its rim—then what “removal of partition” is there? What is the Gemara’s difficulty? After all, even the mat, although it becomes a wall for the pit, still counts toward the measure. The mat does not reduce the area of the pit, because the thickness of the mat also combines with the area. So why does the Gemara assume that the thickness of the mat reduces the area to less than four by four?

[Speaker B] But doesn’t the thickness of the mat count for both sides?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it counts for both. The pit remains eight by four, because the mat is part of the whole big pit—it is not two pits at all. It is one pit with a mat in the middle, but it combines with the whole thing. Yes, that is his question. And what is his conclusion? “Rather, we are forced to say that this was not said of all walls, but only of thick walls made to cover them and use them, which is not the case with a hive and a mat. And perhaps for that reason Abaye mentioned a mat and did not mention a board; and here too it mentions a hive and not a chest or cabinet, because a hive would be made with a mat around it.” What is he saying? That the partition is made from a mat. A mat is not something hard and rigid; you cannot put things on it, they just fall. Okay? It does not combine with the area. Something on which you can place things does combine.

[Speaker C] The area above, of the roof, or of the cavity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: the mat does not combine with the area of the cavity, and the cavity needs to be a net four by four. If there is a mat that completes it, that is no good. If there is a wall that completes it, that is good. That is what the Rashba claims. And in that way he ultimately defends Rabbeinu Hananel’s view. And what does he say? That in the hive, the thickness does not combine because the thickness is made of matting. The roof does combine because the roof is rigid.

[Speaker B] Ah, so wait—then what are the little projections? What did he call them? Like reeds. What are the little projections—what did he call them? Projections.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The projections are the protrusions of the mat, the edges of the mat that stick up above. The mat wraps around the cylinder, and the edges of the mat are reed projections that stick up above.

[Speaker B] Okay, wait, wait—projections.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s stop here for a moment. I just want to clarify where you are holding on the page. How far did you get?

[Speaker C] We started reading the Totsaot Chaim Elazar, Chaim Elazar something like that.

[Speaker B] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, because from what I see we simply didn’t get that far. So you should continue with this page; maybe I’ll complete it. But I want you to follow very carefully what we did today, because otherwise this sugya will get terribly tangled for us. That’s why I’m doing it step by step, and every point is built on the previous one. We need to understand every stage very well. Okay? So next time, go over again the Rashba we just read, Tosafot, and Rabbeinu Hananel, and understand very well the disputes, the difficulties, and what the Rashba resolves. Then we’ll be able to continue onward.

[Speaker E] I have a question: if the mat is not counted because you can’t place things on it, why is it counted in dividing the area into two parts that are no longer called a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It stands there. You can’t place things on it, but it—

[Speaker E] It stands there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.

[Speaker B] Okay, thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much.

[Speaker E] Goodbye.

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