Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 45

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We learn it from the Tabernacle: what existed in the Tabernacle was throwing objects or carrying objects out, not throwing domains. When I change the location of objects between different domains, that is the labor of carrying out. When I change the domains themselves, that is not the labor of carrying out. Okay? If I read this in Rashi more explicitly, this is Rashi in a different comment from what we saw in the previous lecture. Look at this Rashi: “If it is six wide, he is exempt, because it constitutes a domain unto itself.” And from where do we know this? “We derive it from the Tabernacle”: they would throw their needles to one another in the course of their work, but they would not throw domains. They threw objects like needles; they did not throw domains. And if you say that when it is not ten high it too is a domain unto itself, since it is called a karmelit? So he says, fine, a karmelit is not really a domain unto itself; that is less important for us right now, that is the second half of the discussion about throwing into a karmelit. In any case, Rashi explains that this exemption is really learned from the Tabernacle, since the labor of carrying out is learned from the Tabernacle. What do we see in the Tabernacle? That they transferred objects, utensils, needles, but they did not transfer domains. Therefore there is no place for transferring a domain, because that was not in the Tabernacle, and therefore you cannot prohibit it. And this is not that it is permitted; rather, there is no reason to prohibit it. It is not some special exemption for someone who throws domains; there is simply no reason at all to prohibit it. The entire prohibition from the outset was stated about carrying objects or throwing objects.

Now I want to connect this a little to what we saw in that conceptual lecture at the beginning of the year, when I spoke about the essence of the labor of carrying out as an expression of the Sabbath labors in general. Do you remember that? I said some things there about entropy, about changing the entropy of the world. And I said I didn’t want to get into it again, only for those who remember, but the point is that the principle in the labor of carrying out is really a reorganization of the objects, or a different distribution of the objects among the different domains. The world is a collection of domains: private domain, public domain, various kinds of karmelit, an exempt place, all kinds of things. And the labor of carrying out is really taking objects and putting them into different compartments; think of it as organizing a closet. I take an object from one compartment and put it in another compartment, and if the two compartments are essentially different—this one is a public domain and this one a private domain, or vice versa—then I have committed a transgression, because I changed the entropy of the world, I changed the arrangement of the world. Okay?

Now here, in light of that, I think you can understand better what Rashi says here: when I take a domain and move it from place to place, I am not changing the entropy of the world; I am changing the world itself. Understand? So that is not included in the labor of carrying out. If I had a source, maybe I would prohibit that too, but it is not included in the labor of carrying out. The labor of carrying out is a change in order, a change in the arrangement of things inside the closet. But organizing the closet itself—that is, rearranging the closet itself anew—that does not fall under the labor of carrying out. That is something entirely different. What is the connection? You should understand that this is not just some technical distinction. Someone could say to him: what do you mean? You could also say we never found that they threw needles, but we also never found that they threw balls. So if I throw a ball from a private domain to a public domain, or four cubits within the public domain itself, should I be exempt? Because we never found that they threw balls; they only threw needles. That is not a meaningful distinction. Why? What difference does it make—needles, balls—it is the same thing: you are throwing an object from a private domain to a public domain. Here it is not enough that it did not happen in the Tabernacle; I also have to explain why this is essentially different from what did happen there. Because things that did not occur in the Tabernacle but are similar to what did occur there—the difference is not essential—then I can derive them by analogy: just as there, so too here, because it is similar. Therefore what Rashi says—that it did not happen in the Tabernacle—is not enough.

[Speaker D] Maybe you could say that there was no change at all? Because the domain remained the same domain. Even though you moved it from place to place, it remained the same domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m talking about. So you did not change it. That’s what I’m talking about.

[Speaker D] No, you’re saying it’s a change in the world. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A change in the closet. The private domain was here, and now it’s here.

[Speaker B] So all the more so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] I didn’t really understand that. If it is forbidden to throw objects, because the objects don’t even change the world—they only move within it, while the domains remain intact—then if I throw domains, I am changing the domains too, so I’m making an even worse change.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says it’s worse? It’s a different kind of change. You are interfering, so to speak, with the Holy One, blessed be He, in the act of Creation. Our actions in the world are, given the act of Creation, what we do within it. To create worlds is something else. Who says it is forbidden to create worlds? That is a different question. There is no room here for an a fortiori argument. There is no room here for this kind of labor. That is what Rashi is claiming. But what I am adding here is that the lack of a source is something that sometimes even later authorities address in a way that, in my opinion, is problematic. Because what do you mean, lack of a source? As I said before, they also did not throw balls in the Tabernacle. It is not enough that something did not happen in the Tabernacle; you also have to show conceptually that this thing is essentially different from what did happen there. You cannot derive it by analogy from what did happen. And therefore what Rashi says, that it did not happen in the Tabernacle, is not a sufficient explanation. It is part of the picture. You also have to add the reasoning that explains why this is essentially different from what was there, so that it cannot be derived from what was in the Tabernacle. And here that is what I was trying to explain: this is really a change in the closet itself, not a change in the arrangement of objects inside the closet. And therefore it is something entirely different. If you could find some other primary category of labor for it, fine, then it would be another primary category of labor. But there isn’t one. If you want to derive it from the labor of carrying out—from the labor of carrying out, this is not it. And therefore I think that is what is written in Rashi, and that is the point one needs to understand: whenever it is stated explicitly that something was not in the Tabernacle, always, always look for an additional conceptual explanation—why this thing is also essentially different from what was there. It is not enough to say that it was not in the Tabernacle. There must always also be an accompanying rationale. Now.

[Speaker D] All this is for Abaye only, though. What? This is only for Abaye.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I said: Rava does not disagree with him on the conceptual level. I introduced that at the beginning of the previous lecture—that in these lectures I am dealing only with Abaye’s view, except that Rava does not disagree with him in principle. Rava only claims that this is a principle with no practical ramifications, because there is a broader principle that swallows it up. But it is a true principle. Right. So that is Rashi’s view.

Now Tosafot Yeshanim challenges Rashi and says: “This does not seem right, for after all we do find that they transferred domains, such as the Ark and the altars.” In other words, there were very large vessels in the Tabernacle, and when they moved them, that is really like moving a beehive. There indeed was transfer of vessels—and again, they did not move beehives, they moved the Ark and the altars. So what? There still was not specifically moving of beehives in the Tabernacle. But of course everyone understands that that is irrelevant. Because if this is a large vessel and that is a large vessel, then it is similar. I do not care that this exact thing was not in the Tabernacle. The essential distinction does not exist. The essential distinction disappears. Okay? The fact that it was not in the Tabernacle in itself makes no difference. So there is a question here on Rashi.

Now several later authorities go in this direction. For example, the Rashash—I didn’t refer you to him, I only mentioned him because his discussion is a bit complicated. But basically what he wants to claim, and what several later authorities say, is that Rashi is speaking only about throwing, not about carrying out. And therefore he brings the case of needles. Rashi does not say this by accident—that we are talking about throwing a beehive, not carrying out a beehive. Why? Because if one carries out a beehive, one really would be liable. There is no exemption for “carrying out domains.” How do I know that? Because in the Tabernacle they carried out the altar and the Ark. Rashi knows that too. But those they carried out; they did not throw them. In throwing, what existed in the Tabernacle was only the throwing of needles. And throwing needles is throwing objects, not domains. Therefore everything Rashi says is an exemption for one who throws; it is not an exemption for one who carries out. That is the Rashash’s claim. The Chatam Sofer wants to say something along these lines as well, and other later authorities also want to make that claim: that this is speaking only about throwing and not about carrying out.

Now the point is that this is still not simple. Look at Tosafot HaRosh; he asks: “This does not seem right, for in the chapter ‘HaZorek’ we conclude that one who throws four cubits in the public domain is learned as a tradition, and not from the Tabernacle.” In the end, the labor of throwing in general is not learned from the Tabernacle. From the Tabernacle we learn the labor of carrying out; the labor of throwing is a tradition received by Moses at Sinai. It is basically included within the labor of carrying out. There is no source in the Tabernacle for the labor of throwing; it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. So why should I care what was or wasn’t in the Tabernacle? You only need to discuss it conceptually. Now I say: if you want to discuss conceptually that transferring a domain is not the same as transferring an object, then you should also exempt in the case of carrying out. And on the other hand, if you see that in the Tabernacle they also transferred domains, as with the altar and the Ark, then you see that in the Tabernacle they did not distinguish between transferring a domain and transferring an object. So why in the world would you make such a distinction regarding throwing? Throwing is only a subcategory of carrying out; it is not a separate labor, and it is not learned from the Tabernacle. So why should I care what the situation was regarding throwing in the Tabernacle? Even if in the Tabernacle there was only the throwing of needles—so what? The labor of throwing is learned from the labor of carrying out. Whatever applies to carrying out applies to throwing. So if in carrying out you do not distinguish between a vessel and a domain, then where would you invent such a distinction regarding throwing?

The marginal notes of Rabbi Akiva Eger—I did refer you to that—also say that in the conclusion we say that we do not find that they threw needles. Even worse: Rashi’s whole claim about throwing needles is also not correct according to the conclusion of the passage. And again, I don’t want to get into it, but that too is not correct according to the conclusion of the passage. We do not find that they threw needles; the whole story is a tradition received by Moses at Sinai. We do not learn throwing from the Tabernacle at all. So if that is true, this becomes very strange. Because regarding carrying out, as the medieval authorities proved—Tosafot Yeshanim—regarding carrying out we do find in the Tabernacle the transfer of domains. So with carrying out there is no difference between a domain and an object. And the labor of throwing has no independent source; it is learned from carrying out. So from where would one invent that in throwing there should be a difference between a domain and an object?

Now without getting into all of the Chatam Sofer here: the Chatam Sofer reconciles this with the passage there. He claims that in the preliminary assumption of the passage, in the early days they did throw needles; afterward they did not throw needles.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, in the Chatam Sofer there’s some word there, something like “de-loda” or “de-lavda,” I don’t know—what is that word?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which word? I didn’t understand. Wait—do you have the Chatam Sofer on the page?

[Speaker D] Yes, yes, I have it on the page. It’s line eight, the first word on line eight.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And nevertheless, it seems to me in my humble opinion…”

[Speaker D] The first word—no, yes, you can start from there: “For seemingly…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “For seemingly the words of the Rashash at the beginning of the chapter ‘HaZorek’ are difficult, for he asks from the fact that it teaches ‘Loda…’”

[Speaker D] Ah, what is “Loda”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The man from Lod. We would need to look at the passage there again; since we didn’t get into that passage, we won’t get into all the details.

[Speaker D] It sounds like “for sure” in modern Hebrew.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly.

[Speaker D] Yael,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] did you want to ask?

[Speaker C] Yes, sorry—maybe this is a naïve question: what does “those who threw needles” mean? What were they throwing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They threw needles there from one person to another in order to sew things.

[Speaker D] The ones

[Speaker C] who worked on the fabrics?

[Speaker D] Yes, so they put it in from one side and threw it to the other side. Okay, thanks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In any case, let’s see. So up to this point we have seen Rashi’s basic idea. Rashi understands that the basis of the exemption is that we found throwing of objects, not throwing of domains. And I explained the rationale that accompanies that. Tosafot understands it differently. Tosafot claims that the basis of the exemption is something else, and it is entirely possible that the reason for Tosafot’s different explanation is the difficulty raised by Tosafot Yeshanim—because of that he does not accept Rashi. And then he says as follows. Let’s read; I’m sharing it here: “A beehive is exempt, because the beehive itself becomes a private domain when it comes to rest. And it is like one who throws from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain, who is exempt, as was said above on page 4, because throwing is not learned from handing over.” Right—throwing is not learned from handing over, and therefore one who throws from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain is exempt, even though one who hands over from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain is liable. Throwing is not learned from handing over. “And even according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that something caught is as if it had come to rest, here he is exempt, because wherever it is considered at rest, it is deemed a private domain.” What does he mean here?

[Speaker D] So first of all, Tosafot is talking about the labor of carrying out and not about throwing. What is he saying? He is saying that this is transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is talking about throwing. You are saying that his reasoning could apply to carrying out too; but he is talking about throwing. Okay, we’ll see that in a moment, we’ll see.

[Speaker B] In any case, Tosafot says that this is transfer from a private domain to a private domain—that is what is happening here—because as soon as they place the beehive down, via the public domain—

[Speaker D] Via the public domain.

[Speaker B] What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very important, very important: via the public domain.

[Speaker B] Yes, but you are transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain. Okay, and throwing—you throw from a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now he says: what happens when the beehive comes to rest? It basically becomes a private domain, and so it turns out that I placed it in a private domain. To carry from a private domain to a private domain is not prohibited.

[Speaker D] And while it is flying through the air, is it also a private domain? I didn’t understand. While it is flying through the air, is it also a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get to that in a moment, we’ll get to that. Now I ask you: what happens if I throw the beehive from the public domain to the public domain?

[Speaker D] And move it four cubits or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, four cubits. Liable or exempt?

[Speaker C] No—if I uproot it, haven’t I uprooted a private domain? And now the space inside, in the public domain, is a private domain, and the moment I place it down it is again a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the law? I threw a beehive four cubits in the public domain.

[Speaker D] Exempt, exempt. Why? Because it remains a private domain the whole time; it is as if there was no public domain here at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically this is from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain; it is the same thing. Right? Right? Also when I throw from the public domain to the private domain, ostensibly it is also the same thing, because when the beehive is sitting in the public domain—sorry—it is still a private domain. Right. So basically it is always private domain to private domain, right? But notice that when you read Tosafot carefully, you see that when the beehive is in the air it is not considered a private domain. It is considered an object passing through the airspace of the public domain. Do you agree?

[Speaker D] Only when it comes to rest is it a private domain, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise he would have had to say: this is not from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain—that is the whole point of the story. Ah, why, why, why?

[Speaker D] He says even according to Rabbi

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Akiva—wait, wait, wait—before Rabbi Akiva. First of all, this is from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain, right? I’m asking: why “via a public domain”? It is not via a public domain; it is a private domain the whole time. The beehive is a private domain.

[Speaker E] No, maybe when it is flying through the air it is not considered a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—so you see in Tosafot that the beehive is a private domain only when it comes to rest. It is not a beehive that is always a private domain. Therefore Tosafot says that when you uprooted it, it was a private domain; when you placed it down, you placed it down as a private domain; but on the way it passed through the public domain. Meaning, the novelty that the beehive is considered a private domain applies only when the beehive comes to rest, not while it is standing, and not while it is flying.

[Speaker B] And how does that fit with “something caught is as if it had come to rest”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one second, I’m getting to that now. Once we understand this, it brings Tosafot a bit closer to what I said earlier about Rashi. If you remember, I was talking about changing the closet itself as opposed to changing the objects inside the closet. Now when the beehive is flying, it is not part of the closet. The closet is static; it has shelves, and I move objects from shelf to shelf. When the beehive is flying, it is really an object—a large object—but only when it is standing does it become a shelf in the closet.

[Speaker C] What about an airplane?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] An airplane.

[Speaker D] How would we define an airplane?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same thing. The same thing. Why?

[Speaker D] Ah, an airplane—

[Speaker C] of course—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] above ten handbreadths is not a public domain, but say an airplane passing within ten handbreadths—then it would not be a private domain.

[Speaker D] Why? Because it needs a fixed place on the ground or something like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I’m saying: a beehive, something that is not stationary, is not a private domain, even if it has the required dimensions.

[Speaker D] I’m asking whether because it is not stationary, that means it has to have a base on the ground?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, I—

[Speaker D] No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I would not need that definition. Rather, a domain is something that is on the ground. The ground is divided into different domains. What is not resting on the ground is not included in the map of domains. Okay? A domain is a place on the ground; meaning, the world is divided into domains. Remember again the closet. The closet is divided into shelves; likewise the world is divided into domains. When there is something moving—when I am building some shelf inside the closet—during the building it is not yet a shelf. It is a shelf after it is already standing there and ready to contain objects. So that is one side.

On the other hand, Tosafot adds that this is true even according to Rabbi Akiva. Why is it true?

[Speaker D] Because obviously, he said that something caught is as if it had come to rest, so even while it is in the air it is considered as though it were resting on the ground.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then it does not work out. It is the opposite.

[Speaker C] Right, so—

[Speaker D] If—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it is considered to have come to rest in the public domain, no? Then he should be liable.

[Speaker D] If it is considered at rest, then it is a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, exactly. Notice: because “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” why do we make someone liable for an object flying on the basis of “something caught is as if it had come to rest”? Because the object is considered as resting in the public domain. So what about a beehive? How is a beehive different from an object? The moment it is considered as resting in the public domain, it itself becomes a private domain because it is at rest. So even according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” and for an object that I throw from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain, Rabbi Akiva holds one liable, because the object in the middle is considered as resting in the public domain—but in the case of a beehive that would not be the rule. That is what he is saying. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who for objects says “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” for a beehive, which is a domain, there will not be “something caught is as if it had come to rest.” Why? Because when the beehive is considered as resting on the ground, the moment it is at rest it is a domain. So it is effectively resting in a private domain, not in a public domain. Therefore that is what he says: “wherever it is considered at rest, it is deemed a private domain.” And according to Rabbi Akiva this is not private domain to private domain via a public domain, but private domain to private domain via a private domain.

[Speaker C] Wait, so if the beehive at every given moment—regardless of where it is—is considered a private domain, right? According to this. When it is at rest. Fine, “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” meaning in every situation—whether it is on the ground or in the air at any point—and later when it comes to rest. The whole time it is a private domain. But from here it seems that by virtue of its structure it becomes a private domain no matter where it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Akiva. Only according to Rabbi Akiva. Because Rabbi Akiva holds “something caught is as if it had come to rest.” Right, that is exactly what Tosafot said. He says: without Rabbi Akiva, one who transfers from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain—since throwing is not learned from handing over—is exempt. With Rabbi Akiva you do not need to reach this whole discussion, because it is not transferring from a private domain to a private domain via a public domain, but transferring from a private domain the whole time within a private domain. You do not need to get into the question whether throwing is learned from handing over or not. That is Tosafot’s point.

And again, this strengthens even more the claim I made above: you see in Tosafot another important point, that the beehive is considered a private domain only when it comes to rest. Therefore the whole discussion arises depending on Rabbi Akiva or not—only when it comes to rest. It is not always like that.

So we learned two things from Tosafot. First, he learns differently from Rashi. The placing down of the beehive—that is, the throwing of the beehive—is exempt not because there is liability only for throwing objects and not for throwing domains. There is no difference between domains and objects. Rather, wherever you place the beehive, you have placed it in a private domain. So what happens is that you transferred from a private domain to a private domain. And for that one is not liable. That is a different explanation from Rashi. The second thing we learned from Tosafot is that as long as the beehive is moving, it is not a domain. Only when it comes to rest is it a domain.

There might perhaps be room to understand this otherwise. One could have said that even according to Rabbi Akiva, “something caught is as if it had come to rest” means that it is considered halakhically to have come to rest—but in reality it is obviously flying. And perhaps its status as a domain depends on actual resting, not halakhic resting. That is not Tosafot; I am just saying that without Tosafot one could have said that according to Rabbi Akiva it would not be this way. Because according to Rabbi Akiva, in such a case one really would be liable. Why would one be liable? Because the beehive, by “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” is essentially considered as resting in the public domain. And in order for it to be considered a domain itself, it needs to be actually resting, not merely considered as resting. Tosafot does not make that distinction. Tosafot says that if Rabbi Akiva says “something caught is as if it had come to rest,” then the beehive is resting and is considered a domain.

[Speaker E] Could someone maybe have said it that way or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that one could have said it that way too. One could. Tosafot does not say that, but one could have said that too.

[Speaker E] That would create liability, as it were—you could perhaps make a distinction. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then it comes out not like what we said here according to Rabbi Akiva, because—but we do not rule in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, so it is not terrible. And it comes out like the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Akiva. It may depend somewhat on how we understand the law of “something caught is as if it had come to rest.” If you remember, in the lecture where we discussed this, we saw that some say it means resting in the air, some say resting on the ground, and some say mere presence is enough. Right? It does not need to be resting at all. The moment it is in the public domain, from my perspective that is as if you brought it into the public domain; it does not need to be resting there. But according to that third formulation, for example, you can easily understand what I just said. Even if you say “something caught is as if it had come to rest” according to Rabbi Akiva, that means it is in the public domain, but it is not resting. And if it is not resting, then the beehive is not considered a domain. And according to Rabbi Akiva in that formulation, of course he would hold one liable. Because the beehive is not at rest; rather, it does not need to be at rest. Very nice. But in order to regard it as a domain, yes, it does need to be at rest. And if it is not considered actually at rest—and “something caught is as if it had come to rest” does not mean that it really is considered at rest—then it is not… you cannot treat it as a domain, so it is an object. And according to Rabbi Akiva, for whom that object is considered at rest in the public domain, I should be liable. So according to that formulation it is quite clear that Rabbi Akiva does not fit. Here Rabbi Akiva would say one is liable for throwing a beehive. Okay?

[Speaker B] Why liable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he throws the beehive; the beehive is in the airspace of the public domain, it is in the airspace of the public domain, and that is enough to create liability—I brought it from a private domain to a public domain. You might ask me: but the beehive is a domain. No, it is not a domain, because it is in the air; it is not resting on anything.

[Speaker B] That’s only in carrying from a private domain to a public domain, but from private to private with a public domain in the middle nobody holds one liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unless Rabbi Akiva holds one liable. Rabbi Akiva holds one liable because of “something caught is as if it had come to rest”; on the contrary, that is exactly what Rabbi Akiva is discussing.

[Speaker B] Yes, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now Tosafot raises a difficulty. He says this: “Now it seems that it is obvious to Abaye that it is considered as though it came to rest after it became a private domain.” I’m breaking Tosafot down here, because these are points where you really have to be careful; a lot of questions arise here if you do not notice all the nuances we just made. And I’ll continue with this.

[Speaker D] So he says—that means that already in the air it was a private domain. What? Meaning, that already in the air it was a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After we were careful in Tosafot and saw that Tosafot insists that when the beehive is flying it is not a private domain, not a domain at all—it is an object. Only after it comes to rest is it considered a private domain. So Tosafot says: according to this, when is the beehive considered—when is it considered to have come to rest? After it became a private domain? When? After it came to rest it became a private domain. So if that is the case, you should be liable, because when it came to rest, it came to rest inside the public domain. After it came to rest it became a private domain, and suddenly—boom—it is a private domain. But at the instant of rest, before it came to rest, that place was still considered a public domain. So how does Abaye exempt? Abaye apparently claims that no—it is considered as if it came to rest after it became a private domain. And then I ask in parentheses: how can that be? A moment ago we saw that while it is flying it is not a private domain, so as long as it has not come to rest it is still not a private domain—only after it comes to rest.

[Speaker D] Maybe the moment it reached a height of three handbreadths?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, wait—then it comes to rest at three handbreadths; same question.

[Speaker D] Maybe before he threw it at all it was also a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, there obviously yes—but in the air, no. Because in the air, once it is flying, it has become an object in the airspace of the public domain, and then it enters the public domain and lands. Okay? And the moment it lands, it becomes a private domain after it has landed. So when it lands, it lands in a place that is still defined as a public domain. But I have a question. Either way, according to Tosafot the logic should be that the beehive is considered something placed in the public domain. On the other hand, in the Gemara it says that Abaye, according to Tosafot, exempts in the case of a beehive. Why? Because the beehive itself is considered a private domain; it is as if you placed it in a private domain. So this doesn’t fit in Tosafot. Those two claims in Tosafot do not fit together. On the one hand, while it is flying it is not considered a domain; on the other hand, after it comes to rest it is a domain and therefore you are exempt—those two statements do not sit well together. And notice—wait, wait—and notice that those two statements are both statements of Tosafot. This difficulty is only on Tosafot. That is why I emphasized that in Tosafot you see, first, that he learns the exemption not like Rashi. If the exemption were like Rashi, this whole question would not arise. If the exemption is because you are throwing a domain, then what do I care—you are throwing a domain, that is the point. But if the exemption is because when it comes to rest it comes to rest in a private domain, as Tosafot understood, then that does not fit with Tosafot’s second statement that as long as it is flying it is not a private domain. Do you see? It is basically a contradiction between the two insights we sharpened earlier in the previous section of Tosafot.

[Speaker D] Maybe it happens simultaneously, like we had before?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, we’ll talk about that in a second. Did someone else want to comment?

[Speaker B] No, no, I got it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay. Now, just to sharpen this further, I brought here—I didn’t refer you to it so that you wouldn’t get tangled up in that sugya—a fascinating Kovetz Shiurim. I once wrote about it; it has wonderful things there, logic and the logic of time and so on. The Kovetz Shiurim basically makes the following claim.

There is a Gemara in Ketubot that discusses what happens when we convert a minor non-Jew. He has no legal capacity; he cannot accept obligations upon himself or undergo conversion on his own, yet we convert him. How does that work? Tosafot says it works by the law of acquisition on someone’s behalf. In other words, one may acquire something for a person even in his absence; I can, as it were, perform actions for someone else as though I were his agent. Okay? The common conception of this law is that it is a kind of agency. So I basically acquire the conversion for him, as it were—I, the judge, okay, acquire the conversion for him. But Tosafot says: there is a problem here, because this law should not work, since there is no acquisition on behalf of a non-Jew. A Jew cannot be the agent of a non-Jew. “So shall you also contribute”—“you too” includes your agents; just as you are members of the covenant, so too your agents must be members of the covenant. In other words, there is no agency from a Jew to a non-Jew or from a non-Jew to a Jew.

[Speaker D] Can acquisition on behalf of a minor work?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker D] Can acquisition on behalf of a minor work?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s exactly what Tosafot asks. You want to acquire conversion on behalf of this minor non-Jew, but there is no acquisition on behalf of a non-Jew; you cannot be his agent. Tosafot answers: “his acquisition and his legal status come simultaneously.” What does that mean? I acquire it for him, and he immediately becomes Jewish, so he is no longer a non-Jew. Because then I did not acquire for a non-Jew, since at the moment I acquired it he was already Jewish—I converted him. So in effect I did not acquire for a non-Jew; I acquired for a Jew. You can already see the connection to our issue, right?

[Speaker D] But he is a Jewish minor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so what? For a minor it works. At the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin, from the princes who divided the land we learn the law of acquiring on another’s behalf. And how do I know that they divided the land? There were minors who could not divide it themselves, and the princes divided it on their behalf.

So the Kovetz Shiurim says this: “And in what Tosafot wrote, ‘his acquisition and his legal status come simultaneously,’ it appears that the explanation is as follows: this rule that there is no acquisition on behalf of a non-Jew applies only where, even after the acquisition takes effect, he remains a non-Jew. Then it turns out that a non-Jew acquired by means of another, and that is impossible. But in the case of conversion, after the acquisition takes effect he is already Jewish.” After all, I acquired conversion for him, so he changed from non-Jew to Jew. Therefore who acquired through that acquisition? A Jew. Because after he acquired, he is a Jew and not a non-Jew. And therefore Tosafot says there is no problem here: “his acquisition and his legal status come simultaneously” solves the problem that there is no acquisition on behalf of a non-Jew, because it happens at the same time, simultaneously, and once it happens simultaneously, you effectively acquired for a Jew, not for a non-Jew. Okay?

Now he says this: “And the Ran, in the chapter ‘HaSholeach,’ wrote in the name of Nachmanides that ‘you shall work them forever,’ and because of ‘do not show them favor,’ it is forbidden to give him a gratuitous gift. And when one frees him, there is no greater gift than this.” A brief introduction—“do not show them favor” is actually very interesting and connected to Tosafot, so I’m pausing on it a bit. “Do not show them favor” is a prohibition against giving a gratuitous gift to a non-Jew. There is a prohibition: do not give them a free gift. Okay?

[Speaker D] Freeing a non-Jew is a great gift, and that’s good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one at a time, I can’t hear.

[Speaker D] Freeing a non-Jew is a great gift.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. Now Nachmanides says—cited by the Ran—that there is a prohibition of “you shall work them forever.” If you have a Canaanite slave, a non-Jewish slave, you may not free him. Nachmanides says this is like “do not show them favor,” because freeing him is giving him a gift, and one does not give a gift to a non-Jew. By the way, this is very hard to understand in its plain sense. The Kovetz Shiurim understands him literally; that is very difficult, because this is a different prohibition. It is the prohibition of “you shall work them forever,” the nullification of a positive commandment. It is not the prohibition of “do not show them favor.” But he identifies the two. In my opinion, Nachmanides does not identify them, but the Kovetz Shiurim thinks that Nachmanides does, and then he says this: “According to the above, one must consider: since after the gift takes effect he is free”—after all, a Canaanite slave whom I free, as you know, becomes Jewish. His manumission completes his conversion; he becomes Jewish. So freeing the slave turns him into a Jew. It turns out that the freed man received the gift, not the slave. That means you gave the gift to a Jew, because when he received the gift he became Jewish. If so, necessarily the prohibition cannot be because of ‘do not show them favor’; rather it is an independent commandment, ‘you shall work them forever.’” In short, he has a difficulty with Nachmanides. It cannot be a prohibition of gratuitous gift, because the gift is being given to a Jew. How do I know? From the Gemara in Ketubot, where Tosafot says that “his acquisition and his legal status come simultaneously” removes the problem that there is no acquisition on behalf of a non-Jew. Okay?

Now I am not going into it—I made a distinction there, and one can resolve it very nicely, but I do not want to get into that. I only want you to see that the mechanism is exactly like ours. Because what are we really claiming here? When that domain lands on public ground—when the beehive lands in the public domain—it becomes a private domain at that very moment. So tell me: did I place it down into a public domain or did I place it down into a private domain? When I placed it down, that very act of placing it down turns the place into a private domain. Is that called placing it into a private domain or into a public domain? You see that this is exactly the same question as ours?

[Speaker B] Exactly the same.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. And what does Tosafot basically claim? Ostensibly I would have said: so if that is the case, no problem—Tosafot can say here too that they come simultaneously. What does that mean? Exactly like Tosafot said in Ketubot. I throw the beehive; the moment it comes to rest on the ground of the public domain, it becomes a private domain. Why is it exempt? Because at the moment it came to rest, it also became a private domain; it happens at the same moment. And since it happens at the same moment, it is considered placing it into a private domain.

Tosafot does not assume that way when he raises the difficulty, right? What does Tosafot say? That it is considered as if it came to rest after it became a private domain. Why does he have to say “after”? Why not simultaneously? You have Tosafot in Ketubot speaking on exactly the same principle and saying they come simultaneously. So I have a simple resolution—what is the difficulty? There is no problem at all. It came to rest at the moment it became a private domain.

[Speaker D] Because if it’s before, then it didn’t pass from the public domain to the private domain. Do you understand? Because while it was still in the air, it didn’t pass from the public domain to the private domain. When it landed—if it became a private domain before it landed—then it didn’t land from a public…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not before—simultaneously.

[Speaker D] No, but he didn’t write that. He says it came to rest after it became a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which is what I asked—why?

[Speaker D] I’m explaining: because if it were simultaneous, then it would come out that from the public domain it landed in a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he doesn’t need to assume that in order to raise a difficulty. Then let him not assume it and not raise the difficulty. What does that mean? He says: “Now it seems that it is obvious to Abaye that it is considered as though it came to rest after it became a private domain.” And then of course he has all sorts of difficulties. But not true—it came to rest while becoming a private domain, and then there are no difficulties at all and everything is fine.

[Speaker B] I understand—what does it mean that it came to rest while becoming a private domain?

[Speaker D] At exactly the same second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simultaneously. They come together.

[Speaker B] So while it was in the air it was not a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct—that is what he said above. The moment it came to rest, at that same moment it also became a private domain. It came to rest and became a private domain simultaneously. And you see from Tosafot there that when something happens simultaneously, there is no problem; simultaneous is fine.

Tosafot apparently assumes—there is another nice example I mentioned here. There is a student of the Rabbi of Brisk who asks: how is it written that the Holy One, blessed be He, knew how to time midnight exactly, when He killed every firstborn in the land of Egypt at midnight? And what is written there is “about midnight,” because human beings cannot pinpoint the exact instant. So that people should not seize on the Holy One, blessed be He, as if He had not spoken truth, He says to Moses: “About midnight I will go out into the midst of Egypt.” But in reality the Holy One, blessed be He, knew how to pinpoint the exact instant—like Balaam, and like… never mind. So he asks: what do you mean? Midnight is not an instant. Midnight is the boundary between the first half of the night and the second half. That boundary has no width, no duration, of its own. It is simply the line separating the first half of the night from the second half.

[Speaker B] And that is the general question of boundaries in mathematics. Right, right. Is it approaching, or does it actually arrive?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no, no, no, not boundaries in that sense.

[Speaker B] Why not? It keeps coming into my head that it’s the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s not the question, and it is not connected to the question of limits. This is not limits in the sense of infinity. It is something else.

[Speaker B] Why not? A point—a point, does it really occupy any area, or does it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I understand. In another moment I’ll explain why that’s a mistake. It’s a question about boundaries in a different sense; I’ll talk about that shortly, I’ll explain. In any case, what’s written there is that—wait, just a second—the moment of death is some kind of event. It has to occur at some time. But midnight is not a time; it’s only the seam between the first half of the night and the second half. It’s not a time in its own right. So he says: then how can it be that even the Holy One, blessed be He, knows how to time death to the exact moment of midnight? There is no such moment. And then he has a brilliant answer. Do you know what the answer is? The answer is that death, too, is not an event. After all, death is only the seam between the time when I’m alive and the time when I’m dead. So put life onto the first half of the night, death onto the second half of the night, and dying sits exactly on the seam of midnight. Nice, right? He says—that’s a nice commonsense way of looking at it, I think. In any case, why am I saying this has nothing to do with the concept of limits? Because people think that a point is something whose length is zero, or approaches zero, and that’s a big mistake. Anything that has length must have at least one dimension. And even if its length approaches zero, like an infinitesimal, it still has one dimension. An infinitesimal is something whose dimension is one and whose length is zero. A point has dimension zero. Not length zero in one dimension. Its dimension is zero. It’s a different kind of entity. Therefore a point is something entirely different; it has nothing to do with limits at all. A point doesn’t have zero length; a point has no length at all. The concept of length simply doesn’t apply to it.

[Speaker B] So what you said, that midnight is not a time. Exactly. That’s why this actually does make sense to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I’m saying. And it has nothing to do with the concept of limits. It’s because… the claim is that midnight is not a time, and dying is also not an event. Dying is only a description of the transition from the phase of being alive to the phase of being dead. Okay, but then it comes out that I can coordinate two things—I can coordinate two things only when both of them are really transitions. They’re not entities that have some independent existence. Can I say “they come simultaneously”—I’m going back to them and to the topic—can I say “they come simultaneously” about two things that really happen? Maybe yes. I can say that the seam between the stage when it ceased being a public domain and began being a private domain happens exactly at the seam between the stage when it was moving and the stage when it is at rest. The coming-to-rest—the coming-to-rest is not a process; it is the transition between the stage when it was moving and the stage when it is at rest. Okay? And then I really can say that here they come simultaneously. Since Tosafot doesn’t mention that option, doesn’t raise that option, he apparently understands that this is an event. In other words, being at rest is an event; it’s not just a seam. And therefore he says that there’s no choice but to say that according to Abaye—if Abaye exempts in the case of throwing the beehive—there’s no choice but to say that it becomes a private domain a moment before it comes to rest, and therefore when it comes to rest it is already resting on a private domain or within a private domain, because otherwise he would not exempt. So the option of “they come simultaneously,” at least for the moment in Tosafot, doesn’t come up.

[Speaker D] I didn’t understand how he assumes that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So how? He assumes…

[Speaker D] What—that it became a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot doesn’t… for now at least, he rejects the option of their coming simultaneously. He says we have to say that it becomes a private domain a moment before it comes to rest, which is very strange, because a moment before it comes to rest it’s flying, and when it’s flying it isn’t a private domain—you yourself said that just a moment ago. So I asked: then the most obvious thing for Tosafot to say is, what’s the problem—these things happen simultaneously, all at once. I tried to explain why, at least at first glance, Tosafot is unwilling to accept that option, or doesn’t raise that option. Okay, but notice: after Tosafot raises various difficulties, he does eventually get there at the end. Here—on the chapter “One Who Throws,” Rabbi Yohanan raises the question: if there is a pit of nine handbreadths, and he dug out from it a ring of earth and completed it to ten, and placed it in the public domain—do the uprooting of the object and the performance of the prohibited labor come simultaneously, and is he liable, or not? Right? What is he unsure about? You see, it’s all the same thing. In other words, there is a pit of depth nine, and now he digs it another handbreadth, takes out the dirt, and removes it outside. When he took the dirt, did he take it from a private domain? It became a private domain only after he took out the dirt, because before that it was depth nine. Okay? So is that considered that he removed it from a private domain or not? That’s the question. And he continues—he continues the quotation from the Talmudic text—“And if you should say,” yes, if you say, “since there was not a wall of ten there originally, he is not liable”—yes, since at the beginning it wasn’t ten deep, he isn’t liable—then if there was a pit of ten and he put into it a ring of earth and reduced it, what is the law? The placing of an object and the removal of the wall, etc. Right? What is he saying? The reverse. I throw dirt into a pit of ten and fill it up, and now it is only nine high. Is that considered that I placed it into a pit of ten or not? Okay? And if so, Abaye, for whom in that same passage the matter is obvious in the case of the mat that nullifies the wall—as he says there, we mentioned this Talmudic passage above in Eshkahan—as he says there, if there is a pit in the public domain, ten deep and eight wide, and one throws a mat into it and divides it, he is exempt, because now it no longer has a width of four. Right? That’s Abaye’s view. And Abaye says that if from the outset there really was a domain here, but my throwing neutralized it, canceled the status of domain, then I’m exempt. So you see that in essence we follow the state created after the placing, right? Okay? So he says: “And all the more so he is exempt in the making of a wall, because since there was not a wall of ten originally, he is not liable. And if so, here he ought to be liable for this reason, since there was not a wall originally—after all, it came to rest in the public domain and he is liable.” So in our case, how does Abaye say—why does Abaye obligate? After all, in our case it became a private domain only after it came to rest; before it came to rest it was a public domain, and we go by what happens—what happens before. So Tosafot says: “And one can say that Abaye’s reason is that neither the uprooting nor the placing is considered significant when they come simultaneously. And here too, the placing is not considered significant since the placing and the making of the wall come simultaneously.” Now he does bring the option of simultaneity. The objection—no. Now he says there is no choice but to say that it happens together. But then what happens now that it happens together? Notice that he changes direction. What does he say? Why indeed is there exemption? Not the formulation he gave at the beginning. The formulation is not that you place it in a private domain—no. The exemption is because there is no placing here at all. Not that you place it in a private domain—there is no placing. This is not a placing. Why not? Because the domain into which you placed it did not yet exist at the moment you placed it. What is “placing”? “Placing” is when a domain exists, and you take an object and place it into the existing domain; then it is called that you placed it. After that we can ask whether you placed it in a private domain or a public domain—that’s another discussion. First let us discuss whether there was any placing here at all. Tosafot says that if the domain, the place into which you placed it, is created together with the very act of placing, that is not an act of placing. Meaning, the exemption is not, as everyone understands Tosafot and as seems to emerge from the beginning of his wording, as we discussed at length earlier, that the exemption is because I placed it in a private domain. Tosafot says no, that cannot be, because then we get tangled up with the timeline. The exemption is that there is no placing here at all. That is the exemption. It is an uprooting without a placing. Even though—he writes this. He says: “And here too, it is not considered a placing, since the placing and the making of the wall come simultaneously.” He doesn’t say it is not considered a placing in the public domain. He says this is not a placing. Because the placing and the place into which you are placing occur together. But “placing” means there is a place, a table, and you place something on it. The table has to exist. To place the table itself and then say the table is resting on itself—that is not called placing. And therefore, what the exemption is according to Tosafot is a third formulation. And I’ll say again: later authorities (Acharonim) did not understand Tosafot this way; in my opinion they are mistaken. Tosafot does not exempt the way it sounds from his wording at the beginning, what we discussed at length earlier, that he exempts because this is a placing in a private domain. Tosafot exempts because there is no placing here.

[Speaker B] Mei Menuchot—that’s what he writes on Tosafot. What? Okay. He writes that this isn’t called placing. It isn’t considered placing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, so this is already a third formulation of the exemption. Okay. What will happen now in the case of one who throws a beehive from the public domain to the private domain? According to the first formulation of Tosafot?

[Speaker D] It would have had to be a private domain even before he placed it, and then there was a placing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He should have been liable, right? Someone who throws a beehive from the public domain to the private domain according to Tosafot—what is the law?

[Speaker D] Yes, liable. Liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because after all, he—the one who placed it—removed it from the public domain and placed it in the private domain. According to the formulation I’m saying now in Tosafot,

[Speaker D] that there’s no placing here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt. Right—because although it is in the private domain, there was no placing in the private domain. Exempt. Exempt. Okay? There’s a difference here.

[Speaker D] Is he exempt or is it permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt. All these cases in Tosafot are only exempt,

[Speaker D] not permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] If there’s no placing here at all, then why isn’t it permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text itself says here that once there is no placing here because this is a domain—not just that there wasn’t an act of placing—then it is only exempt. The rabbis nevertheless prohibited it. And the Talmudic text says here “exempt,” not “permitted.” So that’s the practical difference. What happens in the case of carrying four cubits in the public domain? There too, one could have said that according to Rashi he is exempt, because it is transferring a domain, not transferring an object. According to Tosafot he should be liable because he placed it in the private domain. But according to what I’m saying now, that’s not right, because he didn’t place it; there was no placing here. He placed it down below when it was a private domain together with him.

[Speaker B] And was there an uprooting? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The uprooting? Also an interesting question. It’s possible not.

[Speaker B] Because here he distinguishes in the case of the pit based on whether the walls were there beforehand or not. So in placing, apparently they weren’t there beforehand and then they were created, and in uprooting it’s the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot himself—Tosafot himself talks about the fact that the Talmudic text makes a distinction between uprooting and placing on this issue. But נכון, in principle with respect to uprooting as well one could say the same thing. Wait. Okay, now let’s take a look at the Ran. The Ran writes as follows: “And I am astonished at Rabbenu Yonatan, of blessed memory, who wrote: specifically when he threw it upright, in which case it is considered a domain. But if he threw it not upright, but sideways like a skylight, he is liable, even though its width is six and its height is ten, for its entire resting is in the public domain”—end quote. The view of Rabbenu Yonatan, Rabbi Yonatan of Lunel, is that if he throws the beehive while it is lying down, then when it comes to rest in the public domain its height is six handbreadths, right? The whole thing is within the public domain, and therefore in that case he says clearly he would be liable. The whole discussion of Abaye in our passage is when he throws it upright, standing. Why? Because then, when it is standing, it is considered a private domain since it has a height of ten, and so it is really resting inside a private domain.

[Speaker C] And if it’s lying down, then it’s an object?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear. Yes, if it’s lying down, then it’s an object because it’s not a private domain. Right? So therefore Rabbenu Yonatan says that in such a case the passage is not speaking. The passage speaks only when you threw it standing. About this the Ran says: “And I do not understand, for what difference does it make whether sideways or upright, since it is a private domain? And the Torah only imposed liability for vessels and the like.” What is his objection?

[Speaker D] That it doesn’t matter what the shape is, whether it’s standing or lying down, it’s still called a private domain. Why? Because of its measurements, that it can be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Look—look at the previous paragraph in the Ran: “Abaye said: if one threw a beehive in the public domain”—meaning it is round—“and if he threw it, since it is ten high and six wide, he is exempt because it constitutes a private domain, for the Torah imposed liability only for throwing a vessel, but not for throwing a domain, for that is not considered a resting in the public domain, just as it is not considered in the case of one who throws above ten in the public domain, which is an exempt place. And it makes no difference whether he threw it four cubits in the public domain or whether he threw it from the private domain to the public domain.” Why does he add that? Because according to Tosafot it does make a difference. Right? Because according to Tosafot in the first naïve formulation, then if he throws four cubits in the public domain, he placed it in the private domain, so he is liable. If he threw it from the private domain to the public domain, in the end he placed it in the private domain, so he is exempt. These are different things according to Tosafot. But according to Rashi there is no difference. Because according to Rashi the exemption is that all the laws of carrying out or throwing were said about objects, not about domains. And once you throw a domain, you are exempt no matter from where and to where. It doesn’t depend on the question of whether in the end it came to rest in a private domain, a public domain, or no matter where. The very fact that the object here is not an object but a domain exempts you. According to Rashi there is no difference between anything and anything. And you can see it here in this Ran, that the Ran certainly learned like Rashi. If so, I go back upward to his dispute with Rabbi Yonatan—this is exactly according to their respective views. The Ran argues…

[Speaker B] Why “domain”—why can’t we say that according to Rashi it is called a domain only when it is upright, and you can’t turn it? Even according to Rashi you could say that. Maybe the potential…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why should that matter? This thing is a domain—what difference does it make how it stands?

[Speaker B] Because it matters, because when it stands on the ground it matters a lot. We said that when it stands on the ground it requires a height of ten… but why does it matter whether it stands on the ground or stands in the air?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter.

[Speaker B] I’ll remind you again of what I said earlier—wait, wait, I’ll remind you again of what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —I said earlier about the sagging door in the discussion at the beginning of the class. When the object has the status of a domain, then even if when I place something inside it I would not be liable for one reason or another. And I argued that at least according to the Ra’akh, this thing is called a domain. But there is a functional problem here. So with regard to throwing the beehive itself, it is called a domain. With regard to the question whether placing something inside it is considered placing in a private domain, it is not considered placing in a private domain. One second, one second—the same thing I’m arguing here. I’m saying that if this beehive has the status that it is called a domain and not an object, then it really makes no difference whether it is lying down or standing. At the moment I’m asking: what is this beehive? I’m not speaking functionally. If the beehive comes to rest crosswise, lying down, and I place an object inside it, I will not be liable. On that I agree. Since functionally there is no height of ten handbreadths here. But if I ask whether this item has the status of a domain or the status of an object, the answer is that it is a domain.

[Speaker B] I understand that answer, and I can still argue that the status of a domain exists only when there is height.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can argue that, but that’s not a difficulty on the Ran. The Ran claims otherwise, and there’s no problem. If he had said otherwise—you’re saying to me, not that—

[Speaker B] not on me, I’m just saying that the Ran isn’t necessarily decisive. At first I said that the Ran follows Rashi’s view, but I can argue that Rashi’s view is not like the Ran. I can argue that Rashi’s view is that there still has to be height when standing, and not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only the object itself if it combines. I understand, understand, understand completely. And what I’m answering is that first of all the Ran says he is following Rashi’s view; that’s not a guess. Second, according to Rashi’s view it is natural to make this comment about Rabbi Yonatan. True, if I had a contradiction in the Ran I wouldn’t die from it; I would say that it has the status in the object itself of a private domain only when it is standing and not when it is lying. But if both signs are there—green on the outside, red on the inside, and it has watermelon seeds—there’s no reason not to say it’s a watermelon. Meaning, the simple assumption is that this is how the Ran understands Rashi’s view here. I’m not saying one must understand it this way, but it is very natural to say that this is exactly it. After all, the Ran says, “I don’t understand Rabbi Yonatan at all”; he raises an objection to Rabbi Yonatan, he isn’t merely stating a position. He says you can’t say otherwise.

[Speaker B] I understand that the Ran understands Rashi that way? Clearly. But that doesn’t mean we can’t—we can understand Rashi differently too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. I answered before that I agree. I’m only saying that the Ran not only says otherwise; the Ran also understands that one cannot say otherwise. Because the Ran is objecting to Rabbi Yonatan—what are you objecting to Rabbi Yonatan for? Let’s say Rabbi Yonatan also follows Rashi’s view. You say—what did he object to Rabbi Yonatan? “What difference does it make whether sideways or upright? Since it is a private domain, the Torah only imposed liability for vessels.” Rabbi Yonatan would answer him: what do you want? The Torah imposed liability only for vessels and not for domains, true, but this is not a domain because it is lying down. So what is the great objection to Rabbi Yonatan? Because the Ran not only holds this way in Rashi; the Ran also understands that one cannot say otherwise in Rashi. Now you are right that I could have resolved it differently, but in the Ran עצמו it is clear that he understands not only that by chance he says this and also says that; he understands that this is derived from that. Do you understand what I’m claiming?

[Speaker D] Rabbi Yonatan is talking about the actual reality, and the Ran is talking about the potential—once you turn it over, it can be a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Now when we want to explain Rabbi Yonatan, Rabbenu Yonatan, several possibilities open up here. The most natural thing, if I continue following the Ran, is to say that Rabbenu Yonatan follows the basic approach of Tosafot. Namely what? If Tosafot says that in order to exempt, it has to be resting in a private domain, and when the beehive comes to rest it is simply resting in a private domain, and therefore he exempts—then Rabbi Yonatan says: that is all when it is standing. But when it is lying down, it is not true that it is in a private domain, because to place something inside it when it is lying down would not be considered placing in a private domain; it does not have a height of ten when it is lying down. So if that is the case, then one cannot say that it is resting in a private domain, right? That is the natural interpretation. I continue with the Ran and say that according to Rashi the Ran is certainly right and one cannot disagree, let’s say, aside from what Hani pointed out earlier. So what will I say about Rabbenu Yonatan? Fine—because he does not accept Rashi; he follows Tosafot’s view. Which of the two formulations of Tosafot? It doesn’t matter. Right? Whether we say that in Tosafot’s formulation this is a placing into a private domain, or whether the formulation in Tosafot is that this is not a placing at all. Since if it is lying down, then there is also placing, because once, when it is lying down, it is not considered a private domain, then placing it there is indeed considered a placing. Both formulations of Tosafot on this point fit Rabbenu Yonatan. Hani is right that one can also explain Rabbenu Yonatan according to Rashi’s view and against what the Ran assumes as something so obvious. Namely: it is considered a domain as long as it is standing, not when it is lying down. When it is lying down, it is not a domain. Okay? That is definitely also a possible explanation of Rabbenu Yonatan.

[Speaker D] You can also see from the wording “he threw a beehive into the public domain, ten high,” as if in the public domain it will be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that doesn’t mean it is ten high when standing. It could be ten high and he threw it into the public domain.

[Speaker D] So it’s not only talking about height measured from the floor upward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right—height from the floor upward when it is standing. And now he threw it. Its height is ten handbreadths.

[Speaker D] It doesn’t say “he threw a beehive ten high into the public domain,” but “he threw a beehive into the public domain, ten high.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, because it isn’t flying at a height of ten. I didn’t say it was flying at a height of ten. I said that the beehive itself has a height of ten. But when I threw it, that doesn’t mean it was standing; it could be that it was lying down. The beehive is ten high. Think how you would say it: you have a beehive whose height is ten, and now I took the beehive and threw it while lying down. How would you describe that? Wouldn’t you describe it as “he threw a beehive ten high”? What’s the problem? The height of the object is ten. Just in conclusion, look here in Totsaot Chayim—he really does connect it to this, at the end of section 3, end of section 2.

[Speaker D] Wait, end of section 3.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here. “And it seems that the practical difference in this is”—here, from here—“and it seems that the practical difference in this is with regard to what is discussed in the Ran’s novellae in the name of Rabbenu Yonah, that the rule that one who throws a beehive is exempt applies specifically to carrying out and when he threw it upright, but if he threw it widthwise, since now it is not ten high, he is liable. And the Ran rejected this, for what difference does it make whether widthwise or upright, since it is a private domain, for the Torah imposed liability only for a vessel. And in the Meiri’s novellae he brought this from Eruvin,” etc. “And when we discuss what the object is, we view it as if it were in a form in which it could be considered a domain.”

[Speaker D] And that’s its potential.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—yes—but he says, “And it seems that this depends on that. And if the exemption is because it is not a vessel but rather a domain, then there is no practical difference in which way it is thrown”—Rashi, yes? “There is no practical difference in which way it is thrown, since in essence the object has the status of a domain upon it, and therefore it becomes a domain. But if the exemption is on the ground that at the time of resting it is a private domain, and it is like one who throws from a private domain to a private domain”—notice how he understands Tosafot; I don’t agree with him—“then this is only when it rests in a way that it will be a private domain at the time of resting, and not when it rests widthwise. And this is the practical difference, to teach us that there is no exemption on account of throwing a domain, for then he would be exempt even when throwing it widthwise; rather, his exemption is on account of its being like one who carries from a private domain to a private domain, and that is only when he placed it at a height of ten, and this is obvious.” Well, that’s exactly the point—it is not at all obvious. It is a practical difference, but it is not a simple practical difference. One can certainly argue with it. Okay? That is basically his claim. Now he also sharpens the point I mentioned earlier. Because really, tell me what would happen according to Rabbi Yonatan, according to Rashi. So Rashi says that once I threw a domain I am exempt, and it makes no difference even if I threw it widthwise, right? That is how the Ran understood it. Now I ask: what happens if I placed an object into this beehive while it was lying in the public domain? According to Rashi? Yes, according to Rashi and according to the Ran.

[Speaker D] It’s still exempt, because it doesn’t matter in what form you placed it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—but I didn’t place the beehive; I placed an object into it.

[Speaker D] But it is considered a private domain.

[Speaker B] Exempt, because it doesn’t have a height of ten.

[Speaker D] It—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not considered a private domain for this purpose. If you took it out from the public domain, then you did not place it in a private domain, right? Because it doesn’t have a height of ten. Even according to Rashi, that the beehive has the status in the object itself of a private domain, that does not mean that now whoever places something inside it has placed it into a private domain. Do you see the distinction I mentioned at the beginning of the class with the flowerpot on his head? There is a difference between the definition of the object and its functionality. And for liability in carrying, it is not enough that the object be defined as a private domain; it also has to have the functionality of a private domain, a height of ten. And that is another proof for the distinction I mentioned above. Okay.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much. Nice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much. Have a good holiday.