חדש באתר: עוזר בינה מלאכותית המבוסס על כתביו ושיעוריו של הרב מיכאל אברהם

Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 46

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lesson

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Table of Contents

  • General Overview
  • The Goal of the Lesson and a Reading Exercise in Later Authorities
  • The Plan for the Campus Meeting and Its Connection to Jewish Law of the Sabbath in a Hospital
  • Maimonides as a Summary of the Overall Picture of the Topics
  • Opening with Kehillot Yaakov and Presenting Fundamental Disputes in the Beehive Topic
  • The Measurement of “Six Wide,” the Thickness of the Walls, and Tosafot’s Question
  • Rabbi Chaim: Gud Asik, a Private Domain on Top of the Beehive, and the Distinction Between a Floor and a Domain
  • The Topic in Sabbath 99b: A Wall Not Four Wide and the a fortiori argument “If it makes a partition for others”
  • Kehillot Yaakov’s Question from Rabbeinu Chananel: A Sealed Beehive as a Private Domain
  • A Pit and Its Rim, Chavut Rami, and Three Requirements: Measurement, Level, and Use
  • Nachmanides in Milhamot: We Do Not Apply Lavud, Gud Achit, or Gud Asik to Vessels, and Resolving the View of Rabbeinu Chananel
  • End of the Lesson and Logistical Coordination

Summary

General Overview

The lesson is devoted to a guided reading exercise in the writings of later authorities on the topic of throwing a beehive on the Sabbath, with the goal of getting the participants used to dealing directly with complex textual moves in works like Kehillot Yaakov and Rabbi Chaim. The lecturer describes the plan for continuing the learning, including a future summary through Maimonides in chapter 14, and updates the class about a planned campus meeting with a rabbi who deals with Jewish law of the Sabbath in a hospital and issues of saving life. During the group exercise they read Kehillot Yaakov, section 9, and explain it step by step, clarifying the disputes of Rashi, the Rif, Tosafot, the Arukh, the interpretation of Rabbeinu Chananel, Nachmanides, and Rabbi Chaim’s comments, while building an understanding of the conditions for a private domain, the inclusion of wall thickness, and the use of concepts like gud asik and chavut rami.

The Goal of the Lesson and a Reading Exercise in Later Authorities

The lecturer says that the time has come to move from additional nuances in the topic to a practical exercise in reading later authorities based on what was learned in the previous lessons. Kehillot Yaakov is presented as relatively clear, and Rabbi Chaim as clear too, but with a conceptually complicated line of argument that requires tracking many Talmudic topics. The lecturer asks the participants to read aloud and explain, stressing that this is not a test and that the purpose is to develop independent reading ability and the capacity to grapple with text.

The Plan for the Campus Meeting and Its Connection to Jewish Law of the Sabbath in a Hospital

The upcoming Tuesday meeting is planned to take place on campus with the rabbi from Hillel Yaffe, who will speak to both groups. He is expected to address problems and solutions he encounters in his work in a hospital in relation to Jewish law of the Sabbath, and the meeting will also be used to study background material related to saving life on the Sabbath and Sabbath law in those contexts. The agenda described is to begin with his lesson or meeting early in the morning, and afterward the participants will continue learning, with a joint discussion after his remarks.

Maimonides as a Summary of the Overall Picture of the Topics

The lecturer notes that after the second half of the topic on Thursday, he plans to direct them to read Maimonides in chapter 14 as a nice summary that creates a general picture out of the scattered topics. He attributes to Maimonides the important benefit of gathering separate topics and presenting the overall picture, including the definition of the domains, the meaning of the walls, and issues hinted at in Tosafot and the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

Opening with Kehillot Yaakov and Presenting Fundamental Disputes in the Beehive Topic

The lecturer chooses to begin with Kehillot Yaakov even though it is later than Rabbi Chaim, because it gives a broader picture more connected to the topic, while Rabbi Chaim goes off in additional directions and deals with details. Kehillot Yaakov first brings the Talmudic text about a beehive in the public domain that is ten high and six wide, for which one is exempt, and then presents two basic understandings: Rashi explains the exemption by saying that in the Tabernacle we find the throwing of an object, not the throwing of a domain; whereas the Rif and Tosafot explain that it is like throwing from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain, because where the beehive comes to rest it itself is a private domain. The lecturer adds that in Tosafot there is a concluding move claiming that there is no act of placing here at all, because the domain is created together with the placing.

The Measurement of “Six Wide,” the Thickness of the Walls, and Tosafot’s Question

Rashi is explained in Kehillot Yaakov as saying that the need for six is not exact, and that five and three-fifths is enough in order to square out four by four. The Arukh in the name of Rabbi Immanuel and the Rif are explained as calculating wall thickness of one-fifth of a handbreadth on each side, so that the net interior space is five and three-fifths while the gross width comes to six, and a four-by-four area is required aside from the thickness of the walls. Tosafot ask that the thickness of a partition ought to count toward completing the required measure, because *if one wanted, one could place something on it* and use it, and they bring support from the principle of combination in Eruvin.

Rabbi Chaim: Gud Asik, a Private Domain on Top of the Beehive, and the Distinction Between a Floor and a Domain

Kehillot Yaakov cites Rabbi Chaim as saying that the reason for including the walls is *if one wanted, one could place something on it*, and that on top of the beehive there is a private domain because of partitions by force of gud asik. Rabbi Chaim argues that one cannot exempt someone who throws the beehive because the beehive itself comes to rest in the public domain and is not itself a private domain when it does not contain four by four inside, and what exists above is a separate private domain for which the beehive serves as a floor. Kehillot Yaakov formulates this by saying that this situation is not “throwing a domain” and not “placing in a private domain”; only when the beehive has four by four inside besides its walls does the beehive itself become a private domain, and then its walls too are considered a private domain by force of the a fortiori argument, “If it makes a partition for others, all the more so for itself,” as stated on page 99.

The Topic in Sabbath 99b: A Wall Not Four Wide and the a fortiori argument “If it makes a partition for others”

The lecturer pauses to demonstrate a method of checking sources and jumps to Babylonian Talmud, Sabbath 99b, regarding a wall in the public domain that is ten high and not four wide and encloses a karmelit. He presents the sides of Rabbi Yochanan’s doubt whether it is an exempt area or whether it is considered as though filled in, and the words of Ulla and the tradition in the name of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan that one who throws and it comes to rest on top of it is liable because of the a fortiori argument, “If it makes a partition for others, for itself all the more so.” He notes that there are interpretive directions as to whether the wall is subsumed into the area of the domain or whether the logic is specifically that it serves as a partition for itself, and raises the suspicion that this is simply another formulation of the same idea of “it is considered as though filled in.”

Kehillot Yaakov’s Question from Rabbeinu Chananel: A Sealed Beehive as a Private Domain

Kehillot Yaakov asks that according to Rabbi Chaim it follows that if one throws a sealed solid body ten high and four by four wide, one should be liable; but in the interpretation of Rabbeinu Chananel in the Vilna-style printing of the Talmud it is explained that if the beehive were not hollow it would be considered a private domain at four by four and one would be exempt. He suggests the possibility of attributing this to the Arukh, namely that partitions created through gud asik also enclose downward, like a hanging partition that permits in water, whereas on dry land a hanging partition does not permit because kids break through it, while here the solid body prevents such passage and therefore “it indeed permits.” Kehillot Yaakov ends that suggestion with “this requires further analysis” and returns to say that a difficulty still remains for Rabbeinu Chananel’s position regarding the need for four by four besides the walls, because here too we would say *if one wanted, one could place something on it*.

A Pit and Its Rim, Chavut Rami, and Three Requirements: Measurement, Level, and Use

Kehillot Yaakov seeks to explain the position of Rabbeinu Chananel and those who follow him, according to whom the walls of the beehive do not complete the required four-by-four measure, and raises Tosafot’s question, “How is this different from a pit and its rim,” where the wall thickness does complete the measure. He rejects an explanation based only on practical use, because even without four by four one could seemingly place a protruding board there, and concludes that the reasoning of *if one wanted, one could place something on it* is said only when there is already a four-by-four place through combination, and only then do we ask whether it is fit for use. He asks how the floor of the pit below and the wall thickness above can combine, and suggests that the answer is by the rule of chavut rami, as appears in the case of a sparse sukkah and aligned beams, while distinguishing that chavut rami applies across airspace, so one cannot say that the wall thickness is “lowered” downward, but one can say the reverse, that we view the floor as though rising upward through the air. In that way a four-by-four area is obtained on one level, though the question of usability remains, and for that we say *if one wanted, one could place something on it*.

Nachmanides in Milhamot: We Do Not Apply Lavud, Gud Achit, or Gud Asik to Vessels, and Resolving the View of Rabbeinu Chananel

Kehillot Yaakov cites Nachmanides in Milhamot on the topic of the beehive, who states that we do not say lavud, gud achit meḥitzata, or gud asik with regard to vessels, and a vessel becomes a domain only when the required measure exists in reality and not by way of a halakhic rule. He concludes that since the inclusion of the wall thickness toward a four-by-four measure in the case of a pit and its rim depends on the halakhic rule of chavut rami, one cannot learn from there to a beehive, which is a vessel. Therefore, in a beehive that does not contain an interior of four by four, we do not say chavut rami in order to make it into a domain by means of a halakhic rule. On that basis he explains why the wall thickness of a beehive cannot be included to complete the measure needed for a private domain, and distinguishes it from the case in Eruvin, which deals with the rim of a pit and a rock, not vessels, and he concludes, “And this is correct, with the help of God, blessed be He.”

End of the Lesson and Logistical Coordination

The lecturer sums up that they completed reading Kehillot Yaakov but did not yet begin Rabbi Chaim, and he estimates that the exercise achieved its goal. It was set that the Tuesday meeting at the university would begin at 8:45, with a future update on the schedule, and it was stated that it is supposed to continue until 1:15. One participant says she will not be able to come on Tuesday because of work and mentions another date change to the 24th, and the session ends with wishes for a peaceful Sabbath and thanks.

Full Transcript

[Speaker A] Okay, let’s begin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So, like I wrote to you yesterday, my feeling was that this is a good time, instead of digging into more nuances of the topic, to take what we’ve done so far and try to use it to do some kind of exercise, workshop, I don’t know what to call it, in reading later authorities. Since here we have Kehillot Yaakov and Rabbi Chaim, who overall are both, on the one hand, fairly clear writers compared to other later authorities certainly; Kehillot Yaakov really writes clearly in general. And Rabbi Chaim usually writes clearly too, but it’s more complicated. Meaning, the content is complicated. It’s not that it’s incredibly hard to understand what he writes, but following the line of thought, seeing which topics he’s referring to, and so on, that’s not an easy exercise, and I assume at least some of you found that difficult, and that’s fine. I mean, I’m doing this intentionally because it’s part of grappling with these things. You have to struggle a bit with reading the material itself and not only hear me talking about it or see the structure, but really get used to reading on your own, with the background we’ve built in the last two lessons obviously helping. So that’s a basis that can make the struggle easier for you, and I thought we should really devote today to that exercise. This coming Tuesday, just to remind you, it’s supposed to be—again, supposed to be—our meeting on campus. The rabbi from Hillel Yaffe is supposed to be there to speak with both groups, actually. We’ll do some learning around that issue; I’ll still update you. It will probably be something connected to—he’s a hospital rabbi—so he will probably talk about the problems and solutions he encounters in his practical work in a hospital in relation to Jewish law of the Sabbath. He knows we’re learning Sabbath, and we’ll learn a bit about issues, the background related to saving life on the Sabbath and Sabbath law, and what they are, what we do with them in those contexts of saving life. So we’ll use that meeting both for the meeting with the groups and also for learning these topics, which are a bit different from what we’re doing here, but still connected to Jewish law of the Sabbath. So that’s the plan for Tuesday, unless there is some change, in which case I’ll update you, but right now that’s the plan. And the plan, at least as far as I know, unless it changed, is that we begin with his lesson or meeting with him, meaning at the start of the morning. And afterward we’ll do some learning on the topic of saving life; I won’t give a whole lesson, but we’ll see exactly how I do it—your learning with some joint clarification between us—but that will be after his lesson. So it won’t be preparation beforehand, but it will be a day devoted somewhat to those matters. Okay, as for today, I really want to get into Kehillot Yaakov and Rabbi Chaim, and just now when I looked at Maimonides in chapter 14 I thought that after we do the second half of the topic on Thursday, I hope one time will be enough for overturning the barrel over him and the second half of the topic, then I’ll simply tell you: read Maimonides in chapter 14, because it’s a very nice summary and suddenly you see that from all the things we’ve touched on and seen and so on, an overall picture can emerge about the definition of the domains, the meaning of the walls, and all these things—and for that there is Maimonides. In other words, one of the greatest benefits Maimonides brought to learning is really to take all the scattered topics, each of which we deal with separately every time, and try to show what overall picture comes out of them. I think that’s quite nice after we’ve already touched the issues from a range of directions. Some of it, of course, is other topics, but they were mentioned in Tosafot, mentioned in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and you’ve encountered them—not necessarily directly inside the sources, but you’ve heard the concepts. Meaning, you already understand the environment in which this topic operates, and therefore I think that reading Maimonides will be a nice way to summarize this unit. Okay, but that’s for later. Let’s begin with our topic. As I wrote to you, I want to hear you a bit today. Or rather, to read a bit—you should read a bit, we’ll talk, you’ll explain. Don’t panic, because it’s obvious to me that some of you will certainly struggle with some of it—understood, not understood, it’s okay, this isn’t an exam or anything like that, just in order to—in order to activate you a little and see that you too are grappling with the text and not only listening to me and hearing my explanations. Okay? So no, I’m trying to calm you down because I know things like this always intimidate people and raise anxieties. So don’t worry, we’re here together, among ourselves, it’s fine, nothing is happening. Okay, so I really would like everyone to read. Meaning, so I hope we’ll have time; we’ll see how to do it, but I hope we do. So let’s start. I want to start דווקא with Kehillot Yaakov, even though of course it comes after Rabbi Chaim and even mentions Rabbi Chaim, but it gives a broader picture and one more connected to our topic. Rabbi Chaim touches our topic but actually goes off in other directions too and deals with details. The complexity there is greater, so I prefer to begin with Kehillot Yaakov. I’ll share the file so we can all read it from the screen. You don’t need to look at it on your own screens; we’ll all be able to see it on the screen. Okay, this is Kehillot Yaakov, section 9. Good. Okay, so let’s begin. Who wants to volunteer to start? The beginning is easy, I mean, so actually I think the beginning should be done by someone who feels she had more difficulty, because here it’s relatively easier.

[Speaker C] I can start, but I’ll say in advance that I don’t read Rashi script very fluently. Okay, all the abbreviations—I don’t always get them exactly right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, perfectly fine, that’s exactly why we’re doing this exercise. Wait, so I—the problem is that when I’m sharing I don’t see—was that Miriam? Yes. Ah, okay, I identify by voice, because when you’re sharing I just don’t see you. The wonders of Zoom, I guess. Okay, so go ahead, Miriam.

[Speaker C] Okay, I’ll read from where you opened, but could you enlarge it just a little, because my eyes…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, it’s just that then it runs farther off the page. Fine, so I’ll make it, say, eighty. Okay, is that better?

[Speaker C] Yes. Abaye said: If one threw a beehive into the public domain, if it was ten high and six wide, he is exempt. And Rashi explained—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Up to there, up to there—that’s a quotation from the Talmudic text, with the necessary skipping.

[Speaker C] Yes, this whole part is pretty concise, there’s not really a whole topic here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In itself, just bringing the data in order to start working.

[Speaker C] Because we did not find in the Tabernacle anything but the throwing of an object, not the throwing of a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—go ahead, explain.

[Speaker C] Meaning that it’s not a labor from the Tabernacle, it’s not from the Tabernacle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “We did not find” means—we did not find. Yes, we did not find in the Tabernacle anything but…

[Speaker C] But the throwing of an object and not the throwing of a domain. Meaning that in the Tabernacle there is no throwing of a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and therefore one is exempt. If you throw a domain, you’re exempt; that’s what we saw as Rashi’s explanation.

[Speaker C] Yes. And the Rif and Tosafot wrote that it is because it is like throwing from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain, for which one is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And likewise the beehive—

[Speaker C] Wherever it comes to rest is a private domain. Meaning? Meaning that Tosafot related to it as throwing from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain, which is exempt, and the place where the beehive comes to rest is also a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m throwing the beehive into the public domain, so in fact when the beehive comes to rest in the public domain, it itself becomes a private domain, and then it’s as though I placed it in a private domain. So he is anticipating here the dispute we saw, that there are two conceptions of how to understand the exemption for throwing a beehive. According to Rashi, it’s because in the Tabernacle we saw only the throwing of objects, not the throwing of a domain. And according to the Rif and the Rosh—what Tosafot brings—it is because he is like one who throws, sorry, according to Tosafot, because the Rif is something else, yes, because he is throwing from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain, since the beehive itself is considered the place where it itself sits. Meaning, when it is a private domain, then when I threw it into the public domain, it’s as though it is resting on the place that is…

[Speaker E] In the air it’s not a private domain, right? You hear? In the air it’s not a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s one thing, and second, from the conclusion—that’s the wording at the beginning of Tosafot. But after the questions, in the conclusion, I think he changes the wording and explains that it’s not that there is placing in a private domain here, but rather there is no placing here at all. Because the domain into which you placed the object was created together with the placing, and that isn’t called placing. Placing means taking something and putting it down in an existing place. But when the place is created together with the placing, you can’t say there was placing here. So it’s a different exemption from saying that this is placing in a private domain. The claim is simply that there was no act of placing here. And we saw the implications of these things in various directions. In any case, up to here he has basically brought the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), with the two conceptions of why one is in fact exempt for throwing a beehive. Okay, continue.

[Speaker C] And Rashi explained that the reason it needs to be six wide, even though with five and three—

[Speaker E] fifths

[Speaker C] —one can square out four by four, he was not being exact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Up to here. What is he saying?

[Speaker C] He’s talking about the width of the six—if you add the walls, then together it becomes six.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s not Rashi. That’s the Arukh—he’ll read that in a second. I’m talking about Rashi. What does Rashi say? Rashi says that what Abaye says, that the width is six—well, that’s not exact, because the width should be 5.6, five and three-fifths. Okay? So that’s what he says. Right, five and three-fifths is enough, but he was not exact. He spoke approximately, not with mathematical precision. That’s Rashi’s explanation.

[Speaker C] And in Tosafot—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the name of the Arukh—

[Speaker C] In the name of Immanuel they explained: because the thickness of the walls is a fifth, a fifth of a handbreadth—a fifth means one-fifth—of a handbreadth on each side, and we require a place of four by four in order to make it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a private domain, aside from the thickness of the walls.

[Speaker C] And so too the Rif of blessed memory wrote.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he saying? Up to here—what do the Arukh and the Rif say?

[Speaker C] That the thickness of the walls is five handbreadths on each side?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One-fifth of a handbreadth on each side.

[Speaker C] Okay, and then what comes out?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it reaches—

[Speaker E] six.

[Speaker C] What—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does it help that there is one-fifth of a handbreadth on each side? In the actual space, in the inner cavity, we have 5.6. Now the thickness of the walls on both sides, each one is one-fifth of a handbreadth, meaning 0.2 of a handbreadth. So all in all, the total width from edge to edge, gross, is 5.6 plus 0.2 plus 0.2.

[Speaker C] Yes, so that comes out to exactly six.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the six being discussed. So according to the Arukh and the Rif this six is exact. According to Rashi it isn’t exact. According to the Arukh and the Rif it is exact. Okay.

[Speaker C] And Tosafot objected, for the thickness of the partition is fit to complete the required measure, because if one wanted one could place something on it and use it, as explained in Eruvin 78.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? What are Tosafot asking against the Arukh and the Rif?

[Speaker C] If the partition—that is, if the thickness, if the wall—is usable, if it’s for use—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that you can place things on top of the walls, and then I ought to take the thickness of the walls, and that can be considered part of the width of the actual interior space. So Tosafot asks: why do you need to get to a net 5.6 plus two fifths on the two sides? Just get to 5.6 gross, with the two fifths on the sides already included within that, because overall the walls can combine to the measure of the cavity, so you don’t need six, you need 5.6—5.6 is enough. That was Tosafot’s question. First of all, you see that in the first paragraph—and this is always the case, at least with orderly later authorities like Kehillot Yaakov—this is always how it works. He really brings, in brief, what emerges from our topic in the aspects he wants to address. So here he has brought a concise summary of the information from our topic. He brought the Talmudic text, brought the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about how to understand the basis of the exemption for throwing a beehive—whether it’s throwing a domain or placing in a private domain—and after that he brings the dispute between the Rosh and the Rif on the one hand and Rashi on the other regarding the calculation of the six handbreadths of width: whether the cavity combines with the partitions or not. That’s the gist, in brief. Yes.

[Speaker E] But according to Rashi, a four by four interior of the beehive is still required, right? I didn’t understand. According to Rashi he requires four—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Four by four in the cavity of the beehive without the walls? I think so.

[Speaker E] Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why yes?

[Speaker E] Because I’ll explain: “he was not exact” means there is still room for the walls and they don’t have to reach all the way to six.

[Speaker D] No, no, no, no. Rashi didn’t say that.

[Speaker E] Why does it have to include the walls according to Rashi?

[Speaker D] “He was not exact” means simply that he stated an inexact number.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s the calculation we discussed in Rashi. Exactly for that reason he says the number is not exact—because the gross measure should be 5.6, and here they give the gross number as six, so it’s not exact. And actually, with Rashi—I said that, admittedly, you are right that this is what the plain wording of Rashi sounds like—but after looking at Tosafot’s question and the words of the Rosh, it comes out that the picture actually reverses. Specifically the Rosh, who takes wall thickness into account, argues that the required measure should be based on the net interior. And Rashi, who does not take wall thickness into account, is actually arguing that the measure is based on the gross size. I said—according to the area of the roof on top—and therefore I don’t care whether the support underneath consists of partition or cavity, because what matters to me is the total area above, on the roof of the beehive. Again, Rashi doesn’t explicitly say this; it’s the result of a calculation. You’re right that in the wording of Rashi it really sounds like he is talking about the cavity, but it seems to me that in the calculation this is more correct. And Tosafot, who joins Rashi and also says “he was not exact” against the Rosh and the Rif, certainly learns that way. So I assume that strengthens it further. Not that I can hear you?

[Speaker E] In Tosafot it’s clear, but according to Rashi it’s not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot goes back to Rashi’s words, and I assume that strengthens even more that Rashi probably says this too, because there are considerations within Rashi’s own position that led them to that conclusion; it’s not just because Tosafot happens to agree with him. The fact that Tosafot agrees with him strengthens it, but as we said, the calculations—why above the gross measure is enough but in width the gross measure isn’t enough, all the considerations we discussed there in Rashi—I won’t go back to that now. In any case, that’s the section that narrows down the words of the Talmudic text and the basic disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Okay, who wants to be next? I’m ready.

[Speaker F] Go ahead. Just before that, what does the Aramaic phrase mean—”if one wanted one could place something on it”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he wanted, he could place something on it.

[Speaker F] Okay, good, that’s what I thought. And in the novellae of our teacher Rabbi Chaim his wording is as follows: He wrote that here too the reason is “if one wanted one could place something on it.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, regarding Rabbi Chaim, here it doesn’t mean “his wording is as follows” but rather “of blessed memory.”

[Speaker F] Right, I never know, so I just say “his wording is as follows” for everyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’ll tell you the criterion. First: as soon as “his wording is as follows” appears, immediately after that there should begin a quotation, and at the end of the quotation there should appear “up to here is his wording,” which is the quotation-mark system in Talmudic language. The quotation marks are: begin with “his wording is as follows” and end with “up to here is his wording.” Okay?

[Speaker F] Okay. For on top of it there is a private domain, because by placing something there one can use the top of it, and on top of it too there are partitions by reason of gud asik. Meaning, what he is saying here is that it basically has a roof, and the roof is also a private domain because it has partitions by the principle of gud asik.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And likewise Rashi—though we’ve already seen that this isn’t completely agreed upon. Meaning, it may be that above there is a private domain without our needing to resort to gud asik. The partitions surrounding me from below can themselves be considered partitions, because they block anyone coming from outside. If he assumes this is gud asik, but this…

[Speaker G] What? If there are partitions—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Always. If there are no partitions, nothing will help here. We’re talking about a beehive with a height of ten, and above it is a private domain. Now the question is: how is the top a private domain? Is it because the top itself is defined as enclosed by partitions, because there is gud asik upward? That’s what Rabbi Chaim is assuming here. But I said there is another possibility, one that Rabbi Chaim himself mentions in the laws of sukkah: one can say that the top is a private domain even without gud asik; rather, the walls of the beehive, although they are located, as it were, beneath me when I stand on the roof of the beehive, those walls count as adequate partitions—one doesn’t need gud asik. Why? Because someone coming from outside, if he wants to enter this private domain, sees in front of him a partition ten handbreadths high. And from my perspective that is enough.

[Speaker G] Ah no, I was talking about the four by four—the height…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here I’m talking about the partitions.

[Speaker G] Fine, okay.

[Speaker F] All right? And so too Rashi wrote, of blessed memory, on page 6b.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Page 6b.

[Speaker F] They also anticipate Rashi of blessed memory on page 6b.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi, who lived after him.

[Speaker F] Under the heading “this teaches us”—that by reason of gud asik, the area above is considered a private domain. Nevertheless, one cannot exempt the person who throws this beehive, for the beehive itself comes to rest in the public domain, and it itself is not a private domain when it does not have four by four inside it. Meaning, inside it there is no private domain, but on top there is. Then what? Therefore someone who throws into it—so he throws from the public domain to a private domain, and one should not exempt him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. What it says here, “one who throws this beehive,” doesn’t mean someone who throws into the beehive, but someone who throws the beehive.

[Speaker F] Throws the beehive. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s in Talmudic language. In modern Hebrew it isn’t like that, but in Talmudic language “one who throws this beehive” means he throws this beehive. Okay. So what is his claim here? This is an important point, a central sentence. What is the claim?

[Speaker A] His claim is that the beehive—

[Speaker F] He continues the point—I just want to finish because he explains why. He argues that the beehive is not a private domain. Why? One who throws a beehive cannot be exempted. Why? Even though the roof is a private domain, one cannot exempt him. He explains: and only on top of it is there a private domain, and it is the floor of the private domain that is above it. Meaning, the beehive itself is not the private domain, because inside it there is no private domain, and it is only considered the floor of the private domain. Therefore you are not throwing a domain here. There is no throwing of a domain and no placing in a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is that sentence doing?

[Speaker F] There is no throwing of a domain because—

[Speaker E] The beehive is only the floor of the private domain, so you’re not throwing a domain. But also according to Tosafot, in his approach that you placed it in a private domain, that doesn’t apply here either because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly.

[Speaker F] That sentence is saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That sentence, “and there is no throwing of a domain and no placing in a private domain,” is saying that Rabbi Chaim’s principle works both according to Rashi and according to Tosafot.

[Speaker F] According to both approaches. Unlike a case where it has four by four aside from its walls—that is, where there is a net four by four inside—then it itself is a private domain, and consequently its walls too are considered a private domain. Now what he writes here is something I simply understood earlier from Rabbi Chaim. By force of the a fortiori argument: if it makes a partition for others, then it itself—what is that idea? From what I understood, there is a question whether the walls of a private domain themselves are considered a private domain. And I understood that what does it mean, if these walls make, create a private domain, then all the more so they themselves are a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Read the phrase: if it makes a partition for others, then for itself all the more so. As we say on page 99.

[Speaker F] Even though in my opinion he didn’t need to bring in here that the walls themselves are now a private domain. It would have been enough for him to say that this whole thing is a private domain; I don’t think he needed to get into the corner point that the walls too are considered a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker E] The walls together with the cavity, not by themselves.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker F] But he didn’t need to say that the walls separately are—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They aren’t separate. He doesn’t say they are separate.

[Speaker G] Is he saying they combine or not?

[Speaker F] He’s not talking about combining here. He’s saying that I have a net four by four inside, so that’s it. Why do I need to say that the walls too count as a domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because he does need to say it. Because if the walls themselves are not a private domain, then when I throw the walls—it’s true that concerning the cavity I am exempt, but concerning the walls I would be liable.

[Speaker F] Ah, right, that’s exactly what—when we read it I didn’t understand why he insisted on bringing that in here. Okay, so—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now—

[Speaker H] Rabbi, could you explain that again for a second, with the walls? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: first of all, as a general takeaway—we are doing a reading exercise here no less than a content exercise. So look: you come across some unfamiliar citation here, right? What he says here, by force of the a fortiori argument, “if it makes a partition for others, then for itself all the more so.” So notice, he says: as we say on page 99. What one does in such a case is go to the Talmudic text in tractate Sabbath on page 99.

[Speaker F] I usually just go to Google a lot of the time, which is also an excellent option.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but when they’re quoting the Talmudic text, that won’t help.

[Speaker F] When there’s an unclear word then no, because then it explains the phrase. A lot of the time Google explains those expressions very well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, in any case—

[Speaker F] This one I didn’t check, because earlier we read Rabbi Chaim and there—no no, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Chaim brings the Talmudic text, that’s why I’m saying—right, here we’re doing it in reverse order. But I mean in principle, when you see something like that, you jump to the Talmudic text in tractate Sabbath. Let me jump there for a moment because it will accompany us later too, so I want—

[Speaker F] Still to go into the Talmudic text for a moment. That’s what we did with chavut rami. Huh? There was that expression later on—chavut rami. A sparse sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a sparse sukkah. Right. So here we come to the Talmudic text on page 99b. He doesn’t even write that it’s on side b, so you look around a little for the phrase. In this context not only the phrase matters but the context matters too, because Rabbi Chaim also uses it. So I do want to go into the Talmudic text for a moment, both as part of the reading exercise and for our needs later. What it says here is this: Rav Mesharshiya said—I’ll do this quickly for a moment—Rav Mesharshiya said: Rabbi Yochanan raised a question: A wall in the public domain, ten high and not four wide. Yes? There is a wall in the public domain. Do you remember the baraita? In the baraita, one of the cases there is a wall—one of the examples of a private domain. But there we’re talking about a wall that is four wide and ten high. Here, however, we’re talking about a wall that is ten high but not four wide. It encloses a karmelit. What does it mean that it encloses a karmelit?

[Speaker E] It encloses a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It encloses a karmelit—that’s basically a beit se’ah, beit satayim, what we saw.

[Speaker G] Wait, wait—is it enclosing a karmelit? Sorry, is it enclosing a karmelit, or do its boundaries define it as a karmelit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Around the karmelit itself there are walls on all four sides. And if that karmelit isn’t too large—it isn’t more than beit satayim—then what happens inside is that it is a private domain. Okay?

[Speaker G] But wait, this is a wall, a sealed solid unit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker E] And now the question is what its own status is—not sealed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not sealed. No—enclosed. Enclosed. That’s what it means.

[Speaker E] It couldn’t suddenly mean something else, solid.

[Speaker G] Maybe he suddenly means something else, solid.

[Speaker E] Wait—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And now the question is what the status of the wall itself is, not what it does for the surrounding area. Okay?

[Speaker G] Wait—this wall, let us say, with a width of two—if it itself encloses a karmelit, yes, is it itself not called a karmelit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. They’re asking about the status of the wall. It encloses an area that turns the area into a karmelit. And now I’m asking what the status of the wall itself is.

[Speaker G] Why do I care about its size?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if this wall doesn’t have a width of four, then it won’t be a private domain. If it does have a width of four, then it is a private domain. Right? Regardless of the fact that it encloses a karmelit. What’s the definition of a private domain? If this wall has width four, it is a private domain. If it doesn’t have four, then it isn’t. Rabbi Yochanan says: but if this wall encloses a karmelit, then even if it isn’t four wide, yes, then maybe its status will nevertheless be that of a private domain. So again: Rabbi Yochanan asked: A wall in the public domain, ten high and not four wide, and it encloses a karmelit and thereby made it a private domain, and one threw something and it came to rest on top of it—what is the law? Do we say that since it is not four wide, it is an exempt area? The simple case is that if it doesn’t have width four, it’s called an exempt area, right? Ten high above the public domain, not four wide—that is an exempt area. Or perhaps, since it made it into a private domain, it is considered as though filled in. What does that mean?

[Speaker G] It joins it and is part of the domain; it itself becomes, since—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since it turns what is inside it into a private domain—because on the Torah level, remember, that karmelit is a private domain. It’s really a karpaf, beit satayim. Even though it’s a karmelit, and usually a karmelit on the Torah level is an exempt area, a beit satayim, a karpaf of beit satayim, is a karmelit that on the Torah level is a private domain. So now this wall basically turns the area inside it into a private domain. Rabbi Yochanan says: if so, maybe we view the private domain as if it were filled, and then the top of the wall is considered part of the area of the private domain, and therefore the top of the wall also receives the status of a private domain. So that is Rabbi Yochanan’s uncertainty, his doubt.

[Speaker I] The thickness of the wall.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So now Rabbi Yohanan is uncertain. Ulla said: all the more so—if it serves as a partition for others, for itself all the more so. Okay? By the way, this really shouldn’t have a question mark here in the text, but rather a question mark and an exclamation point. It’s a rhetorical question. Meaning: if it serves as a partition for others, then for itself it certainly serves as a partition. There’s no real question here; it’s a statement. And the claim is that if this wall turns the area inside it into a private domain, then it itself is certainly considered the partition of a private domain. That’s apparently the straightforward meaning of the words. What does this mean here?

[Speaker E] That the wall is considered included in the area of the private domain. What do you hear? That the wall is considered included in the area of the private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One possibility is to say that the wall is simply subsumed into the area inside it and becomes part of it, and the whole thing, including the thickness of the wall, is a private domain. In the plain wording of the Talmud, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) struggle with this here, but in the simple wording of the Talmud it sounds like this is some kind of consideration about a partition—not that the wall becomes the private domain, but that you think this wall has no partitions. It does have partitions, because since its partitions function as partitions with respect to the private domain, they also function as a partition with respect to itself.

[Speaker E] Then that’s a different claim. Okay? Now what happens here—so are there two private domains? Is there the private domain of the wall and the private domain of the area?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. That’s an extreme formulation of the second approach I mentioned. I’m not going into all the details here, but there are two directions that the commentators raise here. Okay? Now, simply speaking, what Ulla says is something different from the side of Rabbi Yohanan’s doubt. Because what was Rabbi Yohanan’s reason for saying that such a wall is a private domain?

[Speaker E] As if the floor is raised up to the end of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As if everything is filled in, right? As if everything were filled in, and then the area is really one continuous area, including the top of the wall. Okay? Ulla, by contrast, seems to offer a different reason, another reason—a kind of a fortiori argument: if it is a partition with respect to the private domain, then it is also a partition with respect to itself. I suspect—and here the later authorities hesitate and leave it unresolved and so on—I definitely suspect that Ulla does not mean to say something different; it’s another formulation of the same thing Rabbi Yohanan is saying. Since it made it a private domain, it is considered as though it were filled in—the meaning is that because it makes it a private domain, it is considered part of the private domain in question. It’s just that, true, its top is higher up, so how can it join the area on the ground? And for that we say: it is considered as though it were filled in. This will come later in the Kehillot Yaakov with the question he raises; in my opinion, that’s exactly the question the Kehillot Yaakov is talking about here in the Talmud. But we’ll get to that in a moment. It was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav, and Rabbi Yitzḥak also said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: a wall in the public domain ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and surrounded by a karmelit, and it made it a private domain—one who throws and it lands on top of it is liable, because if it serves as a partition for others, for itself all the more so. Okay? So he’s just repeating this, and he says that in the end this is how they rule in Jewish law. And in fact that is how the halakhic authorities rule in practice. So that’s the Talmud. Now we return to our issue. Okay? So what exactly is the Kehillot Yaakov claiming? That the hive, in a case where it has an internal empty space of four by four by four in the net inner space, right—what happens then, Ḥani?

[Speaker F] That what’s on top is considered a private domain, also inside, and then also the partitions? The partitions—the partitions themselves are also considered a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because of the Talmudic passage we just saw.

[Speaker F] And therefore if he throws the hive, then according to that view—according to both views—it works out. According to Rashi’s view, he’s literally throwing a domain, and according to the view of Tosafot, it is resting in a private domain—both the empty space is resting in a private domain and the partitions are resting in a private domain, because the partitions themselves are also a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What happens when there is no net empty space of four by four?

[Speaker F] Then according to what he writes in the paragraph, if there is no empty space, then according to Rashi it isn’t a domain. Rather, the floor of the domain. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What about the partitions? Why don’t the partitions…

[Speaker F] help here? Because they do not enclose a private domain, so how can they themselves be a private domain?

[Speaker E] Right, because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, the partitions do not turn the inner part into a private domain, because it doesn’t have enough area. Once they do not turn it into a private domain, then you don’t have the a fortiori argument that says: if they turn it into a private domain, then they themselves are a private domain. Therefore in such a case—sorry?

[Speaker G] Does it depend on the thickness of the partitions?

[Speaker E] No, it depends on the size of the empty space.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As long as the partition itself doesn’t have a thickness of four by four on its own, then that’s not what we’re talking about here, obviously. And then what happens is that when the empty space is not a private domain—as we saw, by the way, in the law of a house—the empty space is not a private domain, the partitions do not enclose a private domain, and therefore they themselves are also not a private domain. So what is? On top. The roof—

[Speaker F] is a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And that is just a floor.

[Speaker F] But what he argues is that the roof is not—it is only the floor of a private domain; it is not itself the private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore the hive—you can’t call the hive a “domain hive,” because the hive is the floor. The domain is what happens above its roof. So when I throw the hive, you can’t say that I threw a domain here. Right, and that’s the difference between whether it has a net empty space or whether it does not have a net empty space of four by four.

[Speaker F] And that also works according to Tosafot’s view, because then when it is resting, it is actually not resting in a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is basically the essence of Rav Chaim’s words regarding our Talmudic passage. Who continues?

[Speaker G] I don’t mind, but if Yael—if that’s okay? Should I continue?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, let’s continue.

[Speaker G] And apparently according to this, one who throws a solid body ten high and four by four wide should be liable. And in the commentary of Rav Ḥananel, may his memory be blessed, printed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the Vilna Shas edition—Re’em is the publishing house of the Vilna Shas.

[Speaker G] in the Re’em Shas—I didn’t understand what some Re’em was doing here—it is explained that if the hive were not hollow, if it were solid, it would indeed be considered a private domain at four by four, and one would be exempt; see there. And perhaps his reason—wait, up to here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does Rav Ḥananel say?

[Speaker G] That—wait, wait. It is explained that if… meaning if the hive were solid—not, but he says “not hollow”—

[Speaker E] Not hollow means solid.

[Speaker G] Ah, if it were solid—no, I don’t understand the phrase “would indeed be considered.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It would indeed be considered a private domain if it has four by four, and therefore one who throws it is exempt—“and one would be exempt.” Meaning Rav Ḥananel writes against the conclusion of the Kehillot Yaakov. Rav Ḥananel says that if you have a solid hive—what?

[Speaker G] So that’s the opposite of the first two sentences.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s exactly his difficulty here. He says: according to what we said above, it should come out that if the hive is solid and someone throws it, then he is liable, because it is an object and not a domain. But Rav Ḥananel writes that in the case of a solid hive one is exempt—that it is considered a domain.

[Speaker E] And that makes sense, because if there’s no empty space, then why not count the entire area? Once it’s a solid body, why not? It’s all one unit. Right? So four by four—why shouldn’t he be exempt? Why shouldn’t it be a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It would be—what do you mean?

[Speaker E] No, right, that’s what the Arukh says, but what he wrote earlier—“one who throws a solid body ten high etc.”—he says that he would indeed be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, there’s no use of it; you can’t use it. Something that gives rise to a domain is not itself a domain. That’s what he said according to his conclusion from the previous paragraph. So one thing is built on the other. In light of his conclusion in the previous paragraph, what is he basically saying? That if the hive is constructed in such a way that its roof is considered a private domain, that is not considered to mean that it itself is considered a domain, and therefore if I throw it I am liable. Okay? Yes, yes. So therefore he says: but in Rav Ḥananel it says one is exempt, which means it is called a domain. So that goes against what we said above. “And perhaps”—go on reading.

[Speaker G] That the reason of the Arukh, may his memory be blessed, is that even though it has no inside space, nevertheless, since the top of it is considered a private domain, and we regard partitions above by the principle of “extend upward,” then those same partitions above, by force of the law of “extend upward,” also enclose below, like a suspended partition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—“like a suspended partition”; we’ll explain his example in a moment—but what is he saying?

[Speaker G] That permits in water.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, wait, let’s pause the reading for a moment—what has he written up to here?

[Speaker G] Wait, wait a second. Since the top of it is considered a private domain. Ah—he says, if we related to the upper part, on top of it, as a private domain, then we can take that by way of “extend upward,” as though I have partitions, and the inner part too—even though it is solid—is a private domain. Why? Because when I am up above, I apply “extend upward,” as though I built partitions, and the partitions enclose a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning the partitions that are up above, by “extend upward,” reach down to the ground, descend downward, and therefore they are considered partitions that start from the ground—not from the roof of the hive, but literally from the ground. And if the partitions start literally from the ground, then contrary to what Rav Chaim says, in Rav Ḥananel we see not like Rav Chaim—that even if the hive is built in such a way that only its roof is a private domain and not it itself, it is still considered that it itself is a private domain, and if one throws it one is exempt. Why? So he says because the “extend upward” partitions in fact enclose all the way down. Even though they are above, they enclose all the way down. And now he brings the examples.

[Speaker G] But there are ten there—I’m saying, not only do they enclose below, they kind of create an empty space.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no empty space there. There are partitions enclosing a sealed solid space. There’s no empty hollow there; the inside is solid.

[Speaker G] Okay, like a suspended partition that permits in water, because the passage of fish is not considered passage. Meaning, it is permitted when below there is, as it were, some sort of substance, so that even if something moves inside it, it does not interfere with the thing itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me explain the sentence. A suspended partition is a partition that is ten handbreadths high but does not reach the ground; it hangs from above and stops several handbreadths above the ground. That is called a suspended partition. If there are fewer than three handbreadths from the ground, then it is considered joined by the rule of lavud, but if it is more than three handbreadths then it is a suspended partition. Now, like this: if it hangs over ground on dry land, then it is not considered a partition. Why not? Because young goats pass under it. The goats pass through; it does not stop them. Even though there is a partition of ten and it encloses the whole area, since from below one can enter, it is a suspended partition and it does not permit. Meaning, it does not turn what is inside into a private domain. In water, even though fish can enter through that gap beneath, in water the claim is that this partition does permit. The water is considered as though it continues the partition; if below it is not air but water, then it is considered as though the partition reaches all the way down. That is the law; the reasoning and distinctions don’t matter right now, but that is the law. So what does he want to infer from there to our case?

[Speaker G] And just a moment—where am I? And only a suspended partition in the air does not permit, because the goats pass through it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Period. That was the example he explained; now he returns to our Talmudic issue.

[Speaker G] And here, underneath the partition, there is a solid body, and there is no passage of goats, so it indeed permits. Wait—“the partition above indeed permits making even the space below into a private domain.” And this requires further analysis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he saying?

[Speaker G] So he says that since the partition here really continues down to the ground, there is no passage of goats here, no break in the partition, so it turns this whole unit—wait—“the partition above permits”—ah, so the partition really continues all the way down and defines the entire height, including the upper and lower parts, as a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is basically comparing our case to the case of a suspended partition. Now let’s try to see the analogy. What does “suspended partition” mean? Which is the partition and where is the air gap?

[Speaker E] The partition is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the “extend upward” above the roof of the hive, right? It is suspended in the air because it begins from the roof of the hive and upward. What is beneath it?

[Speaker E] But the solid body blocks the goats. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since below it is indeed more than three handbreadths, and apparently that shouldn’t have helped—but why doesn’t it help? Because there is passage of goats. But here, after all, it is sealed. And since it is sealed, there is no passage of goats. So it has the law of a suspended partition in water, not of a suspended partition on dry land. Therefore he says that this partition is basically considered a partition that seals all the way down, and then the whole area from the ground—not only from the roof of the hive—is considered a private domain. And therefore, this thing is considered a domain according to Rav Ḥananel as well, and therefore if one throws it, one is exempt. That is the claim.

[Speaker E] But why does he use the concept of a suspended partition? He could have just made the partition go down to the ground.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a real wonder.

[Speaker F] That’s an excellent question you’re asking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I—

[Speaker F] I read this and it just seems crazy to me. Why? Because to say that the partitions that are suspended in the air are specifically the non-physical partitions, and that the partitions below are the—like, to say that the non-physical ones are the physical ones and the physical ones are the non-physical ones—it just runs contrary to all logic. I understand his move, but in the end, when you stand outside and look, you say: it’s an upside-down world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me sharpen even more what Ruti and Ḥani raised here. It really is extremely strange. He basically wants to claim the following: on the roof of the hive, it is a private domain. What are the side walls around the roof of the hive? The “extend upward” that rises from below and continues to the sky. Those are the surrounding partitions. Now he says: okay, let’s see what the status is of the inside volume of the hive itself—the sealed hive, the volume of the hive itself—what is its status? We need to see whether there are partitions around it or not. So he says: around it there are no partitions, but above there are suspended partitions, and suspended partitions are also sufficient because below the goats cannot pass through, since the walls of the hive stop them. That’s his claim. And what is strange here is: why get to the point where the partitions above are the suspended ones and below there is only a function that stops the goats? What is below is the partitions themselves! The tangible partitions are the partitions, so below is fine. Why do all this? You are using those below to create “extend upward”? It’s like Baron Munchausen who took a ladder in order to climb out of the pit and then…

[Speaker D] Against that there is a reason that basically the solid body is not fit for habitation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that is what lies behind his strange statement. His claim is the following: if there were only the solid body and, let’s say, nothing above it, would the partitions around it be considered partitions? Why not? Obviously not.

[Speaker G] Not for purposes of dwelling.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they do not separate between two spaces. Right? So they are not partitions. Rather, when I stand above on the roof of the hive, I want to see whether there are partitions around me. So they tell me: now I apply “extend upward” by force of what is above, because now these partitions have something to enclose, and therefore they are considered partitions. Once they are considered partitions because they have something to enclose, now I look at them as suspended partitions, and what is below is not a partition, because it does not enclose an empty space. So these are like suspended partitions, but what is below—true, it does not enclose an empty space—but it stops the passage of goats, and therefore the suspended partitions above are considered the partitions of the entire private domain, including the sealed volume of the hive. That is his line of thought. Is what I’m saying clear?

[Speaker A] Can I ask a question? No, can I ask?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second—if what I said isn’t clear, then someone, anyone?

[Speaker A] Yes, can I ask something? Yes. I just don’t understand the picture. If we’re talking about “extend upward,” then “extend upward” has some measure, right? Of distance from the ground. And basically the object—the hive—the hive is in the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the hive is on the ground.

[Speaker A] But we’re talking about throwing the hive through the air.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. I’m talking now about what happens with the hive when it is standing on the ground, and from that the law will be derived—when we throw the hive, did we throw a domain or did we throw an object? But how do we test whether the hive is a domain or an object? We place it on the ground and look at what we see.

[Speaker A] So why does he apply “extend upward”? Why does he need to say “extend upward” if it’s on the ground?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the partitions do not touch the ground.

[Speaker A] The hive is placed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] on the ground. The roof of the hive is actually the floor of the domain, right? Because the hive is solid. Yes. So where are the side walls?

[Speaker A] They are only above, really just on the roof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is the “extend upward.”

[Speaker A] Ah, okay. And that doesn’t matter—ah, yes.

[Speaker E] But now I have a question: in the case of a suspended partition too, even if we were to lower it to the ground, the goats would still pass through it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but here the goats don’t pass through, because—

[Speaker A] there is a wall there.

[Speaker E] Right, but I’m asking why he needs that suspended partition, and why should he care whether it reaches the ground? In any case the goats could have passed through if not for the wall.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s do this again. The partitions of the domain are the pure “extend upward” partitions, only those. Otherwise there are no partitions here. The lower part is not considered partitions. The lower part is considered only something that stops the goats from passing through. But still, when I ask myself, okay, but what are the partitions of this domain? The partitions of this domain are the “extend upward.”

[Speaker E] I understand, but why do they have to be suspended? That’s my question. Suspended?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they are in the air! Because they are only above. But what is below is not considered a partition.

[Speaker E] Yes, yes.

[Speaker G] Because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it does not enclose an empty space.

[Speaker E] Fine, now I understand that it’s in the air.

[Speaker G] A question: if I had a body standing on legs, okay—a solid body standing on legs, and the legs really had the open space for goats to pass through—then above it would not be considered for me—no, above maybe yes, but below it would not be considered a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning above it would be considered one, but below it would not.

[Speaker G] No, yes, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right? Now I want to say one more thing. So apparently I have answered Ruti’s and Ḥani’s difficulty, but I nevertheless want to say why I still don’t agree with him. And this actually already begins with Rav Chaim, not with him. Because in fact, in my opinion, there is no need to get to “extend upward” at all. The partitions that are below—the walls of the hive, I’m now talking about the solid hive—the walls of the solid hive are considered walls for the area on the roof. They themselves are walls, without “extend upward” continuing them. They themselves are walls. If I look, at least from the perspective of someone coming from outside, he sees in front of him a barrier ten handbreadths high. That is a wall. So true, that wall does not enclose an empty space, but it is a wall with respect to the roof of the hive. And even without “extend upward,” it would still be a private domain because it has partitions around it. True, the partitions are below it—so what? But relative to someone coming from the public domain—sorry—he sees in front of him a partition of ten handbreadths. So there is a partition here. I’ll say even more than that: the rule that we apply “extend upward”—what do the words “extend upward” mean? The wall rises. Right? The wall continues and rises. “Asik” means to ascend to the Land of Israel. “Asik” means to go up. Okay? So what does it mean that the wall rises? There is a wall here and I continue it. “Extend upward” is not inventing a wall out of nothing. For example, think of a case where below there is a wall of seven handbreadths, not ten. Would we say “extend upward”? Certainly not. We do not say “extend upward.” Why not? Because what is below is not a wall. “Extend upward” is only when there is already a wall below; then, since it is a wall, I continue it upward. But if what is below is not a wall, then we do not say “extend upward” about it. So if that is so, then even if I say like Rav Chaim and the Kehillot Yaakov that here we really do say “extend upward” around the roof of the hive, that “extend upward” is based on the fact that below there is a wall—there is a wall—because otherwise I could not apply “extend upward.”

[Speaker E] It is a wall at a height that creates another domain. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore I claim—and this is what I’m saying—that you are right that it can’t be a wall in the usual sense, because there is no empty space that it encloses; it is all solid. But if I look at the roof, when I look at the roof, from my perspective it encloses the roof. And once I see that it encloses the roof, then it is indeed a wall. After all, that is the only reason I could even make “extend upward” out of it—because if it were not a wall, I couldn’t. But if it is a wall, then we no longer need the “extend upward,” and we no longer need the passage of goats, and we no longer need the whole ingenious move of the Kehillot Yaakov. It itself is a wall. It is the wall of the roof above. And then what happens? In previous classes I explained to you Rashi’s view and also Rav Ḥananel’s view, in effect—that the domain in the hive is really what is above, unlike Tosafot, who said the domain is what is inside. But both Rav Ḥananel and Rashi—in my opinion, and I think according to the calculation we made that is what came out—basically hold that the domain is what is above. Now Rav Chaim does not accept that, because Rav Chaim argues that if the domain is what is above, then you cannot treat the hive as an object that is itself a domain, so that you are throwing a domain here. Because it is only a floor for the domain.

[Speaker E] It is only the infrastructure for the domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I already argued otherwise. In all the previous classes I said not so. That is not what he wrote. I argued precisely on the basis of this point, because I saw that according to both Rashi and Rav Ḥananel the domain is determined by what is above, not by what is below. So therefore it is obvious that even if the domain above is a private domain, that is enough to give the hive itself the status of a domain and not of an object. How exactly? How exactly? Because who are the walls of the private domain above?

[Speaker G] The hive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The body of the hive. And if you then say “extend upward,” it will continue, and if not, then you don’t need it. Bottom line, either way you also need the walls of the hive. So if that is so, then even though what is above is the private domain, that still causes the hive itself to be considered a domain and not an object. Because the walls of the hive are the walls of the roof, of the private domain on the roof. Do you understand what I’m saying? Therefore the whole foundation and distinction of Rav Chaim is, in my opinion, incorrect.

[Speaker E] He—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] assumed that if only the roof is a private domain, that is not enough to turn the hive itself into something considered a domain. And I say that it is enough. And that is what the Kehillot Yaakov proves here from Rav Ḥananel. From Rav Ḥananel himself you see this. Because Rav Ḥananel himself talks about a solid hive, which according to Rav Chaim cannot work. Because in a solid hive only the roof is a private domain. And Rav Chaim said that if only the roof is a private domain, then the hive cannot be considered a domain, so it is an object. So then how do you explain Rav Ḥananel, who treats the hive as a domain even when it is solid? So the Kehillot Yaakov himself infers this, and rightly so. That is exactly what I did in the class without having seen them. In Rav Ḥananel we are forced to say not like Rav Chaim. I hadn’t even seen Rav Chaim yet then. Meaning, in Rav Ḥananel we are forced to say not like Rav Chaim, because Rav Ḥananel tells us that even though the roof is the private domain here, nevertheless the hive itself is considered a domain and not an object. I only argued there—and here I think there is no need to reach this subtle pilpul of the Kehillot Yaakov—I argued that this is because the walls of the hive are the walls of the roof, and therefore the hive itself is also considered a private domain. And therefore I claim that this is true even with a solid hive.

[Speaker E] By the way, “asik” is related to soaring upward, ascent upward, of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right? Is what I’m saying clear? Okay.

[Speaker G] What—wait, you went too far upward. “And this can be further analyzed.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’re not finished—sorry, continue, yes Yael, “and this can be further analyzed.”

[Speaker G] “And this can be further analyzed,” meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he himself feels that what he said here is not complete; it needs more analysis. Okay. Wait, what?

[Speaker G] “And therefore, in any event…” “And in any event it is explained in Rav Ḥananel, may his memory be blessed, that even a solid body is a private domain, and if so—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “the question returns to its place.”

[Speaker G] Again?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question returns to where it was.

[Speaker G] “The question returns to its place.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Returns”—that means returns—“the question…”

[Speaker G] “…to its place,” to where it was. “…to its place,” yes, “…to its place.” “That even when there is not four inside it…” Yes—what is he basically saying?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, Rav Ḥananel tells me that even a solid body, if it has the proper measure, is perfectly fine, right? Very good. But if so, then why does Rav Ḥananel explain that there must be a net 5.6, and the thickness of the walls is what is beyond that? After all, then even if it were solid it would be fine. In other words, the gross 5.6 should also suffice. Why do you need a gross six? He returns to Rav Ḥananel in his dispute with Rashi about whether the thickness of the walls is counted within the 5.6 or not. Okay. All right? So he says: if something fully solid is fine, then when there is an empty space of 5.2 plus 0.2 on each side, giving together 5.6, treat that as if it were solid. How can it be that Rav Ḥananel says that is not enough? You need a net empty space of 5.6 plus 0.2 on each side. Why does the empty space need to be a net 5.6? After all, even a solid body is fine. Okay?

[Speaker G] Should I read the last line for a moment? Yes, yes. “And if because it is not fit for use, but we say: if he wants, he can place something on it,” etc.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean?

[Speaker G] Even if it doesn’t—even if it has no interior space that can be used or is fit for use, they also said—wait, I didn’t understand—“place something on it,” meaning he can also go up on top?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or place something on it. What he means is as follows. There was room to distinguish—there is a possible way to resolve the difficulty. One could distinguish and say that if the body is solid, then it can be used—I place things on it. But if the body is not solid and has an empty space and walls around it, then in principle that is worse than a solid body. Why? Because here I can’t use it—what am I going to do? There’s no surface here to place things on. To that the Kehillot Yaakov says: not true; one can place things even if it is not solid, and that is what the Talmud says: “if he wants, he can place something on it.” That is the Talmudic statement that all the later authorities bring here; we already saw this Talmudic passage—Tosafot himself brings it—namely that this is why the walls combine with the empty space, because he can place things on them. Therefore the Kehillot Yaakov says, practically speaking, in the last line: according to Rav Ḥananel’s view, it is not clear what the difference is between a solid body and a body whose net empty space is not 5.6, but only reaches that together with the walls. In the second case Rav Ḥananel says it is not a domain, and in the first case he says it is a domain. That is the reverse of logic. The solid one ought to be worse, not better.

[Speaker E] So according to the one who says that when the empty space is not four by four and it only serves as a kind of infrastructure for the private domain above it—then after all the private domain rests on it. So can one place something on it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case one can place something on it, yes, of course.

[Speaker E] No, I mean—the private domain itself is resting on it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?

[Speaker E] So according to his view, that should also mean it itself is considered a private domain, because the private domain above it is being placed on it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s the question—I don’t understand. Fine. That is the question. He says: according to Rav Ḥananel, you tell me that because there is a private domain above, then even if inside it is solid this is called a domain. So if so, then also when it is hollow inside, just the net area, the net volume, does not itself include four by four, but only reaches that together with the walls—since on top of it there is a private domain because one can place things on it—it should still be considered a private domain. Why there does Rav Ḥananel say it is not? Okay, who’s next?

[Speaker G] Thank you.

[Speaker A] I’m willing. Okay. But well, I’m a little delayed by a few seconds, and also this is a section I understood nothing from, so from the outset I’m…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then better not. So who is ready? Raḥama, Hodi, what about you?

[Speaker E] I’m ready, but today I didn’t review this because we reviewed it last time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I—

[Speaker D] I just have banging here, it’s confusing me—they keep banging all the time. If you don’t hear it, I can do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t hear it. So is that okay?

[Speaker D] Then that’s okay, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t see you, so every time I have to stop the screen share. Okay.

[Speaker D] “And in my humble opinion…” Yes. Yes. “And in my humble opinion, to resolve the view of Rav Ḥananel…” so according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “and those with him.” “Those with him” means those on his side, yes. Those who agree with him, yes.

[Speaker D] “and those with him,” yes. “Who hold that the thickness of the partitions of the hive does not complete the measure of four by four. Why is this different from a pit and its rim? From a pit and its rim? There the thickness of the partitions does complete the measure of four—”

[Speaker E] by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “—as in the difficulties raised by Tosafot.”

[Speaker D] “—as in the difficulties raised by Tosafot.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? Again, before we continue: Tosafot challenged Rav Ḥananel. What did they ask?

[Speaker D] They asked—there is an example of a pit that is less than four by four and its rim completes it. And here we see that the walls combine with the empty space and complete it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The area, not the height, yes? We’re talking about area. Yes. So if so, Tosafot asks Rav Ḥananel: according to your view, Rav Ḥananel, if there is an empty space of less than four by four, but together with the thickness of the walls it does reach four by four, then that should be good enough. Right? That was Tosafot’s question. Now he wants to resolve Rav Ḥananel against Tosafot’s challenge.

[Speaker D] He says: and indeed he holds that “if he wants he can place something on it.” So now we have a reason that it only completes in the case of the rim, because the rim serves for things—one can place something there—therefore it combines with the empty space, right? “If he wants he can place something on it.” And this requires further analysis, because if so, then even where there is no four by four at all, even with the partitions included, here too, if he wants he can place something on it—there would be a plank—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is “plank”? It means a piece of wood.

[Speaker A] What is that?

[Speaker D] A protruding board, something extending out on both sides, and it is usable—and even if something protrudes outward and is useful, therefore one would have to say that this too can complete it, as I understood it, yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. What is he really arguing? He says: let’s continue Tosafot’s challenge. Even if the empty space together with the thickness of the walls does not contain four by four—the whole thing together is only five handbreadths including the wall thickness—I can still place something on it, only it will stick out to the sides. Right? So why shouldn’t that be enough? Why does Tosafot stop when the gross measurement is four by four? I can ask the same question even when the gross measurement is not four by four. After all, you can place something on it, so it will stick out on the sides, but it still has some use.

[Speaker D] This whole reasoning based on use is a bit problematic for him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s what he says. “And of necessity one must say…” here we are, yes, look for a second…

[Speaker D] Yes, I’m just reading not from the screen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, so I’m showing everyone on the screen.

[Speaker D] Fine, but on my side I enlarged it a bit, so that’s why I’m reading… “And of necessity?”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, one must say—

[Speaker D] “that where there is no place of four by four, we do not say the reasoning of ‘if he wants he can place…’” Meaning, as I understand it, when you do not have a total area of four by four, you do not activate this argument that one can place something there. “It requires a place…” yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that one can place things on the pit and its rim, or on the hive with the partitions, or whatever you want—that only helps when there is an area of four by four. It does not serve as a substitute for the lack of sufficient area.

[Speaker E] Four by four including the partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At this point, yes, including the partitions; in a moment we’ll see. Go on.

[Speaker D] “Only where there is four by four by combining the pit and its partition, so that it is indeed considered a place, but it is simply not fit for use—and whenever something fit for use as four by four is lacking, the status of a domain falls away from it. And so too regarding a pit and its rim, since it is not fit for the use of four by four.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And concerning that we say”—and about that we say, yes. “Aha” always means “concerning this.” When we say “aha,” it means “about this.”

[Speaker D] “And about this, what we said…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “that it is indeed fit—”

[Speaker D] “for use,” and then I really do look at whether this area is fit for use. “And a place exists here because even without the reasoning of ‘if he wants he can place…’ it is considered a place of four by four, namely by combining the floor of the pit with the thickness of the partitions. And all this seems necessary.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s pause here for a moment. What has he said up to this point? Like Rabbi Yohanan—as though you raise the floor. Wait, wait—no, that’s the continuation. Before that—don’t jump ahead. What has he said up to now?

[Speaker D] We are looking at the—I think we are looking at the whole pit together, as though the floor is joined to the walls.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—again, that’s the continuation, the continuation. What has he said up to now?

[Speaker D] “By combining the floor of the pit with the thickness of the partitions.”

[Speaker E] That without a minimal area, you can’t bring in the argument of use.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So what Idit is saying is that in order for something to be considered a private domain, we actually need two independent requirements. One requirement is that it have an area of four by four, period. A second requirement is that it be usable. If it does not have an area of four by four, it won’t help that it has use. Therefore he says: if the gross area, including the partitions, does not contain four by four, then the fact that it has use won’t help. If the area is indeed four by four and your whole problem is—wait, but what about use?—then he says: there is use; I can place things on it.

[Speaker G] Okay. Wait, okay, the use—if it’s solid and I can place things on it—it can count?

[Speaker D] No, no, no, no, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re right, he is talking now about the hollow case. No, no, no—wait, wait. She’s right, she’s right—this is about the solid case, because the next sentence will now tell me why this is also true when there is a hollow. For the moment, apparently this is about the solid case. And then he says: “but this requires further analysis.” Now continue reading.

[Speaker D] “But this requires further analysis: how can these combine with one another, seeing that the floor is below and the thickness of the partitions is above?”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? What is the question?

[Speaker D] That this is like a pit—how do you combine the floor that is below with those walls, with those rims that come from the width of the walls, yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you combine the area of the floor that is below with the width of the walls that is above, where in top-down projection—when you look at it from above—you see that there is an area of four by four, but the heights are different. How can you regard this as a floor of four by four?

[Speaker D] And here, I think, enters the question that it is somewhat similar to the way we look from the roof. If we can combine the—I don’t know whether above there is area—I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. He says: here enters the question of how we jump from a solid hive to a hollow hive. In a solid hive there is no problem: the thickness of the walls combines with the area of the inside because it is really all one area at one height. But when the hive is hollow, then you are right: there is an area of four by four and there is use and everything is fine. Only one thing is not fine: there is no continuous area of four by four, because there are differences in height.

[Speaker E] So that’s Rabbi Yohanan’s answer: we treat it as if it were filled in. Okay, so he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says—so what does he answer? “And it appears…”

[Speaker G] Wait, I have one more small question. If there are differences in height, then in one part I don’t have ten and in the other part I do have ten, or in one part I have ten and in the other part it’s more than ten?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Call it whatever you like; in terms of the height of the wall it doesn’t matter. I don’t have one continuous floor of four by four.

[Speaker E] They are not on the same plane—the floor of the pit and the…

[Speaker G] But that means that overall, if so, in the hollow part I have a problem—in the height I’ll have a problem if I don’t have…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The height is ten; the height of the partitions is ten.

[Speaker G] If the plane isn’t level, then that’s an imaginary height. Wait, Yael, right? Yael. He’s saying that if the plane isn’t flat, then at some point on the plane I don’t have a height of ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There’s a pit below. Some kind of hive. Okay? The bottom of the hive has five point two. Okay? And now it has walls of zero point two on both sides, so the gross area is five point six, the diameter. So that’s fine, right? And the height is ten. The Kehillot Yaakov says yes, but there’s still a problem here. There is use here, there is area here, everything is excellent. But something else is missing. The area is not on the same level. Meaning, the area—

[Speaker G] The upper and lower? Right. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The zero point two of the walls and the five point two of the floor are at different heights. So there is no area here designated for use of five point six.

[Speaker G] Okay, fine, sorry, thank you.

[Speaker D] But earlier they talked about the pit and its rim, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing. And apparently its basis is? Yes—

[Speaker D] Or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, same thing.

[Speaker D] And apparently its basis is from the law of… wait, where are we?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, I’m marking it here. Okay, thanks.

[Speaker E] Yes, that’s it.

[Speaker D] “Havot rami” — what is that?

[Speaker E] You raise up the lower thing, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Havot rami,” I—

[Speaker F] I can explain it from Sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, go ahead.

[Speaker D] Up to this point—

[Speaker F] As far as I remember, I just learned this. In Sukkah there’s a question about the roofing. What happens if the roofing has beams, beams, but they’re not at the same height? Now the difference between them is more than three handbreadths, because if the difference is less than three handbreadths then it’s considered joined by the rule of lavud. Right. Now someone looking from above—even if there’s one beam like this, one beam lower, one beam higher, one beam lower—apparently someone looking from above or from below can see, if I drew it in two dimensions, I’d see one large surface. I wouldn’t really see the difference. In top projection. From, say, an aerial perspective from above, it looks like one surface. The concept of top projection, because the top projection of this is an area. Yes, so you can do “havot,” as if with the beams, whether from above or below, you can force them as though they’re on one plane.

[Speaker D] So from a top view, in a sparse sukkah, and likewise two corresponding beams, one above and one below, they combine by the law of havot rami, even though apparently—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, up to here. What is he saying? In a sparse sukkah, we— a sparse sukkah is a sukkah whose roofing is at different heights and with gaps of more than three handbreadths. We say havot rami. What does havot rami mean? Throw it downward. Bang it down, bang it down. We bring it down from above. And see it as though everything is on the same level, or in other words, when I look in top projection, I don’t care that there are different levels here. I see everything as though it’s on the same level.

[Speaker E] Or to raise up the “havot”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, it’s all on the same level. Havot rami. Whether from above or from below. Simply speaking it means downward, but it doesn’t matter. Okay.

[Speaker E] Even—

[Speaker D] Though apparently we only say havot rami opposite empty air, where we see the upper one as if it were below. But it doesn’t make sense to say about the thickness of the partitions as though it were brought down below, since its substance is solid from top to bottom. Meaning, there’s no air there—how can you fill what is already filled?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Havot rami—what happens in a sparse sukkah? In a sparse sukkah I have a beam here and a beam here. Under this beam there is air, so I see this beam as though it descended downward and now it’s on the same level as the lower one. But in our case, what happens with the hive or with the pit and its rim? I have a pit, and around it on the sides there are rims, a wall of the earth, okay? Now what happens here is that under the top of the earth there is the earth itself. You can’t lower it down to the height of the pit, sorry. Because there’s no air here—it’s filled, it isn’t air. So therefore apparently you can’t apply havot rami in such a situation. So the Kehillot Yaakov says: nevertheless, you can.

[Speaker G] If I look from above, in any case I don’t see the lower part.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, but the claim is that only when there is air below am I willing to see it as though it lands below. If below it’s filled, then top projection is not enough, so it has to be on the same level.

[Speaker D] But he says, nevertheless, one can say the opposite: that we see the floor as though it rises upward, and that too is by the law of havot rami. Meaning, it doesn’t matter whether to lower or to raise—you can do either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can raise the floor of the pit upward, and above the pit there really is only air, right? In the pit the path passes through air. Lowering the rims into the pit is impossible, because here along the way there is earth, not air. But if I raise the floor of the pit to the height of the rims, there’s no problem, because this path is a path that passes through air. So that’s fine; havot rami actually operates here in the opposite direction. And as we say regarding beams, we see the upper one as though it were below and the lower one as though it were above, in the Talmud / Talmudic text in Eruvin.

[Speaker E] And if the pit is full of water and not air? I understand. If the pit is full of water, not air?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then in any case it’s a cavity, so that’s not a problem.

[Speaker E] Ah, okay, thanks.

[Speaker D] And the lower one as though it were above; see there in the first chapter of tractate Eruvin, page 14, or there in Sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So too here, also in our case, regarding—

[Speaker D] Havot rami, we see the floor as level with the thickness of the partitions, and there is here a place of four by four. Except that in any event it still isn’t fit for actual use, and afterward we say: if he wants, he can place something there and use it. Meaning, okay, up to here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he saying here?

[Speaker D] He says, as I understood it, that there’s a requirement that the partitions have to be usable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning he says like this: look, in practice there’s a question here that we haven’t even put on the table. Maybe above?

[Speaker D] He says if I place—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I take the floor of the pit upward—that’s my havot rami—then why do I need the reasoning of “if he wants, he can place something on it,” and so on? Then they’re all basically here. It’s an area of four by four. What’s the problem?

[Speaker D] No, no, that’s in terms of the area. But you also need the second requirement: if he wants, he can place—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The use has to be actual use. It’s not enough that halakhically it’s defined as being on the same plane, on the same level. The use has to be use in practice. And about that the Talmud / Talmudic text asks: what about use? And it answers that he can place something on it, and therefore there is use as well. So what do we have now? All three requirements are fulfilled.

[Speaker D] Wait, wait, so that’s what he said regarding the hive? If so, then no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That he said—

[Speaker D] About the pit and its rim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, no, that he said about the pit. One second. Three requirements are fulfilled. Requirement one: that there be an area of four by four. Requirement two: that this area be on the same level. Requirement three: that it be fit for use. Three requirements, not two. Now what happens with the pit and its rim? There is a pit, and the earth around it surrounds it, yes? So with the pit and its rim I say like this: in terms of area, that is fulfilled because the top of the earth together with the area of the pit gives me four by four. It is on the same level because there is the law of havot rami, so I see the bottom rising upward. And it is fit for use because I can place something on it. Each one of those solves one of the problems, a different problem that we have here in the matter. Okay? Now he comes to answer what he asked.

[Speaker G] Can we go back for a second to the part about what solves the four-by-four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The joining of the area of the top of the earth together with the bottom of the pit in top view. In top projection we see it as four by four.

[Speaker E] What?

[Speaker G] The walls of the pit together with the cavity of the pit? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The area of the bottom of the pit together with the area found above the earth—of the earth. Look at it in top projection. In top projection you see here a total area of four by four, part of it pit and part of it piles of earth. Okay? Okay. Who’s next? Is that the end?

[Speaker E] I’m ready. Go ahead. And based on what has been explained, it follows that the basis of the law that the thickness of the partition completes the measure of four by four, and that havot rami is effective because we see them as though they are level, and there is here a place of four by four—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one second, let me remind you of one more thing. What was the difficulty he wanted to answer in the first place? You have to keep your head in the game. We’ve already come a long way. What is the difficulty he is trying to resolve? There was a difficulty on Rabbeinu Chananel.

[Speaker E] Why do the walls combine with the cavity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—

[Speaker I] What’s the difference between a solid object and an object where he requires from it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the difference between a solid object and an object whose gross width is five point six but is hollow in the middle? Apparently the second should be even more of a domain than the first, but Rabbeinu Chananel says the opposite. The solid one is a domain, and the second is not a domain. How can that be? So now he explains, in light of everything he prepared until now—now comes the punch line.

[Speaker E] And behold, Nachmanides of blessed memory in Milhamot, in the topic / passage of the hive, wrote that we do not say lavud, or “bring down the partition,” or “extend the partition upward,” with vessels. Meaning, with vessels you can’t use “extend upward” and thereby make it a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t say all these fictional laws—“bring down,” “extend upward,” lavud, all these halakhic completions—we don’t say them with vessels in order to turn them into a domain. Meaning, when there is a large vessel like the hive, four by four and ten high, then if it has the proper measure, it becomes a domain. But if in order to complete its measure it needs various special laws, then we do not say that the vessel becomes a domain by means of those special laws. Those laws were said about domains, not about vessels.

[Speaker E] And although a vessel too can become a domain, that is only when… it has the required measure in reality, but not by means of a legal fiction. And this will be explained, God willing, later. And now the position of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) of blessed memory is very well settled: that with the hive the thickness of the vessel does not combine to four by four, because according to what has been explained, the fact that with the pit and its rim it combines to four is only by force of the legal rule of havot rami. And so it seems to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As above, as above, like we already explained.

[Speaker E] And all this is with the pit and its rim. But with the hive, which is a vessel that does not have a cavity of four by four, we do not say havot rami in order to make it a domain by means of a legal rule, unless it has the required measure in reality. Therefore it is impossible here to combine the thickness of the partitions with the measure of four by four in order to make it a domain. And it is not similar to that case in Eruvin, which is speaking about the rim of the pit and the rock and not about vessels. And correct, with God’s help—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] blessed name. So what is he saying?

[Speaker E] So he’s saying that in the hive there is no cavity of four by four, so it’s a vessel—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But only together with the thickness of the partitions. And then what? What problem do we have? There is use, there is area too—

[Speaker E] But you can’t do havot rami.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, step by step. We have the hive. We’re talking about the hive, whose gross area is five point six.

[Speaker E] But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the cavity alone there isn’t five point six. So let’s see which of the three requirements is fulfilled here. The general area exists, right? Yes. And use too—use also exists, you can place things on it. But it’s not on the same level. Because it’s not on the same level unless we apply havot rami and say that the floor of the hive rises to be level with the top part of the partitions. But we do not say havot rami with vessels; a hive is a vessel.

[Speaker F] But regarding the solid one, we’ll basically have two possibilities here. If we go with Rabbeinu Chananel’s approach, if we explain him to mean “extend upward,” then we don’t say “extend upward” with vessels, and therefore the solid one is also a problem. But if we go with the approach you said, that here we don’t need “extend upward,” but simply that there are already partitions anyway, then it will indeed be considered a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a very interesting comment; actually I thought about it. Apparently that is evidence for what I said earlier against the Kehillot Yaakov and Rabbi Chaim, but I’m not one hundred percent sure. Because we have to check whether the “extend upward” that they say—after all, that “extend upward” doesn’t complete the measure here, it only—he says, everything is here overall, I just see the “extend upward” as partitions that surround the cavity. It doesn’t complete the measure of the hive so that it becomes the proper size. It may be that there too, even according to Nachmanides, they would still say the legal rule applies—I don’t know. But simply speaking you’re right that this is evidence for what I said earlier. Again, let me summarize what he said. What he basically said is this: in order for a domain to be a private domain, three conditions have to be fulfilled. One condition: it must have an area of four by four, even gross area. A second condition: there has to be use. Use. A third condition: that this area be on the same level. Each such thing has to be examined separately. Now he says: what happens with the pit and its rim? With the pit and its rim, overall there is area—the pit plus the rims have enough area. There is use, because you can place things on it. The same floor level also exists, because we apply havot rami to the bottom of the pit upward, right? So everything is fine. What happens with the hive? With the hive there is area, and there is also use because you can place things on it, but it isn’t on the same level. Because the law of havot rami was not stated with vessels, and the hive is a vessel. The pit and its rim are not a vessel; there we do say havot rami. But the hive is a vessel. With vessels we do not say havot rami. And since that is so, it is not on the same level, and therefore Rabbeinu Chananel says that the cavity itself must have five point six, without combining the area of the partitions to it. Not because the area doesn’t combine—the area does combine. Because of the level requirement, you can’t do it. That is the novelty of the Kehillot Yaakov. And therefore I have no problem with a solid hive, because with a solid hive this is not havot rami; it is physically on the same level.

[Speaker E] Okay, but what would Rashi say about that? I didn’t understand. What would Rashi say about that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does Rashi need to say about that?

[Speaker E] You’re saying that he includes in the area the walls together with the cavity, so then it doesn’t have a cavity of four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, Rashi doesn’t owe Maimonides anything, and he can say that we do apply havot rami even with vessels. Okay. It’s only Nachmanides, whom I’m using to resolve the issue because I have a difficulty. Okay. Up to here. At least we managed to get through the Kehillot Yaakov. Rabbi Chaim we didn’t even manage to touch. I knew we wouldn’t finish, but I thought maybe we’d start. Fine. But I hope we got our lesson from this; I hope that overall we learned something.

[Speaker E] On Tuesday at the university.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tuesday at the university, unless another notice comes out. Tuesday at the university. We start with his class, and then I’ll send you the work plan.

[Speaker E] The order—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of work.

[Speaker C] So he says that we start at 8:45 at the university? Yes. And it’ll be until 1:15? Okay. Thank you.

[Speaker G] Thank you very much.

[Speaker H] Thank you very much, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker G] I just wanted to say for a moment that I won’t be able to come on Tuesday. Yes, I have something at work that I absolutely have to be there for, and there’s also something on the 24th, but that’s for another time. They moved it, they moved the first one to Friday; it was supposed to be this week. Yes. Right. Yes. Okay, fine. Thank you very much, Sabbath peace.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sabbath peace.

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