Tractate Shabbat, Chapter One – Lesson 47

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the Sabbath, and that’s preferable to the risk that you’re right, and by the time you went to ask, all kinds of things have already happened. So that’s why the instruction is: don’t ask, don’t hesitate, don’t deliberate—just act immediately. If there’s doubt, there’s no doubt, as people put it. But even in that there can sometimes be danger, right? What do you mean? There’s danger in that too? In what? That I might do something wrong. Seemingly I want to help and save. A person always has to act; a person always has to act responsibly, no question, but you have to act. And if you’re worried, then bring a doctor. Bringing a doctor is perfectly fine, but going to ask a rabbi whether to bring a doctor is one extra step, and that step is unnecessary. I understand. You said something that isn’t connected to the Sabbath; in general one needs to know what the proper treatment is, not to drive him, to tie him down below. But who knows what the treatment is? The point isn’t what exactly to do, but not to sit there wavering—that’s the point.

Okay, so that is really the third level. This is an illness involving danger, and notice: “an illness involving danger” doesn’t mean a person is going to die in, I don’t know, an hour; it doesn’t even mean he will definitely die. An illness involving danger means an illness from which one may die—that’s called an illness involving danger. In the Talmud you already saw that even a doubtful life-threatening situation has the same law as a definite life-threatening situation. So therefore, an illness involving danger is not someone who is definitely going to die, but someone for whom there is a significant concern that he may die. And again, there’s concern that a person may die even if he goes down to the street—maybe he’ll be run over—so no, that’s not called concern that he’s going to die. Concern means significant concern. There aren’t clear-cut criteria, but obviously not every hypothetical possibility is called a doubtful life-threatening case. A doubtful life-threatening case is when there is significant concern. Okay, so that’s subsection b'.

The third level appears in section 17: “A sick person who, because of his illness, is bedridden,” this is here in section 17, “and there is no danger in it.” It’s not just a minor ache—he is sick. On the other hand, he is bedridden, but there is no danger. The criterion is that he is bedridden. Gloss of the Rema: “Or if he has an ailment that causes suffering and makes his whole body ill, then even though he walks, he is considered as though bedridden.” And the Rema adds another criterion. For the Shulchan Arukh the criterion is whether he is bedridden. Something because of which you are forced to lie down—that is what is defined as an illness, as distinct from a minor discomfort. The criterion is whether you’re forced to lie down. The Rema says no: even if you’re not forced to lie down, but even if you are walking around, if your whole body hurts—it’s not some local discomfort or something like that, but your whole body hurts—then even if you are a sturdy person and don’t go lie down in bed because of it, it is still called a sick person without danger.

So here there are various disputes about exactly what one does. We tell a non-Jew to do medical treatment for him, but we do not desecrate the Sabbath for him with a Torah-level prohibition. Even if there is danger to a limb. Notice that—a person can lose a limb, lose an ear, lose a hand, lose a leg, lose a finger, and that does not justify desecrating the Sabbath through a Torah-level prohibition. Notice how far these things go.

Now today, by the way, people are lenient even about that. Why? Because the argument is that if you lose a limb, that itself can endanger your life in general. You might go into hysteria, who knows what—it can lead to all kinds of things. True, that’s a remote concern, but sometimes people tack on remote concerns in order to permit things they basically want to permit for other reasons—that a person shouldn’t lose a limb because of concern over Sabbath desecration. A lot in medicine has also changed and developed, and there is a real basis for this as well, apart from the very severe damage to quality of life that a person… Right, that’s true, but the concern is so remote that I think the likelihood… Let’s say there were no limb danger here, okay? But the same situation existed of concern that I might die—that remote possibility that comes from danger to a limb, right? But I’m saying, let’s say it doesn’t come through danger to a limb, just something else that carries a half-percent life risk. There we would not permit desecrating the Sabbath through a Torah-level prohibition. But if there is danger to a limb, we basically have a motivation to permit in order to save the limb, because losing a limb is no simple matter. So we use the consideration of the remote concern of saving a life, and in effect we permit desecrating the Sabbath because of the danger to the limb.

Can I ask something about that for a second? Yes. If one of the situations we saw in the Talmud is “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths,” now let’s say a person becomes deaf, and now a deaf person is exempt from… What becomes what? Deaf. Deaf, well… Okay, he lost a limb, he also lost his hearing. So a deaf person is exempt from the commandments. No, he isn’t exempt. A deaf person… not exempt. A deaf-mute—the deaf person who is exempt from the commandments, “deaf, mentally incompetent, and minor”—that means a deaf-mute from birth. Only from birth? And someone who wasn’t born that way but later developed a defect? Then no. He is not in the category of mentally incompetent. I understand. If there is a deaf person who is not mentally incompetent, then he is obligated in the commandments. Including if he was born with it? I’m asking something else. I imagine that today the approach is—I don’t know what it was in the past—I imagine that practically they also found ways to permit this in the past. But where does the realm of the psyche enter here? Meaning, a person loses a limb—call it, in gentle language, quality of life, call it, in less gentle language, injury to the person’s soul. We know that in the laws of Sabbath there is also importance to a person’s psyche. There is importance, but it is not life-saving. It is also much less than what is accepted nowadays. In the past it was somewhat negligible, mental health. I don’t know if negligible, but people were less sensitive than today. We’re a bit more pampered today. But I’m saying, there’s another question: in a case where there is concern that a person may lose his sanity and enter the category of mentally incompetent. Then there is a discussion whether something like that is called life-saving. I think yes, but the discussion is not simple. There’s an article by Rabbi Nebenzahl. And that’s part of the danger that he’s going to become blind. What? And that’s part of the issue—he can go into insane stress because of it. Right, so that’s why I said: those concerns are used by some halakhic decisors in order to permit labors in cases of danger to a limb. Now it depends how far one takes those concerns and what one is concerned about. There are no sharp lines here; I’m only sketching a general picture.

And I also wanted to ask—the Sages brought the situation of “and live by them.” “And live by them”—where is the place here also of… I mean, why are they so dismissive about the issue of a limb? Why this dismissal? “And live by them”—you could say he should live in wholeness, so to speak. Why the dismissiveness toward the matter of a limb? You’re assuming they are dismissive about the wholeness of a limb, but you know, that’s the well-known fallacy. There’s a story about Rabbi Chaim of Brisk. A woman’s son was taken in the Cantonist decrees—they took him into the Russian army. They would snatch children and raise them in the army, and the parents lost them; they were raised as non-Jews. So she went to Rabbi Chaim to ask whether she was allowed to travel on the Sabbath to Petersburg, the capital, to try to save her son. He told her: certainly—you are obligated to travel. So his students said to him, tell us, Rabbi, how are you so lenient in the laws of Sabbath? He said: I am not lenient in the laws of Sabbath; I am stringent in the laws of saving life. In every dilemma there are two sides. There’s the side of Sabbath desecration, and there’s the side of the person’s health, and there is no such thing here as leniency and stringency. Leniency on one side is stringency on the other side, and vice versa.

But that’s what I’m asking: why doesn’t a person’s limb appear on a high level? I’m asking from the standpoint of values, because after all this is a discussion of values, as we saw when we learned. Is the body a means for fulfilling commandments, or is there significance to life itself? Why is the significance of a person’s health not on a sufficiently high level? And I’m not talking… What does “not sufficiently high” mean? Again you’re returning to the same question—it’s simply not true. Observing the Sabbath carries karet. Here, if it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath to prevent losing a limb, in my eyes that places a person’s health in a low position. How are you deciding that it’s a low position? What’s your scale? In my opinion what you’re saying places the obligation of Sabbath observance in a low position. So if you ask me, my world of values is that a person… And the fact is that today too the world of values… Chani, maybe your world of values is like that. Right now we are studying the halakhic world of values. The halakhic world of values is not like that. In the halakhic world of values, desecrating the Sabbath is so severe that danger to a limb does not justify Sabbath desecration. Now, you can say that this… but to say that this puts the importance of a limb in a low place is a logical mistake, because there are two sides here. Lower than the Sabbath—lower than desecrating the Sabbath, than Sabbath observance. Sabbath is not called too low. Now, lower than the Sabbath? Right. Now the question is whether that increases the importance of desecrating the Sabbath or lowers the importance of the limb. Okay? That is the question now—how you relate to it, where you place the line. It is a matter of evaluation that has no absolute metric, and Jewish law determines that no, Sabbath desecration overrides that. More than that: we’ll see later that it may be that Sabbath desecration overrides even the value of life. But the fact is that today halakhic decisors don’t rule that way, and I imagine they don’t do it only because of concerns of loss of religion, religious apostasy, or things like that, because I imagine they found all kinds of ways to solve the problem because… They found all kinds of ways when there is a way. Again, I’m explaining: if there is a way, then they combine it. I said earlier: if there were someone entering a small life risk, half a percent, we would not permit him to desecrate the Sabbath for that. But even there I could ask for a moment: what, you place such a small risk so low on the scale? Yes—we place it relatively low compared to the Sabbath. Now, but if someone has danger to a limb, and then someone comes with the trick and says that this danger to a limb will give him a half-percent risk to life, now I will permit it. What does that mean? It means I combine the consideration of saving the limb with the consideration of the half-percent life risk. Together they do justify desecrating the Sabbath. But the life risk itself, the small life risk itself, does not justify it. So decisors who permit this today permit it because they truly combine it with something else. On its own it cannot be permitted. Either you combine it with concern over loss of religion, religious apostasy, or with a small chance of actual life risk—but without that you cannot permit it. And with that, it is a different consideration because there really are two things here, not one. So one has to be careful with the conclusions.

The halakhic decisors are looking for a halakhic solution. Right, and you need a solution. But why are they even looking for a solution? Chani, listen to something: halakhic decision is always a decision between values. Meaning, you have two values, and many times the dilemma is when they are balanced, and then we deliberate over which one, so to speak, to sacrifice in order to gain both. This is true in all kinds of areas. Saving life on the Sabbath is maybe the best-known example, but in the past it was obvious that one does not desecrate the Sabbath. Meaning, for us this is much easier and more fluid perhaps because we are no longer used to seeing it. But for desecrating the Sabbath one is executed. And if not by a court, then it is karet. Do you understand? It’s like saying, okay, I have a headache so I’ll eat on Yom Kippur, or I’ll eat leavened food on Passover. Do you understand? To us that seems impossible, but that is exactly what you’re saying about medicine. Now indeed a change in values also leads to a change in rulings, and then people find some considerations to bring in. That’s what I’m saying—that the values have changed today. Chani, Chani, I want to argue something else. What I answered earlier as well. The values don’t need to change in order to make this change. That is exactly the mistake. What I’m saying is this: the decisor today, if he is speaking about danger to a limb and has no additional consideration, will not permit desecrating the Sabbath. That does not mean that danger to a limb is unimportant in his eyes. It means that Sabbath desecration is more important. But danger to a limb has a certain weight. What does that mean? That if you have an additional consideration, like life risk or risk to sanity or something like that, then the danger to the limb joins it, and together he will permit it. So the fact that decisors look for a way out proves nothing. Nothing. Since they do not permit without a way out, and when there is a way out then that way out is real. Meaning, the permission is not based on permission to desecrate the Sabbath in order to save a limb. There is no such permission. To save a limb plus life risk—there is such permission. Therefore the fact that they look for a way out—people always looked for a way out. That’s not the issue. But the whole point is that one has to look for a way out. Meaning, without a way out, just because today I think a limb is terribly important—fine, you think so, but Jewish law says otherwise.

But here too the Sages—they looked, because already in the Talmud they knew that saving life overrides the Sabbath. The whole question was: from where? And there is a point here that… after all the learning here is from logical reasoning. Wait, wait. So similarly I ask myself: why didn’t they look for logical reasoning regarding the importance of a limb? One simple suggestion—I’m surprised you didn’t think of it: maybe they did look and didn’t find it. Why are you deciding they didn’t look? Because it’s obvious to you that this reasoning is decisive. No—they looked, thought of your reasoning, which after all isn’t all that far-fetched, not so hard to think of, and came to the conclusion: no. Because what I’m praying for—my reasoning is that it says “and live by them,” and “and live by them” means the whole body, the vitality of all the organs in the body. That is the reasoning I would bring; I ask myself where they were in that whole story. If he loses a limb, he is a living person. What do you mean? That’s all. If a person loses a limb he is a living person. I have a reason to say that “live” means every limb in the body. You can say many things, but… You can say many things. You can also say that “and live by them” means he should also have something to eat—that too is “and live by them.” Fine, that he should have tasty food to eat. And also that he should have a spiritual, ideal world that needs to be realized, and if everything is allowed then everything is lost, and then what are we living for? So sometimes that may be more important than… But okay, we’re getting there in a moment. Let’s move on a bit, because it’s too early a stage for that.

But this is an important point because maybe I’ll come back to it later. Whenever we speak here about being lenient or stringent, these are terribly confusing expressions. There is no such thing as lenient and stringent. No such creature. Neither lenient nor stringent. Because when you are lenient in the laws of Sabbath, you are stringent in the laws of saving life. When you are lenient in the laws of saving life, you are stringent in the laws of Sabbath. There’s no getting around it. Meaning, there are two sides to every coin. There is no leniency and stringency here. There is a question of a dilemma between values that needs to be decided.

Okay, so that is regarding the third category. Now we want, as I said earlier, to focus on saving life—that is, on a situation where there is danger to life. Now in a situation where there is danger to life, the question of whether that overrides the Sabbath is the topic in tractate Yoma. As I wrote to you, the discussion is not specifically about Sabbath observance. The discussion is about violating prohibitions in order to save life. Sabbath observance is one of the prohibitions. Of course it is a very severe prohibition, and therefore if the conclusion is that saving life overrides it—then apparently saving life will override almost any other prohibition as well, except for the three severe transgressions. Therefore the discussion is framed around the laws of Sabbath, simply because if it works for the laws of Sabbath, then by an a fortiori inference we will already learn it for all the other prohibitions. But one has to remember that the meaning is always about prohibitions in general, not specifically Sabbath observance.

This… some of you at least saw section 13. I think in section 13 I spoke about the question whether to slaughter for a sick person or to feed him something that is a food prohibition. So in my column, I have a website that dealt a bit with this matter. It didn’t really deal with this matter, but it dealt with the matter of laypeople. Yes, laypeople are those who are not Torah scholars—Jews close to Jewish law but not Torah scholars—and I opened the column with the question: if in the laws of Sabbath there is a sick person, exactly the question of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here, right, and you can either give him pork or slaughter meat for him, okay? What would you do? The average layman, of course, will say: what do you mean? Of course slaughter the cow for him—to eat pork? Have you lost your mind? Eating pork is an ordinary prohibition punished by lashes. Desecrating the Sabbath is stoning—that’s the most severe prohibition there is. And therefore… well, the medieval authorities dispute it there, and I assume you saw some of it; if not, we’ll still get there, I hope. But many times we have some initial gut reaction, and one needs to stop for a second and think: who says? In Jewish law, that initial reaction is not always the decisive one. One needs to think coolly and see which value prevails and which value does not. Of course there is also weight to our evaluative intuitions, but we need to treat them too with a certain suspicion—with limited trust. Thank you very much. “The opinion of laymen is the opposite of Torah opinion.” Yes, that’s the Sma in siman 3: “The opinion of laymen is the opposite of Torah opinion.”

In any event, the source of this law is the Talmud in tractate Yoma. One second, I’m opening it. On 85a. There, in the course of the discussion of saving life and so on, “one on whom a landslide fell.” And in the midst of this I’m sharing the Talmud. Okay.

“And Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were once walking on the road, and Levi HaSadar and Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were walking behind them. This question was asked before them: From where do we know that saving life overrides the Sabbath?” So as Chani already correctly pointed out, and as I also told you on the sheet to think about, from the formulation of the question alone it is already clear that there was no question whether saving life overrides the Sabbath. It is obvious that it overrides it. The whole question is: what is the source for that? Right? That is basically the discussion.

And usually in Talmudic passages where many sources are brought for a certain law, one can infer that the law was probably already known to the Talmud beforehand. The whole discussion in the Talmud is not over whether this is indeed the law, but over what the source of the law is. The law is known; the question is the source of the law. For example, the sources for the fact that “the fruit of a beautiful tree” means an etrog. The Talmud in Rosh Hashanah brings a whole list of possibilities for how we know that “the fruit of a beautiful tree” means an etrog. No one arrived at the conclusion that it’s a clementine. Meaning, it was completely obvious that it was an etrog. The question wasn’t whether it was an etrog; the question was how do we know it’s an etrog. And we have a tradition. On the other hand, the fact that we know it does not mean it’s from reason. It could be a law given to Moses at Sinai, it could be something learned from some source in the past that was forgotten or did not reach us. What reached us was only the conclusion that saving life overrides the Sabbath. We ask ourselves: okay, from what source was that derived?

So the fact that the source… and here too Chani commented earlier, and not correctly—the fact that the Talmud assumes this is the law and only looks for the source does not mean that this is reasoning. Absolutely not. Because if it were from reasoning, then there would be no need for sources—why do I need a verse? It’s reasoning. Therefore when the Talmud says “From where?” if anything I would infer from here that reasoning by itself does not yet say this. Rather, let’s see: we know that this is the law; the sages in the past apparently derived this law from some source; the law, the bottom line, reached us, but we don’t know what the source was. Let’s try to reconstruct it; let’s look for whether we can find a source that yields this law. And all the suggestions that come afterward are suggestions of sources. Nobody says, “It’s reasoning—we don’t need sources, everything is fine.” No, it’s reasoning.

More than that: throughout the whole Talmudic discussion, when all the sources are brought, afterward the Talmud asks about all of them. The Talmud says that they all have refutations except for Shmuel’s source, “and live by them.” And then the Talmud discusses what refutations there are on all these sources. And the main refutation that in effect knocks them all out is that from them we cannot learn that a doubtful life-threatening case overrides the Sabbath. So what? Fine, then it could be that a doubtful life-threatening case really does not override the Sabbath. So why is that a Torah-level doubt? I can’t hear. But it’s a Torah-level doubt if I find a textual support for it. But it’s a Torah-level doubt—and Sabbath observance is also a Torah-level doubt. Again you’re returning to the question of what we are stringent about and what we are lenient about. Right. Therefore when the Talmud rejects sources on the grounds that from them we learn only that definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, but not doubtful life-threatening danger—that raises the question: why is that a rejection? Alternatively, one who learns from those sources learns only that definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, but not doubtful danger. No, but because of Shmuel’s source, from which it is clear that even doubtful danger does, one cannot accept the other sources. Meaning, it was known to the sages here in the Talmud not only that saving life overrides the Sabbath, but also that a doubtful life-threatening case overrides the Sabbath. Meaning, the information from which they began was broader than I described earlier: not only the law itself that saving life overrides the Sabbath, they also knew this detail, that a doubtful life-threatening case overrides the Sabbath. And that sharpens even more the point that all they were doing here in the Talmud was searching for sources, while the law itself was known, both for definite and for doubtful cases. And again my claim is that this is not necessarily the result of reasoning; the fact is that they search for sources.

Okay, one second. Now what about the source that there are only three commandments for which one must be killed rather than transgress? Isn’t that enough? Who said there are only three? And doesn’t it say in Sanhedrin that only for three commandments does one say “be killed rather than transgress”? It does, but that appears as a summary; the question is how we know it. But is it only from here that they know it? Because I asked myself why not the reverse. If they know there are three commandments for which one must be killed rather than transgress, then they know those three are not overridden by saving life. That’s what they know. What about the rest? I don’t know. Here we learn that the rest are overridden. So if so, the conclusion is that only three override saving life. Is there perhaps also a difference in that those three involve truly positive killing, whereas here it’s simply passive inaction? No—why? Idolatry and illicit relations are not murder. No, there it’s to go and be killed, and here it’s just to let go. What does that have to do with it? I’m in danger right now. If I’m in danger, am I allowed to commit idolatry because I need it in order to be healed or to be saved? Right, also to be healed, right. Yes.

So that summary—that only three transgressions are overridden by… rather, override saving life—is a summary that comes after this Talmudic passage, not before it. More than that: this is a dispute among later authorities (Acharonim). We won’t get into it here, but there are later authorities who claim that everything starts from here. In the Talmud here we still know nothing at all about any transgression. We want to know in general whether one may violate prohibitions in order to save lives. The conclusion of the Talmud here is yes. Now begins the discussion of the three severe transgressions, and for each of them a source is brought for why it is an exception and does not enter the general category of this Talmudic passage. And therefore we are left only with the three severe transgressions. But obviously the Talmudic passage we are learning now is part of the process that leads us to the conclusion that only regarding the three severe transgressions do we say “be killed rather than transgress.” Okay?

So if so, what we learn from here—again without entering all the details—is that it was known to the Talmud that saving life overrides the Sabbath. It was known to the Talmud that even doubtful life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath. The whole question was the source. Most of the sources do not yield the law of doubtful life-threatening danger, and therefore they were rejected. But notice: definite life-threatening danger—that is, “and live by them”—also yields the law of doubtful life-threatening danger.

Now an interesting point: regarding the other sources, were they rejected in the sense that they cannot be used? Suppose there is a practical difference between the sources—what do you say? It wasn’t said they were rejected. Wait, they can be used—the fact is they are used. The fact is that “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” is used. Right. What do you say? But the Talmud says there is a refutation against it. But still, because Shmuel’s source is not specifically related to commandments that… to the Sabbath, and it applies to all the commandments of the Torah. So what didn’t I understand? I’m saying that the sources they discussed were specifically in the context of the Sabbath. No, no source here speaks specifically about the Sabbath. “And the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath”—here surely we are talking about… No source here speaks specifically about the Sabbath except Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, and even he is not really speaking about the Sabbath. You saw the Meiri brought in the Bi’ur Halakhah, where you saw that “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” is also not talking specifically about the Sabbath. But “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” is not a textual source—it’s already reasoning, not a source. Fine, reasoning is also a source. Reasoning is also a source. Yes, but one can’t refute it—why there too could it be that doubtful life-threatening danger is still logical? I didn’t understand. The other sources I understood why they were refuted, but why refute this source? For the same reason—that in a doubtful case you cannot derive that one desecrates the Sabbath. That’s what the Talmud says. Definite life-threatening danger—but let’s go back. Repeat the question you asked. I’m saying: the Talmud here says all of them have a refutation except “and live by them,” right? So that means all were rejected except Shmuel’s reason. Then they can’t be used. How does the Talmud in Shabbat use them? And the decisors bring them, and you pointed us to the Bi’ur Halakhah and to the Meiri—they use the reason “Desecrate one Sabbath for him.” Why? After all it was rejected; there is a refutation against it. Truly I didn’t understand why.

First of all there is a simple logical answer. It wasn’t really rejected. It simply does not give us a source for everything we are looking for. As a source for the rule that definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, it is an excellent source. True, you cannot learn from it the law that doubtful life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath. Okay, so for doubtful life-threatening danger the source is “and live by them.” But for definite life-threatening danger it is a good source; it wasn’t rejected for that.

So for example, if we say there are things that can be learned only from Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s source—“Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths”—and not from the source of “and live by them,” it could be that there indeed only definite life-threatening danger would override, not doubtful danger. Some later authorities want to argue that when the Talmud in Shabbat speaks about desecrating the Sabbath in order to save the life of a minor and it brings “Desecrate one Sabbath for him,” they ask: why does it bring specifically that and not “and live by them”? Because “and live by them” does not justify desecrating the Sabbath to save the life of a minor, while “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths” does justify it, because in the future he will observe many Sabbaths. Why doesn’t it justify it? Why does the life of a minor not fall under “and live by them”? One second, one second, we’ll get there. I just want to explain a point here. So if there is, say, this practical difference regarding a minor, then the Talmud says: regarding saving the life of a minor, I indeed use the rationale of “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths,” and not the rationale of “and live by them.” Therefore that rationale is brought.

Now if that’s so, what happens if there is doubtful life-threatening danger to a minor? That’s what I asked, yes. In such a case, apparently one should not desecrate the Sabbath for it. Because the rationale of “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths” is the rationale for which one desecrates the Sabbath for a minor, and that rationale, the Talmud says, does not justify desecrating the Sabbath for doubtful life-threatening danger, only for definite danger. So if only that rationale exists in the case of a minor, then apparently the conclusion is that for doubtful life-threatening danger one does not desecrate the Sabbath. But the answer we had earlier—the answer still stands. I didn’t understand. Meaning, earlier they desecrated the Sabbath for him because he has many Sabbaths afterward, but that answer of many Sabbaths afterward still remains. What do you mean it remains? But he was in doubtful life-threatening danger. In doubtful life-threatening danger that does not justify Sabbath desecration. Because maybe he’ll live anyway, and he’ll have many Sabbaths even without you. But maybe not, maybe yes. Exactly. And therefore it does not justify it. In life we never relate to “maybe yes.” In life we do indeed relate to it, because no one here is talking about life. We’re talking about Sabbath observance. The value of life is not entering here; in a moment we’ll get there. The question is how many Sabbaths you gain. So I’m saying: I’m not sure I’m gaining Sabbaths. A doubt does not remove a certainty. You have a doubt that maybe you’ll gain many Sabbaths, and right now you are definitely losing one Sabbath. A doubt does not remove a certainty. But it’s always a doubt. Who says someone will observe the Sabbath afterward? No, no, that’s not connected. Wait, wait, Chani, Chani. Don’t anticipate; we’ll get there in a moment. Chani, we’ll get there shortly, don’t jump ahead.

So I only want to say that the consequence of the difference between these two explanations regarding doubt can have halakhic significance. If we really understand that the saving of a minor’s life can be based only on Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale—and that is not certain at all, but there are later authorities who want to say it—then the practical difference will be that apparently one may desecrate the Sabbath only for his definite life-threatening danger, not for his doubtful life-threatening danger. Okay?

Now, in a moment I’ll come to the differences between them and then also to Chani’s question, but I want to move forward a bit. Basically the rationales that ultimately remain are Shmuel’s rationale, “and live by them and not die by them,” and the fact is that both in the Talmud in Shabbat and in the medieval and later authorities they also bring Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale. The other rationales are not brought. Maybe they can be used, but they are not brought. These two are brought. Therefore I want to focus for a moment on both of them.

The Talmud basically—that is, these two rationales seemingly work in opposite directions. Why? Because the rationale of “and live by them” basically assumes that life has value and it overrides the value of not violating a prohibition. Meaning, life has independent value; it is not only a means in order to fulfill commandments. Therefore even if this requires me to give up something in the realm of commandment observance, no matter: the value of life overrides that. Perhaps one could formulate it even more sharply. What it says is “and live by them,” and not “die by them.” If keeping the commandments will cause me to die, then the whole enterprise isn’t worth it, so don’t keep the commandments. Meaning, observance of commandments is basically almost a means for life, not a goal, and certainly not the goal of life. That is Shmuel’s rationale—“and live by them.”

By contrast, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale seems to work in the exact opposite direction. He says the opposite: the value of life in itself does not justify desecrating the Sabbath. Why may one desecrate the Sabbath? Because if you save the life, he will simply succeed in observing many Sabbaths. Meaning, seemingly life is a means in order for us to be able to observe Sabbaths, to be able to observe commandments. An opposite conception—an entirely opposite value conception. Now that sharpens the question even more: if so, how can both of these conceptions be brought into Jewish law if they contradict one another? Now these are no longer just two answers or two sources. We have two conceptions here that contradict each other, that are opposed. And we use both of them simultaneously.

What practical difference is there also regarding a non-Jew and a Sabbath violator? About that I said I’d get there in a moment. But the question is: I think Shmuel’s statement also contains that of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya does not contain what Shmuel said. Why? Because Shmuel’s statement is so all-encompassing. What do you mean by all-encompassing? It says that the value of life overrides and pushes aside the commandments. So it appears that the commandments are at most a means for life, but certainly life is not a means for commandments. But Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says life is a means for commandments. Why am I allowed to save life? In principle I should have been forbidden to save life. The only reason I may save life is because I will gain Sabbath observance. Meaning, seemingly life has no value in itself; it is instrumental to Sabbath observance. But Rabbi Shimon addressed only the issue of Sabbath observance in his statement, or did he address…? No, I already said earlier, the Meiri writes—and if you saw it in the Clarification of Halakhah—the Meiri says we’re talking about all commandments, not specifically Sabbath observance. We’ll get there in a moment.

So seemingly we have here two opposing, contradictory conceptions. That strengthens even more the question of how both can be used simultaneously. Earlier I asked: one of them was rejected and the other remained as the Talmud’s conclusion, so how do we use the one that was rejected? I explained that it wasn’t rejected. Now I’m asking a harder question. Fine, it wasn’t rejected—but it contradicts the second conception. How can one use two contradictory conceptions together?

So I want to say the following, and I’ll do it briefly because it really is a philosophical discussion that needs length. When we speak in what is called analytic ethics, moral philosophy, there is a principle called the incommensurability of values. What does that mean? Values—say in Leibowitz’s definition—are things that are not means to achieving anything. A value is an end in itself. Anything that is a means to achieve something outside itself cannot be a value, because it is a means to something else. That other thing, the final goal one wants to achieve, is the value. Meaning, a value can be used by me to explain what is permitted and what is forbidden to do. If I want to explain the value itself—why human life has value—the answer is: just because. There is no explanation. Because if there were an explanation—life has value because one can fulfill commandments, or because one can, I don’t know, enjoy life—then that means life has no value; it has instrumental value. It serves a purpose outside itself. Values are something that is an end in itself. It does not serve a purpose outside it. That is the definition of a value.

Now if so, there is an article by Leibowitz at the end of one of his books—his books are collections of essays. One of the books is called Faith, History and Values. The last essay in that book discusses disconnecting a girl from life-support machines. There was a famous case in the United States of a girl named Karen, and there was a huge discussion around the issue. She suffered greatly and there was no prospect at all; she could not be saved. Was it permitted to disconnect her from the machines or not? It reached legal forums and there was a very broad public debate around it. He wrote the essay about that, and he argued that he opposed it—Leibowitz. He opposed disconnecting? Yes, he opposed disconnecting her from the machines. Why? He says life is a value. The moment it is a value, one cannot see it as serving a purpose outside itself. Now the rationale for permitting disconnection from the machines basically says: life is not worth anything unless one can do various things with it. And this poor girl can’t do anything with her life, so it has no value; one may kill her. And he says that is basically saying that human life is not a value. Human life is a means to do various things with it. But if I understand that life is a value, then one cannot rationalize the value; one cannot reduce it to something else. And therefore one also cannot qualify it. Therefore one cannot say here it has value and here it has no value. A value is something absolute. By the way, I completely disagree with his conclusion. Why? Because there is a clash between values, and sometimes one value will override another, but he ignores that. For our purposes, what matters to me is—there is the issue of suffering. Okay, and therefore? That’s also connected to saving life. No, you can say that the value of preventing suffering overrides the value of life. That’s what I’m saying—that’s why I don’t agree with Leibowitz’s logic. Because the fact that I harm the value of life does not mean that life is not a value in my eyes, but there are other values too, and sometimes values clash. It doesn’t mean one should do it; I’m only saying that his logic is not necessary. Okay? But “be killed rather than transgress” also contradicts what he says. What contradicts? If he claims, if he says what he says according to the Torah, then it’s not true, because the fact is that… He says it morally, not according to the Torah. It is an argument according to himself. Meaning, according to his own morality. Yes.

But I want to go one step further. If indeed values are ends in themselves, not means to anything, then let’s now look at a value conflict. What happens when there is a clash between two values, like in that case of preventing suffering versus saving life, or harming life? Right? Then the question is what overrides what. Some philosophers say that this is basically a conflict or dilemma that cannot be decided. Why? Because in order to decide it one needs to build a scale of values. The scale says which value stands above which other value, and that hierarchy helps me decide in cases of conflict. If value number two clashes with value number five on my scale, then value two will override value five because it is higher on the scale. Okay? So in order to decide value dilemmas I need to build a scale.

Except that there is no way to build this scale. Why? Because how does one build such a scale? I need to measure the values with some shared unit, some kind of common yardstick, and see how many units this value is worth, how many units that value is worth, and then rank them. If I measure them in different units, there is no way to rank them. Let me ask you: what is there more of in the world—water in the oceans or kindness among human beings? You understand that this question cannot be answered, right? Not that we don’t know the answer—there is no answer. It is a meaningless question. Why? Because water can be quantified by weight. Right, because the units by which I measure these two quantities are different units. There is no common unit by means of which I can measure both sides and then compare and say which is more and which is less. Those philosophers say: values are like that too. If a value does not serve some purpose outside itself, then there is no criterion by which one can measure whether it is important and how important it is. If all values served some purpose, then I would say value A has five units of importance because it is very important for that purpose, and value B only three units of importance because it serves that purpose less. Then there would be a way to rank value A against value B. But if these values cannot be rationalized, they do not serve anything outside themselves—how can one measure them? And all the more so, how can one measure them in a common unit for all of them in order to make a scale?

How, in fact—even when I learned this whole sheet I asked myself—for they enter here into the issue of light transgressions and severe transgressions. Right. Who put the Sages in charge of deciding what is severe and what is light? The Torah didn’t say this is severe and this is light. They don’t decide. They take interpretive steps. But for example, regarding carrion and slaughtering, there is the question of which prohibition is light and which is severe. No, there are indications. For example by the punishment; for example by the… There are indications from the Torah. And then they use the indications of the punishment. And who said those are the right indications? And who said our reasoning is correct in general? Why use reasoning? Maybe it’s wrong. What can you do? This is our intellect and that’s what we have. But in Ethics of the Fathers it does say, “Be as careful with a light commandment as with a severe one.” Anyone looking for certainty is not in the right world. One can never be certain of anything. What I have is my reason. I use it, and maybe I’m mistaken—one can always be mistaken—but this is what I have; I have no other tool. So if my reasoning says this, and I understand that this is the Torah’s intention, that’s how I act. If I erred—may my error be held against me. What can I do? I can never be certain, but that’s what there is. Questions after the class. What I understood from Ethics of the Fathers actually strengthens against what you’re saying, because what do they say there? What do you mean? Even though you know there are light commandments and severe ones—I know you’ll be stricter about the severe ones—still also keep the light ones, even though naturally you… They recognize the existence of lighter and more severe ones—that’s exactly what you’re saying. Yes, but let’s not get into that now; that’s a whole separate topic, a class of its own. Whether there are lighter and more severe commandments and how one measures it—I once wrote an article about that. But let’s leave it for now; it’s not our topic.

So I return to ranking values, or building a scale. In order to decide value conflicts one needs to build a scale. For example, Sabbath and saving life. Now how do I build a scale? I’ll ask you an even stronger question. Suppose I ask you whether there is more water in the ocean or more kindness in human beings. If you found a verse that revealed to you that there is more kindness in human beings, would that be okay? Would that help you? The answer is no. Do you know why not? Because there is no answer to that question. It’s not that I don’t know. A verse cannot reveal to me an answer that doesn’t exist. A verse can help me when there is a question, but it is too hard for me and I don’t know the answer. Then the Holy One reveals the answer to me in a verse, and I understand. But where there is no answer, no verse will help. A verse also cannot tell me an answer, because there is no answer to that question. It’s not that there is an answer and I just don’t know it. The problem of incommensurability says there is no answer, not that I have no access to it. It’s a meaningless question.

Then the question arises… But the Torah does say “and live by them.” It placed the values in order for us. It told us that this value of life is more important. Okay, if it’s incommensurable, then basically no verse in the Torah should have been able to help. So the fact that there are verses doesn’t help. So now the question is… after all, not only in Torah but also in life we decide moral conflicts all the time. Okay? It’s a good question how we do it, but the fact that we make decisions means there is some problem with this incommensurability. To solve that problem I need a whole lecture of its own; I’m not going to do that here. What I do want to show… But the conclusion is that someone who studied philosophy doesn’t know how to decide. I can’t hear. Someone who studied philosophy can’t decide these things. Someone who studied philosophy… We simple people who didn’t study, we use our instincts. Not sure. I don’t think philosophy interferes, but it may not help.

I once heard Yeshayahu Leibowitz directly ask: what will a donkey do if it is about to die of hunger and is standing exactly between two piles of hay? A donkey that studied philosophy will die, but an ordinary donkey… That question was asked by Jean Buridan, the dean of the University of Paris in the 14th century. It’s called Buridan’s donkey. I also used it for various other and interesting purposes. In any event, for our purposes, I want to draw your attention to one point. Let’s return to our topic. See what a brilliant maneuver Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya makes here.

We have a clash between saving life and observing the Sabbath. These are two incommensurable values. “Incommensurable” in English means lacking a common measure—there is no common measure. Okay? So they have no common measure; there is no way to measure both of them in the same units. So what does one do?

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: very simple. Let’s say the value of life is x, and the value of Sabbath observance is y. Okay? And now let’s compare our two options. One option: I do not desecrate the Sabbath and the person dies. Okay? So I was spared Sabbath desecration, everything is fine, and I didn’t gain the other Sabbaths, right? And I also saved this Sabbath. The value of that move is zero. What happens if I desecrate the Sabbath and save his life? Then I gained his life, which is value y. And regarding Sabbaths, I lost the Sabbath I desecrated now, and I gained another n Sabbaths that he will live and observe. Meaning, I gained n minus 1 Sabbaths plus the value of life. I lost a Sabbath, but I also lost a transgression? The transgression—I need… I committed a transgression. That’s the Sabbath you lost. What do you mean, that’s the Sabbath you lost? The Sabbath desecration, the transgression itself. So basically what is happening here… But the Sabbath desecration is done by you, while the many Sabbaths observed are by him. None of the decisors raises that possibility. That is one of the fascinating aspects of the topic—no decisor is interested in who performs the transgression. Even in… we’ll get to that when we speak about the Rosh, and there if he eats pork then he commits the transgression, while if I slaughter then I commit the transgression. That consideration interests no one. We saw something like this in “one who places bread in the oven”; there was an initial thought like that, and even there it didn’t remain in the end. But let’s continue.

What about “one who places bread in the oven”? If someone else removes it? We spoke about that. Let’s move on for a second.

What I want to say is this: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya bypasses the problem of incommensurability. What he basically says is this: if you do not desecrate the Sabbath and the person dies, your value is zero x and zero y, right? Zero. If you desecrate the Sabbath, you gained y, which is his life, and n minus 1 times x, the number of Sabbaths he will observe minus the one you desecrated now. Right? y plus n minus 1 times x is always positive, greater than zero. And what if he desecrates the future Sabbaths? Then again we’re back to that question. My assumption is that he observes those Sabbaths. Later I’ll say what happens if he doesn’t. Fine? For now let’s speak about a person who will observe them.

The issue is whether this is quantitative or something beyond quantity and he… No, no. Again, this is a representation. It’s all representation here, but I’m trying to represent the logic. So what I’m saying is this: notice that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya reaches a decision here that does not depend on the ratio between x and y. Whatever the values of x and y may be, I can prove that desecrating the Sabbath is the preferable move over keeping the Sabbath in this case. No matter what you substitute for x and for y, y plus n minus 1 times x is always greater than zero. x and y are positive. Meaning, he did not decide here that life is worth more, or that the commandments are worth more than life. He gains both. Exactly. And that is the point that needs close attention. Because Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya did not determine that life is a means for commandments. That’s a mistake. That is how his words seem at first glance, and if you saw the Clarification of Halakhah, the Clarification of Halakhah writes this explicitly. But it is not true. It’s a mistake. Because Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya succeeded in finding a trick to bypass incommensurability. x and y I have no way to compare and determine which is greater. I have no way, because they are measured in different units. But I can still decide my conflict without deciding the values of x and y. For any x and y greater than zero, y plus n minus 1 times x is greater than zero. Simple algebra.

But what about, Rabbi, the possibility that the person will remain alive anyway if we don’t save him? No, no, right now I’m speaking about a definite case. At this stage I’m speaking about a definite case. How can one know it is definite? Again. One can never know with certainty, but according to the doctors’ assessment the man is going to die. Fine? That is the data we have. There can always be a mistake, but we do not worry about mistakes. We work with the intellect we have, and that’s what we have. Okay, no, but I’m asking in terms of the equation you arranged. If I add the possibility that this person may live anyway, I don’t know, and I also don’t know the value of his life. The equation doesn’t answer those assumptions. No. If I add the possibility that this person may live anyway—there is no possibility, the possibility is zero. The discussion here is where everything is definite. Still, what is preferable: to desecrate the Sabbath or to save him? Okay. For us the possibility is zero. Clearly we could be mistaken, but that’s the assessment. By the way, even a majority is treated like certainty, because one follows the majority. It doesn’t matter; I’m not getting into details now. In order to call it a doubt, it would need to be fifty percent. Eighty percent is not a doubtful life-threatening case; eighty percent is a definite life-threatening case. But let’s leave that now.

In any event, what do I want to say? That it is incorrect to read Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya as saying that life is a means for commandments. Mistake. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya is trying to gain exactly this: without deciding who serves whom and without deciding who is more important than whom, I can decide the dilemma without deciding that. And if so, then Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and Shmuel do not contradict each other; one can use both rationales. Shmuel teaches me that life is a value in itself, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: very good. Even if life is a value in itself, and even if not, I have a way to decide regardless. Therefore there is no contradiction between them. And therefore we can in fact use both of these rationales.

Now let’s enter the earlier comments that came up among you—practical differences. What about saving a non-Jew? Or saving a Jew who doesn’t observe the Sabbath? Or saving a minor who currently is not obligated to observe the Sabbath, or someone mentally incompetent? What about saving a person for only temporary life? I desecrate the Sabbath and he will live another, I don’t know, ten hours. After ten hours he’ll die; he won’t observe many Sabbaths. Is it permitted to desecrate the Sabbath in order to save him? You understand that all these can be practical differences between Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reason and Shmuel’s reason. It goes back to the story of the… of disconnecting the machines. Again? It goes back to the story of disconnecting the machines. In a certain sense, with temporary life it begins to look similar. Yes. Meaning, there really are several practical differences here that could arise. So let’s go through them a bit, because basically it’s not exactly that simple.

The claim regarding a Jew who doesn’t observe the Sabbath, for example—the agreement of almost all decisors, with the exception of the Or HaChaim on the Torah who suggests a possibility, and the Clarification of Halakhah also brings someone there who wanted to argue otherwise—the agreement of almost all decisors is that one desecrates the Sabbath without any doubt to save the life of a person who does not observe the Sabbath. Why? The rationale is broader as well. According to “and live by them” there is no question. But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya—after all, he won’t observe many Sabbaths. He’ll repent and observe many Sabbaths? Maybe yes, maybe no. What are the odds? Statistics. Make statistics—how many among people born secular return in repentance? It’s a small minority. But you said that people who had the experience of almost dying, that would help them repent. How many people who nearly died actually returned in repentance because of that? If you make statistics on that, I assume it won’t be much higher, if at all. Certainly not a majority. You know, they always say there are no atheists in foxholes, right? But there are no believers outside foxholes. After you were in a foxhole and promised the Holy One that you’d return in repentance if He saved you, you don’t return in repentance. You come out of the foxhole and say: okay, God, I managed. Thanks, thanks. But there are also their children. The foxhole is a moment of truth. You know the story of the person drowning at sea, begging the Holy One: if You send me a ship I’ll return in repentance, and this and that. A ship passes by, he gets on board and sits down comfortably: thank You very much, God, no need anymore, I managed. A ship came by. So that’s… Or at soccer games, yes. There is God for ninety minutes. In any event—or in the minutes when goals are scored. Okay, in any event. At least for people like that, they have God for ninety minutes. Yes, yes. Ah, defender of Israel. Yes. Okay.

So in any event, let’s return to our issue. When we speak about a Jew who doesn’t observe the Sabbath, the agreement of all decisors really—except one or two across the generations, meaning an absolute consensus—is that one desecrates the Sabbath also to save someone who does not observe Sabbaths. Why? Because you are supposed to give him the possibility of observing Sabbaths. That’s the point. If he doesn’t make use of it, that’s his accounting with the Holy One. Your job is to ensure or enable as much Sabbath observance as possible. You should do what you need to do. If afterward he uses that for Sabbath observance or decides not to use it, that’s an account he has to settle with the Holy One, not your business. That is the point in the Jewish context.

In the context of a non-Jew, it’s a more complicated story. Because in the case of a non-Jew he doesn’t need to observe the Sabbath at all. A Jew needs to observe the Sabbath, it’s just that he may not be doing so. The non-Jew is not obligated in Sabbath observance at all. Therefore in principle, strictly according to the law, it says in the Talmud—and I referred you to that Talmudic passage on the same page above—one does not desecrate the Sabbath to save the life of a non-Jew. That is the law in the Talmud, and all decisors rule that way. You saw it in the Shulchan Arukh; I referred you to section 330, paragraph 2.

However—and I inserted a note there because I can’t leave it that way. It is outrageous, and in my view it’s also incorrect. The point is this: I therefore brought you the Meiri, who writes in the eighth chapter of Yoma that this applies only to the gentiles of that time who were not restrained by the norms of civilized nations. For the gentiles of today one does desecrate the Sabbath in order to save them. Why? Because the point is this. The Meiri—and the Meiri, by the way, is a later authority whom the Clarification of Halakhah brings right at the beginning—the Meiri writes there: what about temporary life? I desecrate the Sabbath and the person will live only until Sunday morning; he won’t observe many Sabbaths. He will have time to confess and repent. The Meiri says: we are not speaking specifically about Sabbath observance; we are speaking about commandments in general, and he can manage to perform a great many commandments by Sunday morning, and therefore there is no problem—you desecrate the Sabbath even to save temporary life.

Now notice: if we are talking about a non-Jew—this is the temporary-life point. What happens if we’re talking about… and the point is this: according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya as well, says the Meiri, one desecrates the Sabbath to save temporary life. That is the important point. Meaning, according to “and live by them,” fine, “and live by them.” But I’m saying that according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, apparently there is no justification for saving temporary life because he won’t observe many Sabbaths. They say: incorrect—even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya one desecrates the Sabbath to save temporary life. So the non-Jew too is commanded in the seven Noahide commandments? Exactly—that’s the point. Therefore the required conclusion is the same regarding a non-Jew. The non-Jew is commanded in his commandments, and you need to enable him to do them. It is not specifically Sabbath observance.

However, there are non-Jews who are wicked non-Jews; they don’t observe their seven commandments. For such non-Jews—the ancient gentiles of whom the Meiri speaks—the Talmud said one does not desecrate the Sabbath to save them. But non-Jews who behave like human beings, who are moral non-Jews, who behave properly, who keep their seven commandments—for them one desecrates the Sabbath to save them. If one understands this regarding temporary life, the same can be said regarding saving a non-Jew.

Now if you ask decisors today, almost all decisors will tell you that basically it is forbidden to save the life of a non-Jew. Not all decisors? Just a second. Only because of arguments of hostility, ways of peace, what will people think of us, desecration of God’s name, all kinds of things of that sort. They won’t save Jews elsewhere—but again, those are tricks. In the end, strictly according to the law, almost all decisors will tell you today: one may not desecrate the Sabbath to save the life of a non-Jew. In my opinion that is a major mistake. One should desecrate the Sabbath—not only is it permitted, one should desecrate the Sabbath—to save the life of a non-Jew, and not only because of hostility and ways of peace and so on, but strictly according to the law. Everything written in the Talmud and the halakhic authorities that one does not desecrate the Sabbath is because all the non-Jews they knew behaved like beasts. Those are the non-Jews they knew. The non-Jews I know are different; they behave like human beings, no different from Jews—sometimes, sadly. But that is the situation, and therefore… But what does that have to do with it? Sometimes Jews and non-Jews both… But what does it have to do with how they behave? Saving… desecrating the Sabbath in order to save a life is conditional on his doing commandments or good deeds in his life, right? That’s why I desecrate the Sabbath. So if there is a non-Jew who behaves like a beast, there is no reason to desecrate the Sabbath, because he won’t do that in his life. But if there is a non-Jew who behaves as he should, then one desecrates the Sabbath to save his life. But if you say it’s because of the value of life, that’s one thing. But if you say it’s connected to how he behaves, then who decides what behavior counts as that of a good person or of a bad person? The Torah. The Torah. The Torah says one must keep seven commandments. But how do you know? How do you know at such a moment of life-threatening danger what kind of non-Jew this is? There are presumptions in the world. When you see a person and you don’t know him, you judge him by presumptions. That is true in every area of Jewish law. Now the question is: what is the average non-Jew? That is really the question. If the average non-Jew is a reasonable human being, then the person standing before you is presumed to be such unless proven otherwise. According to that, you should have saved a Nazi? According to that you should have saved a Nazi. It depends who. If you see and know he is a Nazi, then no. Because you know he is not a human being. A Nazi is an enemy—that is already a completely different law. What would you do? No, no, I’m not talking about an enemy. An enemy is something else. I’m talking about someone who doesn’t behave like a human being, not because he is an enemy. Fine, a Nazi is also under the law of a pursuer; there are other things too. No, no, so I’m not speaking about an enemy. An enemy is something else. I’m talking about someone who doesn’t behave like a human being. So why with a Jew did you say it’s okay? With a Jew we give the possibility, and a non-Jew gets no possibility? Right. That is the difference in Jewish law. That is the only difference between Jew and non-Jew in Jewish law: the granting or assessing of potential. It is a real difference. For a Jew, even if he is presumed wicked, I do not know a decisor who says—again except for the Or HaChaim—not to desecrate the Sabbath for him. But the assumption is that you are meant to place before him the possibility of observing the Sabbath. You could have said the same thing about a non-Jew. Yet I think the difference is, again, not really essential; rather in the time of the Sages the average non-Jew simply was not like that. Since the average non-Jew was not like that, there was no point in speaking about potential that probably would not be realized. The assumption is that among Jews it is not so far-fetched. Some do, some don’t, but you cannot assume it will not happen. And in order not to desecrate the Sabbath you need to assume it won’t happen—not that in order to desecrate you need to assume it will happen. That is the difference.

But Rabbi, you sent us to a source where someone sentenced to death by a court—one does not clear the rubble from him on the Sabbath, because since he was prepared to accept death because he was sentenced to death, why then does one not desecrate the Sabbath for him? Yes, but not for that reason. Not because he was prepared to accept death. A person cannot waive his own life; that is irrelevant. Even if he gives up his life, that does not exempt me from saving his life. A person is not the owner of his own life. But I saw there that for him one does not desecrate the Sabbath. That is for another reason. Because in any event he is going to die. He is one who in any event must die. If it were permitted to carry out the death penalty on the Sabbath, they would kill him on the Sabbath. But there is a law that on the Sabbath one does not execute him. Fine, so now he is dying on his own—why in the world desecrate the Sabbath to save him when I have an obligation to kill him?

What I didn’t manage to understand is why they don’t always use “and live by them.” Seemingly if one accepts from the Talmud also “and live by them,” then one should always have to save a non-Jew. Fine, he didn’t understand. So why don’t the decisors rule this way if it really comes from the Talmud? No, because they claim that even according to “and live by them” one does not save the life of a non-Jew. Why? Because the value of his life does not justify Sabbath desecration. But the Torah didn’t make a distinction between Jew and non-Jew; it wrote “and live by them” about everyone. The Torah wrote nothing; it’s all interpretation. That is the interpretation of the Sages. But again I say: the Meiri argues this applies only to the non-Jews of that time. And the claim is that the value of their lives stems from their behavior, and therefore “and live by them” also draws on the same reasoning. Once they behave like human beings, I also treat the value of their lives like the value of Jewish life, and therefore even according to “and live by them” I can desecrate the Sabbath for them. And also “and live by them”—it means live by the commandments and not die because of the commandments. What is “by them”? It’s clearly the commandments. That’s clear, but that’s on the assumption that he indeed will live. But if he won’t live then there is no point in desecrating the Sabbath to keep him alive. To live, one needs to live by them.

Okay, so in any event, that is regarding the various practical differences. The Bi’ur Halakhah in 329, paragraph 4 begins: “Even if they found him crushed such that he can live only briefly”—this is temporary life, yes, that’s the practical difference—“they clear [the rubble] and check up to his nose,” and so on. What does “only briefly” mean? Here the Bi’ur Halakhah comes in, because this is seemingly a practical difference between Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and Shmuel, right? Because according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya the permission to desecrate the Sabbath is “so that he may observe many Sabbaths.” Here we are talking about someone who can live only briefly. So the Bi’ur Halakhah says as follows:

“Only briefly”—and even though the reason “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths” does not apply here, because it is not specifically Sabbath, but the same applies to other commandments, as the Meiri wrote in Yoma, and this is his wording”—he quotes the Meiri—“‘And even though it has become clear that he cannot live even one hour, in that hour he will repent in his heart and confess.’” End quote. Therefore we are not speaking specifically of observing many Sabbaths, but of observing commandments generally, and therefore temporary life is also included.

But truly, it seems that all this is only a rationale, but as a matter of law it does not depend on commandments at all. For the reason we set aside one commandment is not for the sake of many commandments, but rather we set aside all commandments for the life of a Jew, as Shmuel derives from “and live by them.” And as Maimonides wrote in chapter 2 of the laws of Sabbath: “The laws of the Torah are not vengeance in the world, but mercy and kindness and peace in the world.” And likewise all those Tannaim—all the Tannaim who derive it there in the Talmud. What is he saying? This is the Bi’ur Halakhah I meant earlier. He is basically right that, for practical law, we do not rule like Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya but like Shmuel. Since there are differences in conception between them, we cannot go with both. Therefore the important reason is Shmuel’s, and according to Shmuel the question doesn’t arise; obviously one desecrates the Sabbath even for temporary life, because the value of life is a value in itself, whether temporary life or long life. Only according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, where the idea is to observe many Sabbaths, does the question arise of what happens in the case of temporary life.

What do we see here? That the Bi’ur Halakhah understood that there is a disagreement between these rationales and they contradict each other. That’s what I told you earlier, and I think he is mistaken. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya does not disagree with Shmuel. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says something overall similar—perhaps partial, but similar—and therefore Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale remains in Jewish law, as we saw in the Talmud in tractate Shabbat 151 regarding a minor. And also in the Meiri that he brings here—“Desecrate one Sabbath for him”—that is the Meiri he quotes here at the beginning of his words. So we see that the decisors and the medieval authorities and the Talmud itself do indeed bring also Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale. The Bi’ur Halakhah understood that there is a value difference between the two rationales: Shmuel claims life has independent value, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya understands life as a means for commandments. But that is not correct. That is what I said earlier.

Okay, then afterward he speaks about a deaf person and a mentally incompetent person and so on—in short he goes through all the practical differences we spoke about; it’s all basically in this Bi’ur Halakhah. But I want to move on because we need to continue.

Now regarding, as I said, the saving of a non-Jew’s life—I spoke about that in the Shulchan Arukh, section 330 paragraph 2. Here regarding a non-Jew: according to Shmuel, who says “and live by them,” after all the non-Jew in any case does not observe commandments, so he won’t live by them; why then does Shmuel save him? Why won’t he live by his commandments? Why not live by them? The seven commandments. Yes.

So look: in the Shulchan Arukh in 330 paragraph 2 he basically rules the law regarding a non-Jew. “A gentile woman”—that means a non-Jewish woman—“one does not assist her in childbirth on the Sabbath,” because this is Sabbath desecration, and even though it is a life-threatening situation, “even by something that does not involve Sabbath desecration.” Meaning, even if for me it isn’t Sabbath desecration, I still do not do it, because idol worshipers and non-Jews should be left to die. That’s exactly what I said: this is the Talmudic law.

But the non-Jews of today, writes the Meiri—of his day, the Meiri is the 14th century, but all the more so the non-Jews of today—in my humble opinion these laws are incorrect. They are completely obsolete. So too writes Rabbi Kook. So too write a few decisors who adopt this Meiri, and in my opinion this is simply obvious by reason. There is evidence for it, and it seems completely clear to me. In any event, this is what he writes here.

Now when you look in the commentaries, the Mishnah Berurah, the source is Avodah Zarah 26b. Why not assist in childbirth if it’s not a Sabbath desecration? What is the problem with that? What didn’t I understand? Why not assist in childbirth if it’s not a Sabbath desecration? Because they themselves—one lowers them and does not raise them. Idol worshipers should be left to die. Not because of Sabbath desecration, but because it’s better to be rid of them. So that no more wicked people be born into the world? What? The thin line between this and murder is very small. As if not to help bring another wicked person into the world? Yes. Not because of her child—because of herself. The thin line between this and murder is very small. Right, it’s very small. No, in the Talmud itself in practice one should also kill the non-Jew; only there is no permission to kill him directly, so they kill him indirectly, and at the very least they do not save him. Or “lower him into a pit and do not raise him out.” Yes, lower and do not raise. But again, this is exactly what the Meiri says, and it’s an important point, because people today think this is basically the attitude of Jewish law toward non-Jews. In my opinion that is not true. It is the attitude of Jewish law toward those non-Jews who were there—wicked non-Jews who murdered and committed sexual crimes and stole and behaved like beasts and practiced idolatry. Those people, in the eyes of the Sages, had the status of beasts. If you see non-Jews who behave like human beings, the attitude is completely different.

Rabbi, there was a story in Hebron, there was a terror attack and a yeshiva student was killed—he was from Sweden or something like that—and then they transplanted his organs. His parents weren’t here yet, the family hadn’t managed to arrive, it was on the Sabbath, and they transplanted his organs into Arabs. Okay. And it seemed simply outrageous, beyond all limits. Why? Because the Arabs murdered him and then profited from him. Those are Arabs—someone murdered him and there are other people, also Arabs, who need organs. What difference does it make? You can decide that you don’t want to save Arabs at all, but that has nothing to do with who killed him. But they transplanted into many people; what happened in Lod and in many places, including Arabs. Yes, right, so what? They do that all the time. Exactly. Rabbi, what about saving a wicked Jew? I mean not wicked in commandments, but a criminal, a dangerous person, and so on? In principle there is an obligation to save him, and put him in prison.

The Mishnah Berurah here writes: “A gentile woman—one does not assist her in childbirth even for payment, because on weekdays we assist because of hostility.” So he says that on a weekday we do help her because of hostility—if the non-Jews see that we don’t help non-Jews in childbirth, they’ll hate us, and in the end they can also kill Jews and so on, as explained in Yoreh De’ah. “But here it is forbidden.” But here, on the Sabbath, it is forbidden to do so. Why? “Because one can evade and say: we desecrate the Sabbath only for one who observes the Sabbath.” This is really an amazing phenomenon. He says that on weekdays we assist her because of hostility; otherwise the non-Jews will hate us and they also won’t save Jews, and that can lead to danger for Jews. But if it’s on the Sabbath, says the Mishnah Berurah—look at what an optimistic outlook—if it’s on the Sabbath the non-Jews understand; there’s no problem. They won’t hate us because we’ll say to them: what do you want from us? We don’t desecrate the Sabbath except for one who observes the Sabbath. Then they’ll calm down; everything will be fine. I don’t know which non-Jews he knew. The non-Jews I know—including the Jews I know—I think they would kill me if I said such a thing. But again, perhaps those were the non-Jews in his environment. One has to remember not to be anachronistic, because the non-Jews of that period were different non-Jews. It was obvious to them there were religious commandments. They didn’t come from the moral angle as is common today, but everyone understood there are different religions, and each religion has such and such commandments. So if I said to them, look, on the Sabbath I can’t do this, what can I do, it is religiously forbidden for me—they would accept it. That is what the Mishnah Berurah claims.

I only say that clearly today this is not relevant. No one would accept it, and there is no reason in the world to take such an argument into account. No one would accept such a thing—that I can’t desecrate the Sabbath because my religion says I’m allowed to desecrate the Sabbath only for someone who observes the Sabbath, not for someone who does not observe the Sabbath. That would increase the hatred even more; it wouldn’t calm it at all. So see the difference in perceptions, and I’m talking about less than a hundred years ago. That is less than a hundred years ago.

But clearly for our purposes, I’m saying: that is his rationale, a rationale of hostility or ways of peace or things of that kind. Those are the common rationales in the decisors. He also really writes that one may desecrate the Sabbath only with rabbinic prohibitions, not Torah-level ones. But I’m saying that for most decisors today, first, it is permitted even with Torah-level labors also for non-Jews, except that their rationale is still hostility—because the non-Jews will hate us and so on, therefore it is permitted even with Torah-level labors. And I argue that according to the Meiri one may desecrate—and one should desecrate, not may—through Torah-level labors, and not because of hostility. I am alone, no one hears what I’m doing, and no one will hate me if I don’t do it. I am alone. I need to desecrate the Sabbath through a Torah-level labor in order to save the life of a non-Jew. Why? Because the non-Jew has a status like a Jew, as the Meiri writes. A civilized non-Jew. Meaning, a non-Jew who behaves like a human being, not a non-Jew who behaves like a beast as the Sages described.

If one goes by what the Bi’ur Halakhah there brought, that one desecrates the Sabbath so that he may observe other commandments too, not only the Sabbath, then that is also the rationale for the non-Jew. So I wanted to ask: after all there are commandments—I’m going back again to what I asked you at the beginning about a limb. For example, I happened to learn that a blind person and a disabled person are exempt from the commandment of appearing; they do not have to go up on pilgrimage. So if you cause someone to become blind—you don’t desecrate the Sabbath for his eyes—or even for his leg, or even for a toe in the foot that will cause him not to walk, afterward he’ll be exempt from commandments and won’t perform important commandments. So why not go with the idea that wholeness—after all, commandments are fulfilled with many parts of the body? But he will still keep the rest of the commandments. So again the question is whether the number of commandments he will not observe justifies this Sabbath desecration or not. But that’s what I’m saying—so according to the Bi’ur Halakhah we see that he does enter here into calculations of additional commandments. Also with a non-Jew you haven’t now made a comparison of whether the seven Noahide commandments are equivalent to Sabbath desecration. The assumption is that he does observe commandments. If there is a non-Jew who keeps only four out of seven commandments, maybe there is room to discuss it—I don’t know. I don’t know where the line passes. Right now I’m speaking about someone who does or does not observe his commandments. No, but according to the ruling that today’s non-Jew does observe commandments, you didn’t start making the calculation of how many commandments he observes. You don’t need to make the calculation—he observes his commandments. So likewise, if a person loses a limb he won’t be able to perform a certain commandment when a certain organ is damaged. But he’ll observe his commandments. So there is one commandment every few years to go on pilgrimage, which he won’t perform—so what? Still, something essential is missing here. What? And if he becomes deaf and won’t be able to lay tefillin? So I’m saying: maybe. So in a place where the consideration… By the way, to save an eye one does desecrate the Sabbath. There is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot why. The Talmud says “the light of the eye”—one desecrates the Sabbath. Only according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam they disagree: one approach says it is because it leads to actual danger to life, and the other says a blind person is considered like dead, and therefore one desecrates the Sabbath. That second approach probably works through the mechanism Chani spoke about here. But that is only for the eye.

Okay, we’ll stop here. So we basically got up to section 12, but not including it. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace, goodbye.