This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- An inquiry from a doctor about the definition of life and death
- Organ transplants, brain death and cardiac death, and the question of value
- Irreversibility, medical criteria, and criticism of the “irreversible” argument
- Boundaries, “whose blood is redder,” and the difference between rescue and active killing
- The uncertainty of transplant success versus the certainty of taking impaired life
- Sources for saving a life: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” and “and live by them”
- Permitted versus overridden: conceptual definition and criticism of practical distinctions
- Acting quickly in rescue, “one who asks is considered a shedder of blood,” and pragmatic reasons
- The Maggid Mishneh and a broad conception of “permitted”
- Who desecrates the Sabbath to save a life: adults, non-Jews, minors, and women
- “Choose the lesser prohibition first” and Kovetz Shiurim: must one create a situation with a lighter prohibition?
- Slaughtering on the Sabbath for a sick person versus feeding him carrion: a “litmus test” between ordinary people and scholars
- Maharam, permission by analogy to food preparation, and the distinction between object-status and person-action
- The Ran: many prohibitions in carrion versus one Sabbath prohibition
- The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling: slaughter, unless the carrion is immediately available
- Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah: coercion, illness, and punishment for healing through the three cardinal sins
Summary
General Overview
The text opens with correspondence with a senior doctor from Hadassah about determining the moment of death and defining life, and suggests that it is not always right to begin such a discussion with abstract definitions, because they are sometimes dictated by the desired ethical and halakhic conclusions. In the context of organ transplants, it is argued that the dispute over brain death versus cardiac death sometimes becomes a semantic game intended to permit the “harvesting” of organs, and that instead one should formulate explicitly the value-judgments regarding the life of the donor versus the life of the recipient, and the question of boundaries. The lecture then returns to the foundations of saving life on the Sabbath, to the sources “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” and “and live by them,” and to the inquiry into “permitted” versus “overridden,” emphasizing that usually this distinction has no practical consequence, although there are exceptional views such as that of the Maggid Mishneh. Finally, practical dilemmas are discussed, such as feeding a sick person carrion versus slaughtering on the Sabbath, the consideration of “choose the lesser prohibition first,” and finally an apparent contradiction in Maimonides between the laws of coercion and the case of a sick person healing himself through the three severe transgressions.
An inquiry from a doctor about the definition of life and death
The speaker receives an email from a senior doctor at Hadassah who wants to discuss determining the moment of death and defining life, and he is described as a brilliant doctor who, from what it seems, is not religious. The speaker says that discussion of life and death tends to begin with philosophical definitions, but he himself questions whether that is the right path in normative and halakhic issues. He suggests that many definitions are not sharp, and that sometimes the definitional starting point is already dictated by the practical implications.
Organ transplants, brain death and cardiac death, and the question of value
The speaker explains that in organ transplantation there are certain organs that can be “harvested” only between brain death and cardiac death, because one cannot take a heart or lungs after the heart has stopped functioning. He presents the dilemma: if you take a heart while it is still beating, apparently you are killing one living person in order to save another, and the principle of “What makes you think your blood is redder?” forbids killing one person to save another. The speaker argues that instead of hanging everything on the semantic definition of the moment of death, one should recognize that the claim that brain death is “death” in practice rests on the assumption that life without a brain has no value, and therefore the argument should be formulated directly as a question of the value of life and a clash of values.
Irreversibility, medical criteria, and criticism of the “irreversible” argument
The speaker rejects the claim that irreversibility is the determining criterion for the moment of death, and brings an anecdote about an article by Dr. J. Lavi that defined brain death as the moment of death because of irreversibility. He replies that the argument from “irreversible” does not distinguish anything, and mocks it by saying that “according to that, the moment of birth is really the moment of death,” because from then on death will certainly come. He clarifies that the discussion is conducted on the assumption that this is an irreversible state, but irreversibility is not a defining criterion, only a condition for beginning the discussion.
Boundaries, “whose blood is redder,” and the difference between rescue and active killing
The speaker explains that the question of the boundary comes up immediately: if one permits harming “impaired” life in order to save others, why not kill an old person to save a young one? He admits that the question of boundaries is “weighty.” He emphasizes the difference between a symmetrical case of “whom do we save first” (as in the discussions in Horayot) and actively killing one person in order to save another, and argues that in rescue there is more room for considerations of priority than in permission to kill. He adds that the public and medical discourse around brain death has been influenced by the need to allow organ harvesting, and therefore he sees many such definitions as ad hoc determinations.
The uncertainty of transplant success versus the certainty of taking impaired life
The speaker adds another consideration: a transplant is not certain, so we are dealing with a doubtful life-saving measure versus the certain taking of impaired life, whereas the patient in need of the transplant “will definitely die” without it. He notes that the chance of success of the transplant is a relevant parameter, but there is no clear line between a high chance and a low one. He ends this part by saying he is sharing the example because it touches on the topic of saving life that is being studied in the lecture.
Sources for saving a life: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” and “and live by them”
The speaker returns to the Talmudic topic of setting aside the Sabbath because of saving a life, and presents two main reasons that remain: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths” and “and live by them, and not die by them.” He argues that the Talmud rejects “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” only with respect to permission in a doubtful life-threatening case, but regarding a definite life-threatening case the source remains valid. He explains that the discussion concerned implications such as saving a minor, preserving brief remaining life, saving a non-Jew, and whether there is a conceptual contradiction between the sources.
Permitted versus overridden: conceptual definition and criticism of practical distinctions
The speaker defines “overridden” as a situation in which Sabbath desecration is indeed Sabbath desecration, but it is allowed because the value is overridden in favor of saving life; and “permitted” as a situation in which there is no Sabbath desecration at all, because the act is being done permissibly or even as a commandment. He brings an example from Rabbi Dessler about lying that is permitted for the sake of peace, and argues that lying has a factual definition that does not change, whereas with the Sabbath, as a religious prohibition, one can more easily argue that an act done as a commandment is not “desecration.” He states that in his view, in most situations this distinction has no practical halakhic consequence, because even if one says “permitted,” only what is required to save life is permitted, and whatever is not required is not part of life-saving.
Acting quickly in rescue, “one who asks is considered a shedder of blood,” and pragmatic reasons
The speaker accepts the psychological argument that viewing it as “permitted” will lead to greater alacrity and less hesitation, but replies that even within the framework of “overridden,” the Shulchan Arukh rules that “one who asks is considered a shedder of blood” where delay is a concern. He sketches a practical rule: where there is doubt and danger, one does not stop to calculate; where there is time, one can ask and choose “the lesser prohibition first.” He argues that the reasoning of halakhic decisors is usually built on concern for future danger to life, and therefore in practice these are reasons of “overridden” even when it appears as though the matter is “permitted.”
The Maggid Mishneh and a broad conception of “permitted”
The speaker presents the Maggid Mishneh on Nachmanides’ words in Torat HaAdam, and the phrase “we do for him everything that we ordinarily do for him on a weekday,” explaining that the Maggid Mishneh understood this to mean that even things not related to saving life, even indirectly, are permitted simply for the patient’s needs. He notes that Rabbi Chaim of Brisk quotes and rules this way, and describes it as a “stringent” approach regarding life-saving that leads to leniencies on the Sabbath. The speaker argues that this position is based on “permitted” in its broad sense, but says it is “not reasonable” and that for most halakhic decisors it has no place, citing the Biur Halakha, who questions it and brings many authorities who disagree.
Who desecrates the Sabbath to save a life: adults, non-Jews, minors, and women
The speaker cites the Shulchan Arukh, which rules that when the Sabbath is desecrated for a dangerously ill person, one tries to have it done by adult Jews of sound mind, and not by a non-Jew, minors, or women. He explains that the commentaries offer different reasons: with a non-Jew there is concern about laziness and danger, and with minors and women there is concern that people will come to minimize the seriousness of the permission and be lax in life-threatening situations. He argues that these reasons point to a framework of “overridden,” because they are based on preventing danger and on public policy.
“Choose the lesser prohibition first” and Kovetz Shiurim: must one create a situation with a lighter prohibition?
The speaker cites Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot, which distinguishes between a case where the lighter permission is already available before him and a case where one must “bring about” the lighter permission. He quotes Kovetz Shiurim as saying that there is no Torah obligation to bring about the lighter alternative in order to avoid the heavier one, because at the time he eats the heavier prohibition, his eating is permitted if the lighter one is not readily available. The speaker connects this to the discussion among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about “putting oneself into a situation of coercion,” such as falling asleep on a ship on the eve of the Sabbath, and presents the dispute over whether such a case is considered coercion now even though the person caused it.
Slaughtering on the Sabbath for a sick person versus feeding him carrion: a “litmus test” between ordinary people and scholars
The speaker presents a dilemma: a dangerously ill person needs meat and there is no kosher-slaughtered meat available—should one slaughter on the Sabbath or feed him carrion? He describes the reaction of an “ordinary person,” who is horrified by the idea of eating pork or carrion, and the “scholarly” reaction, which prefers carrion because the Sabbath is more severe. He cites the Rosh, who quotes a question posed to the Raavad and the Raavad’s answer, which sides with those who say it is better for the patient to violate the prohibition of carrion than for others to violate a Sabbath prohibition punishable by stoning; then he brings various reservations and other explanations, such as concern that the patient may be repulsed by forbidden food and refrain from eating, thereby putting himself in danger.
Maharam, permission by analogy to food preparation, and the distinction between object-status and person-action
The speaker cites Rabbenu Meir (Maharam of Rothenburg), who draws an analogy to food preparation on a Jewish holiday, according to which the Torah permitted labor for food preparation and therefore it is “like a weekday”; from this he concludes that any labor on the Sabbath for a dangerously ill person is as though done on a weekday. He presents a responsum that distinguishes between a case where the food itself is forbidden (carrion) and a case where the food is permitted but the prohibition lies in the action (slaughtering on the Sabbath), formulating this as a distinction between a prohibition in the object and a prohibition in the person’s act. He notes an additional reason: concern that the patient will recoil from eating forbidden food and thereby come into danger.
The Ran: many prohibitions in carrion versus one Sabbath prohibition
The speaker cites the Ran, who challenges the Raavad’s responsum and proposes a different reason: eating carrion involves a prohibition for each and every olive-sized portion, whereas desecrating the Sabbath through slaughter is one prohibition, and therefore “the many prohibitions of carrion” are not necessarily lighter than “the one prohibition of the Sabbath,” even though the Sabbath carries the punishment of stoning. He presents the principle raised by the Ran as quantity outweighing quality, and comments that it is difficult to define quantitative boundaries. He also brings a yeshiva-style insight on “Please say you are my sister,” attempting to use this principle to explain preferring one killing in order to prevent a repeated prohibition.
The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling: slaughter, unless the carrion is immediately available
The speaker quotes Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 328:14, which rules: “One slaughters for him, and we do not say: let us feed him carrion,” but if he needs “immediate eating” and the carrion is available at once while slaughter would cause delay, then one feeds him carrion. He emphasizes that the permission to feed carrion here stems from concern about delay and danger, not from a formal claim that there is no obligation to alter the situation. He uses this as an indication against reading Kovetz Shiurim as establishing a rule that one need not prepare a lighter alternative even when there is no danger in delaying.
Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah: coercion, illness, and punishment for healing through the three cardinal sins
The speaker quotes Maimonides, who rules that one regarding whom it was said “transgress and do not be killed,” but who nevertheless allowed himself to be killed, is “liable for his life”; while one regarding whom it was said “be killed and do not transgress,” who transgressed under coercion, is exempt from punishment by the religious court. He cites Maimonides, who compares a person near death from illness to cases of coercion, and permits healing through all Torah prohibitions in a life-threatening situation except idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. He points to an apparent contradiction later in Maimonides: “And if he transgressed and was healed, the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate for him,” and presents a dispute among later authorities whether this means an extra-legal punishment or an actual legal punishment, ending with it as a puzzle to be discussed later, while mentioning an article he wrote about separating Siamese twins in which he used this Maimonides.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good morning. It’s interesting, because just last night I got some email from a doctor who turns out to be a senior doctor at Hadassah today, and he wanted to discuss determining the moment of death and the definition of life and all kinds of things of that sort. He wasn’t satisfied with all kinds of answers he had received from different places. I think he’s not religious, it seems to me, from what I understood, and I remembered that I had corresponded with him many years ago when he was still a resident abroad, and I corresponded with him about philosophical matters in general—about Ockham’s razor and all kinds of things of that sort. In my opinion he’s a brilliant guy, unlike many other doctors I know, and that’s why it stuck so strongly in my memory. Usually I’m not very impressed by their intellectual abilities. But just one second. So that’s how we began the discussion, and this morning I spent a bit of time on it, and it’s really, really our topic, because he’s trying to define what life is—whether it’s connected to consciousness or to all kinds of things of that sort—and to what extent the sources have anything to say about it. And as is the way of a person engaged in theoretical thinking or abstract philosophical thinking, you begin with definitions. And then you have to define what life is or what death is, because they are apparently opposites, and from that derive all kinds of conclusions—which is actually also what we’re supposed to do in our discussion. What does saving life mean? What has to happen to a person in order for us to call it danger to life? But I wrote to him that I’m not at all sure that in this case it’s right to go in that direction. Meaning, first to begin the discussion by defining the concepts of life and death, and then derive the ethical or halakhic or normative conclusions. Because, for example, I reminded him that in an article I once wrote in Techumin, I discussed organ transplantation. I’m saying this because it’s part of our picture, not only because I dealt with it this morning—though that too—but because it actually also connects to our topic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So regarding organ transplantation, there are certain organs that can be harvested—that’s what they call it there—harvested only between brain death and cardiac death. A person’s death is made up of several stages. Usually it begins with brain death; there is something in the brain stem that still exists, but the brain itself is already dead. Again, the definitions aren’t sharp, but that’s the basic picture. And afterward the heart also stops beating, and that is the final death. Now there is a dispute over when we define the moment of death. Is brain death the death, or only later, cardiac death? Why is this important? Because there are certain organs, like the heart and lungs, that cannot be taken after cardiac death. Once the heart stops beating, you can no longer take it and transplant it into someone else—it’s dead, finished. If you want to transplant a heart, or a heart and lungs, you have to take them while the heart is still beating. But if the heart is still beating, then the person is alive. If you take his heart, you are killing him in order to save someone else. Who says that the other person’s blood is redder than this person’s blood? You may not kill one person in order to save another. Therefore, in the ethical world and also in the halakhic world, it is customary to make this question depend on the question of the moment of death. If the moment of death is brain death, then at that stage the person is already considered dead. He is after brain death. So if you take his heart, you have killed a dead person. In other words, you haven’t murdered a person. But if the determining moment is cardiac death, then when you took his heart earlier, you actually killed a living person. It is forbidden to kill a living person in order to transplant the organ and save another patient.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in that article I argued that these are semantically empty pilpulim. Because I argue that really—why are you saying that brain death is the moment of death? Because you assess that after the brain dies, his life is basically worth nothing. After all, his heart is still beating. So on what basis do you determine that this is specifically the moment of death? You’re saying that these are not lives of value, that one cannot relate to this as human life in such a condition. But if that’s so, then leave the definitions aside. Just say that since in this state his life has no value, then even if he is defined as alive, I am allowed to harm the valueless life of person A in order to save the full life of person B. And then I can, without defining the moment of death, without getting into the question of what exactly the moment of death is—which I don’t know how to define, how to decide—I can decide that this is permissible even if the moment of death is cardiac death.
[Speaker C] Do you own his life?
[Speaker D] Do you own his life? What does it mean that I own his life? I don’t own his life. That you can decide when to take it from him.
[Speaker C] No, no, no.
[Speaker D] Why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has nothing to do with ownership of life.
[Speaker D] Why don’t you have the right to take from him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s murder, regardless of ownership.
[Speaker D] Why does anyone have ownership to take an organ from someone without his knowledge and consent? A dead person no longer has ownership.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, I didn’t say without his knowledge and consent; I’m talking about with his knowledge and consent. Second, even the person himself does not own his life, so his knowledge and consent are not relevant to the ownership issue.
[Speaker D] Okay, but you still didn’t answer it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And third, I also don’t own the patient in order to leave him to die. I have to make decisions about what to do; the Holy One, blessed be He, isn’t here to help me. I have to make the decision. Not making a decision is also a decision. What can you do?
[Speaker C] Can I? I wanted to ask—can I? Yes, yes. But there’s another factor here. Death is something irreversible; a person will not live. Even with resurrection of the dead, he definitely won’t live. But if we take a factor like “the life is not worthwhile,” it could be that tomorrow he returns to life and it will be worthwhile. That can’t be identified with death.
[Speaker E] Therefore, if
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] we
[Speaker C] say that brain death is irreversible, then yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if we understand that everything is irreversible, then brain death is also irreversible.
[Speaker C] If it were reversible, the Rabbi’s argument wouldn’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m not talking about reversibility; nothing here is reversible. Reversibility plays no role. If it’s reversible, then we’re not talking—obviously. I’m talking about an irreversible state. Now, assuming it’s irreversible, the question is whether the moment of death is brain death or cardiac death. We’re on one track moving forward. I once saw an article by someone named Dr. J. Lavi—he was in charge of transplants, I think, at Tel HaShomer or something like that, head of the transplant unit—and he wrote some article as though there were some defined medical determination here. It’s all nonsense, of course. And he argued that his criterion was indeed irreversibility. He said that it’s clear that brain death is the determining moment of death because it is irreversible. So I wrote in response that according to that, the moment of birth is really the moment of death, because from then onward it’s irreversible. The moment you’re born, in the end you will certainly die. What kind of foolish argument is that? In other words, reversibility is not relevant. You can say that even if I see the current state as a state of death, if it’s reversible I still can’t draw conclusions. If it’s irreversible, then we can start talking. But not that reversibility is a criterion; reversibility is not a criterion for anything.
[Speaker F] I understand,
[Speaker E] but one life doesn’t override another life, there is no life overriding… What? Following what you said, this whole thing of brain death—doesn’t it basically mean that our whole body operates according to instructions that exist in the brain? Right. So if I have brain death, in another moment the heart too will die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In another moment, but meanwhile it hasn’t.
[Speaker E] No, fine, so there are the last pulses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s exactly what we’re talking about, that’s the whole discussion. Sometimes, by the way, it’s hours. Sometimes, by the way, it’s several hours.
[Speaker E] Rabbi Michael? I’ll define this point differently. If I have brain death—if the brain has stopped functioning—then I don’t have a situation where the person will continue to live.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, it’s irreversible. But the fact that it’s irreversible is not interesting; reversibility is not a relevant criterion.
[Speaker E] It’s not a matter of reversibility, it’s a matter of in another moment everything collapses because the brain has stopped…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in another moment he’ll die, but right now he’s alive.
[Speaker D] And also, the criterion that there is no value to the life—that could apply in other situations too. So if anyone, let’s say someone who had a severe stroke and his life no longer has value, is in such a state…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so here you’re asking the boundary question. You’re asking, okay, so where do you stop? Maybe we should also kill an old person to save a young one, because his life is worth less, his life expectancy is shorter. The boundary question is a good question. I’m talking about the basic principle of the discussion.
[Speaker F] But I want to ask something for a moment. Do you understand… do you define—if a person—do you define this, leave aside the need to save someone else. Assuming you don’t need to save anyone, is this called murder or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: if he is considered alive, it could be that it is called murder.
[Speaker F] So then there really is a fundamental discussion here
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] about whether this is life or not.
[Speaker F] We have to address the fundamental discussion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As far as the prohibition of murder goes, one can discuss it here, except that it doesn’t matter, because no one is going to kill him if there’s no need. The discussion about whether it is permissible to harvest organs from him—I argue that one does not need to decide for that purpose what the moment of death is, because you can’t really decide it anyway. And all these games—why did all the doctors suddenly decide that brain death is the moment of death? Do you know why?
[Speaker F] Because only that way can they harvest organs from him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole discussion is about harvesting. Because only that way can they harvest organs from him, that’s all. So leave it—what you really want is to harvest organs. Why should I care now about theoretical definitions that you are defining ad hoc? It’s nothing, it’s a word game.
[Speaker F] But in the end, you can say that maybe it really is murder, but the question is whether one life is being set aside for another—whether there is still room for a halakhic discussion here, even though it is apparently murder?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that is exactly my claim. My claim says: the discussion in the Talmud that asks why one life is not set aside for another—why don’t we kill Reuven in order to save Shimon? Or myself, it doesn’t matter. Because “What makes you think your blood is redder?” Your blood is no redder than his. The conclusion from that is that if my blood really is redder than his—or the reverse, it doesn’t matter—then apparently it would be permitted. Now I’m saying, I’m talking about with his consent and everything, so that’s a separate discussion; I’m not talking right now about against his consent. But even with a person’s consent, I am not allowed to kill him—that’s not the point. Therefore I say: assuming he agrees, let’s put that aside for the moment. Is the act, in itself, a permitted act? So I’m saying there is room for this kind of consideration, and the question of boundaries is a serious one, but there is room for this kind of consideration that says when one person’s blood is plainly redder than the other’s—so much redder that most people in the world define such a state as death. Why do they define such a state as death? They define such a state as death because in their eyes life in such a condition is worth nothing. So I’m saying: if that’s so, then why go through the definition of this condition as death? Just state that argument directly: that the life here is not worth much, and therefore it is permitted to surrender it in order to save other life, even without making this semantic hairsplitting that because the life is not worth anything, therefore he is dead. It’s unnecessary; it leads nowhere.
[Speaker F] This did come up in the halakhic discussion of whom to save first—who takes priority in rescue, whether it’s one’s teacher, father, wife. Meaning, this discussion of whose blood is redder does exist in Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud in Horayot, yes. But there it’s something different, because there I’m talking about when both are in a symmetrical situation and the question is whom to save first. Here I’m talking about actively killing one in order to save the other. That’s something else.
[Speaker F] But in both cases there is the principle of whose blood is redder, meaning
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In both cases there is some unequal worth. No, it’s not clear. It’s not clear. In a place where I am supposed to save one of two—not kill one in order to save the other—there the halakhic decisors have more room to reason that the redness of the blood will decide. Even the redness of a young person’s blood versus an old person’s blood, where I would never have imagined permitting killing an old person to save a young one—in rescue there is room for such a consideration.
[Speaker F] During COVID this discussion did come up. But I just wanted to say—so actually you sharpen what they said, that because there is a problem of boundaries here, maybe that’s why they went to the issue of determining the moment of death.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And also in general
[Speaker F] they mainly went with that because of the Haredi public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying again, I don’t care now about the politics. I’m talking about the things themselves. So the point is that the boundary question is an important question, but a different one. Meaning, first I want to show the basic form of thinking. After that someone can come and say, look, in principle you may be right, but because of the boundary question—I don’t know where to place the boundary, how much redness of blood there has to be, how great the difference has to be in order to permit such a thing—therefore it isn’t right to permit it in general. That’s an argument one can hear; I’m not saying otherwise. I’m just trying to show a way of thinking that tells me it is not always right—and especially I, since I have an analytical tendency, always feel that when you begin a discussion you have to define concepts first. And here, in this case, I’m not at all sure that the right path is first to define the concepts and then derive the conclusions, because the definition of the concepts itself is done while already glancing at the conclusions. I am basically defining the person as alive or dead because I know what the implications will be regarding whether I am allowed or forbidden to take his organs. So come on—why play games? Just say directly what you want to say.
[Speaker D] And besides, Rabbi, when they do a transplant it’s not certain that the transplant will succeed, so here we have only a doubtful saving of life. Okay, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and opposite that we have certain death.
[Speaker D] Certain rescue versus doubtful life-saving.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But opposite certain death. The other person will definitely die if I don’t transplant into him. There’s nothing to be done about that. Meaning, it’s a doubtful saving of full life versus the certain taking of impaired life. That’s the discussion here. Okay? Fine. There is definitely room to discuss how likely this transplant is to succeed. Meaning, ask doctors: if the chance is ninety percent, that’s one thing; if the chance is fifteen percent, that’s another. I definitely think this is a relevant consideration. Where exactly the line is—I have no idea. But yes, certainly that too is a parameter that has to be taken into account, correct. Again, it’s a very broad topic, delicate, hard to decide. I’m just trying to show the mode of thought. This morning I was dealing with exactly this discussion, so I’m sharing it with you, because it really does touch our topic as well.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s return to our line of discussion. We had essentially begun with the Talmudic discussion about setting aside the Sabbath—or prohibitions in general—because of saving life. We saw that there are two reasons here: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths,” Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, or Shmuel: “and live by them and not die by them.” There are more, but these are the reasons that ultimately remain. The reason of “Desecrate one Sabbath for him” is apparently rejected in the Talmud, but I explained that this is not correct. The Talmud rejects it only because you can’t derive from it permission in a case of doubtful danger to life. But regarding definite danger to life, it is a source that the Talmud definitely treats as valid, a legitimate source. So at least regarding definite danger to life, that source remains, and “and live by them” of course also permits even doubtful danger to life. I spoke about the differences between the two sources, about the question whether there is any conceptual contradiction between them: apparently one sees life as the goal and the commandments as the means, and the other the opposite. I said that this is not correct. In both, I think, life is also a goal, not only a means for fulfilling commandments, and still one makes the move of commensurability—that’s what I discussed regarding “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.” We discussed the implications regarding saving a minor, preserving temporary life, saving a non-Jew, all kinds of things of that sort.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And now I want to discuss “permitted” and “overridden.” I said section twelve—we reached section twelve. There is a discussion among the medieval and later authorities; I referred you to an article that deals with this somewhat and also connects it to the Rosh on the issue of slaughtering or carrion, which we’ll still get to. The question is whether the Sabbath is permitted in the face of saving life, or overridden in the face of saving life. Now on the face of it, Rabbi Bindiger too, in the talk he gave, spoke about this matter, but in my opinion he didn’t define the concepts precisely. “Overridden” and “permitted” with respect to the Sabbath in the face of saving life—he immediately moved to the implications. But the question is conceptual. What is the difference between overridden and permitted? In the literal definition, overridden or permitted means: when I desecrate the Sabbath in order to save life, have I desecrated the Sabbath, except that I’m allowed to do so because it is required, because it is overridden in the face of the value of saving life? We talked about value conflicts, so the value of the Sabbath is overridden by the value of life. Or perhaps the Sabbath is permitted in the face of saving life. That means that when I desecrate the Sabbath for the purpose of saving life, this is not Sabbath desecration at all. Sabbath desecration is defined where it is forbidden. If here it is permitted, or even a commandment, then it is not even called Sabbath desecration under compulsion; I did not desecrate the Sabbath. Okay, that is basically the meaning of the words—permitted versus overridden. If the Sabbath is permitted, then there is no Sabbath desecration here at all. Or if it is overridden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll say parenthetically just something that has always annoyed me. Later I looked for it, and by the way I didn’t find it, but it’s somewhere in Rabbi Dessler’s Michtav MeEliyahu. Rabbi Dessler says—after all, there are places where the Sages say that it is permitted to lie. In chapter two of Bava Metzia, the Talmud says that Torah scholars alter their speech in three matters. Okay? Now Rabbi Dessler says that in those places where it is permitted to lie, it isn’t a lie at all, because a lie is something that it is forbidden to say. But here it is permitted, or even a commandment, to say it for the sake of peace or whatever it may be, and therefore it is not a lie at all. Now that really irritates me. Why does it irritate me? Because lying has a definition. Meaning, the question of what is a lie and what is not a lie—if it corresponds to the state of affairs in the world, it is truth; if it does not correspond, it is a lie. That it is permitted to lie—fine, one may, one should, it may even be a commandment to lie, everything is okay—but don’t tell me it’s not a lie. Now apparently that’s only semantics, but it is also really an expression of this very discussion: is it permitted or overridden? Except that with lying, unlike Sabbath desecration, lying is a moral matter. And in a moral matter, one can—and in my opinion it is even reasonable to—say that even if you lie in a place where it is justified to lie, you still can’t say that what you did wasn’t lying; there is still the moral cost of not speaking truth. The moral cost of not speaking truth is there. There is no choice; I have to pay it, but it is there. Okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By contrast, with Sabbath desecration, there is room for the claim that since the prohibition is a religious prohibition and not a moral one, in a place where Jewish law itself says that I must desecrate the Sabbath—not just that I may, but that I must—then in such a situation it is not Sabbath desecration at all. There aren’t the moral implications, the aspects that exist in moral contexts, and therefore here there is room for the argument that such a thing is not called Sabbath desecration at all, to the extent that I don’t react against the claim that this is “permitted” and not “overridden.” Okay? That’s the point. Now let’s try to see what the implications of such a thing might be. The later authorities bring many implications; in the article I sent you, there
[Speaker F] on the Yeshiva website, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] yes, he goes through various implications. Those are the standard implications. But in my opinion, according to the conceptual distinction I laid out here, it has no practical halakhic consequence at all.
[Speaker F] And that’s exactly what I—I’m looking at this and that’s exactly what I asked. Because even in “permitted” I can say: fine, Sabbath desecration was permitted, but only the Sabbath desecration that is needed. Only in “overridden”—wait.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in permitted, not in overridden.
[Speaker F] No, I’m saying it even in permitted. In overridden it’s obvious. But even in permitted I can say: who says everything was permitted? Okay. Maybe only the minimum you need was permitted. Say, if you can violate a rabbinic prohibition rather than a Torah-level one, who says the Torah-level prohibition was permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And all the implications they bring in this context—about minors and non-Jews and women and everything they bring there, and whether I have to do “the lesser prohibition first,” meaning to try to choose the path with the lowest halakhic cost—those are the implications they usually bring. The Rashba himself mentions permitted and overridden in connection with the dilemma of a sick person, slaughtering for the sick person. But on the face of it, I don’t see any such practical difference. Because there is certainly room to say that if I can desecrate the Sabbath through a lighter prohibition, then there is no reason at all to assume that the heavier prohibition was permitted to me, even if the Sabbath is permitted in the face of saving life. What is permitted is what is required for saving life. If you do something that isn’t required, then it is simply not a case of saving life. So why assume that it was permitted? Everything permitted to me is only because I need it in order to save life. But what is not needed to save life, because I can do it in a lighter way, was not permitted. So really, whatever you would say in overridden, you can also say in permitted. It doesn’t seem otherwise to me.
[Speaker C] God willing. Let’s say with impurity that is permitted in the public service. It is permitted only in the Temple; in other things you didn’t permit it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not the point. The question is whether it is permitted or overridden—the question is whether there is any practical difference. In the Temple itself, the question whether impurity is permitted or overridden is a discussion in the Talmud.
[Speaker C] But no, you can say that in the Temple it is permitted, but in other things outside the Temple, in things
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other things it is neither permitted nor overridden, it is nothing. In the Temple itself there is a discussion whether it is permitted or overridden.
[Speaker C] So am I allowed to eat terumah outside the Temple because of that? Or in the Temple itself, everything connected to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re not formulating it well. The discussion whether impurity is permitted or overridden applies only in the Temple in the public context. Only there is there a discussion whether it is permitted or overridden. Outside the Temple it is neither permitted nor overridden—it is nothing. The discussion is whether in the Temple, where it was allowed, that allowance is a case of permission or of override.
[Speaker C] But that’s not right; what was permitted was permitted for the patient, not for anything else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that has nothing to do with the Temple.
[Speaker C] No, I mean it as an analogy. If it’s here, you don’t expand the permission to other things, only to those.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not. But I’m saying again: the analogy is to things that were not permitted in the Temple, not to things outside the Temple. There, there are no permissions at all.
[Speaker C] Fine, but I’m saying the same thing with the patient. Whether for the patient it is permitted or overridden—that is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the term. And everywhere there is a discussion of permitted or overridden, my claim is that it has no practical consequence.
[Speaker C] Why? Let’s say the patient doesn’t need it at all, not even to settle his mind, right? I think that this way, with the light, without the light it will be better for him, and then I turn it on or off—those are things that he doesn’t really need for that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s what Hani said before: that even if the conception is “permitted,” there is still no reason in the world to permit such a thing.
[Speaker C] But if the doctor thinks it’s better for him that way, then he’ll do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Still. Even if it is “permitted,” it may still be forbidden for me to do that.
[Speaker G] But I have some example…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, more than that—it’s simple. I’m talking about a situation where what I’m doing is required to save his life, except that I could have done it with a modification, through a rabbinic prohibition. Not a case where what I’m doing is only for his comfort; when what I’m doing is only for his comfort, that’s another discussion. I’m talking about something more than that: even if what I’m doing is required to save the life of the patient, but I could have done it in a way that involved a lighter prohibition, the question is whether I’m allowed to do the more severe prohibition. And here it is indeed required for his rescue. Yes, but at the conceptual level it isn’t really required, because after all I could have saved his life by a path involving a lighter prohibition. And then even if I say “permitted,” who says I’m allowed to do such a thing?
[Speaker G] I have a quick example, can I ask about it? Yes, yes. Say there’s a person who works for Magen David Adom and he specifically chooses to work shifts on the Sabbath. Okay. So if it’s considered permitted outright, then he’s even doing a commandment. From his point of view he’s collecting commandments, because he wants to do commandments now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case he’s doing a commandment.
[Speaker G] No, but if it’s merely overridden, then maybe—then maybe not, maybe it’s not okay for him to set things up so that he specifically takes Sabbath shifts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no dispute that he’s doing a commandment.
[Speaker G] He’s putting himself into those situations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there’s—there’s no dispute that he’s doing a commandment. No dispute.
[Speaker G] No, but isn’t there a difference here between permitted outright and overridden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently not. I don’t see why there would be. In both cases he’s doing a commandment, in both cases the prohibition is set aside in the face of the commandment. The question is whether it’s permitted or overridden, but he isn’t violating the prohibition. So what practical difference would it make to do… Let me sharpen it, maybe a bit more. Look, once I heard someone who wanted to argue that maybe the practical difference would be whether he has to repent. Because after all, true, he committed a transgression under compulsion, but he did commit a transgression. Whereas if it was permitted outright, then he didn’t commit a transgression at all—there is no transgression. So I asked the person who told me that: tell me, as part of that repentance, one element of repentance is accepting for the future not to return to that sin ever again. Meaning, what is he supposed to do now? Accept upon himself that in a future life-threatening situation he won’t desecrate the Sabbath anymore? And leave people to die? That’s absurd. It’s not that he acted because there was no choice, or that he was coerced—this is a commandment. He doesn’t want to desecrate the Sabbath; the Torah instructed him to desecrate the Sabbath. How can you say such a thing requires repentance? Does he need to repent for obeying the voice of the Holy One, blessed be He? What, should the Holy One, blessed be He, repent for putting a transgression in my path while instructing me to do this act? It’s His fault, not mine—let the Holy One, blessed be He, repent.
[Speaker D] But if… one at a time, one at a time. It seems to me that when a person chooses this… it seems to me that when he starts from the assumption that it’s permitted outright, then he’ll be much more energetic in his work and examine things less, and there’ll be less delay and hesitation than if it’s overridden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t hear you well.
[Speaker A] He won’t ask questions.
[Speaker D] I’m saying that when he starts from the point that it’s permitted outright, meaning, then he’s much quicker in his work and examines things less—this way or that way or another way. And if it’s overridden, that leads to more delay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that could be a pragmatic consideration, not an essential one, but a matter of policy: in order to save lives in the best possible way, you tell people don’t ask and don’t think, just do whatever first seems necessary. But notice: although almost all halakhic decisors rule that it’s overridden, including the Shulchan Arukh, the Shulchan Arukh itself brings the Jewish law that one who asks is considered a shedder of blood. And yet—right? What does that mean? It means you can make that statement even within the conceptual framework of overridden. It’s overridden, but wherever there is doubt, there is no doubt—don’t ask questions. In a place where it’s clear-cut, and you have time, and there’s no problem, and you just need to choose whether to do a lighter prohibition or a more severe one, then choose the lighter one first. But anywhere you have some uncertainty such that you stop to think—don’t stop, don’t think, ignore everything. And that is within the framework of overridden; the Shulchan Arukh rules overridden. So that’s not a practical difference.
[Speaker D] But if this person—what? What they tell him—psychologically it still has an effect.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the fact is that in the Shulchan Arukh he doesn’t make it depend on that.
[Speaker G] But what about this person who deliberately chooses from the outset to put himself into situations where he’ll regularly have to desecrate the Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s looking for commandments, just like you said—excellent. He’s looking for commandments, he wants to do commandments—what’s the problem?
[Speaker G] That’s wonderful. So I think that does make a difference whether it’s overridden or permitted outright with respect to this case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see why it’s different. Because if it’s overridden, it’s—
[Speaker G] Like after the fact, like—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s compelled to do it. No, no, no, that’s not what I explained earlier. That’s not correct. Even if it’s overridden, it is entirely from the outset; it’s a commandment. You have to do it, it’s a virtue if you did it, and if you didn’t do it then you’re a criminal. There is nothing here that is only after the fact.
[Speaker G] So I don’t understand what the difference is between permitted outright and overridden.
[Speaker A] Great,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent question. I don’t understand either.
[Speaker A] Is what stands behind it basically whether I should aim for maximal reduction of Sabbath desecration?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s true both if it’s overridden and if it’s permitted outright.
[Speaker A] She’s trying to answer her, supposedly, apparently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but she’s right in the question that at the end of the day, in light of what I’m saying here, no difference remains. And I’m saying: yes indeed, no difference really remains. Anyone who thinks there’s a practical difference between these two things—it’s just words.
[Speaker A] Maybe with regard to the medical team treating him—say now I’m hot, so I turn on the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that will indirectly affect saving his life, then yes, even if it’s overridden it’s permitted. If not, then even if it’s permitted outright it’s forbidden. What was permitted is only what is needed for saving the life. That doesn’t mean the Sabbath is now ownerless, or at least not necessarily. To say that the Sabbath becomes completely ownerless, you need some kind of source. After all, the sources brought even in the Talmud, in their plain meaning, are sources that recognize the conflict. It’s not that there is no conflict; rather, there’s no choice, so in order to save a life they allow you to desecrate the Sabbath. But what—from this point on the Sabbath is ownerless? So I’m saying: wherever the reasons are reasons of streamlining the treatment or preventing future concerns of life danger, then once again we’ve basically returned to the conceptual framework of overridden. So it’s not permitted outright. Even if in the end you say don’t ask, don’t think about anything—why? Because there’s a concern you may come to endanger life—that reasoning is basically saying that we operate in the world of overridden, not in the world of permitted outright. The result looks like the result of permitted outright, but the reasoning—that’s why I told you to look at the rationales of the commentaries, and you’ll see that the rationales are all rationales of overridden. Even someone who says don’t ask, and let adults do it, and whatever else you want—not to hesitate at all, seemingly as though it’s permitted outright—but no, all the rationales are rationales of overridden.
[Speaker D] I want to ask for a second: is overridden versus permitted outright unnecessary? Is this whole issue of overridden or permitted outright unnecessary?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So yes, it’s unnecessary too. In my opinion this is a pseudo-dilemma. A pseudo-inquiry. There aren’t really two sides here; it’s saying the same thing in different words.
[Speaker F] What’s the meaning of really saying overridden? I mean just conceptually for a moment. Overridden I can understand, but how can you say, like you said regarding lying, that if it’s permitted outright then I didn’t desecrate the Sabbath? But I did desecrate the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you desecrated the Sabbath in a place where it’s forbidden, then that’s desecrating the Sabbath. In a place where it’s a commandment, that’s not desecrating the Sabbath.
[Speaker F] Right here the whole issue comes in of what desecrating the Sabbath really means. What is the significance of the thirty-nine categories of labor? This is basically a theoretical discussion of that, because if we say that the thirty-nine categories of labor are Sabbath desecration…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, if you define it that way, then that definition already dictates the result. I’m only saying that there was room, logically, to distinguish: with lying I can object to such a statement, but with Sabbath desecration maybe not, because Sabbath desecration is a religious prohibition, not a moral one. If someone comes and says: look, but even with Sabbath desecration there are objective, result-based definitions—not at all. Fine, very good, then he’ll say even with Sabbath it’s overridden. But it’s not—so what, did the eternity within splendor get damaged because I did it? I don’t know, something like that.
[Speaker F] But I wouldn’t go into those places. I would go to moral places—namely, that the Sabbath also has moral reasons, “so that your ox and your donkey may rest,” and all that. It has moral rationales. And those moral rationales are not relevant when saving life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s no longer relevant.
[Speaker F] Right, so even with lying there’s still the issue of what is preferable. So similarly with the Sabbath you can set up two values here and ask which is preferable, and therefore in my view overridden is a more sensible rationale than permitted outright.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. That’s what I’m saying. Right.
[Speaker F] In theory, not in—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I agree, I agree. I think even more than that: I claim that permitted outright is just words. It’s not really a different alternative. They too are talking about overridden, just a more expansive version of overridden, that’s all. That’s my claim: that this conception called permitted outright is really a broad conception of overridden; it is not a conception of permitted outright. It only wants to say: take into account future concerns as well, even weak possible dangers. That’s all. But in the end it’s still a conception of overridden. Ultimately the entire permission is based on the fact that I want to save lives in the most optimal way. That’s the whole story. And whatever isn’t required for that, isn’t required.
[Speaker D] I think overridden comes from “desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths,” and “and live by them,” and that fits permitted outright better.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some people did want to argue that based on those rationales, but as I said earlier, I’m not sure there really are two formulations here, or an inquiry for its own sake.
[Speaker D] He’s not desecrating—it sees it as desecration, so that’s overridden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, I understand how you derive that from the sources, and I agree, many have said that. I just don’t think the result is really two different alternatives. It doesn’t seem to me like two different alternatives. But I’ll say something else that somewhat qualifies what I’m saying here. Look, there is the Maggid Mishneh—I’ll share the Jewish law here for a moment, let’s open the Bi’ur Halakhah on 328:4. “This is the language of Nachmanides in Torat HaAdam, and the Maggid Mishneh wrote that from this it implies that even though there is no danger in withholding that particular thing…” end quote. This is a famous view of the Maggid Mishneh, which Rabbi Chaim of Brisk always cites and rules in accordance with. He was very lenient—really very stringent in the laws of life danger. Right? Or very lenient in the laws of Sabbath, as we discussed at the beginning. So the Maggid Mishneh is basically considered the father of the conception of permitted outright, because he says that you care for the needs of the sick person even where there isn’t even future danger. Whatever the patient needs, you basically provide for this patient. And the Shulchan Arukh itself—the wording in the Shulchan Arukh around which this revolves, yes. You can see it, right? Yes. “An internal injury does not require evaluation, for even if there are no experts there and the patient says nothing, we do for him everything that one would ordinarily do for him on a weekday.” Okay? And that is the wording of Nachmanides in Torat HaAdam, and from this the Maggid Mishneh understands that you basically do even things that are not needed for saving life.
[Speaker D] What’s the definition of “internal”? I didn’t understand. What’s the definition of “internal”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—“internal” means inside the cavity of the body.
[Speaker F] Internal organs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Internal, yes. Internal injuries. Except for the teeth. From the teeth inward, as it were—never mind, there are specific definitions in Jewish law, but these are internal injuries. In any case, the claim is that we do for him everything that one ordinarily does on a weekday. The Maggid Mishneh says that from this wording of Nachmanides it comes out that one may do everything: for the patient, the Sabbath is permitted outright. Now I’ll say that in one direction there really is meaning here. What do I mean? If we say what the Maggid Mishneh says, that is certainly a conception of permitted outright, right? Because he is basically saying that it is permitted to desecrate the Sabbath even where it contributes nothing to saving life, even indirectly. Nothing. The patient simply wants to read a book so that he’ll feel more settled, but it won’t endanger his life in any way—turn on the light for him. That’s what the Maggid Mishneh says, if the patient is, of course, a dangerously ill patient. Again, it’s not permitted for everyone. When there is a dangerously ill patient, then even things that do not contribute to his healing are permitted. Just for his comfort—that’s the Maggid Mishneh. And here Rabbi Chaim—by the way, no one rules this way except Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, who was stringent in the laws of life danger, hysterically stringent, and the entire Brisk tradition as well. So many regard these as hysterical leniencies, but really they are hysterical stringencies in the laws of life danger. In any case, the claim is—they Briskers are always stringent. So the claim is that if one says what the Maggid Mishneh says, then clearly one is assuming a conception of permitted outright. What I claimed earlier—wait—what I claimed earlier was that this conclusion does not follow from the conception of permitted outright. But if someone did derive this conclusion, then clearly his point of departure is a conception of permitted outright. Do you understand the difference? In other words, it exists in one direction. You say: I think the definitions of permitted outright and overridden say nothing about this question. Whether it’s permitted outright or overridden, there is no reason in the world to permit turning on a light for a patient so that he can read a book if that contributes in no way at all, I would say, to his healing. There’s no basis to permit that, neither according to permitted outright nor according to overridden. The fact is that the Maggid Mishneh does permit it. I don’t know why, but that is the fact—
[Speaker G] the fact is that the Maggid Mishneh permits it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assuming I accept that this is his position—and that probably was his position—he probably really understood the concept of permitted outright in its full sense. Meaning: the Sabbath is permitted outright, and once there is a dangerously ill patient here, the Sabbath is permitted outright, and now that it is permitted outright you no longer have to make any calculations even regarding something not needed for the patient’s rescue. What I claimed earlier is that this conclusion alone is completely unsupported. Because even if I say permitted outright, there is no reason to say that I thereby permit things that are not needed for saving life. But the fact that the Maggid Mishneh makes this calculation—so in that sense, if you had asked me, I would have said there are no such two sides. And therefore I say there is no place for the Maggid Mishneh’s position at all; it is incorrect. But assuming there is such a position—the Maggid Mishneh’s position—clearly he assumes a conception of permitted outright. That is clear.
[Speaker D] But I think there is a difference here, because the moment you say the Sabbath was overridden, then in the act you did there was no Sabbath. And in the case where you say it was permitted outright, then even though you did an act that was permitted, which is usually forbidden on the Sabbath, the Sabbath still remained the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] It’s words. What does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A practical difference for marriage betrothal? What?
[Speaker D] The moment you say overridden, you overrode the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, maybe it’s philosophical. At the end of the day, those words are exactly what I said at the beginning. The question is whether there is a prohibition here that one is simply allowed to violate, or commanded to violate, or whether there is no prohibition at all. That’s clear—that’s the literal meaning of permitted outright and overridden. I’m only asking whether those two formulations are really different from one another. I’m not at all sure. As for practical differences, there I’m sure there are none. As for whether there is a philosophical difference—even about that I’m not sure. It depends on positivism: whether a difference in meaning is derived from practical differences, or whether there can be a difference in meaning even if there is no practical difference. That’s an interesting philosophical question—that’s the debate around positivism. But regarding consequences, I claim there are none. Regarding meaning, there may perhaps be room to discuss it. Okay? Now I’m just saying that we have to pay close attention: if we are now learning the halakhic world as it is—not as it should have been, because in my opinion as it should have been there shouldn’t have been a position like the one you’re presenting. There is no such creature; it’s a completely baseless position. But the fact is that in the halakhic world there is such a position. Assuming there is such a position, we need to know that it really is based on a conception of permitted outright in its broad sense. A conception of permitted outright means that the moment I have a dangerously ill patient, there is no Sabbath in the world with respect to him. Nothing, there isn’t. Do whatever you want. You can turn on music for him and entertain him, whether he asked you or not, whether he did ask you, it makes no difference—do whatever you want. Seemingly, yes—that is basically the conclusion. There is no Sabbath. So I’m saying: now in this formulation do you understand why I think this is a completely unreasonable position. And therefore I say again: the inquiry in and of itself doesn’t really have consequences, but once someone derived these consequences, he is probably assuming the premise of permitted outright. That is clear. I just don’t agree with it.
[Speaker F] And how can he assume that if most halakhic decisors go with overridden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, most halakhic decisors? How does a minority ever arise if most halakhic decisors say otherwise? That’s a question you can always ask in any dispute. The minority thinks differently.
[Speaker D] Fine, I’m saying that we have to determine the truth.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He thinks this way; others think differently. Now you’re observing and saying, okay, so the majority goes against him. Now the question is about him—why does he think this way?
[Speaker F] He doesn’t rule that it’s permitted outright, because apparently I saw in halakhic discussions—I don’t remember exactly where I saw it—that regarding a woman in childbirth they do permit doing everything. There’s a reason for that permission, and it could still be overridden and not permitted outright, for the reason that they argue that a woman in childbirth is afraid. Right, to calm her mind. Right, so you could also say that about a dangerously ill patient, that he’s afraid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you say that about a dangerously ill patient, you’ve returned to overridden.
[Speaker F] Right, so that’s why I’m saying that the Maggid Mishneh’s permission could also be overridden and not from permitted outright.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already very implausible, because in the end to say that with every patient there is a concern that his mind will become deranged is completely far-fetched. Meaning, the patient says, “You know what, I feel like reading a book. Just casually—I’m not under pressure about it. I feel like reading a book.” So now I’m going to turn on the light so he can read a book? Why? Because maybe his mind will become deranged? No, that doesn’t sound plausible to me. It’s not logical.
[Speaker D] But is there a ruling, from the standpoint of Jewish law, whether this is called overridden or permitted outright?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, the accepted ruling is overridden. Overridden as long as there is no actual concern for life—real concern, even indirectly. Therefore the Shulchan Arukh, which rules overridden, still says: you do not ask, you do not hesitate, adults do it, everything—there are no limitations so long as you have… if there is doubt, there is no doubt. Meaning, if you have any doubt at all that this could cost human life, with some risk or another, then there is no doubt—do what you need to do, don’t ask questions. But the basic conception, the framework within which all this is said, is a framework of overridden. Okay? So that’s an important point. Meaning, in a place where you have time and no pressure, and you can try to clarify things, you can go to a halakhic decisor and ask whether to do it this way or that way in order to see what to do most optimally—then yes, go ask. You don’t go ask in a place where there is time pressure, and don’t be a saint right now—right now you are saving lives. But in a place where there is no problem at all, there is time, I can prepare, I can organize, everything is fine, then no one says to you, “Do whatever you want.” Okay? Not no one, rather the decisors of overridden do not say that. And the Maggid Mishneh maybe would say that—I don’t know. But that really is a lone opinion. Okay, so that’s regarding… Now the Bi’ur Halakhah there discusses this issue, and in my humble opinion it requires examination—you can see on the second line—“in my humble opinion it requires examination, and it appears that many decisors disagree with this reasoning.” What? Did you hear what? Yes, “in my humble opinion”—the first line is where he brought the Maggid Mishneh. “And in my humble opinion it requires examination, and it appears that many decisors disagree with this reasoning.” And then he brings a whole list of decisors: Rashi, who disagrees—that where there is no danger, such that if they do not perform this treatment he will not die, and so on—it implies that if there is danger, it means he is endangered in relation to that treatment, meaning only then is it permitted to do it for him, not just because he wants it. The Beit Yosef already brought this, and so explained the Yom HaPekudah, see there, and so too under the heading “we clear away rubble,” and so wrote the Ran on Alfasi in several places, and so on in accordance with Rashi’s explanation, and more. Another proof from the Mishnah: “A sick person is fed according to experts; without evaluation he is not fed,” so we see that an assessment is required—it’s not simply that the Sabbath is permitted outright and you can do whatever you want. As brought in Tosafot and the Meiri and old Tosafot. In short, he says all the decisors go against the Maggid Mishneh. But here this discussion is usually made to depend on the question whether it’s permitted outright or overridden, and that is true in principle—it is true in the reverse direction. That is, if you already disagree on this, then apparently the fundamental dispute is permitted outright versus overridden. But from the fundamental dispute of permitted outright versus overridden, I would not derive this dispute. I would think that whether you say permitted outright or whether you say overridden, in the end you should still go like the decisors and not like the Maggid Mishneh—the majority of decisors, whether under permitted outright—
[Speaker D] or under overridden, it makes no difference. The Rashba also holds that it’s permitted outright, doesn’t he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rosh also talks about slaughtering for a sick person. We’ll get to that in a moment, step by step. Okay, so that’s regarding permitted outright. And also in section 12 there in the Shulchan Arukh that I directed you to—section 12 in the Shulchan Arukh, or rather section 4, which is often brought in this context—“When one desecrates the Sabbath for a dangerously ill patient, one tries not to do it by means of a non-Jew, minors, or women, but rather by adult, competent Jews.” Not by women, but by competent adult Jews. So the commentaries here already discuss the question and say that there is a difference between minors, women, and a non-Jew—each one has a different reason. Regarding a gentile, it’s because people may think perhaps—that is, there’s a possibility that he won’t really do what is needed, he’ll be lazy, and then there is a concern of life danger. Regarding minors and women, there is some concern that people will think that one may not desecrate the Sabbath for such a thing, and therefore they delegate it to minors, and then they may end up being negligent in situations where there are no minors or no gentile or whoever it may be. There are different rationales here, but all these rationales point—and I told you, look here in the commentaries—all these rationales point to the fact that the reasons are all reasons of overridden. Therefore what they say here—“one tries not to do it,” don’t use workarounds, not by a gentile and not by anything else—seemingly sounds like permitted outright. No, it’s not saying permitted outright; it’s saying overridden. Don’t do it because there is some concern that it may create danger to human life. Meaning, the point is always the danger.
[Speaker D] Whoever wants to calm down about the women issue should read Machatzit HaShekel. Can’t hear? Whoever wants to calm down about the women issue should read Machatzit HaShekel. He explains why not by means of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any case, it seems to me that the attitude of the Talmud and of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) toward women won’t be helped much by all kinds of apologetics, let’s put it that way. What can you do? We won’t argue. Yes, no, but the sages say—
[Speaker F] That was the situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In some respects that really was the situation, by the way. Really, women in earlier times were—perhaps not their fault—a kind of… not all of them were Rashi’s daughters. But that’s fine. They were—the classic example of bias. Why do people remember Rashi’s daughters?
[Speaker F] Because they were the minority; most were not.
[Speaker D] There were the daughters of Tzelofchad—what about the daughters of Tzelofchad?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Beruriah, the daughters of Tzelofchad, right—but exactly, we know the whole list. Now tell me the full list of male Torah scholars.
[Speaker D] Right, I just didn’t know if there were that many.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were many, many more. There were many more in fact. Nothing will help—not because of slandering women or anything. Those were the facts, so there’s no point in it. And were women forbidden to study? Whether that is good or not good, the facts are that this really was the case. By the way, look in Bnei Brak—the difference between women and men is a snapshot. The same thing: the women in Bnei Brak in many ways are like the women who were around then, in terms of their understanding of Torah, of Jewish law, of what it means, where it comes from—they don’t know much. Because they don’t study. Not because they’re stupid, of course; they simply don’t study. It’s a matter of social structuring, not necessarily because they are or aren’t talented. That was the situation. You can like it or not like it, but these statements come against the background of a given factual reality. Okay, so that’s with regard to permitted outright or overridden, and therefore I have serious doubt whether there is really any actual practical difference between them. Now, maybe one more note from Kovetz Shiurim, which I referred you to in Ketubot 13. “And regarding a dangerously ill patient, we feed him the lighter prohibition first”—again, a conception of overridden; as much as possible, you do the lighter prohibition—“it appears that this is only when the permitted option is available before him. He is forbidden to eat the more severe one. But to bring him the lighter one, there is no Torah-level obligation because of separating him from prohibition. For at the time that he eats the severe prohibition, his eating is permitted, since they did not bring him the lighter one.” What is he saying? It’s true there is such a rule that one should prefer the lighter prohibition. Say they needed to eat meat and there is danger and there are different levels of prohibition. But if the lighter prohibition is already available before him, and the more severe one is too, then of course he should prefer the lighter one. But if the more severe one is here—sorry, if the lighter one is not here—there is no obligation on you to bring the lighter one in order to avoid the more severe prohibition. Why? Because eating the severe one is permitted. This is a very interesting discussion. Seemingly, why? What’s the problem? Maybe that sounds like an assumption of permitted outright. Right? He is basically saying—I’m speaking now where bringing it doesn’t endanger life. I can wait a few minutes until the delivery arrives, okay? So why really not bring it? So what if it isn’t in front of me? It sounds from his words like some formal halakhic consideration. I’m not supposed to alter the situation. In the present state of affairs I am permitted to eat the more severe prohibition. I have no obligation to create a different situation in which I can do it in a lighter way. I’m supposed to act given the current situation, the present situation. There is no obligation to escape prohibitions. There is an obligation not to violate a prohibition. Do you understand? I am not obligated to create a situation in which I won’t need to violate the prohibition. Right now I’m compelled, so right now it’s permitted to me. Can I prevent the compulsion one way or another? Who says I’m obligated to do that? Right now it’s permitted to me. Therefore, notice the formulation I just used: it is not necessarily a formulation of permitted outright. It’s overridden. But even if it’s overridden, there is no obligation on you to flee from that situation, because in the end, in this given situation, the Torah says it is overridden, and you have both a commandment and full compulsion to do it. And since that is so, you have no obligation to escape this situation. And just as there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who argue that there is permission to put yourself into a situation where you will be compelled—getting onto a ship on Friday evening and falling asleep, and forgetting that on the Sabbath the ship will suddenly begin to sail—as if forgetting, yes? And then what? You find yourself waking up—oops, it’s the Sabbath and I’m in the middle of the ocean, I’m compelled, what can I do? I fell asleep. But you fell asleep knowing that you were falling asleep now and that you would wake up on the Sabbath. But no matter: since right now I’m compelled, it may be permitted. There is a major dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—I’m not going into when and how right now—but there are views that say it is permitted. He puts himself into compulsion. Why? Because in the end, when you are compelled, it is permitted. Right now you are already in that situation. True, you could have made sure you wouldn’t be in that situation.
[Speaker A] That’s starting with negligence; starting willingly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but it doesn’t matter. Right now he’s compelled. And under compulsion there is no transgression. Again, even if it’s overridden, under compulsion there is no transgression. Because he is compelled. So what if he was at fault in bringing about that compulsion? Right now he’s compelled. That’s it. That is the conception of Kovetz Shiurim. I’m not saying it’s necessary. Some would disagree and say you’re forbidden to fall asleep on Friday. Why? Because you can’t say you were compelled—after all, you yourself brought about the situation. It wasn’t forced on you. You entered the situation, and now it is forced on you. And therefore it is not a case of compulsion. But again, notice: the dispute is only about whether the current situation is called a situation of compulsion or not. But given that it is called a situation of compulsion, even if what I did yesterday was blameworthy, that doesn’t matter. Right now it is compulsion, and under compulsion I commit no transgression. So I think that even this Kovetz Shiurim is not necessarily speaking here in the language of permitted outright. Rather, it’s a kind of halakhic formalism. Even if it’s overridden, it’s overridden. If it’s overridden then it’s permitted—what’s the problem? True, I could have avoided it? I could have. That shows us once again that even this practical difference—whether I can avoid it—is also not necessarily a practical difference between permitted outright and overridden. Okay. Fine, so that’s just one note. Now, what happens with a sick person who needs to eat meat and we have no kosher meat to give him? We have two options. One option is to slaughter for him, and the second option is to give him non-kosher meat. Again I’m sharing the… wait, I’ll bring up the whole thing, but… As I told you, I think I said this last time, this is a litmus test for scholars versus ordinary people. The ordinary person—you tell him this—and he says, what do you mean, eat pork? Are you crazy? Of course you should slaughter for him on the Sabbath, that’s permitted and all that. Pork? To put pork into a Jew’s mouth? Such a thing is unthinkable. That’s the ordinary person, the “layman,” in the somewhat dismissive language. The scholar says, what do you mean, of course pork! Why? Because pork is just a lashes prohibition, an ordinary negative commandment. The Sabbath is a capital offense by stoning. True, pork has become a symbol, but symbols are the business of Cassirer the philosopher or of ordinary people. Serious people are not interested in that. Serious people deal with things in themselves, not with what they symbolize. So the fact that pork became a symbol is irrelevant. The question is the severity of the prohibition—that is the important question. And therefore, apparently, the obvious answer is to give him pork and not slaughter for him. But it turns out that not only ordinary people, but even some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), disagree on these matters. And it says as follows in the Rosh: “The rabbis taught, from where do we know…” and so on, never mind. “They asked the Ra’avad”—yes, end of the second line—“they asked the Ra’avad of blessed memory: in the case of a dangerously ill patient who will not eat unless he eats meat, and there is carrion before him but no slaughtered meat unless one slaughter on the Sabbath”—yes, we need to slaughter on the Sabbath, we don’t have—“if there is slaughtered meat before him”—notice the assumption already in the question—“if there is carrion meat and slaughtered meat, both lying before him, is it permitted to eat the carrion?” Certainly not. That isn’t even a question. Right? Notice, the issue of permitted outright—I’m returning to the issue of permitted outright—the assumption already built into the question, even before entering the dispute in the answer, is an assumption of overridden. Right? Because it is clear that if slaughtered meat and carrion are before me, there is no permission to eat the carrion—that is obvious. The question is what happens when there is no slaughtered meat before me. Then the question is whether I need to slaughter. Now notice: the Kovetz Shiurim we saw earlier argues that I don’t even need to slaughter; I don’t even need to bring slaughtered meat so as not to eat the carrion. Even that I don’t need to do. That goes even further. But here the discussion is not whether to bring slaughtered meat—that apparently certainly one should—but whether to slaughter, which is a real prohibition, a Sabbath prohibition punishable by stoning. So the question is what to do if there is carrion before him and no slaughtered meat unless one slaughters on the Sabbath. “For some say”—first opinion—“it is preferable that he himself violate the negative commandment of carrion than that others violate a prohibition punishable by stoning.” That is what I told you comes up in the initial assumption in the Tashbetz. Because what is fascinating in this discussion—and again, this is a note that may connect to next lesson—“desecrate one Sabbath for him…”
[Speaker D] What?
[Speaker F] About the accounting of commandments in the world. We talked about that in one of the lessons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The point is that there is no real significance to the question of who it is that violates the prohibition. The question is how many prohibitions are violated. We are basically looking at this from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, not from my perspective as a private individual or from the perspective of the patient as a private individual. And therefore the assumption—the assumption of most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—is that there is no room for the consideration of who will violate the prohibition. The patient himself, for whose sake the whole thing is being done—he’s the one who needs it—and then apparently one might naturally say: okay, then you violate the prohibition—why should I violate the prohibition for you? Or that I should violate the prohibition. This consideration—
[Speaker F] But here there is a practical difference for permitted outright. Because if it’s permitted outright, then no prohibition is violated in the world, so here there is room for these calculations. If we go with the idea that the calculation is general and not personal, then we prefer—if the Sabbath is really permitted outright—then I’m saying it’s preferable to desecrate the Sabbath because it’s permitted outright and there is no transgression in the world.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll repeat your earlier remark and answer you in your own coin. You can say we are dealing here with permitted outright, but what is permitted is only what is needed. And if the patient himself can manage by means of a prohibition that he himself violates, then let him do it, and for me it was not permitted. For me, only what I must do because otherwise the patient will die was permitted. But it is not true that if I do not slaughter the patient will die; let him eat carrion and he won’t die.
[Speaker F] Yes, but he addresses that afterward, that it’s preferable to go with permitted outright.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I agree. I’m just saying that I don’t think—even the Rashba—I said, the Rashba goes on at length here about permitted outright and overridden; in the article I referred you to he describes it. But I don’t agree. I think there is no practical difference here between permitted outright and overridden. Fine. In any case, so the first opinion says: it depends on who violates the transgression. The patient is the one for whose sake the whole matter is being done; there is preference for a transgression that he himself commits over one that I commit. Notice: they don’t mention here the issue that the prohibition of carrion or pork is a lighter prohibition whereas the Sabbath prohibition is more severe. I would combine that too. After all, there are two factors. Apparently that’s the obvious solution, right? And it turns out that no—many medieval authorities (Rishonim) argue otherwise.
[Speaker E] And the Ritva answered, yes? What, I can’t hear. Can I? Yes. A small question: are carrion and pork the same thing? Because I understood carrion to be an animal that died.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, they’re not the same factually, but one is a negative commandment and the other is a negative commandment; one negative commandment and another negative commandment, at the same level of severity.
[Speaker E] But is a negative commandment—wouldn’t carrion be more dangerous than eating pork? It’s one negative commandment and another negative commandment, but one is dangerous and one isn’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Dangerous? Why dangerous? What’s dangerous?
[Speaker E] Because I understood carrion to be an animal that already died.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And that’s a health issue?
[Speaker E] No, there’s no health problem here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean dangerous? There’s no health problem here.
[Speaker A] It wasn’t slaughtered according to Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It wasn’t slaughtered according to Jewish law, and we kept it frozen in the refrigerator.
[Speaker E] Fine, so it’s like pork. Okay, all right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So both are negative commandments. It’s not the same negative commandment; they are two different negative commandments but at the same level of severity. Okay, fine, thank you very much. “And the Ra’avad answered”—yes, this was a question asked to the Ra’avad. “And he answered: the words of those who say so are well aimed. But one can say that the Sabbath prohibition has already been given to be overridden with kindling and cooking and heating hot water.” What does that mean?
[Speaker D] That’s overridden—that this is a regular thing, that they desecrate the Sabbath for life danger.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. There is a preference to violate Sabbath prohibitions over violating the prohibition of carrion or the prohibition of pork. Why? Because even if you take the pork, you still have to cook the pork for him, you still have to heat the water, or light the fire. All the Sabbath prohibitions you will have to do anyway even if you are giving him pork to eat—he’s not going to eat raw pork, okay? So since that is so, you are in any event already going to desecrate the Sabbath. So if that’s the case, then you may as well desecrate the Sabbath by slaughtering too. A very strange argument.
[Speaker A] Really problematic. If so, then not only am I doing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Other Sabbath prohibitions, yes. But this Sabbath prohibition versus the prohibition of carrion—there is preference for the prohibition of carrion, it’s lighter, and the patient does it and not I. He apparently means to say: not only is the emphasis on Sabbath prohibitions, but the claim is that you won’t get out of this without you yourself also violating prohibitions. If the only consideration is that the patient himself should violate the prohibition and not you, that consideration doesn’t exist. Because even if the patient wants to eat the carrion, someone will still have to cook it for him and heat it for him—and that will be you. Therefore, in any event, you yourself will still have to desecrate the Sabbath. Therefore the consideration of whether it will be the patient or you is irrelevant. That’s what he means to say, leaving aside for the moment the relative severity of the prohibition, because that didn’t even come up in the words of “those who say so,” the severity of the prohibition. “Those who say so” only distinguished between the question of who violates the prohibition—the patient or me.
[Speaker D] But the continuation of the sentence—that there shouldn’t be one minor at the end of the world…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I haven’t read that yet.
[Speaker D] That there is a fixed reality in which the Sabbath is desecrated.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I haven’t read this part yet; this is the continuation. Or alternatively. I haven’t read this yet. What I just want to say is that he apparently means to say here that in any case, you won’t get out of this without you yourself desecrating the Sabbath. There’s no solution here in which only the patient violates prohibitions. And therefore, again, the emphasis here is not on the Sabbath. I don’t think the point is that the prohibition of the Sabbath can already be set aside through kindling and cooking. Rather, the point is that you yourself, in any event, will have to violate Sabbath prohibitions here. Meaning, I don’t think the emphasis is specifically on the Sabbath. That’s how it seems to me, at least. Even though it is phrased that way. But from comparison to the words of the “some say,” the “some say” discuss the question of who violates the prohibition, the patient or me. So what does the Raavad answer to that? The Raavad answers: no, no, the prohibition of the Sabbath is going to be violated in any case. Who was talking about the prohibition of the Sabbath? Fine, the Sabbath prohibition, let it be done—but by the patient and not by me. Therefore I think what he means to answer here is that you yourself will violate Sabbath prohibitions in any case. The emphasis is on you, not on the fact that these are Sabbath prohibitions. You won’t get out of this without violating prohibitions yourself. And still, by the way, so what? So I’ll do those prohibitions because there’s no choice. But regarding the prohibition of eating, why assume that you need the prohibition of slaughter rather than the prohibition of pork? At least on that plane, you gain that the patient will eat the prohibition of pork or carrion. The Raavad’s reasoning here isn’t exactly clear. Or alternatively, that it’s impossible that there not be at least one child at the end of the world. What does that mean? So that really is already one of these evasive maneuvers—that you’re basically allowed to cook or kindle or something like that for a child who’s at the end of the world and needs it, okay? But then I can say the same thing about pork.
[Speaker D] But then the point is that every Sabbath there will be a situation, a fixed reality, that the Sabbath is desecrated for someone in life-threatening danger. The moment it becomes a fixed reality. But he says that this detail matters, that it’s a fixed reality, in the article you told us about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not important that it’s a fixed reality; rather, because at this very moment that I’m in, there is also such a child, because there’s always such a child. What matters is this moment. What he says—that it’s always like this—is simply in order to say that in this moment too, it’s like this.
[Speaker D] But because he says that just as they offer the daily offering on the Sabbath. Right? So you can’t say here that they’re desecrating the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I said—I’ll repeat—it’s not that reasoning. Here he’s not talking about it being a fixed reality. He’s talking about this: the reason he needs the fact that it always exists is to tell you that even at this moment, the one you’re talking about, it probably exists. Don’t tell me that maybe right now there’s no child; there’s always some child. It’s not because it needs to be always; that’s not the point. There’s no law here that this must always be so. I just want to say: even at the moment when you’re deliberating, there’s probably such a child. And the constancy here plays no role; it’s just a technical matter. Therefore I find this argument of the Raavad hard to understand. But if there were a sick person who needed to eat immediately, and the carrion was ready for him right away while the slaughtered meat would be delayed, then certainly we feed him the carrion and do not wait for slaughtering, skinning, and cooking. Yes, because it takes time to slaughter, skin, and cook, and here there is ready pork meat or ready carrion meat. Okay, so this is already somewhat similar to what we saw in Kovetz Shiurim. Not to order it in—but in Kovetz Shiurim, it seems to me that here the emphasis is not to wait because that puts him in danger. Right? In Kovetz Shiurim that wasn’t the emphasis. In Kovetz Shiurim the emphasis was: you have no obligation to order it from outside, because you don’t need to change the situation you are in. If you are in a situation where this is permitted, there is no obligation on you to create another situation in which you can manage without it. That’s not because it endangers the patient. Do you understand what I’m saying?
[Speaker A] No, please repeat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. On the face of it, what he says here is exactly what Kovetz Shiurim wrote. He says: if the slaughtered meat is not before him and it will be delayed, then certainly you don’t need to order slaughtered meat so that he won’t now eat the carrion. Right? So on the face of it, that’s what Kovetz Shiurim said. But that’s not true—it’s only on the face of it. Because here the discussion is whether it will be delayed. What does that mean? It could take time, and then the patient could enter a dangerous state. Don’t take risks—give him the food that exists now. That’s the point. Because if you bring it, order it, then there’s still slaughtering and skinning and cooking, and that will take time, and the patient may enter danger. If you have something that right now you can do immediately, excellent. If not, give him the carrion. Kovetz Shiurim said something else. It has nothing to do with delay. Even if it will arrive in two minutes and there is no danger at all to the patient—therefore I said these things sound like “fully permitted.” They are not “fully permitted,” but they sound like it. Why? Because he says that if you currently find yourself in a state where only carrion is before you, and from the standpoint of Jewish law it is permitted and even a commandment to feed him the carrion, then you have no obligation to change the situation into another situation in which you won’t have to feed him the carrion. Not because the patient is endangered. Halakhic formalism. Because in this situation it is permitted—so why should I care now? You don’t need to create another situation in which it would be forbidden. Okay? It’s not the same discussion as the danger that may threaten the patient, which is what is written in the Rosh. Do you understand why it’s not the same thing? Yes. The reasonings here look very similar, but when you read carefully—and that’s why I’m reading this with you and trying to show you—because when you read carefully you see that these are completely different worlds. Each one is a different rationale. They look terribly similar and people mix them all up, but they’re really different things. Each one here is saying something else, even though they’re very similar. Moving on. And Rabbeinu Meir—of course, the Maharam of Rothenburg, the teacher of the Rosh—And Rabbeinu Meir answered in a responsum about this—I assume, what does “about this” mean? The Raavad was earlier, meaning they told him that the Raavad had been asked this—he answered in a responsum about this and brought an analogy from food preparation on a Jewish holiday, where one slaughters on a Jewish holiday, and there is a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding the forbidden labor, while carrion involves only a prohibition; or to tell a gentile to kill birds by stabbing, where there is only a rabbinic prohibition, since for a bird there is no Torah-level slaughter requirement, but since the Torah permitted food preparation for us on a Jewish holiday, then for us all food preparation on a Jewish holiday is like a weekday. So too, since the Torah permitted life-saving, then every labor one performs on the Sabbath for a dangerously ill person is as though he did it on a weekday.
[Speaker D] That’s “fully permitted.” That’s “fully permitted.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you say about this reasoning?
[Speaker A] It sounds like “fully permitted.”
[Speaker D] And it sounds like even if one acts as on a weekday—but that’s what was entirely permitted on a Jewish holiday.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand why the Sabbath is fully permitted and carrion is not fully permitted. After all, there’s no statement here specifically about the Sabbath. We already said—I introduced this already in the Talmudic text in Yoma—we’re dealing with overriding a prohibition in order to save life. They mentioned the Sabbath because the Sabbath is severe, but not because there is some special law regarding the Sabbath in the face of life-saving. We’re talking about prohibitions in the face of… The fact is that when the Talmud derives this law, it doesn’t derive it specifically about the Sabbath.
[Speaker D] But the difference between carrion and the Sabbath is that here the carrion itself—the food—is forbidden, whereas on the Sabbath the food—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is kosher, and the labor—
[Speaker D] —of preparing it is the prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says: where there are two prohibitions, we feed him the lighter one. And slaughtered meat—the food is permitted, but with carrion the food itself is forbidden, and a lion crouches upon it. Up to here. What does he mean to say? With carrion, this is a prohibition in the object itself, right? Whereas with slaughtered meat, the food in itself is permitted; I only have a forbidden action. So he says: the action is not forbidden, because I have the commandment of life-saving. With carrion, although the act of eating carrion is a permitted act because of life-saving, at the end of the day you actually ate an object of prohibition, an object of carrion. And his claim, basically—and here this is the explanation of the words of the Maharam, even though it looks like different reasonings, I’m not sure there’s a textual variant here, there are no variant readings; apparently there’s a collection of reasonings, but here they’re brought as continuations of one another or explanations of one another—his claim is that there’s a difference between object-prohibitions and person-prohibitions. In person-prohibitions—and this is somewhat similar to what I said about lying versus the Sabbath—why? Because in person-prohibitions, all there is is that the Torah told me not to do them. Here the Torah is indeed telling me to do them, because of life-saving. With carrion, the thing itself is problematic. It’s not only that I’m forbidden to perform the act of eating it; it is also forbidden to be eaten by me. So the act of eating that I perform is a permitted act because of life-saving, but in practice I ate carrion here; the carrion was eaten; the practical result happened here. In that sense it’s a bit like a lie. These are really the terms of “fully permitted” and “set aside.” An object-prohibition is not fully permitted; it is set aside, whereas a person-prohibition is fully permitted. That’s basically his claim. Okay? Fine. So of course this too can be debated, but that seems to me to be the point he is making. And I heard in the name of—because we are concerned lest the patient be disgusted by eating something forbidden and refrain, and endanger himself. That’s a drop in the bucket. Yes. You know, there are all sorts of righteous people who don’t want to eat on Yom Kippur even though they are ill, and rabbis always need to persuade them: know that your commandment of Yom Kippur is to eat, and make the blessing with intention before you eat. Not only is there no commandment upon you to fast; your observance of Yom Kippur is that you eat. And of course that’s not true; it’s demagoguery for laymen, but with laymen you need to use their own kind of demagoguery.
[Speaker D] The last answer, “and I heard,” that’s “set aside,” not “fully permitted.” I didn’t understand. The last answer he brings here is “set aside” and not “fully permitted.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, clearly that’s “set aside.” In my opinion everything here is “set aside,” but never mind. This is certainly “set aside.” Here the concern is that the patient will come to danger because he is righteous and doesn’t want to eat pork. Okay? Therefore it’s preferable to slaughter for him, because if I slaughter for him he eats kosher meat, I do the prohibition; but with eating pork, it may be that he’ll recoil from committing that prohibition and then he’ll die. There are all kinds of righteous ignoramuses like that, who are very strict and in the end don’t do what Jewish law actually says.
[Speaker D] Okay. I don’t think that’s only… a dangerously ill person who recoils from it—that’s a sign that it’s rooted deep, deep in…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that there really is a statement here not about laymen, but about a physical, natural recoil.
[Speaker F] That’s what I thought. That it’s just that people are used to eating kosher, and to them it seems repulsive to eat pork.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, yes. It disgusts him, so he simply won’t be able to eat it, and then it won’t help. Fine, that could certainly be. And in truth, pork or carrion—for a person who observes Jewish law, it really is something that is hard for him to eat, regardless of the halakhic perception of the matter at the moment. So it may be that this is also what it means. In any case, these are the words of the Rosh; there is an interesting parallel in the Ran.
[Speaker D] This is Kovetz Shiurim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran says as follows: as we read in the Talmudic text, etc., and the Raavad was asked—do you see this?—in this wording: if there was a dangerously ill person and one needed to slaughter a chicken for him, why not tell a gentile to kill it by stabbing for him, for her, kill it not by proper slaughter, and feed him the carrion, which involves only a simple prohibition, and not slaughter and thereby set aside the Sabbath, which involves a stoning prohibition? And he answered that for this patient, which prohibition is standing in his way and holding him back? Certainly the prohibition of the Sabbath, not the prohibition of carrion. Proof: if it were not the Sabbath, we would not seek out carrion for him but slaughtered meat. Fine, this too is somewhat strange logic. He says: what prohibition clashes with his illness? The prohibition of the Sabbath, not the prohibition of carrion. Why? If it were a weekday, then obviously he would not eat the carrion; we would slaughter for him and give him kosher meat, right? Therefore, what currently interferes with him is the Sabbath prohibition. And since what clashes with his life-saving need is the Sabbath prohibition, that is also the prohibition that is set aside before life-saving. Do you understand this sort of logic, which of course can be debated—it’s not… but that is his claim. And the explanation is that the Sabbath—wait—rather, slaughtered meat—and since so, the prohibition standing over him and holding him back is that the Sabbath is apparently a complete permission, not another prohibition. Therefore they do not permit him the prohibition of carrion. End quote. And I am astonished, because if so, if he found a chicken killed by stabbing, we should feed him that and not slaughter for him. And just as you say the prohibition of the Sabbath prevents him from slaughtering, so the prohibition of carrion prevents him from eating this carrion—you can use exactly the same logic in the opposite direction. And furthermore, he says even more—but it seems to me—what does the Ran himself say? This is a very, very famous Ran.
[Speaker D] Because with each and every act of eating he transgresses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it seems to me that regarding a sick person, the prohibition of carrion is no lighter than the prohibition of the Sabbath. For although carrion is a simple prohibition and the Sabbath is a stoning prohibition, there is another stringency in carrion, because one who eats it violates a prohibition for every olive-sized portion he eats. As we say regarding a Nazirite who was drinking wine, etc., that if they said to him, “Do not drink, do not drink,” and he drank, he is liable for each and every one. But regarding the Sabbath, he transgresses only at the moment of slaughter; for all the olive-sized portions that he will eat afterward, it is one prohibition of slaughter—in one prohibition alone. And there are those who say that products of Sabbath labor are permitted, and we rule: it is holy, but its products are not holy—and the prohibition of products of Sabbath labor is only rabbinic. Therefore, the many prohibitions of carrion are not considered a lighter prohibition as against the one prohibition of the Sabbath, even though the Sabbath is a stoning prohibition. This Ran is the beginning of the discussion in Atvan DeOraita that deals with quantities versus qualities. And this Ran is basically arguing that quantity overcomes quality. What does that mean? If you eat carrion, every olive-sized portion you eat is itself a Torah prohibition. More than that: every quarter of an olive-sized portion involves the prohibition of a partial measure, which is also from the Torah. But let’s say even for every olive-sized portion. So every olive-sized portion you eat is a Torah prohibition, a lighter prohibition, an ordinary simple prohibition. By contrast, the Sabbath is a very severe prohibition, a stoning prohibition, but you violate it once—you slaughter it—and after that you have a whole cow to eat permissibly. Okay, of course there’s skinning and cooking, there are several more things here, but only for the sake of the principle. Okay? And therefore, although the more severe prohibition is the Sabbath prohibition, since it is only one prohibition as against several prohibitions in carrion, it is preferable to do the Sabbath prohibition and not violate the prohibition of carrion, because quantity decides over quality.
[Speaker F] How can he make such a decision—what decides, quantity or quality?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s very, very strange. I’ll say even more: who says there is quantity here? How many olive-sized portions of meat is he going to eat? Two? How much can you eat already?
[Speaker F] He says that if it’s only one then obviously—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that if it’s two, that already decides it. Why two and not five?
[Speaker F] So that’s exactly the question: how can one decide at all? And let’s go to another case—if it were a rabbinic prohibition, then surely he would say that it’s preferable not to desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of a hundred cases of a rabbinic prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not at all sure.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, someone seized by bulmos will eat much more than a yard of meat. I didn’t understand. I’m saying, if we’re talking about someone seized by bulmos, then he’ll eat a serious quantity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, bring him—and if not bulmos, then a whole cow. And if not bulmos, after all this is a general ruling.
[Speaker D] Fine, he’s talking about the potential. What potential?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no potential. If it’s bulmos, I understand; if not, then what? How does he define the boundary? It appears from him that in a case like this you need to establish a rule of thumb; you can’t decide separately in every single situation. He says: as a rule of thumb, what determines it is the number of prohibitions and not their quality. It doesn’t matter now whether it’s two against one—that’s enough too. Even though I’m not sure he really draws the line exactly at two or at three or at five. But because we can’t draw a line, he says: let’s establish a rule of thumb—quantity wins, because I don’t know how to decide which prohibitions are truly more problematic, and weighing the reward of a commandment against its loss, and all those things—yes, do not judge lighter versus more severe. And therefore, he tells you to go after the quantities of prohibitions; that’s the rule of thumb. If I could put a clear line for you, maybe I would draw a different line, but since I have to establish a sweeping rule, the sweeping rule is that quantity always overcomes quality. That’s the claim. Now, this is a very interesting remark. You know, there’s a little yeshiva quip: when Abraham—or also with Isaac—there were three such cases, they came to Avimelekh or to Pharaoh there in Egypt, he says to her, “Please say you are my sister,” because otherwise they’ll kill me in order to take her. So in the yeshivot they ask: what do you mean? The Egyptians will kill him so that she’ll be available and then the king can marry her—so they violate the prohibition of murder in order to avoid the prohibition of adultery. Is murder preferable to adultery? Both are among the three severe transgressions. Why would the Egyptians trouble themselves to kill Abraham in order to permit Sarah? Let them simply take Sarah as a married woman, and that’s it.
[Speaker E] They’ll do both.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim is—the usual pilpul is the pilpul of the Ran. They bring this Ran and say: if he has relations with Sarah or with Rebecca, then every single time he violates the prohibition of a married woman. But if he kills Abraham or Isaac once, then afterward she is permitted; every later time he has relations with her, it’s permitted. So since he decides once—
[Speaker F] But he can send someone else to kill him. You can send someone else to do the prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And we already said that we don’t calculate based on who performs the prohibition.
[Speaker F] And that also seems forbidden. It’s much cleaner to send someone to do the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —thing without you seeing it. Right, like King David sent Uriah to die in war, and still there is a claim against him, of course. In any case, for our purposes—I’m joking, of course—this is a nice yeshiva pilpul, but for our purposes this is essentially what the Ran is claiming. The Ran claims that quantity decides over quality, and therefore it is preferable less so for the patient. By the way, I cast onto the table the Shulchan Arukh—did you see it in the Shulchan Arukh?
[Speaker F] In which paragraph? Which…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t direct you to the Shulchan Arukh on this; I just remembered now that I hadn’t directed you. The Shulchan Arukh rules Jewish law on this matter. Wait one second.
[Speaker D] But in which paragraph?
[Speaker A] It’s in the laws of the Sabbath, isn’t it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] 328, it’s in the same section—
[Speaker D] 328, but which paragraph?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll open it in a second. Here—paragraph 14. Let’s share. Do you see? If there was a dangerously ill person—do you see paragraph 14 here? If there was a dangerously ill person who needed meat, one slaughters for him, and we do not say, “Let us feed him carrion.” But if the sick person needed to eat immediately, and the carrion was ready at once while the slaughtering would be delayed for him, we feed him carrion. This is like that view in the Rosh, that slaughter is preferable to carrion, and of course if it’s delayed, then not. But again—if it’s delayed. Seemingly, from here there is evidence against what Kovetz Shiurim says. Because it implies that if there is no problem of delay, and the only question is whether I am obligated to change the situation—then I am obligated to change the situation. And only the concern about future danger is what leads us to say: don’t wait; give it to him; feed him the carrion. Yes. Okay. Now I’ll just begin the next part—this was paragraph 14. Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. There I—
[Speaker D] I didn’t see what he—what that has to do with our topic there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] I didn’t see what that has to do with our topic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah.
[Speaker F] You’ll see in a minute.
[Speaker D] Paragraphs 4 and 6.
[Speaker F] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Paragraphs 4 and 6, but for the context I wanted you also to see the setting. Okay, he’s basically talking about the laws of sanctifying God’s name. All the house of Israel are commanded regarding this great sanctification of God’s name, etc., and that there are cases of “let him be killed rather than transgress”—yes, for all commandments no, but for the three severe ones yes. Law 2: In what case are these words said? Regarding the other commandments, apart from idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed. But for these three transgressions, if one says to him, “Transgress one of them or be killed,” he must be killed rather than transgress. All this is when it is not a time of religious persecution; but at a time of persecution it’s something else—then one must be killed even for everything. Law 4 is important for our purposes. Anyone of whom it is said, “Transgress rather than be killed,” but he is killed and does not transgress—behold, he is liable for his own life. It’s a marvelous sentence of Maimonides, yes? Meaning, if you gave up your life for an ordinary commandment, not one of the three severe ones, then essentially you died; you committed a transgression and are liable for your own death because of that. And anyone of whom it is said, “Be killed rather than transgress,” and he is killed and does not transgress—behold, he sanctified God’s name. And if it was in the presence of ten Jews, he sanctified God’s name in public, etc.
[Speaker D] Meaning, in life-saving, when it’s not one of the three transgressions, he should have transgressed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—no, no. I don’t yet want to say that; let’s just read the background. And if it was before ten Jews—yes, I continue—if it was before ten Jews, behold, he profaned God’s name in public and nullified a positive commandment, which is sanctifying God’s name, and violated a prohibition, which is profaning God’s name; and nevertheless, because he transgressed under compulsion, they do not flog him, and needless to say they do not execute him in a religious court, even if he killed under compulsion, for they flog and execute only one who transgresses willingly and with witnesses and prior warning, as it says, “And I will set My face against that man.” By oral tradition they learned: “that man”—and not one under compulsion, nor one acting unintentionally, nor one in error, nor one misled, etc. Fine. This whole passage is what matters for our purposes in law 4. So basically there is here an exemption from punishment even in the three severe transgressions, where in principle you should be killed rather than transgress; if you didn’t withstand the test and you transgressed rather than being killed—so you transgressed idolatry or murder—you are not liable to death for that. Why? Even though you were forbidden to do it, you are still considered under compulsion. Okay? That is what Maimonides says. Maimonides continues in law 6—I’m skipping law 5 for the moment—law 6: In the same way as they spoke about compulsion, so too they spoke about illnesses. How so? One who became ill and was near death, and the doctors said that his cure depends on some item forbidden in the Torah—we act and heal with all Torah prohibitions in a case of danger, except for idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed, for even in a place of danger one may not be healed through them. Up to here everything is fine, right? This is straightforward life-saving. This is the law relevant to us. In a case of life-saving, this is basically illness. Maimonides says illness is like compulsion: just as when someone threatens you, you may save yourself at the cost of a transgression except for the three severe ones, so too if you are ill—not a person threatening you, but the illness threatening you—then you may transgress all prohibitions except for the three severe ones. Okay? “For even in a place of danger one may not be healed through them.” The important sentence is this next, final one: “And if he transgressed and was healed, the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.”
[Speaker D] “And was healed” through those three prohibitions?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the three severe transgressions. Meaning, someone was ill and took something connected with idolatry in order to be healed—which is forbidden—“the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” How does that fit with what he said above, that in compulsion they do not punish? So the later authorities disputed this. There are later authorities who claim that “the punishment appropriate to him” means punishment not strictly according to the law. It’s not actually a death penalty that he deserves for idolatry, but disciplinary lashes or some sanction for not having acted properly. But then the question arises: so why above doesn’t he write the same thing? He says that he is exempt from punishment, and he does not write, “the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.”
[Speaker D] But wait—but “was healed” is through others; he was under compulsion here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it makes no difference whether through others or through himself; it has no connection, it’s not…
[Speaker A] But—
[Speaker D] This is by his own will; it’s not that someone is sitting in danger and they feed him something that is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He eats—or eats forbidden foods because of the danger.
[Speaker C] By his own free will. If he doesn’t know, it’s impossible to punish him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else, obviously. We’re talking about a case where he decided it. So, “the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him.” If we say that this means only disciplinary lashes and not a punishment that truly applies by law, then the question comes up: so why above didn’t you write that? When they threaten to kill me if I don’t worship idols, and I didn’t withstand the test, and I worshiped idols, what did Maimonides write above? They do not punish me; I am exempt because that is compulsion, even though I committed a transgression. Why doesn’t he write the same thing there at least? Why doesn’t he write there, “the religious court punishes him with the punishment appropriate to him”? Same thing. Therefore the Or Sameach and other later authorities say that Maimonides means by “the punishment appropriate to him” actual court-imposed punishments, a death penalty like one who transgressed the prohibition of idolatry. So it turns out that even though Maimonides opens this—
[Speaker C] —law—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —“In the same way as they spoke about compulsion, so too they spoke about illnesses”—wait—
[Speaker C] But he himself says it’s the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m highlighting that now. Maimonides opens this law, “In the same way as they spoke about compulsion, so too they spoke about illnesses.” The Or Sameach says: that is only regarding the principle, but regarding the punishment in a case where he did transgress anyway, there is a difference between cases of compulsion and cases of illness. In compulsion there is no punishment, and in illness there is punishment even though you were under compulsion. The question is why. So that I’ll leave for next time; that’s the puzzle we’ll deal with next time. The question I asked about law 5 and the Kesef Mishneh—I probably won’t get to it now. It’s a very interesting question; I wrote an article about it. If you want, you can read there what it was about—about separating Siamese twins. What was it about? About separating—
[Speaker C] Siamese twins. There I related to this Maimonides. Good. Thank you very much. Thanks. Goodbye. Thank you very much. All the best.
