Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 39

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but a karpef is a rabbinic law. A karpef, on the Torah level, is a private domain; that’s not a novelty of Ulla and Rabbi Yohanan.

[Speaker B] As for… it’s a private domain with respect to the Sabbath, but not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re only talking about the Sabbath. There is no law of karpef in impurity. That’s a law in the Sabbath laws.

[Speaker B] But why… but why does he claim, Rav Ashi, that in the baraita in Toharot, he claims about our baraita that they meant the Sabbath, about the Sabbath baraita, that it’s a valley that is a karpef, or that in Toharot it says that it’s a karpef?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, there is a baraita in tractate Shabbat and a Mishnah in Toharot, first of all. Rav Ashi is speaking about the Mishnah in Toharot. The Mishnah in Toharot, which says that a valley is a private domain, is speaking about a valley with partitions. That’s it. The baraita in Shabbat, which says that a valley is an exempt area that becomes a karmelit, is speaking about a valley without partitions. That’s it, that’s what he says. Now why do we need the law of karpef?

[Speaker B] But he doesn’t use partitions, he talks about a karpef. He doesn’t use partitions, he talks about a karpef. When he talks about a karpef…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, who is talking?

[Speaker H] Rav Ashi doesn’t talk about a karpef, he talks about partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Ashi talks about a karpef only incidentally? Rav Ashi says it has partitions, period. What karpef? Who needs this karpef here?

[Speaker H] But you can carry inside it, can’t you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] Ah, for example… ah, now I see I skipped a line here. Rav Ashi said: for example, where it has partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s all, stop there. It has partitions, finished. Why do you need to bring me support from the statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, when that whole statement is a novelty in the laws of the Sabbath—rabbinic Sabbath law—in order to explain to me a law in the laws of impurity? So you’re telling me this: in the laws of the Sabbath, if it has partitions then it is a private domain. Fine, I understand. And with respect to impurity it is a public domain because the public passes through it. Fine, all good. Now what does karpef add in explaining what Rav Ashi says? Nothing.

[Speaker H] But according to that, in a valley—according to Rav Ashi—it would be permitted to carry inside it. I don’t understand. According to that, in a valley with partitions it would be permitted to carry inside it because it is a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. It is a private domain in terms of its basic conceptual definition; it has the law of a karpef, in which carrying is forbidden, but that’s unrelated. Look in the laws of karpef in Ulla’s statement in the name of Rabbi Yohanan. Rav Ashi does not disagree with that; he’s just not dealing with it here. He is only discussing the question why this is defined as a private domain for the Sabbath but not as a private domain for impurity. So he says: because it has partitions. That’s all. What’s the question?

[Speaker I] But I understand this to be a full private domain, meaning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why would you understand that? What, haven’t you learned the law of karpef? He doesn’t need to write the entire Shulchan Arukh here. He’s dealing with the question of how to reconcile the Mishnah. This Mishnah is speaking about a valley with partitions, that’s all. What is its status for the Sabbath? It’s a private domain. What is its status for the Sabbath? Look under private domain: if it is large enough, there is a rabbinic law that nevertheless forbids carrying inside it. But that is not Rav Ashi’s topic; Rav Ashi is not dealing with that. It seems to me that, in the straightforward reading, when Rav Ashi says “for example, where it has partitions,” he is explaining this not only in the Mishnah in Toharot but also in our baraita. Our baraita too is speaking about a valley with partitions. So why is it a karmelit? Simple.

[Speaker G] But where do we see that our baraita is speaking about a valley with partitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see it; I’m now explaining that when Rav Ashi says “for example, where it has partitions,” he means both the valley in the Mishnah in Toharot and the valley in the baraita. So what is he really coming to say? After all, what did you ask? When you asked, you told me: look, the baraita says it is a karmelit, and you understand that a karmelit on the Torah level is always an exempt area. Rav Ashi says: not true. We are speaking about a valley with partitions. A valley with partitions is a karmelit that, on the Torah level, is a private domain; it is not an exempt area. So then there is no difficulty at all from the baraita against the Mishnah in Toharot. In short, what I want to say is that when Rav Ashi says “for example, where it has partitions,” he is speaking both about the valley in the Mishnah in Toharot and about the valley spoken of in the baraita here. Then he really does need to bring the law of karpef, because he needs to show you that even though the valley in our baraita is a karmelit, there is still room to say that we are dealing with a valley that on the Torah level is a private domain. Such a thing exists. Where do we find it? Karpef. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. If he had said: our baraita is dealing with a valley without partitions, and therefore it is a karmelit whose original Torah-level status is an exempt area; whereas the Mishnah in Toharot is dealing with a valley with partitions, and therefore they said it is a private domain—then there would be absolutely no reason in the world to bring the law of karpef here. Karpef adds nothing. He explains the valley as a valley with partitions also in the baraita that deals with the laws of the Sabbath, and then he has to explain what the whole difficulty was based on. After all, why is there a contradiction between the Mishnah in Toharot and the baraita? Because the Mishnah in Toharot says it is a private domain, and the baraita says it is a karmelit. Why is that a contradiction? There is no contradiction at all. On the Torah level it is a private domain, and on the rabbinic level it is a karmelit—so what contradiction is there? The contradiction arises only because at this point we do not yet know that there is such a creature as a karmelit which, on the Torah level, is a private domain. It is obvious to us that if it is a karmelit, then on the Torah level it is an exempt area. So how can the Mishnah in Toharot say it is a private domain? Rav Ashi comes and says: what was obvious to you is not true. There are such karmelits that, on the Torah level, are private domains. Which ones? Karpef. Karpef and a valley. Right, a valley with partitions is a karpef.

[Speaker G] No, if you say that a valley is a karpef, then a karpef is a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A valley with partitions is a karpef, yes. A valley with partitions is a karpef, yes, exactly. Therefore it is clear that when Rav Ashi says this, he is introducing the law of karpef. After all, in the question—let’s go back for a moment to the question above—look what they asked. “The master said: but the sea, and a valley, and an itztavnit…” that is a quotation from the baraita, right? “And a valley is neither like a private domain nor like a public domain.” But we learned: “A valley in the summer months is a private domain for the Sabbath and a public domain for impurity,” and so on. What is difficult? What is difficult? What’s the problem? A valley is a private domain because that is what is written in the Mishnah in Toharot, and for our purposes it is neither like a private domain nor like a public domain because it is a rabbinic karmelit. So what’s the problem? Why is there a contradiction? There is a contradiction because the Talmud’s assumption is that if it is a karmelit, then on the Torah level it cannot be a private domain; it is apparently an exempt area. So how can the Mishnah in Toharot… it is a private domain, not an exempt area. What is this karmelit? Karpef, or a valley with partitions. And that is what Rav Ashi says: the valley being discussed is a valley with partitions, that is, a karpef. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes.

[Speaker B] The valley with partitions—wait—and that means that in the laws of the Sabbath it is considered an exempt area?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what he says.

[Speaker B] No, a valley without partitions. Without partitions. But a valley and a valley—a valley with partitions is a karpef. A valley with partitions is a karpef, yes. But if he says that our baraita is speaking about a valley with partitions, how can they say that it is a karmelit? Because they were more stringent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the rabbinic level they said that it is neither like a private domain nor like a public domain, because they forbade carrying inside it like a karmelit.

[Speaker B] I understand.

[Speaker D] And that being so, why does Rashi write “where it has partitions”? Let him say “that is, a karpef.” Is that what I understood? What Rav Ashi is doing is this kind of interpretive setup—“where it has partitions”—so he should simply say: it is speaking about a karpef.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says “valley,” what do you mean?

[Speaker D] No, a valley with partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well exactly, that’s what he says. It says “valley.” It says “valley,” and Rav Ashi says: no, it means a valley with partitions—in translation, a karpef. But he has to explain the wording of the baraita and the Mishnah, because the baraita and the Mishnah speak about a valley; they do not speak about a karpef. So he says: no, no, this is a valley with partitions, meaning a karpef.

[Speaker D] So in Toharot it is speaking about a karpef and not about a valley? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a karpef? A valley with partitions is a karpef. Fine. Also in the Sabbath baraita here, it too is speaking about a valley with partitions.

[Speaker D] So why is it in this list?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The novelty of our baraita is not the novelty that a valley has the law of karmelit; that is obvious. A valley has the law of karmelit; it is no different from an itztavnit, or the sea, and so on. So what is the novelty regarding a valley? The novelty is that even a valley with partitions is also a karmelit. Even though on the Torah level it is a private domain, it is still a karmelit. Therefore there is a novelty in the valley.

[Speaker G] No, wait, wait, now I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] Wait, are there still two things—a regular valley and a fenced valley? Because a karpef does not appear in our list. Why? Because here in our list of sea, valley, itztavnit, and karmelit, there is no karpef—why? Because the source category of karpef is private domain. And the valley—it doesn’t say here “valley.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. This section of the baraita is talking about karmelit; this is already the third domain. We have already gone past private domain and public domain. Now karmelit as a whole is a rabbinic domain. On the Torah level it is something else—an exempt area, a private domain, something else. But here they are coming to say, they are coming to say, that there is a third domain on the rabbinic level called karmelit. Now in the list of examples that have the law of karmelit they bring: sea, valley, itztavnit, karmelit. Right?

[Speaker D] So why isn’t karpef written here among the examples, in the list?

[Speaker G] It isn’t a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what I’m saying: it does say karpef. The valley being discussed here is a valley with partitions, which comes to teach me the law of karpef.

[Speaker D] I understand, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So on the contrary, and now it’s also clear.

[Speaker D] The baraita is not dividing the different types of karmelits—those that came from an exempt area as opposed to those that came from a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary, it is coming to introduce that there are karmelits like the sea, and there are karmelits that had been a private domain, like a valley with partitions.

[Speaker D] All in one list.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one by one, again.

[Speaker D] No, I’m just saying that there is one list; it doesn’t make a distinction of two separate lists.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. This list contains all the items that are karmelit, but every item has to contain some novelty. So one item says there is a karmelit whose original status is a private domain, and there is a karmelit whose original status is an exempt area. Therefore they brought several examples, to show you all the types of karmelits.

[Speaker G] I have a question, I have a question. Is the itztavnit—who is speaking now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again.

[Speaker E] Ruti? Is the itztavnit an additional special type of karmelit? I didn’t understand. Is the itztavnit an additional special type of karmelit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because, you know, we talked about this: open to the private domain, open to the public domain; it can function either as a private domain or as a public domain depending on whether it is open or closed. Each one of these is a special example.

[Speaker G] But I have a question: isn’t there something lenient here? Meaning, instead of the Rabbis being stringent—if on the Torah level this is called a private domain, and then the Rabbis came and made it into a karmelit, then they sort of made things easier, didn’t they?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they were stringent. It remains a domain—say, if someone transfers from the public domain into this karpef, then he violates a Torah prohibition, because it is a private domain. The Rabbis did not cancel prohibitions, the Rabbis did not make things easier; they only made them stricter. If someone carries four cubits within the karpef, then he violates a rabbinic prohibition. That is a rabbinic stringency. But they did not remove from it the status-name of private domain; they did not come to be lenient. They came only to be stringent.

[Speaker G] So the fact that they call it a karmelit—isn’t that a matter of leniency?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No. Karmelit is always a matter of stringency. In general, karmelit is always a stringency, not a leniency. Okay. So I’m saying that from the fact that Rav Ashi brings the statement about karpef, it is clear that he also interprets our baraita as dealing with a valley with partitions, not only the Mishnah in Toharot. Again, none of this changes anything halakhically; it’s only for the commentators. Halakhically, is there basically a dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi?

[Speaker E] No.

[Speaker G] Not in Jewish law, but in definitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Everyone agrees that a valley without partitions is an exempt area that becomes a karmelit. A valley with partitions is a private domain that becomes a karmelit. Everyone agrees that in the summer months, with or without partitions, it is a public domain. And in the rainy season it is a private domain. Meaning, everyone agrees to all of that. The whole question is just an interpretive one—how to reconcile the baraita with the Mishnah. But there is no halakhic dispute here. Agreed? Yes. Okay. So that is the interpretive discussion. At the end the Talmud asks: “Granted, Rav Ashi did not say like Ulla, but what is the reason Ulla did not say according to his own teaching?” And here there is a hint: after all, Rav Ashi uses Ulla’s own statement, so why didn’t Ulla, who knows his own statement, himself say this answer too? Right? So Rav Ashi did not say like Ulla because it is forced, what Hani said earlier. But why doesn’t Ulla choose Rav Ashi’s answer? So the Talmud answers: He would say to you, “If it has partitions, is it called a valley? It is a karpef!” All right? What does that mean? If it has partitions, then why call it a valley? It should be called a karpef. Okay? Yes. Here too there is a note that continues what I said before. What is this question referring to? The baraita or the Mishnah? What is this puzzlement of Ulla’s? Ulla says to Rav Ashi: you say we are dealing with a valley with partitions, so why did they write “valley”? They should have written “karpef.” About what? What is he talking about? The baraita? The Mishnah? Both? What is he talking about?

[Speaker B] The baraita in Shabbat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Most clearly—or much more plausibly—he is speaking about the baraita in Shabbat. Because as for the Mishnah in Toharot, it is speaking about the laws of impurity and purity; the Sabbath is only in parentheses there. So there is no reason to insert there a concept that is entirely borrowed from the laws of the Sabbath. With respect to the laws of impurity, this is called a valley, not a karpef. In the laws of impurity there is no significance to saying that this is a karpef. So therefore, he is basically saying—apparently Ulla is making a claim that concerns the baraita in Shabbat. Why did the baraita give the example of a valley? Let it say karpef, because in the laws of the Sabbath that is the correct term. And this is further proof that when Rav Ashi gives an interpretive setup and says that it is speaking about a valley with partitions, that applies also to our baraita, not only to the Mishnah in Toharot. Because the very fact is that the debate of Ulla against Rav Ashi also concerns our baraita. If Rav Ashi were speaking about a valley with partitions only in the Mishnah in Toharot and not in the baraita—where the baraita speaks about one without partitions—then what question would there be, why didn’t they use the word karpef? They didn’t use karpef because it is speaking about a valley without partitions. Therefore this is another support for what I noted earlier: it seems that Rav Ashi’s interpretive setup, that it is speaking about partitions, applies also to the baraita in Shabbat, not only to the Mishnah in Toharot. He reads both as speaking about a valley with partitions. Okay? Yes. Now, maybe while we’re here I’ll say something. I said there isn’t—I asked you this later on the page—but I said that, straightforwardly, there is no dispute between Rav Ashi and Ulla in Jewish law. The whole question is interpretive, how to understand it and what the words “private domain” mean, but there is no actual halakhic disagreement. That is not completely accurate. Because if Rav Ashi interprets—now I’m talking about the Mishnah in Toharot—if Rav Ashi interprets the Mishnah in Toharot as speaking about a valley with partitions, and what he wants to say by “private domain” is—

[Speaker G] So a private domain that only…

[Speaker E] In the rainy season it will be here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then everything that is written basically means that in a valley with partitions, in the rainy season it is a private domain for both impurity and the Sabbath, and in the summer months it is a private domain for the Sabbath and a public domain for impurity. Right? That is what is written, according to Rav Ashi, in the Mishnah in Toharot. What happens with a valley without partitions? It may be that with a valley without partitions, even in the rainy season it will still be a public domain for impurity. Maybe.

[Speaker B] But now that already depends on what follows, and the question is why, and so…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has begun, yes?

[Speaker B] Maybe this is connected afterward to what follows, because if the reason is rain, then in a karpef too the rain bothers us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment, we’ll see in a moment. Later I wanted to ask you—and you can see it in Tosafot in Bava Batra—whether there can be a halakhic dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi. And here I want to say that maybe there can, indirectly. Why? Because Rav Ashi, for interpretive reasons, reads the Mishnah in Toharot as speaking about a valley with partitions. Meaning, now the novelty that a valley is a private domain in the rainy season may have been said only about a valley with partitions. But if the valley is without partitions, then perhaps not—you may not say that it is a private domain even in the rainy season. Maybe. And then it comes out that fencing the valley has significance also in the laws of impurity, and not only in the laws of the Sabbath. Or in other words, even in the laws of impurity there would be significance to karpef versus valley. That is a big novelty. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. Now this is only a possibility, it is not certain. But it could raise such a possibility. I’m saying this because later we will see—and the Rashash noted this—we will see that among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there are references that make it seem as though fencing is indeed relevant also to the laws of impurity and not only to the laws of the Sabbath. At first glance fencing is not relevant to the laws of impurity. In the laws of impurity it is always either a public domain or a private domain, so what difference does it make whether it is fenced or not? Fenced or not, fences are relevant only to the definition of private domain for the Sabbath. But here we see a possibility opening up to say that perhaps fences play a role also in discussions of impurity and not only in discussions of the Sabbath. Now let’s continue. Fine, I’m only making this note for the sake of what follows, so that we have it in mind. Let’s now go back and talk in general about impurity. Regarding impurity, what is the meaning of private domain and public domain with respect to impurity? The context is the laws of doubtful impurity. All right? Doubtful impurity is different from doubts about prohibitions. Why? A doubt about a prohibition—if it is a Torah-level doubt, we rule stringently. That is the rule for doubts about prohibitions. In the laws of impurity there is a different rule. If it is in a private domain, then we rule stringently about the doubt. If it is in a public domain, then we rule leniently about the doubt. In a private domain, apparently, this is similar to an ordinary doubt about a prohibition—we go stringently, a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, right? The novelty is in a doubt in the public domain: that in the public domain, even though it is a Torah-level doubt, we rule leniently in impurity. Meaning, there is no novelty in doubtful impurity in a private domain. The novelty is doubtful impurity in a public domain.

[Speaker B] But as for a double doubt, isn’t that a novelty? Isn’t there an idea that a double doubt is ruled leniently, and here specifically in impurity…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good point. There is a novelty—on the first level there is a novelty also in a doubt in a private domain, in doubtful impurity. Why? Because as the Mishnah says, however many doubts you pile onto it, you still rule stringently. I referred you to that Mishnah. What does that mean? That even a double doubt, or a triple double doubt, still goes stringently. That is also a novelty in a doubt in a private domain. Because in the laws of doubt about a prohibition, if it is a double doubt we rule leniently. But in doubtful impurity, if it is in a private domain we rule stringently. So there are two novelties in doubts about impurity. One novelty is on the stringent side: that in a doubt in a private domain, even in a double doubt we rule stringently. A single doubt is not a novelty, because in ordinary doubtful prohibitions too we rule stringently. But in doubtful impurity, even if it is a double doubt, we rule stringently. The second novelty is that in doubtful impurity in a public domain, whereas in ordinary doubtful prohibitions we would rule stringently in a single doubt, in doubtful impurity we rule leniently. Okay? Now where does this novelty come from? So I referred you—I told you that the Talmud in several places, again without going into it because it gets complicated—but the Talmud in several places learns this from the case of the sota, the suspected adulteress. In the case of a sota. What happens with a sota? Her husband warned her, and she secluded herself with someone in some house, in a private domain; they come out, and we presume that she is impure. We presume that she is impure. Now why? After all it is a doubt. I don’t know what she did inside. Maybe yes, maybe no. No, we presume that she is impure. Why do we presume that she is impure? The Talmud says: we see that doubtful impurity in a private domain—when she secluded herself in a private domain—is ruled stringently; we presume that she is impure. Whereas if she did not seclude herself, if it was not in a private domain but outside, then the laws of sota do not apply. So doubtful impurity in a public domain is pure. That is how the Talmud learns it. There is a lot to analyze there; I don’t want to get into it, but in principle the source is from there. These are explicit passages. The source is from the doubtful case of the sota. Fine, that is what we need to know for our purposes.

[Speaker B] Now, hold on a second. But that really doesn’t make sense, because in a public domain, if she didn’t seclude herself, then there’s no doubt here, there’s certainty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in a public domain, without anyone knowing, she was in a public domain—not inside a house—but nobody knows. I still have a doubt, but a doubt ruled leniently. By the way, this also comes out clearly by logic. If a woman—or such a couple—wants to commit a transgression, they won’t do it in an open field even if nobody is there at the moment, because someone might come. So by simple logic too it is pretty clear that the suspicion there is lower. Okay, but in any case that is what the Talmud says; the Talmud learns from there to the laws of doubtful impurity. All right? That is what we need to know for our purposes. Now we can discuss the meaning of this. Why indeed, in doubtful impurity in a public domain, do we rule leniently unlike ordinary doubtful prohibitions? This is somewhat reminiscent of the rule that impurity is permitted for the community. We know that when there is a communal offering, it cannot be brought if the owners are impure. In general, an offering cannot be brought if the owner is impure. But if the owner is the community—that is, it is a communal offering and the community is impure—then the offering may be brought. If the offering itself became impure, that too may be brought if it is a communal offering. An individual offering, no, because impurity is permitted for the community. Now when we think to ourselves, why is impurity permitted for the community? The simple view is that this is because of the greatness of the community, or because we want to be lenient with the community. There are often things where we accommodate the community more; the community gets greater consideration.

[Speaker D] Maybe for the community—maybe because it’s possible? That not the entire community would be pure together. I can’t hear? For the community—maybe because it’s possible?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, what? Again, one at a time. Idit?

[Speaker D] It isn’t possible for the whole community to be pure all at once, simultaneously.

[Speaker B] But “permitted”…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For the community means the majority, not everyone. Yes, it goes by the majority.

[Speaker E] For the community, in order to preserve the continued existence of the Torah and not cancel it entirely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what does that have to do with preserving the Torah? I don’t understand.

[Speaker E] For example, Passover. Right? If the whole community—and you forbid it—then there won’t be Passover. There simply won’t be anyone to observe it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Then they won’t bring the Passover offering; they’ll bring it on the second Passover, what’s the problem?

[Speaker E] But… what’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t bring the offering—just as an individual doesn’t bring the offering—so they’ll bring it on the second Passover or the following Passover. What, there is no problem in that at all.

[Speaker C] It doesn’t mean that we’re sad—we are doing Passover, we didn’t forget.

[Speaker G] I have a question. An innocent question. When a communal offering is brought, who brings the offering?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The one who offers it is a priest. But there is an owner. The owner of the offering is the community.

[Speaker G] Okay, but somebody brings the offering, somebody bought it, somebody brought it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Temple treasurer is responsible for communal offerings.

[Speaker G] Fine, thank you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So for our purposes now, think about “impurity is permitted for the community.” An interesting question is why it is permitted and not merely overridden. If we want to make allowances for the community, I would have expected impurity to be overridden for the sake of the community, but not that it is simply nonexistent. “Permitted” and “overridden”—the difference is that “permitted” means there is no impurity at all. “Overridden” means I say: there is impurity, but I set it aside out of regard for the community in order to be lenient with the community. But why is it permitted? The fact that it is permitted says that there is something deeper here than just consideration for the community. There is some claim that impurity does not apply to the community. Wow. Impurity does not apply to the community. And what is the idea behind this? At the moment I’m suggesting a conceptual idea. Look, the ultimate source of impurity is a corpse. Right? A corpse is the ultimate source of impurity; the paradigm of impurity is a corpse. One who touches a corpse is a primary source of impurity, but the corpse itself is the ultimate source of impurity.

[Speaker E] The community doesn’t die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every impurity—yes, every impurity—belongs in some sense to death. A metzora is considered like the dead, so there is impurity there. A poor person—there are various things considered like the dead, right? Every single thing, even in the impurity of a woman after childbirth, the claim is that since life has gone out from her, the absence of life is what causes the impurity. And every impurity is connected in some sense to death. Now the rule is that a community does not die, therefore perhaps impurity does not apply to the community. The example usually brought in this context is Rabbi Soloveitchik, at the beginning of On Repentance; he brings Tosafot in Me’ilah 9b. The Talmud there discusses the question of what the status is of offerings whose owners died. Someone designated a sin offering and now he died—what do we do with the offering? After all, the offering has no one to atone for; the owner already died. On the other hand, it is already consecrated, so what do you do with it? You can’t offer it, and there is nothing to do with it. So there are various laws about offerings whose owners died. For a burnt offering, for a sin offering—let it graze until it develops a blemish, redeem it—various things like that. Every offering has its own laws. The Talmud in Me’ilah 9b says that in communal offerings there is no law of an offering whose owners died. The offering is brought even though the entire community died. Suppose, say, a community designated an offering, all right? And then, little by little, all the people died before they offered it. All the people died, and now their children are here, their grandchildren are here. What do we do with the offering? The Talmud says: we offer it.

[Speaker E] But there’s no one to offer it because they died.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, their children are here. There is a community here, but the parents, all those who were there at the stage of designating the offering, died. All right? Now the question is who brings it; their children bring it. Tosafot says: “Communal offerings belong to the community, meaning that even if that generation of the communal burnt offering died, the community remains.” The community always remains. Because “one generation goes and another generation comes,” the verse in Ecclesiastes, “one generation goes and another generation comes, but the earth stands forever.” He brings this as an expression of the fact that a community always exists. Even if the collection of individuals inhabiting it has completely changed, the community still exists. Okay? That is the claim. And therefore a community always exists; there is no such thing as an offering whose owners died in a communal offering. And I want to say that this is something more…

[Speaker B] The Jewish people are the eternal nation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it is an eternal people in the sense that every people, by the way, is an eternal people, not only the Jewish people. Every nation is eternal because a community does not die. Think about it—there are many examples of this, and there are halakhic consequences. What happens, for example—think in legal theory, leave aside halakhic theory. The Knesset legislated a law. Fine? That binds the public, right? Two hundred years pass. All the public that existed then, when the law was enacted, has died; the members of Knesset have also died. Now there is a new Knesset, a new public, everything is new. Does the law still bind?

[Speaker D] Yes, of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. As long as it was not changed, the law binds. Why? Because the law binds not the collection of individuals who existed at the time the law was enacted; the law binds the public. Whoever belongs to that public—that is, the citizens of the State of Israel—is bound by this law. And that is exactly the notion that a community does not die. A community—even if all the individuals inhabiting it have changed—it is still that same community. And in the Shulchan Arukh, for example, when a community imposes a ban or a vow or something like that, it binds even their descendants, even though ordinarily with an individual vow I cannot make a vow that binds my son. A person vows for himself; nobody can vow on my behalf. With the community it is not so. So says a responsum of the Rosh, brought as Jewish law in the Shulchan Arukh. With a community it is not so. If a community vows, it binds all their descendants for generations. Why? Because that vow does not take effect on some particular collection of people. It takes effect on an organic entity, on a community. Whoever belongs to that entity, it applies to him—even generations later, and even if it is a completely different set of people.

[Speaker D] Like with the Gibeonites, where they swore not to give from their descendants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. Meaning, you can bring many examples. What does this actually mean? It means that death does not apply to a community; a community always exists. Maybe that is also why impurity does not apply to a community. Impurity does not apply to the community. Okay? Now here I brought you that Tosafot in Bava Kamma. I won’t go into all the… did you understand it? Did it come out clearly from there?

[Speaker G] What in Bava Kamma?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The Talmud there basically says that there is a difference between a doubt and a double doubt in the impurity of a woman after childbirth. If it is possible for the placenta to come out without any part of the fetus, then once the placenta comes out I have a double doubt: a doubt whether there is a fetus in the placenta, and even if there is, a question whether it is most of the fetus. Since it is a double doubt, the woman is not impure. But if it is a single doubt—if there is no such thing as part of a placenta without a fetus—then it is clear that a fetus came out; I only have a doubt whether it was most of it or not most of it. That is only one doubt, so the woman is impure. Tosafot asks there: where do we find in doubtful impurity a difference between a single doubt and a double doubt? After all, if it is in a private domain, then whether it is a single doubt or a double doubt, it is impure. If it is in a public domain, then whether a single doubt or a double doubt, it is pure. Where do we ever have a case that with a single doubt she is impure, and with a double doubt she is pure? There is no such case in the laws of impurity.

[Speaker B] Maybe that can only be in the prohibition to her husband…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] where a double doubt permits, but a single doubt does not permit. Tosafot says: the discussion here is a discussion of her prohibition to her husband, not of her impurity. And with respect to prohibition to her husband, that is an ordinary doubt about a prohibition, and ordinary doubtful prohibitions follow the regular rules: a doubt is strict, a double doubt is lenient. And this is a very interesting case, because it basically means—the woman is both impure and prohibited to her husband. Tosafot says: that is correlation, not causation, as statisticians always say. You have to be careful: correlation is not causation. And here what he is basically saying is that this woman has two statuses: she is both impure and prohibited to her husband. But those two statuses are not one the result of the other. Therefore it is possible for there to be a situation where the woman is impure but not prohibited to her husband, or the opposite. Okay? And that is what Tosafot says. So the Avnei Nezer, in the passage I sent you, asks: what do you mean, prohibited to her husband? But that is itself the source of the laws of doubtful impurity. Where do we learn the laws of doubtful impurity from? From the sota. In the case of the sota, what is the discussion? What does it mean whether she is impure or not impure? It means whether she is prohibited to her husband. Not impure in the sense that if she touches something she imparts impurity to it. “Impure” there means prohibited to her husband. So how can you tell me that if we are discussing a woman’s prohibition to her husband, this is not connected to doubts of impurity but to doubts of prohibition? The entire law of doubts of impurity is learned from a doubt about prohibition—a woman to her husband in the case of a sota. So what is the meaning of this distinction of Tosafot? The Avnei Nezer says a very interesting idea based on the Kuzari: impurity applies only where there is holiness. He says like this: when we speak about the prohibition of a sota to her husband, what is the prohibition based on? The prohibition comes from the fact that she damaged the marital bond. A woman who commits adultery damages the marital bond. Once the marital bond is damaged, she becomes prohibited to her husband. We see in the Talmud in other places that the marital bond belongs to the concepts of holiness. For example, the betrothal of a woman is compared to consecrating an offering. In tractate Kiddushin 6, “holiness spread to the whole of it”—there is a whole passage there comparing consecration of an offering to the betrothal of a woman. The betrothal of a woman is a matter of holiness. And one who damages something holy—that is called impurity. Therefore the prohibition of a sota to her husband belongs to the category of doubtful impurity. What happens in the case of a woman after childbirth? Why is she impure? Or why is she prohibited to her husband? Because she damaged anything? The opposite—she brought a child into the world. What do you mean she damaged anything? That is the whole purpose of marriage, in the end. So why is she prohibited? And she is not prohibited only to her husband; she is prohibited to everyone. Once she is impure, sexual relations are forbidden with her even if she were unmarried. This is not a prohibition to her husband. They say she is prohibited to her husband because, usually, for a married woman, sexual relations are with her husband. But actually that prohibition has nothing to do at all with betrothal and nothing to do with her husband. It is a prohibition on a woman who is in such a state: sexual relations are forbidden with her even if she is unmarried. She is prohibited to everyone. This is a prohibition that does not concern her relationship to her husband, to the husband, to the betrothal. It is not damage to the betrothal. Therefore this is a doubt about a prohibition, not a doubt about impurity.

[Speaker E] It depends—there is a prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of a woman to her husband that results from damage to the holiness, to the betrothal between them. And there is a prohibition of a woman to her husband where she is prohibited to her husband just as she is prohibited to everyone else, but that is not connected to the bond of betrothal between them. And that is judged by the rules of doubtful prohibition, not doubtful impurity. What do we see here? That impurity applies only in a place where there is holiness. And when we speak about doubtful impurity, that is where the impurity is connected to holiness, and then it is judged as doubtful impurity. If it is impurity in the sense of a prohibition not connected to holiness, then there is no impurity there; then it is a doubtful prohibition. Okay? And therefore what I am basically claiming is that in the community there is some level of holiness that cannot be grasped by impurity. It cannot die. It has essential life. The community, so to speak, is always holy. It cannot become impure. Okay? So what happens, if I understand it this way—and all of this sounds like homiletics, but I want to show you the halakhic consequences—if we understand that impurity is permitted for the community because of the greatness of the community, as though we are accommodating it, then I asked: so why is it “permitted”? Let it be “overridden” for the community. We set aside the impurity in order to be lenient for the community. “Permitted” means that impurity does not apply to the community. It does not apply to the community because the community has an essential holiness.

[Speaker G] If you said…

[Speaker B] The community—the “holy nation,” as it were—the community is always holy. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.

[Speaker G] Meaning, if there are individuals in the community who are impure, then in such a case that is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something else. Then they are impure.

[Speaker G] No, but…

[Speaker D] They are somewhat distanced from the community.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When the impurity pertains to the whole community as a collective, then there is no impurity.

[Speaker G] But the whole community is a collection of individuals?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that is the claim. No. The community as a whole has independent ontological existence.

[Speaker D] The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is like a corporation in legal discourse. A corporation is not the collection of the people who make up the company. The company is an independent legal entity. A community is a kind of corporation. Now what do I actually want to claim? I want to claim that if impurity cannot take hold of it—impurity cannot take hold of the community—therefore it is permitted for the community and not merely overridden. If that is so, then I can also understand why in doubtful impurity in a public domain we rule leniently. Since if it pertains to the community, we are not willing to accept impurity. You’ll ask me: then why not also in certain impurity? So I say: no. Why? Because if there is certain impurity in a public domain, then every individual who passed there became impure as an individual. When there is doubtful impurity, I know nothing; so essentially, with respect to the whole public that uses that public domain, I would have to decide that it is impure. This is a discussion that is inherently a discussion about the community. Certain impurity in a public domain does not interest me qua public domain. Each person who passes there is an individual, and he touched something impure—what do I care that it is a public domain? But if it is doubtful impurity, this is an impurity that I do not know, so everyone who passed there, essentially, I would have to render impure. In other words, I would be declaring the community impure. All who passed through this public domain are impure. That we do not do. Therefore I think that only in doubtful impurity in a public domain do we rule leniently, and not in certain impurity. Now look at something nice.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand that distinction. Why, if it is certain, then…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I have impurity lying in a public domain, and now a person passes there, why shouldn’t he be impure? He touched impurity. Why shouldn’t he be impure? An individual person who touched impurity is impure. That is not a communal discussion. Bring me the individual person—or ten individual people—each one who passed there, and I say: you are impure. When I have doubtful impurity, I do not even know who passed there; I do not know whether there is impurity or not. What am I essentially saying? All these many people who passed through this domain are impure in my eyes. So in truth there is a collective statement here. It is not against any individual person. And therefore doubtful impurity in a public domain is ruled leniently. And that is why it is only in a doubt and not in a certainty. Now look, I referred you to the Rosh—one more question.

[Speaker G] One more question. Do we have a definition of how many people constitute a community?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. There is no definition for that. A community is a complete group. Just ten people are not a community, nor just three.

[Speaker G] Because now, for example, just as an example, people walking in someone’s funeral procession—they haven’t yet reached the cemetery, but they’re here accompanying the deceased.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In this respect there is indeed a status of a public collective, in the sense that they are basically gathering for a shared event, like a prayer quorum. So ten are a public. But as long as they are not functioning as a prayer quorum—if ten separate individuals are sitting there and praying—then they are many people, but it is not a public.

[Speaker D] But there’s no doubt about it: someone who enters the cemetery—I have no doubt there.

[Speaker G] No, I mean before the cemetery.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just an ordinary funeral procession, unrelated to impurity. A funeral procession is a public, yes. In principle, yes. A community is a public.

[Speaker G] So then he’s not impure? So in a case like that, do we rule leniently? At a funeral? In a case of doubt we’re lenient. A doubt in a public domain is ruled leniently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s just think about what exactly the discussion is, what the question being asked actually is—it’s not so simple. But let’s move on for a moment. Look, in the Mishnah in Taharot, on Mishnah Taharot 4:11—not the Mishnah I brought earlier—the Rosh, the Rosh of Sens, and the Bartenura, two of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), look: “A doubt in the public domain”—do you see the highlighted section? “A doubt in the public domain,” a doubt concerning impurity in the public domain is pure, for we find that the public brings the Passover offering in impurity. If definite impurity is permitted for the public, then all the more so doubtful impurity. I have never seen such an astonishing passage. What does one thing have to do with the other? We are discussing doubtful impurity in the public domain, and he brings me impurity being permitted for the public—that is a completely different law regarding offerings. The rule that impurity is permitted for the public refers specifically to definite impurity, and says it does not apply to the public. But doubtful impurity in the public domain is only a rule about doubtful cases, not definite ones. Why is definite impurity in the public domain not pure? Well, just as there is no impurity for the public—impurity is permitted for the public. If that’s your source, then why are you bringing me that source at all? The source is from the sotah. Why are you inventing sources for me from the offering of the Passover sacrifice? Or from communal offerings? What is this? It is completely disconnected. I want to argue that what is written there is exactly what I said earlier.

[Speaker G] No, we read it, and we didn’t understand it in that spirit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m saying, I want to argue that what he means is this: the source is from the sotah. But he wants to tell me what the meaning of the law is. The meaning of the law is that impurity does not apply to the public. Where do you see that? You see it in a communal offering, where it says that impurity is permitted for the public. Definite impurity is permitted for the public. Why is it “permitted” and not merely “overridden”? Because impurity does not apply to the public. So what follows? Therefore doubtful impurity in the public domain is pure—not definite impurity. I asked: if there it is definite, then why shouldn’t it also be definite here? Because definite impurity in the public domain is not a discussion about the public; it is a discussion about the individuals who touched it. Only doubtful impurity in the public domain is a public discussion, and therefore there we really do rule leniently. And that resolves it beautifully. Otherwise you simply cannot understand the question.

[Speaker B] What about doubtful impurity? I didn’t quite follow—if you could sharpen this for me for a second—why in the case of doubt is it about the whole public, but in the case of certainty it is only about individuals?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll explain. Suppose there is impurity—a piece from a corpse is lying in the public domain. Fine? I know that. Now I ask: what question arises in that context? Somebody passed through there, and everyone knows that too, right? There’s no doubt here, nothing at all; everyone knows and is careful not to touch it. Then someone comes and touches it. He comes before me and asks, “Tell me, am I impure?” The answer is yes. Why? Because this is a question about a specific person who touched a corpse. What do I care that he did it in the public domain? A particular person, a specific person, touched a corpse, so he is impure. Okay? Now suppose there is impurity that I do not know about—no, nobody knows about it, it is hidden there, I don’t know whether there was impurity and where it was, I’m in doubt. Okay? What am I actually supposed to do? No specific person comes to ask me. I am now supposed to declare: all the many people who passed there in that domain are impure. That is a collective declaration about the public as a whole. That, we do not do.

[Speaker F] So that’s also what we said, Hani—we discussed that it isn’t practical to declare everyone impure if you don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know whether it’s impractical; I think it is practical. But we don’t do it because impurity does not apply to the public.

[Speaker F] But you can’t count—you can’t know one by one what each person’s status is, or whether his status changed. It’s not like the case of one person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. A person—if one person comes before me, and another person, and another person, and they ask me whether we are impure, I’ll tell all of them that they are impure.

[Speaker F] It somewhat reminds me—but they don’t know, that’s exactly the point. If you have ten thousand people, how can you even distinguish between people’s different situations?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? We’ll determine that all of them are impure because of doubt—all of them are impure because of doubt.

[Speaker B] It’s a bit reminiscent of COVID. With COVID this really illustrates it, because with COVID you can say that whoever knows he was with someone will go into isolation, but if now there’s some uncertainty and then they announce, “Everyone who rode the train at such-and-such an hour,” then a person will always be presumed impure, because who knows where he wandered around.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, very good. So we’ll determine that everyone is impure—what’s the problem with that? Why can’t we do that? We’ll determine it because of doubt.

[Speaker B] But you can’t—because then the many can’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …be together if they are always possibly impure. Wait, Miriam is trying to say something.

[Speaker B] I’m saying that no one—meaning every person—will never be able to become pure, because he is always possibly impure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. What are you talking about? No, no, no. What do you mean? Why? Doubt needs a reason. There is no doubt just because I don’t know. I know that in some place there may be something dead on this path. Then a doubt arises. It’s not that if someone walks around the world he is automatically in a state of doubtful impurity.

[Speaker B] But I didn’t know about it; someone would now have to go back and announce to the public that everyone who passed there is impure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. You didn’t know, so you became impure inadvertently. What can you do? But you still became impure.

[Speaker B] But how will the information reach me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The religious court will post an announcement on the bulletin boards: anyone who passed through that domain on such-and-such a day is presumed doubtfully impure. That’s all.

[Speaker B] But what if the information doesn’t reach me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it doesn’t reach you, then you’ll be acting under compulsion. What can you do? You’ll be under compulsion. If there is a piece of pork and you don’t know that it’s pork and you eat it, then what can you do? Then you acted inadvertently or under compulsion. Miriam, you wanted to comment earlier.

[Speaker F] Okay, that more or less answers me, that’s fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So the claim, basically, is that I had two questions. First: why do the Rashba and the Bartenura bring a source from impurity being permitted for the public for the law of doubtful impurity in the public domain? What is the connection? Especially since the Talmud itself brings a different source—from the sotah. So why are you inventing sources? Second: you are bringing me a source where even in the case of definite impurity we are lenient. “Impurity is permitted for the public” refers to definite impurity, not doubt. If the offering became impure, we bring it in impurity if it is a communal offering. It is definitely impure—we know it, there is no doubt here at all. So if that is your source, then in doubtful impurity in the public domain you should have permitted even definite impurity, not just doubtful impurity. And you can’t say that the Bartenura and the Rashba didn’t notice this, because they explicitly write there that it is an a fortiori argument: if definite impurity is permitted, then doubtful impurity is certainly permitted. I don’t understand—you make that a fortiori argument, and still you tell me that definite impurity in the public domain is not pure? What, you didn’t notice the internal contradiction in your own words right there? Not some forgotten outside source. There is an internal contradiction in what they themselves say. I argue that this is exactly the point. The point is that they bring a source from impurity being permitted for the public, where it is definite impurity. Why there do I say that you are not impure? Because there the impurity applies to the public as a whole. There is no impurity upon the public as a whole—certainly not, even in a definite case, not only in doubt. It’s just that with impurity in the public domain, if it is definite, then it is not impurity on the public as a whole; it is impurity on whoever touched it. In impurity in the public domain, only when it is a doubtful case is the law about the public as a whole. And therefore they learn from there to doubtful impurity in the public domain. Okay.

[Speaker G] Okay, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, if that really is so, then we can now understand what Rashi says in our passage. I’m coming back to our passage—I don’t have too much time. Rashi in our passage basically says: why really… I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] Can you share the screen?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So Rashi says this: “A private domain for Sabbath,” because it is not a route for the public, since the public does not leave the path to go through the field. Okay. So in the public do… in… in the rainy season it is a private domain for Sabbath because it is not a route for the public. Sorry—in the summer season. And it is a public domain for impurity. Why? “And a doubt there is pure, because it is not a place of seclusion, since people enter it, and the rule that doubtful impurity is impure is learned from the sotah.” We learn it from the sotah. “And there it says seclusion: ‘and she was hidden away, and she became impure’; in a place of seclusion she is forbidden to her husband because of doubt.” From here you infer the law for a creeping creature and other things. So what is he really saying? After all, there is a valley here with partitions, right? A valley with partitions is a private domain for Sabbath because it is not a public thoroughfare. Why? Because there are partitions enclosing it. But that doesn’t mean you can’t enter it. Right—exactly. People do go in there. For Sabbath that doesn’t matter. As long as there are four partitions, it is a private domain. For impurity, what matters is whether it is actually accessible to the public or not, whether many people pass through there or not. And they do pass through there. So I don’t care about the physical character of the place. The fact that it has partitions around it is irrelevant to the laws of impurity. In the laws of impurity, what matters is the essential character of the place, not the physical character. What is it used for? Who has access to it? For Sabbath, what determines whether it is a private domain or a public domain are physical definitions. There are four partitions here—it is a private domain. There is a width of sixteen cubits, the public traverses it, etc.—it is a public domain. If there are no partitions, it is a public domain or an exempt domain. Those are all physical definitions. In doubtful impurity, the definition is based on how people actually use the place, not on physical definitions. So if physically it is enclosed, but people still enter, then with respect to Sabbath it will be a private domain, and with respect to impurity it will be a public domain. Why is that so? In light of what we saw earlier, we can really understand it: with doubtful impurity in the public domain, one might have thought this was a matter of formal domains. In a public domain, there is a Torah novelty that doubt is ruled leniently; in a private domain, doubt is ruled stringently. So it would follow the formal domains. If it worked that way, I would compare it to Sabbath and see what kind of domain it is. But… as we saw earlier, it doesn’t work that way. The issue is not the public domain; the issue is: about whom is the discussion? Is the discussion about the public, or is the discussion about one individual? Right? That is the question in doubtful impurity. If so, then what matters is not the physical character of the place, but who is moving around there. And therefore, for doubtful impurity, if many people move around there, then it is a public domain. I don’t care that there are four partitions. Because what interests me is not the character of the place; what interests me is who the question is being asked about. Is the question being asked about a specific person, or about a public? And therefore the character of the place is not important. It is not determined by the physical character of the place; there is no definition for laws of domains in impurity based on physical character. The definition is supposed to be based on accessibility. If you remember, in the class before last, I spoke about Maimonides’ desert and about the proof the Ran brought there, and we discussed whether something that is accessible to the public is enough to define it as a public domain, or whether the public must actually pass through it. I’m saying something like that here as well. Only I am arguing that with regard to impurity there is no room for debate. With impurity, it is clear that you need actual public accessibility in practice. Because the question is: what… about whom is the question? It is not about the structure of the place; the structure of the place is not important. Okay? You can see a sharp expression of this idea in Kiryat Sefer. I think I gave it to you, right? What does he write? Kiryat Sefer is the Mabit, one of the sages of Safed in the sixteenth century, and Kiryat Sefer is his work on Maimonides. “Doubtful impurity in a private domain is impure; we learn it from the sotah,” as stated at the beginning of chapter 2 of Nazir, “just as in the sotah there is a man and a woman, so too every case of doubtful impurity in a private domain is where there are two. But if there are three, it is doubtful impurity in the public domain and is pure.” With three it is pure. “Alternatively, we establish it on a presumption of purity in the public domain, which is a Torah-level presumption,” and there are views that say that doubtful impurity in the public domain is only when there is a presumption of purity. “And as we said above—and this is the important point—any place frequented by the many with respect to impurity, even though it is not a public domain with respect to Sabbath, for if there are three even in the innermost chambers it is pure, as implied in Nazir, as the Rosh wrote in the tenth chapter of Taharot.” What is he really saying? Notice also who wrote this: the Rosh. This is the same Rosh I brought earlier—the very same person, not the same place—that I brought earlier as the source for what I’m saying here. What does the Rosh say? Look, you have a closed room, innermost chambers, a room within a room within a room, with eight hundred thousand walls around it, not just four. Okay? The most enclosed thing possible, the most private domain possible. As far as Sabbath is concerned, there is no doubt that it is a private domain. But if many people are moving around there—“many people,” for him, means three or more, a zimmun, yes, a zimmun is already a public. Three or more is many, so…

[Speaker C] It’s doubtful impurity in the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that is the most distilled expression of the difference we saw earlier in Rashi between the definition for Sabbath and the definition for impurity. The definition for Sabbath is determined by the physical definition. Something in the innermost chambers is a private domain in the fullest sense. I don’t care how many people are moving around there; that doesn’t interest me. But if many people are moving around there, then for impurity it will be a public domain, and I don’t care how many partitions there are around it. So here this is the strongest expression of the fact that the definition of domains is altogether completely different in the two contexts. I opened with the question of migo, right? How can the same term be used in two different contexts? Here it is really not the same term at all; it is something entirely different. This is a domain in which many people move around, and that is a definition, a character of a domain that is public. It is something entirely different. Not different criteria for the same thing—two different things. Therefore there will be no migo here. Also, if something is a public domain for Sabbath, it will not be considered a public domain for impurity by migo. Because here it really is not the same concept. Not like a wall and a partition in sukkah and Sabbath. By the way, I think in this context we have seen similar reasoning on the rabbinic level. For example, with an alleyway. For most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), an alleyway is a private domain by Torah law. Right? It has three walls and is open to the public domain; so aside from the Taz and Maimonides, the accepted view of the Rishonim is that it is a private domain by Torah law. So why nevertheless did the Sages prohibit carrying there?

[Speaker E] If the public passes through it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying—that’s the Taz—but let’s leave that aside for the moment, without the Taz. The accepted approach among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is that an alleyway is a private domain even though it is open to the public domain.

[Speaker D] Okay? And with regard to impurity they turned it into a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The Sages prohibited carrying four cubits there. Why? Now in light of what I’m saying here, I’ll formulate what we understood then, but more sharply. With respect to impurity, I’ll ask you: what is the status of an alleyway?

[Speaker B] That it is a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A public domain, right, because many people move around there. True, it has three partitions—what do I care? Even in the innermost chambers, if there are three people or more, a minimal public, it is a public domain for impurity. And therefore the Sages basically say: since with respect to impurity it is a public domain, I am afraid that people will confuse impurity and Sabbath, so I establish that rabbinically, for Sabbath too, we will treat it like a public domain, and they made it like a karmelit. That is exactly the law of karmelit in general. The law of karmelit is entirely of that kind. It is basically like a migo from impurity to Sabbath, but on the rabbinic level. Why here is the migo rabbinic and not by Torah law? Because by Torah law they really are two different concepts; there is no connection between them. Not like a wall and a partition. Because here it is a domain where many people move around, and there it is merely a feature describing the physical character of the domain. They are simply two different things; there is no connection between them. Except that people can get confused. So on the rabbinic plane we make a migo. On the rabbinic plane we say: if there is something that is a private domain for Sabbath, but in terms of impurity would be a public domain, then rabbinically for Sabbath too we will treat it as a public domain. And that is how karmelit is defined. And that is true whether originally the place was an exempt domain—which is the usual case—or whether originally it was a private domain for Sabbath. It makes no difference. As long as it is open to the public, and in terms of the laws of impurity it is considered a public domain, then rabbinically with regard to Sabbath as well we will view it as a public domain. And this sheds a sharper, more precise light on the concept of karmelit. The concept of karmelit is nothing other than a rabbinic migo—a rabbinic migo from impurity to Sabbath. And therefore the concept of karmelit exists both in domains that originally were exempt domains by Torah law and in domains that originally were private domains by Torah law. Why? Because what matters is the question: what are they with regard to impurity? And with regard to impurity there is no difference between private domain, exempt domain, nothing at all. If the public traverses it, it is a public domain for impurity. And since…

[Speaker D] Could it be that this whole novelty of private domain and public domain is not specifically about partitions or no partitions, but also about public traffic, influenced by the laws of purity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that is what I want to argue. Some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) even want to say that on the Torah level, like the Taz. The Taz is not a medieval authority, but he says this in the view of the Tur. Right? That even on the Torah level it is so. The Maggid Mishneh is a medieval authority. And that is their view. Because what is open to the public is considered a public domain even in the laws of Sabbath. They are basically beginning to connect the concepts of public domain in Sabbath and in impurity even on the Torah level. But in the accepted view it is not so. In the accepted view, the laws of Sabbath are determined by the physical character of the place, and public traffic is not supposed to change that except on the rabbinic level, not by Torah law. And in impurity, public traffic is what determines it. Okay? So here we are beginning to see that on the one hand there is a sharp distinction between Sabbath and impurity, and on the other hand, at least on the rabbinic plane, they are indeed connected—and there are certain approaches that connect them even on the Torah plane—and this is what I want to continue with next time. I want to argue that not everyone accepts this sharp distinction. There are those who will see the physical structure as a relevant parameter also for impurity, and there are those who will see public traffic as a relevant parameter also for Sabbath—not like the sharp distinction I made here according to Rashi. And I already hinted at this earlier, when I said that there are places where enclosure in the Mishnah in Taharot plays a role also with regard to impurity and not only with regard to Sabbath. You understand that enclosure means the physical character of the place.

[Speaker E] And if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I get to the point that enclosure also plays on the field of impurity and not only on the field of Sabbath, that basically means that the physical character of the place determines something also with regard to impurity and not only with regard to Sabbath. The sharp distinction I made here will not be accepted by everyone, and that we will see next time. How far did you get in the page?

[Speaker B] We’re on eight, right?

[Speaker G] Wait, I’m checking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did you see “appearance in space,” 153? Yes. Okay. So next time I’ll devote part of the lesson to completing what I didn’t manage to finish here, and then I’ll move on to karpaf, so I’ll still send you sources about karpaf so that you can complete that for next time. Okay.

[Speaker G] Thank you very much. Have a peaceful Sabbath. Have a peaceful Sabbath.