Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 40

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

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[0:03] Completing the definitions of domains for the Sabbath and for impurity
[1:40] Kiryat Sefer – a private domain or a public domain for impurity?
[3:58] The question of six hundred thousand for impurity – not needed
[6:01] Tosafot on a domain in a valley during the rainy season
[9:18] Rabbeinu Chananel – physical presence determines a public domain
[11:22] Tosafot – principled accessibility is enough for a public domain
[28:19] The connection between fencing and ruling on domain status for impurity
[32:29] Reversing the seasonal domain status through fencing
[34:43] Rashbam’s side on the role of fencing
[36:08] Summary of the definitions and the differences between the domains
[40:46] Rashbam’s interpretation of the transition from the rainy season with fencing
[43:29] Inertia of status between the rainy season and the dry season
[46:23] Maimonides’ approach to fencing and impurity

Summary

General overview

The text completes the conclusion of the previous lecture, according to which domains for the Sabbath are determined by physical characteristics, while domains for impurity are determined by the nature of the question and whether the ruling concerns the public or individuals. But it shows that the matter becomes more complicated: among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is a dispute whether for impurity principled public accessibility is sufficient, or whether actual presence is required, and whether partitions have any significance at all in defining a domain for impurity. From Tosafot, Rashbam, Rashash, and Maimonides, it emerges that there is a way to read the passages such that, at least according to some views, there is a tighter connection between Sabbath and impurity, or that Rava’s statement is not a rule about the status of the domain but a rule about the inertia of a doubt of impurity. Later, the passage of karpaf is brought in order to show that even within Sabbath law itself considerations of accessibility and habitation appear, mainly at the rabbinic level, though there are also readings in Rashi that give this consideration Torah-level weight, and this strengthens the need to rethink the sharp distinction between the definitions.

The conclusion of the previous lecture and the expectation regarding the definition for impurity

The text states that the difference between a doubt of impurity in a public domain and in a private domain stems from the question of whom the ruling applies to—the public or individuals—and therefore the definition for impurity should be determined by accessibility to the public, not by walls, width, or area. The text brings Kiryat Sefer as a clear case in which a room that is a private domain for the Sabbath becomes a public domain for impurity when many people have access to it, and attributes to Kiryat Sefer the threshold of three people. The text notes that this approach seems correct to him, but it is not the accepted view, and that there is room to challenge the claim that there is no connection at all between private and public domain in the laws of Sabbath and impurity and that the terms are merely shared names. The text emphasizes that the definition of six hundred thousand in the laws of Sabbath is a dimension of accessibility or presence drawn from the world of impurity and likens a public domain to the wilderness, whereas in impurity there is no discussion of six hundred thousand at all, only of accessibility to the public.

A fenced valley in the passage of Ulla and Rav Ashi, and the assumption that fencing belongs only to Sabbath law

The text describes the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi as a dispute about fencing the valley, and initially assumes that the fencing is relevant only to Sabbath law and not to impurity, because for impurity what matters is whether people pass through there during the rainy season or the dry season, not the partitions. The text presents the simple reading according to which a fenced valley can be a private domain for the Sabbath at the Torah level and a karmelit at the rabbinic level, but for impurity it remains a public domain because the partitions are not a determining factor. The text declares that today it will become clear that this assumption is neither necessary nor agreed upon.

Tosafot in Bava Batra on the rainy season: Rabbeinu Chananel versus Tosafot

The text brings Tosafot in Bava Batra, on the words “during the rainy season,” which gives two explanations for why a valley during the rainy season is considered a private domain: Rabbeinu Chananel attributes it to the fact that people do not enter because of the heavy rains and mud, whereas Tosafot rejects this and explains it instead by the crops and the prohibition against damaging a sown field. The text sharpens the point that according to Rabbeinu Chananel this is a technical obstacle that keeps people away in practice, even though the place is accessible in principle, whereas according to Tosafot this is normative inaccessibility, because one is forbidden to enter. The text concludes that the dispute reflects a principled question: does a public domain for impurity require the actual presence of the public, or is principled accessibility to the public enough, even if in practice almost no one will enter?

How the views fit the thesis about the nature of the question in impurity

The text suggests that, at first glance, Rabbeinu Chananel fits better with the thesis that the definition for impurity depends on the fact that the doubt concerns the public in practice, because when there is no actual presence, the question reverts to an individual. The text adds that Tosafot too can fit into the thesis, because principled accessibility means that a declaration of impurity is a statement addressed to the public, even if in practice only a minority will enter. The text emphasizes that both views still do not make impurity depend on physical characteristics, but on the question of permission and accessibility, unlike the Sabbath where partitions and area define a private domain. The text notes that even in the laws of Sabbath there is an accessibility component in defining a public domain, since an open karmelit does not become a public domain, and therefore the sharper comparison between Sabbath and impurity actually becomes clear specifically through the definition of a private domain.

Another Tosafot in Bava Batra and the claim that the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi affects impurity

The text brings Tosafot in Bava Batra that cites a dispute among Amoraim in the first chapter of tractate Shabbat regarding the Mishnah in tractate Taharot, and asks why Tosafot bothers to bring an interpretive dispute in Sabbath law into a discussion that concerns impurity. The text suggests that this hints to an understanding according to which enclosure by partitions may be a halakhic dispute and not just an interpretive one, and that it may affect impurity as well and not only Sabbath. The text raises the possibility that according to Rav Ashi, who explained the Mishnah as speaking about a valley surrounded by partitions, the rule that during the rainy season it is a private domain for impurity was said specifically about a fenced valley, whereas a valley that is not fenced would be a public domain for impurity even during the rainy season, thereby narrowing the gap between Sabbath and impurity. The text defines the price of this possibility as requiring, for impurity, two cumulative conditions in order for something to be a private domain: a physical condition of partitions and a condition of the absence of public traffic.

The Talmud in Bava Batra on Rava: inertia of status and doubt

The text brings the Talmud in Bava Batra, which adds a statement of Rava: “They taught this only when the rainy season has not passed over it; but if the rainy season has passed over it, it is a private domain in either direction,” and presents the difficulty, since the rainy season always comes before the dry season. The text brings Rashbam’s explanation that the law depends on the valley having been fenced during the rainy season, and therefore even in the dry season it is considered a private domain, and it presents the difficulties with this—that dependence on the time of fencing seems to lack logic, and that fencing would seemingly have no significance for impurity. The text stresses that the very appearance of status inertia resembles Sabbath law more than impurity, and it notes that Tosafot also raises a difficulty from the Mishnah in tractate Taharot: “A place that was a private domain and became a public domain… when it is a private domain, its doubt is impure; when it is a public domain, its doubt is pure,” which indicates a change of status and not absolute inertia.

Rashash: resolving Rashbam through Rav Ashi and two cumulative conditions

The text cites Rashash, who understands that according to Rav Ashi the valley becomes a private domain for impurity only under two cumulative conditions—the rainy season and a fence—and therefore Rashbam’s interpretation makes sense. The text states that according to Ulla, who explained the case as a valley that is not fenced, the matter is interpreted in line with Rabbeinu Chananel. The text notes that Rashash comments that Maimonides implies that even according to Rav Ashi a private domain for impurity does not depend on a fence, and from here there is a dispute over whether partitions play a role in impurity.

Maimonides and Tosafot: Rava as a rule in doubts, not a rule in domains

The text brings Maimonides’ wording, according to which a valley surrounded by a fence during the rainy season is a private domain for both Sabbath and impurity, and if it is not surrounded, it is a private domain only for impurity. From this it follows that regarding impurity the fence is not a determining factor. The text explains that Maimonides interprets “and a valley over which the rainy season has passed” as a case where the doubt of impurity already arose during the rainy season, so that even if he entered during the dry season and the case was judged during the dry season, it is judged as a doubt in a private domain by virtue of the inertia of the doubt, not by virtue of the inertia of the place’s status. The text emphasizes that this is a different interpretation from Rashbam: according to Rashbam the novelty lies in the laws of domains and in the influence of fencing, whereas according to Maimonides and Tosafot the novelty lies in the laws of doubts regarding impurity that has already become known. The text explicitly quotes Tosafot, who says that only according to the opinion in tractate Shabbat that says, “provided it has a fence on all four sides,” can Rava’s words be explained according to Rashbam, and it shows from this that Tosafot himself reads the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi as a substantive dispute over whether Rashbam’s reading is correct.

Karpaf, beit se’atayim, and the tension between physical definitions and considerations of habitation

The text moves to the law of karpaf and defines beit se’atayim as an area fit for sowing two se’ah of grain, and emphasizes that according to Ulla a karpaf is from two se’ah and up, even “a kor and even two kor.” The text states that a karpaf is a private domain at the Torah level because of its partitions, but at the rabbinic level it is treated as a karmelit because “there is no habitation in it,” and therefore carrying within it is forbidden rabbinically, though throwing between it and a public domain is treated stringently as with a private domain. The text uses this to reinforce that the definition of private domain for the Sabbath is physical at the Torah level, and that considerations of use and habitation enter mainly at the rabbinic level as decrees that imitate parameters of accessibility. The text raises the question how turning a karpaf into a karmelit can create a leniency regarding transfer between it and another karmelit, when karmelit was introduced to be stringent, not lenient.

Eruvin 67: permitting transfer from a karpaf to the sea in order to prevent a mistake in carrying within it

The text cites a Talmudic passage in Eruvin 67 about a rock in the sea, where up to beit se’atayim internal carrying is permitted but taking out to the sea is forbidden because “it is a full-fledged private domain,” whereas more than beit se’atayim internal carrying is forbidden but taking out from it to the sea and from the sea into it is permitted. The text brings the Talmud’s reason, that the permission was intended so that people should not say “it is a full-fledged private domain” and come to carry throughout it, and adds that the Talmud limits the permission to things that are “uncommon” while retaining the prohibition in what is “common,” in order to preserve a reminder that the place is not a full-fledged private domain. The text brings Tosafot, from which Rabbeinu Tam permitted carrying from a karpaf larger than beit se’atayim that was not enclosed for habitation to another karmelit when no genuine public domain is adjacent, and notes that Rabbeinu Tam and the Shulchan Arukh bring the permission without emphasizing the condition of uncommonness.

Rashi on karpaf: enclosed and only afterward used for habitation, and a possible implication at the Torah level

The text quotes Rashi in our passage, who emphasizes “that the house was not adjacent to it before the enclosure,” and concludes that it matters whether the habitation preceded the enclosure or came afterward. The text cites Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who notes that in other places (folios 80 and 99) Rashi writes that a karpaf larger than beit se’atayim that was not enclosed for habitation is not a private domain at all, which hints that the absence of habitation undermines the definition already at the Torah level and not only rabbinically. The text presents an interpretation among the later authorities (Acharonim) according to which Rashi has three situations: a place with no habitation at all, which is not a private domain even at the Torah level; a place enclosed when habitation already exists, which is not a karpaf; and a place where habitation came after the enclosure, which is a private domain at the Torah level and becomes a karpaf only rabbinically. The text concludes that this reading of Rashi joins the challenge to the sharp distinction between Sabbath and impurity, because it gives considerations of habitation and accessibility weight in the laws of Sabbath as well, not only in impurity.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, I want to complete what we did last time regarding the definition of domains for the Sabbath and for impurity. I’ll just remind you of the conclusion we reached. The conclusion we reached was that the definition of domains for the purposes of Sabbath is determined by the physical characteristics of the domain, while the definition for impurity is determined by the nature of the question. Meaning, the law of domain with respect to impurity—private domain or public domain—the practical implication is what we do in a case of doubtful impurity. Now, the difference between doubtful impurity in a public domain and in a private domain, I explained, basically stems from the question of whom the doubt is about, or to whom the instruction of what to do in the situation of doubt is addressed. And my claim is that once the instruction is addressed to the public, there are different rules than when the instruction is addressed to individual people. But if that really is the definition, then I would expect that the definition of private domain and public domain would have nothing to do with whether there are walls or no walls, or width, or area, or all sorts of things that we know from the laws of Sabbath, but rather with the question of whom the question concerns. That is, are we talking about the public or about individuals? But that has to do with how accessible the public is to that domain, not with whether it has walls or not. That’s not relevant. Therefore the conclusion was—Kiryat Sefer was perhaps the clearest expression of this—that if there are people, or many people, who have access into a single room, which by all opinions is a private domain with respect to the laws of Sabbath, once many people have access to that room, it is a public domain for impurity, because the physical characteristics are not important. The question concerns the public, so the laws of doubtful impurity in a public domain apply here. That, basically, was our conclusion.

[Speaker B] For impurity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s—

[Speaker B] More than three people, that already counts as a public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Kiryat Sefer says—three people. But the basic claim is that you don’t need physical characteristics of the domain, only accessibility to the public. How many those “many” are doesn’t matter. Now I want us to see today that it’s not so simple. Meaning, there is room to hesitate about this, and then the whole conceptual dimension that I presented last time needs to be reconsidered. Because what I presented last time is not the accepted view. I think it’s a correct view, but it’s not the accepted view. And today we’ll see that in any case there is some kind of—what I presented last time was that in fact there is no connection at all between the concepts of private domain and public domain in Sabbath and in impurity. It’s just a shared name. That’s why I also said that the miggo there would not exist on the Torah level. Meaning, if there is some private or public domain for Sabbath purposes, that doesn’t interest me for impurity purposes except on the rabbinic level. We said these are rabbinic decrees that do try to make the contexts resemble one another.

[Speaker C] So the whole definition of public domain for Sabbath, where one of the conditions is that six hundred thousand pass through it—a certain number of people—is taken from the issue of impurity, and it could be that it’s a condition that’s not really relevant?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on the contrary. The definition for Sabbath—there is a dispute whether you need six hundred thousand or not; I mentioned that in the past. But that is specifically a definition that does introduce dimensions of accessibility into the definitions in the laws of Sabbath. Either accessibility or actual presence—we saw that this is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). And that, at first glance, doesn’t fit the thesis I stated earlier. But in impurity it is clear: there is no opinion that says impurity requires six hundred thousand. There is no discussion of that. The whole question is whether it is accessible to the public or not accessible to the public. The definition of six hundred thousand basically takes us back to the wilderness, and so in a certain sense it is still some expression of the characteristics of the domain and not of accessibility to the public. Rather, the domain has to be like it was in the wilderness, where six hundred thousand move around, or where six hundred thousand can move around. In impurity we are not supposed to compare it to any particular place. Simply according to the matter itself. We need to see whether we are talking about the many or not talking about the many. That’s all. And in that sense, that distinction still remains. Now I’ll again draw your attention to the fact that the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi in our passage basically talks about fencing the valley, but the fencing is relevant only to the laws of Sabbath, not to the laws of impurity. Right? A fenced valley may be a private domain for Sabbath. A fenced valley may be a private domain for Sabbath at the Torah level; rabbinically it’s a karmelit, but at the Torah level it’s a private domain. But for impurity it is a public domain, because I’m not interested in the fact that there are fences, since the physical character is not what determines things. The question is whether people pass there or not. That depends on the rainy season and the dry season. That determines whether people pass there or not, but the fences are not relevant. This whole resort to the question of whether there are partitions around the valley or no partitions around the valley, the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi—that is entirely a matter of the laws of Sabbath. It has nothing to do with impurity. At least that’s the plain sense of the Talmud. Today we’ll see that this is neither necessary nor precise nor agreed upon, at least. So look, I’ll begin with Tosafot in Bava Batra—sorry, Tosafot on the words “during the rainy season.” Right? In Bava Batra 153.

[Speaker C] Wait, wait, there’s no screen share.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, there’s no screen share, right, I have to remember each time what I see and what you see. You—

[Speaker C] You need to be multitasking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So, Tosafot there says—he brings two explanations for this matter, that during the rainy season the valley is a private domain. Rabbeinu Chananel explained: during the rainy season people do not enter it because of the heavy rains. It’s raining and there’s mud, so people don’t go in there, they don’t leave the road and enter the valley. The valley is the field, and the road runs alongside it. People don’t leave the road to enter the field when it’s full of mud and when it’s raining. So basically people don’t move around there, and therefore during the rainy season a valley is a private domain. That’s how Rabbeinu Chananel explains it. And Tosafot says that this does not seem right—that it is not because of the accumulation of water, not because it is full of water, but because of the grain, as stated in the Tosefta in tractate Taharot that Rabbeinu Chananel cited, which says: these are the dry-season days, when the grain would be uprooted from its place. Fine, that continuation is less important for us. What does this mean, basically? It means—

[Speaker B] According to Rabbeinu Chananel, this is a physical reason that prevents people from entering. Can’t hear? If there are rains, if there’s a lot of water, that’s a physical reason that prevents people from entering; otherwise they would enter. But here, if there are seeds, then people themselves prevent themselves from entering the valley so as not to damage the seeds.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’re not just preventing themselves—it’s forbidden to them. After all, a valley is a field; the field belongs to someone, he planted things there, so he doesn’t allow people to enter.

[Speaker B] But what do you mean, he doesn’t allow it? He’s not standing there twenty-four hours a day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, but he doesn’t allow it. We’re not talking about thieves, right? Trespassers. The man doesn’t permit entering this place because it’s planted.

[Speaker B] In principle, yes, but during the rainy season, if there’s a lot of rain, then a person does this out of his own personal interest—he doesn’t go in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Rabbeinu Chananel.

[Speaker B] But there are differences between those two tracks—I’m trying to point out the difference between these two reasons. Okay. I’m saying that if he doesn’t go in because it’s muddy and so on, he does that according to his own personal interest; he doesn’t want to stay there. But if he doesn’t go in in order not to damage the seeds—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s—

[Speaker B] It’s not because the obstacle is that it would harm him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? So what? Why does that affect our conceptions of what a domain is for impurity or for Sabbath?

[Speaker B] Maybe because here there’s something objective and subjective.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? So what? Why does that affect us?

[Speaker B] Maybe because for Sabbath it’s something objective, perhaps, and for impurity it’s more subjective.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let me develop that a bit. On the face of it, the disagreement between Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot is really about whether this domain is accessible to the public in principle, or whether the public needs to be there in practice. According to Rabbeinu Chananel, he claims that during the rainy season it is indeed accessible to the public—there’s no prohibition, everything is fine—but people don’t actually enter because there’s mud. And Rabbeinu Chananel apparently requires, in order for something to be defined as a public domain for impurity, actual presence of people, something like what we saw in Sabbath law with the six hundred thousand. The proof is that Rabbeinu Chananel says that if there is some technical obstacle that causes people not to enter, then true, they are allowed to enter, it’s not closed to them, but in practice they are not there. Rabbeinu Chananel says: that is not a public domain. For it to be a public domain, you need actual presence, just like we saw in the dispute in the laws of Sabbath regarding a public domain. By contrast, Tosafot says no: the fact that in principle it is accessible to people—sorry, you don’t need people actually to enter in order for it to be a public domain. Principled accessibility is enough. Therefore Tosafot says: if it were only a problem of rain and mud, then there is principled accessibility; this is a domain open to everyone. True, usually people choose not to enter, but it is permitted. They’re allowed to; it’s accessible to them. If you remember, in the laws of Sabbath we saw the same thing with the Ra’ah and the Ran there. So Tosafot says, from my point of view that does not turn it into a private domain. So what does? If they are forbidden to enter. Meaning, this is one person’s domain; you are forbidden to enter. It’s not that you choose not to enter. So here the point is not that you are not there, but that it is not accessible to you at all. And the difference between Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot is whether you need physical presence, or whether all that’s needed is that it be available to the public even if the public chooses not to make use of it. Okay? That is basically the dispute. At first glance, Rabbeinu Chananel actually fits better with the thesis I’ve been presenting up to now.

[Speaker E] I didn’t understand the distinction between the mud and the grain. The mud means that in practice they don’t go in, but they could have. In principle they can enter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rabbeinu Chananel claims that because of that, it is not a public domain. According to Rabbeinu Chananel, precisely because people do not actually enter, that means it is not a public domain. What do I learn from this? That according to Rabbeinu Chananel, the definition of a public domain is only if there are actually people inside. If that condition is not met, then it is not a public domain, he says. And therefore mud is enough for him to take it out of the category of public domain.

[Speaker E] And according to Tosafot it’s the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Not the opposite, but different. According to Tosafot, you don’t need the actual presence of people in order for it to be a public domain. It’s enough that it be accessible to people in principle. Suppose there’s mud, but they didn’t plant there, so people can enter, the way Rabbeinu Chananel describes it. What would Tosafot say about that? From my point of view, Tosafot says, that is a public domain, even if people do not enter. What is needed in order for it not to be a public domain? That they be forbidden to enter. Meaning, that it not be accessible to them at all.

[Speaker D] But if it’s not accessible to them, does that mean it’s a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s a private domain for impurity. So in the definition for impurity there is a dispute between Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot. According to Rabbeinu Chananel, a public domain for impurity is when the public is actually present; principled accessibility is not enough. According to Tosafot, principled accessibility is enough even if in practice people choose not to use it.

[Speaker C] Would Tosafot apply this rule also to a public domain at the Torah level? He’s talking about impurity. Only for impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The discussion here is only about impurity. Ah, okay. So the point is—and that is exactly the point. So at first glance, in light of the conclusion from the previous lecture, which of the two views fits it better? At first glance, it’s Rabbeinu Chananel. Because Rabbeinu Chananel says: once many people are there, then when I ask the question regarding a doubtful impurity in such a place, the question is in fact about many people. Because they are all there, and now I have to deliberate about all of them whether they are impure or not impure. So that’s a question addressed to the public. And therefore Rabbeinu Chananel says this is a doubtful impurity in a public domain. But that is only when people are there. If people are not there, what do I care about principled accessibility? Still, the question will not be a question about all the people, about the public. Rather, it will be about whoever happened to enter there. So the question is a question about an individual and not about the public. So Rabbeinu Chananel, at first glance, fits better with the conclusion we reached in the previous lecture. But on second thought, look, Tosafot is not all that different from this either. Because one could say that even if there is principled accessibility to the public, although I know that most people won’t make use of it—there’s mud—but there is principled accessibility to the public, when I say that this place is impure, I have made a statement to the public. True, only a small minority of the public will actually make use of it, but still we are not speaking about specific individuals; we are speaking about the public. It just happens that only a small part of the public will be affected by it in practice. And therefore it could be that Tosafot also does not disagree with this basic conception of the definition of domains in impurity. It still speaks about the question: what is the nature of the question? Is this a question addressed to the public, and not the definition of the domain itself? And indeed, look—both Tosafot and Rabbeinu Chananel are not talking about physical characteristics of the domain. Tosafot too is not speaking about physical characteristics. Tosafot is talking about whether they are forbidden or permitted to enter. That is of no interest in the laws of Sabbath. In the laws of Sabbath, the physical characteristics—if there are four fences, it is a private domain. It doesn’t matter who is allowed to enter and who is forbidden to enter; that is not relevant. By contrast, in impurity, even in Tosafot’s more moderate formulation, you still see that the degree of accessibility to the public plays a role here. Therefore, even Tosafot—I don’t know how far he departs from the picture I described in the previous lecture.

[Speaker B] But later, regarding what Rabbi Yochanan says, there are requirements for what the domain has to look like. I didn’t understand. Later in our Talmudic passage, with karpaf, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There—

[Speaker B] There is a requirement for what the domain has to look like.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What requirement?

[Speaker B] If it’s a beit se’atayim that was not enclosed for habitation. Even a kor or even two kor—then it’s already—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand—you’re talking about the laws of Sabbath. The laws of Sabbath, certainly. But not in impurity. Yes. And in the laws of Sabbath, obviously—the whole idea is that in the laws of Sabbath the definition is made according to the physical character of the domain. In impurity, the claim is that it is determined by the question of whom the question concerns, or whom the halakhic instruction concerns—the public or individuals.

[Speaker D] Wait, if there is no accessibility to the public, then basically the impurity questions here are questions for individuals, right? Yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, either accessibility or actual presence, but you still see that the determining parameter is who the public is that moves around there, or what public moves around there—not whether there are fences or no fences, okay? It’s not the physical matter. Now, in another Tosafot there in Bava Batra, Tosafot says as follows. Maybe actually there’s another important remark here because it could be confusing.

[Speaker F] A question—could it be that according to the rabbi, the same domain at one time—I mean, not in the same contexts, say both in the rainy season—but one day, I don’t know, people will have boots and they’ll be able to enter? Meaning the same domain can be a public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems so, yes. It all depends on whether people move around there or not.

[Speaker F] So it’s clear why Tosafot really goes in the direction of defining something in a very one-way, sharp way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s so sharp and one-way about it? It depends on whether people move around there. Is rainy season and dry season really sharp and one-way? How much mud has to be there for it to count as a private domain? Nothing here is sharp. Fine.

[Speaker F] But permission to enter or not is something very clear, and it defines it not according to the situation or according to the estimate of how many—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m not sure the point is a desire to strive for a clear criterion, because if that were the issue, then it really wouldn’t be a substantive dispute. It would only be a matter of, okay, but come on, law has to be determined in a way that is clear and sharp. But that wouldn’t really be a dispute. I think there is a principled dispute here. The practical consequence is that with Tosafot it perhaps comes out as a sharper definition, but I don’t think that is why Tosafot disagrees with Rabbeinu Chananel.

[Speaker F] Why is there a principled dispute? What is the emphasis on the public and not on the location? Why is that a principled dispute? You said both of them are talking about the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I said: the dispute is principled, but not as extreme as I presented it at first. Because Tosafot too is not just talking about the characteristics of the domain. I’ll sharpen it a bit more. Look, there’s another sentence I need to say. Regarding a public domain, even on the Sabbath there is significance to the question of to whom it is accessible. For example, on the Sabbath there is a difference between a karmelit and a public domain. Right? A karmelit is not considered a public domain; it is considered exempt space at the Torah level. An ordinary karmelit, not a karpaf. Okay? Why? After all, it’s open, it’s accessible to the public, anyone can enter. Right? We are talking about something like the sea, the valley, whatever it may be. Okay? Why is that not defined as a public domain? Because it is not accessible to the public. Meaning, even on the Sabbath, the definition of public domain does take accessibility to the public into account. I think the sharper difference is what counts as a private domain and what counts as a public domain. Of course one reflects on the other, but for private domain on the Sabbath it is not a question of accessibility to the public. If there are four walls, it is a private domain, period, that’s it. Except—we said the Taz in the view of the Tur, if you remember—who says that if it is open to the public, that cancels its status as private domain. But that’s one view. According to most views, once there are four walls, it is a private domain. It doesn’t matter whether it is accessible or inaccessible to the public. In a public domain, even in the laws of Sabbath, accessibility to the public does play a role, because otherwise there would be no such thing as a karmelit. Every karmelit would be a public domain. Therefore I think that if we want to compare Sabbath and impurity, it is better to look at the definition of private domain, not public domain. Meaning, during the rainy season, what is called a private domain? Is a private domain something where the public does not move around, or something that the public does not have access to? Okay? I’m not looking at what is defined as a public domain; everything that is not a private domain is defined as a public domain. But the distinction between Sabbath and impurity is easier to see when we focus specifically on private domain and not on public domain. Because private domain on the Sabbath is defined entirely physically. There are four walls—or, never mind, two and a handbreadth; we saw all the disputes—and the area is four by four, and that is a private domain, period. It does not depend on who moves around there, to whom it is accessible; none of that matters. Except, I say again, the Taz in the view of the Tur, if you remember, who says that if it is open to the public—well, never mind. In public domain it already is a question of accessibility, because a valley or a sea or things of that sort are, at least in principle, accessible to everyone. What’s the problem? Why shouldn’t that be a public domain? Even on the Sabbath that is not a public domain; it is exempt space, a karmelit rabbinically. Okay? In impurity? That which is not accessible to the public. Private domain on the Sabbath is a definition of partitions. Right. And in impurity? It’s accessibility to fewer than three people. What is not accessible to the public, yes. Not accessible—or people don’t move around there; that’s the dispute between Rabbeinu Chananel and Tosafot. Therefore the comparison is better made with respect to private domain, not public domain. True, everything that is not a private domain in impurity is a public domain, so it is the other side of the coin, but it is easier to see when we make the comparison with respect to private domain. Okay, now look at Tosafot—I’m bringing another Tosafot there in the same passage in Bava Batra. “A private domain for Sabbath and a public domain for impurity.” Tosafot says: in the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, the Amoraim dispute this. There is one who establishes it in a valley surrounded on all four sides, and it is a public domain for impurity, for even a courtyard into which one enters on one side and exits on the other, as we say in Eruvin, is a public domain for impurity, all the more so a valley where people regularly walk. That is one opinion. And there is one who establishes it where it is not surrounded, and then it is a karmelit; and why does he call it a private domain? Because it is not a public domain. Notice that when he explains the Mishnah in tractate Taharot—“a private domain for Sabbath and a public domain for impurity”—he brings the dispute of the Amoraim from our passage in tractate Shabbat, which does not appear in the Bava Batra passage. Why? Why is that important? Seemingly, this dispute is merely, first, not a halakhic dispute at all, only an interpretive dispute. Right? We talked about this. Between Ulla and Rav Ashi there is no halakhic disagreement, only an interpretive disagreement about how to explain the baraita, but they are not disagreeing about the law of a fenced valley or an unfenced valley. That isn’t the discussion. The discussion is not halakhic; the discussion is what fits the Mishnah more plausibly. So it’s an interpretive dispute. Second, their dispute concerns the laws of Sabbath, not the laws of impurity. A valley fenced on four sides is a private domain; the other says no, it’s a karmelit, and it’s called private domain because it’s not a public domain. It’s all with respect to Sabbath, not connected to impurity.

[Speaker B] From the fact that he talks about karmelit, it’s obvious that we’re talking about Sabbath and not impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here he brings the dispute of the Amoraim from our passage. I’m just asking: why does he need to bring that here? What difference does it make? When the discussion is a discussion about impurity, why should I care that Amoraim disagreed in a dispute that, first, is not even halakhic at all, only interpretive, and second, all they are trying to explain is something in the laws of Sabbath in general—it has nothing to do with impurity. So why is it relevant? What, with respect to impurity does it make a difference whether it is surrounded by partitions or not? The Amoraim disputed it? They didn’t dispute anything. With respect to impurity it makes no difference whether it is surrounded by partitions or not. The whole discussion is only with respect to Sabbath, and even there it is not a halakhic disagreement but only an interpretive one.

[Speaker F] But it could be a criterion for whether the public passes through it or not; that is, it could help us evaluate that issue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure, because as Kiryat Sefer says, once there’s an inner room and yet the public still moves around there, it is still called a public domain. But beyond that I want to say something more radical. I want to claim that in this Tosafot there is a first hint—we’ll see this later in greater detail—that enclosure by partitions, first, is a halakhic dispute and not only an interpretive one, and second, that it pertains to the laws of impurity as well and not only to the laws of Sabbath. And I mentioned this in passing in the previous lecture; I’ll remind you again. In the previous lecture I said that the Amoraim are really disputing how to understand the Mishnah in tractate Taharot, the Mishnah that distinguishes between Sabbath and impurity. Is it speaking, according to Rav Ashi, about a valley surrounded by partitions, or does Ulla say no, it is not surrounded by partitions, but it is still called a private domain because it is a karmelit, which is not a public domain? Now on the face of it this really is not a halakhic dispute and not a dispute that concerns impurity, only Sabbath. But notice: once according to Rav Ashi the Mishnah deals with a valley surrounded by partitions, and about that it says that during the rainy season it is a private domain for impurity, who says Rav Ashi agrees that without partitions it is also so? After all, the Mishnah is speaking about a valley with partitions, right? Once you make Rav Ashi’s interpretive move, then what is written in the Mishnah—everything written there, no matter right now what the reason was for saying it speaks of partitions; that reason comes from Sabbath. Fine. But now, practically, I ask myself: what does the Mishnah say? What the Mishnah says is this: a valley surrounded by partitions, during the rainy season it is a private domain, during the dry season it is a public domain, for impurity. And you want to tell me that without partitions it has the same law as well? I don’t know. The Mishnah doesn’t say that. And then it is entirely possible that Rav Ashi would say that true, the reason we were forced to establish the case that way comes from the discussion of the laws of Sabbath. But once the Mishnah is already speaking of a valley defined on all four sides by partitions, then the whole rule of that Mishnah may be speaking only about a fenced valley. But an unfenced valley would be a public domain for impurity even during the rainy season. And if that is indeed so—and right now I’m saying it all as an “if”; in a moment we’ll see it without the “if”—but if,

[Speaker B] Maybe he wants to say that even though it is surrounded by partitions, during the dry season it will still be a public domain. Okay, maybe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how we learned it until now. He says, that’s how we learned it until now, but now I want to suggest a different possibility. I want to argue that Tosafot brings the dispute among the Amoraim because he understands that they have a real dispute, a halakhic one, not just an interpretive one, and that this dispute also relates, or maybe only relates, to the laws of impurity. And the claim is that according to Rav Ashi, who says that the Mishnah is talking about a valley enclosed on all four sides, then the Mishnah’s ruling that in the rainy season it is considered a private domain was said about an enclosed valley. What about a valley that is not enclosed? Maybe not. Maybe it would be a public domain, just like on the Sabbath. And then impurity and Sabbath would indeed be the same. In contrast, according to Ulla, where we are talking about a valley that is not enclosed, then clearly this law does not depend on fences, so everything we said until now is correct according to Ulla. According to Rav Ashi, it depends very much on how you learn it. Is Rav Ashi coming to dispute Ulla, or is he only offering another interpretive suggestion, but not disputing Ulla, and certainly not in the laws of impurity? So those are two possible suggestions. The price, of course, if I accept this suggestion, which is a new one, is that at least according to Rav Ashi, Sabbath and impurity do go by the same criteria. For impurity too, the physical structure of the domain plays a role. If it has four walls, it is a private domain. If it does not have four walls, it is a public domain. True, it is not only the physical structure, because you need two conditions together. If it has four walls, then in the rainy season, when people are not walking around there, it is a private domain; in the dry season, even with four walls, it is a public domain. Okay? Rav Ashi agrees to that too. So it comes out that for something to be considered a private domain for impurity, you need two cumulative conditions. One, a physical condition: that it have four walls. Two, that people are not moving around there. It sounds a little like the Taz and the Tur in the laws of Sabbath. Right? That it be enclosed and that the public not pass through it. Okay? And then I say: this is a first challenge to the distinction I made in the previous class between a domain for Sabbath and a domain for impurity—that for a domain regarding impurity, the physical structure might also play a role. So what I said, that there is no dependence at all on the physical structure, is not correct—if I’m right in this whole explanation here, and we’ll soon see. Yes.

[Speaker C] Just one point—if it is not enclosed according to Rav Ashi, then is it always considered a public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, according to this suggestion. I’m not claiming it as a fact; I’m raising a possibility. I’m raising this possibility because in the next Tosafot we’ll probably see that this is the correct possibility. But I’m showing it here because I think that even in this Tosafot it makes more sense to understand that this is how they learned. Otherwise it is not clear why they bother to bring this dispute among the Amoraim here—who cares? Why is it important? Who is even dealing with this? It is not even a halakhic dispute, so what difference does it make? We did not ask the questions of the Sabbath passage; we are looking for the answers to the Sabbath passage. This is a passage dealing with something else. Okay? Therefore, already in this Tosafot it seems that, from his perspective, the Amoraic dispute in our passage has a halakhic implication regarding the definition of impurity—the domain for impurity. Now let’s move on. Look at another Tosafot in Bava Batra, under the heading—sorry, before Tosafot, first the Talmudic text there. The Talmudic text there says: “As we learned in the Mishnah”—it brings the Mishnah in Taharot that is also brought here—“A valley in the dry season is a private domain for Sabbath and a public domain for impurity; in the rainy season it is a private domain for both.” Rava said—this is an addition that does not appear in our passage, only there—Rava said: “They taught this only when the rainy season had not yet passed over it, but if the rainy season had passed over it, it is a private domain for both.” What does that mean?

[Speaker B] That’s if someone passed through the valley, say. In the dry season it was a private domain, and afterward the rainy season came.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s obvious. Why would it need to say that? That’s simple.

[Speaker B] No—then they didn’t render him impure. They treated it as though he came only after the rainy season.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Why on earth? If he passed through in the dry season, then for him it is a public domain, so what is the question? Obviously, regardless of what was before and what will be after. No, it works the other way. What happens if we established a status for this domain in the rainy season, and it was considered a private domain? Okay? And now the dry season arrives and a person enters there. Seemingly we should have treated him as impure. Right? Sorry—treated him as pure. As pure. Why? Because now it is a public domain, and a doubtful case of impurity in a public domain is pure. No—since before it was defined as a private domain, true, now it has changed, but our status remains as it was. That is what Rava says. Okay? That is the simple reading of Rava. Seemingly these things actually take us back again.

[Speaker E] It seems to me this is talking about partitions, because otherwise what does it mean, “the rainy season had not yet passed over it”? The dry season arrives—then of course the rainy season has already passed. So from what I understood, that means that in the rainy season there were partitions there, and they continued to be there in the dry season too, because if we’re not talking here about partitions, I can’t understand it. What does it mean, “the rainy season had passed over it”? In the dry season the rainy season has always already passed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s what you’re saying, and that’s what Rashbam says. What Hani is basically saying here is that apparently there must have been partitions here. Why? Because the nature of the world is that there is a dry season and then a rainy season and then a dry season and then a rainy season. So what does it mean: if there was a rainy season before the dry season? There is always a rainy season before the dry season. So what is the meaning of this? Rather, we have to say—and this is what Rashbam writes there—that if it was enclosed in the rainy season and acquired the status of a private domain in the rainy season, then even when the dry season comes afterward, and seemingly it should already have acquired the status of a public domain—no. It remains in the status of a private domain, and if someone passes through in the dry season in that same domain, his doubtful case is treated stringently. He is impure out of doubt, like a doubtful case of impurity in a private domain. That is how Rashbam explains it. Okay? Now this is something strange. Strange in two ways. Why?

[Speaker D] Wait, and if it’s the other way around? Sorry. If the enclosure was made in the dry season?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then seemingly it would be the opposite.

[Speaker D] The opposite, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is how it appears, yes. Now if—what do we see here? First of all, in terms of—what?

[Speaker D] Sorry—if it’s the other way around, then the enclosure has no significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? The enclosure does have significance. Because once the enclosure was made in the dry season, the enclosure did not change the status—it remained a public domain. So now when it remains enclosed in the rainy season, it will not become a private domain.

[Speaker D] Why? If I enclose it when? In the summer, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see that in a moment. At this stage we still don’t know that enclosure is relevant to impurity—that’s why I’m bringing this Tosafot, and in a moment we’ll see this passage. So look: first let’s leave Rashbam aside for a second. Even without Rashbam, the very fact that you’re not considering only the question of whether there are many people here or not, but you’re looking at the name of this domain—if it has the name of a private domain, then it remains a private domain—that fits Sabbath much more than impurity. With impurity, after all, I’m not interested in the domain itself; I’m interested in whether people walk around there or not. And indeed Tosafot there asks exactly this question. People are walking there—why should I care whether it used to be in the rainy season and whether it was enclosed or not enclosed? If people are walking there, then it is a doubtful case of impurity in a public domain. So first of all, that is Tosafot’s question, but in the Talmudic text itself, what do we really see? That apparently there is significance to how I define the domain. It is not only the question whether people walk there or not. Another point: Rashbam, as I said earlier, brings what Hani said before. Look, I’ll bring it here. “Rashbam explained”—I’m quoting this from Tosafot, but that doesn’t matter, it’s a citation—“that the rainy season passed over it after the valley had been enclosed, and even so, in the dry season it is considered a private domain.”

[Speaker B] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot asks: “And this does not appear at all, because what logic is there in saying that once it was enclosed and the rainy season passed over it, it becomes a private domain even in the dry season, but before the rainy season passed over it, it would not be a private domain?” Everything should be determined by the question whether there are people there or not. Why do I care when it was enclosed and when it wasn’t enclosed? And he asks another question: why is the enclosure relevant at all? Regarding impurity, enclosure makes no difference whatsoever in whether it is a private domain or a public domain, so how does Rashbam make it depend on enclosure? Now the reason he has to do that is what Hani said earlier, because without that, how could you define that the whole thing began in the rainy season? Something has to happen in the rainy season so that we can say, okay, it started in the rainy season and then moved into the dry season. I understand his motivation, but I can’t understand how he solves the—why is enclosure relevant? After all, with regard to impurity, enclosure changes nothing. With a fence or without a fence, in the rainy season it is a private domain; in the dry season it is a public domain. So what do we see?

[Speaker F] But can’t you say it’s just an indication?

[Speaker C] The rainy season is a private domain, the dry season—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, an indication?

[Speaker F] I want to assess whether—I wasn’t there. A person comes to me and he has a doubt—not to me, but to a religious court. And I want to assess whether enough people pass there, at least according to Rabbeinu Chananel, not according to Tosafot. I want to assess whether many people are passing there now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That can’t be, it can’t be, because then what difference does it make whether the dry season came after the rainy season? You just want to assess whether people are passing there or not—so look—

[Speaker F] Whether people are passing there now, at the time when the impurity question is relevant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if—

[Speaker F] But if in the rainy season it was—if in the dry season it was enclosed. But then people didn’t pass there, so why should I care—but now they do pass. So then, necessarily, however you explain it, you’re taking us back—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —back to the definition of what this domain is, and not only to the question of how many people pass there. However you look at it. I’m only saying one additional thing: in Rashbam, the solution he proposes to this difficulty makes it depend on enclosure. And here suddenly we discover something new, so I’m reminding you of what I suggested earlier: enclosure plays a role in the laws of impurity. Without that it would not be relevant.

[Speaker B] But according to what you’re saying, enclosure alone—yes, it could be that only if it was in the rainy season, then it remains a private domain. Right, but you’re saying that if the enclosure was in the dry season, that won’t help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: two cumulative conditions. There needs to be enclosure, and it needs to be in the rainy season, when people are not there.

[Speaker B] And is that Rav Ashi’s requirement? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. I’m claiming that Rashbam here—and I think there’s no choice, that’s what the Rashash writes, I opened the Rashash for you—what Rashbam is basically saying here is that for something to be considered a private domain for impurity, there is also a physical component in the definition, not only the public’s accessibility to it, but the partitions also play a role. How does that fit with our passage? In our passage we explicitly see not so. Necessarily, as I said earlier, according to Rav Ashi.

[Speaker E] But according to Rashbam, it’s not that you need both conditions. After all, in the dry season when there is a fence, it’s a private domain, right? No. Because that’s what the Talmudic text said. Where?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The dry season is a private domain only if it came after the rainy season. Right.

[Speaker E] Right, and after—not important. So there is inertia, and still many people can pass there—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and it is still now a private domain because there is a rule here that the domain’s status has inertia. That is written here in any case. I’m only asking: how did it become a private domain in the rainy season, such that afterward it continues by inertia into the dry season that follows? That is Rava’s novelty; fine, I accept that. But I’m asking: in the rainy season, how did that happen? Why is it relevant that it was enclosed? We see that the enclosure is what determines the name of the domain. Besides that, there is also the law of inertia, right, that’s another dimension. So here we see explicitly.

[Speaker F] Again, why is it important when the enclosure began?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because here, in any case, we see that the definition of the domain plays a role for impurity too, not only the presence of the public. The definition of the domain.

[Speaker F] Even if I defined the domain in the dry season, that isn’t enough for me. I didn’t understand. Why, if I enclosed it in the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the public is present. What? Because the public is there. You need two cumulative conditions for it to be a private domain: that it be enclosed and that it not be accessible to the public. And a third law is that after once it was a private domain, it has inertia, and it continues even into the dry season. But first of all, in the basic definition—how is the name of this domain created? When does that happen, how does it happen? Two cumulative conditions: enclosure and inaccessibility to the public.

[Speaker F] Wait, so if I made the enclosure in the dry season, and people can still enter there—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s a public domain.

[Speaker B] Where?

[Speaker F] Because people can still enter there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. We said: two cumulative conditions.

[Speaker F] Cumulatively.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Rashash writes. It seems that for impurity, the seasons are more dominant than—

[Speaker B] Can’t hear. It seems to me that for impurity, the condition of the seasons is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —more dominant than—

[Speaker B] What does “more dominant” mean? Only it is dominant. Only for impurity is it dominant. For Sabbath it’s not relevant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No, but you’re saying that for impurity there is also—

[Speaker B] —the issue of defining the domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but the issue of accessibility exists only for impurity. Yes, right. Now look at the Rashash, yes, Yael?

[Speaker D] No, I wanted to say that it’s not significant when I enclose it… wait, I want to say something. I don’t think it’s all that significant when I enclose it, because I can plan when I enclose it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but in the end, when you actually carry it out, that determines the status of this domain. Partly. Yes, one of the two cumulative conditions, right? Now look at the Rashash. I’m skipping for a second just so you can see it in the Rashash. Here it is. “It appears from their words that according to Rav Ashi there, who establishes it in a case where it has partitions, according to Rav Ashi it is not a private domain for impurity except with two conditions”—two cumulative conditions—“the rainy season and a fence. And if so, Rashbam explained it well,” and that resolves Tosafot’s difficulty against Rashbam. Therefore Rashbam explains that if the rainy season had passed over it and it had a fence, then it’s fine. “But according to Ulla there, who establishes it in a case where it is not enclosed, it is explained according to Rabbenu Hananel’s interpretation. But from Maimonides it appears that even according to Rav Ashi, a private domain for impurity…” —we’ll see Maimonides in a moment. Okay? So he is explicitly saying what I said earlier: that Rashbam is in fact assuming Rav Ashi’s premise, and according to Rav Ashi the definition of a private domain for impurity is made up cumulatively, from a physical component and an accessibility component. Tosafot, who has reservations about Rashbam, who questions Rashbam, is unwilling to accept such a thing. Why? Because he learned our Talmudic passage in its plain sense, and in our Talmudic passage in its plain sense, enclosure does not play a role in the context of impurity, so what difference does it make that he enclosed it in the rainy season? It changed nothing one way or the other, that enclosure. Regarding impurity it plays no role. If so, we learn from this that Rashbam and Tosafot disagree on the very question I raised at the beginning of the class: does the definition of a domain for impurity include a physical component, as on Sabbath, plus an accessibility component—so one component like Sabbath—or not, and there is a dichotomous difference: for impurity, the physical components do not interest me at all; all that matters is accessibility. In other words, Rashbam narrows the gap between the definitions of domains for Sabbath and for impurity, contrary to what I described in the previous class. What Tosafot assumes is indeed the plain sense of our passage: really not—there is indeed a clear gap; the physical component does not play a role in definitions regarding impurity. And that is why he questions Rashbam; he does not understand him. Now let us return. That was just the Rashash. Rava’s words are puzzling, because there is a Mishnah in Taharot—I referred you to it—“A place that was a private domain and became a public domain, and then returned to being a private domain: when it is a private domain, its doubtful case is impure; when it is a public domain, its doubtful case is pure.” Sorry, I didn’t read that with the right intonation.

[Speaker E] “A place that was a private domain—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —“and became a public domain, and then returned to being a private domain: when it is a private domain, its doubtful case is impure; when it is a public domain, its doubtful case is pure.” And that means there is a possibility of changing status. Right, so where—how does that fit with Rava? Rava, after all, says there is this sort of presumption, that you do not change status; once the status is set, that’s it. Here we see an explicit Mishnah not like that.

[Speaker B] So that’s according to Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] It doesn’t fit Tosafot’s approach?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, before Tosafot. First of all we have to understand the Talmudic text. The Talmudic text itself—Rava says there is inertia: the status you received in the rainy season continues with you into the dry season. There is a Mishnah that says not so.

[Speaker F] But maybe the Mishnah means that something changed, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, something changed?

[Speaker F] Maybe not only did time pass, but something changed with time—I don’t know, the partitions fell down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. One possible explanation, it seems to me—

[Speaker F] One possibility—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One possibility is that the Mishnah speaks about a case where a private domain lost its partitions, or had partitions added to it—it is simply something else now. There, there is no inertia, because it became something else. In our case, only the seasons changed, which of course affects public accessibility, but in terms of the domain itself it is the same domain. About that, Rava says: here there is inertia.

[Speaker E] But by the way, the commentators who explained this Mishnah—we saw in Bartenura, I think—he doesn’t explain it that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I referred you there; let’s go back there. I keep stopping because I want to see the participants.

[Speaker F] Not there maybe what Hani—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —asked? Yes. Now I’ll just say it myself. The Rash and the Bartenura there on the spot say: “It returned to being a public domain, such as the valley discussed later, where in the rainy season it is a private domain and in the dry season a public domain.” So the Rash is basically identifying the law of the Mishnah in Taharot—who is the Rash? The Rash of Shantz, one of the commentators on the Mishnah, one of the Tosafists. So he identifies this statement of the Mishnah—

[Speaker D] But here, though, it sounds to me that everywhere we said that if we enclose it, that makes it a private domain, right? What? If we enclose an area—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, Yael is speaking, yes?

[Speaker D] Then it has no significance. Meaning, according to this logic there can’t be, say, an enclosed place that is a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes there can. In the dry season, enclosed, it is a public domain for impurity. For impurity? Yes, we’re talking about impurity only. Only impurity?

[Speaker D] Yes, in the dry season—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, we are talking about an enclosed valley. In the rainy season it is a private domain, and in the dry season it is a public domain despite the enclosure. Why? It is significant, but significant cumulatively. If there is enclosure and the public is also not present there, then it is a private domain. If one of those two is missing, then it is a public domain, even if there is enclosure. Maimonides’ language, for example, is not like that. Maimonides, for example, writes: “A valley surrounded by a fence in the rainy season is a private domain for Sabbath and for impurity, and if it was not surrounded, then it is a private domain for impurity only. And a valley over which the rainy season has passed is a private domain for impurity even in the dry season.”

[Speaker B] What does that mean? An enclosed valley over which the dry season has passed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Again?

[Speaker B] Does he mean an enclosed valley over which the rainy season has passed? A fence?

[Speaker D] At the end?

[Speaker B] In his last sentence. “It is a private…” Does he mean the enclosed valley at the end?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly he said at the beginning that it is an enclosed valley: “a valley surrounded by a fence.” So in the rainy season it is a private domain for Sabbath and impurity. “And if it is not surrounded by a fence, then it is a private domain only for impurity.” Okay? So that means that regarding impurity, the fence does not play a role, right?

[Speaker D] Against what Rashbam says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides is—

[Speaker D] Like Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —only about the rainy—

[Speaker D] —season now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, regardless: according to Maimonides, enclosure does not play a role in matters of—

[Speaker D] impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is also why the Rashash himself brings Maimonides, in order to say that in Maimonides we see—

[Speaker D] —not like—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —Rashbam, that enclosure does not play a role, like Tosafot. Now Maimonides continues: “And a valley over which the rainy season has passed is a private domain for impurity even in the dry season.”

[Speaker B] Meaning that its status was established as a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, “the rainy season has passed over it”? Here he is bringing Rava’s law, right?

[Speaker B] What is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “the rainy season has passed over it” mean? You see that this is not like Rashbam, right? It’s not that they enclosed it in the rainy season. Rather it is the public—rather, that they pass through in the rainy season. What does “they pass through” mean? If people still pass through there despite the mud, they pass there anyway—that is what he means to say.

[Speaker E] So then it’s not like Rava. It can’t—

[Speaker F] be—

[Speaker E] Could it be that he means “the rainy season passed over it,” not “they passed through it in the rainy season”? It means the rainy season passed over it. What does that mean? “The rainy season passed over it” means that rain fell. “They passed over it” means that people nevertheless entered it despite the rain. And then what? It is a private domain for impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is still a private domain for impurity, both in the dry season and in the rainy season. Why? After all, if many people pass there, then what difference does it make? I think what Maimonides means is—and this is like the approach of the Yere’im or the approach of Rabbenu Hananel—that the doubt arose in the rainy season. This is impurity, not the valley. A valley with impurity through which people passed in the rainy season—that means: when did we begin asking the question of doubtful impurity? In the rainy season. Because already then people were passing there. There is a question: when does the doubt arise? When do we become aware that there is a concern that impurity is found there? Did it already start troubling us in the rainy season? If so, in the rainy season it has the status of a private domain. So the rule is that regarding this doubtful impurity, this place is a private domain. Now, even if we also arrive at the dry season, since this impurity was already known to us, or the problem already arose for us in the rainy season, then in the laws of doubt we continue to view it as a doubtful case of impurity in a private domain. Now understand that this is a different interpretation from Rashbam’s interpretation. Yes.

[Speaker B] That means that if people now pass through in the dry season, they will be impure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And notice, this is not connected—notice why Maimonides says this, because Maimonides disagrees with Rashbam and holds that enclosure is not relevant to impurity. So the question returns: how then are we to understand Rava’s statement here, that the rainy season came before the dry season? The rainy season always comes before the dry season.

[Speaker B] Unless the doubt arose in the rainy season.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So the solution Maimonides proposes, like Rabbenu Hananel cited in Tosafot, is that the doubt of impurity arose in the rainy season. The doubtful impurity we are discussing began troubling us already from the rainy season. That is the point. And then indeed the conception is that enclosure is not relevant to impurity, like the simple conception, like Tosafot, like everything I said in the previous class—against Rashbam. So because he disagrees with Rashbam on the question whether enclosure plays a role, he therefore also has to explain Rava’s law differently.

[Speaker E] But are we talking here only about—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait one second, okay? We are talking here about doubtful impurity only if there was impurity in that place, not if—

[Speaker E] I entered that place, or details—various laws of various kinds of doubts in impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, look, if people did not enter there, then why would it be troubling?

[Speaker E] No, the doubt is whether I entered there or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, it is always around entering. If he did not enter there, there is no doubt.

[Speaker E] But then if today I’m uncertain whether I entered there in the rainy season… no, the doubt is not about then.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once then it had the status of a private domain—a private domain. Once that is the doubt that arose, it arose regarding the rainy season. Now, even if a doubt now arises about the dry season—someone now passes there—since the reason to doubt is that same impurity that began troubling us already in the rainy season, for us it acquired the status of doubtful impurity in a private domain.

[Speaker D] What kind of impurity lasts that long?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? For example, for example, for example, it’s a cemetery. They didn’t find it, but they know it’s there. Yes. So this Maimonides is an indication that the accepted view among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is against Rashbam. And indeed the simple conception, as we learned until now, is that enclosure does not play a role in the context of impurity. Rashbam’s novelty is a special novelty, but the approach of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) is not like that. And then of course the question returns: how are we to understand Rava? So Maimonides says simply: because the impurity issue arose in the rainy season. That is the inertia. In short, the law stated here is a law in the laws of doubts, not a law in the laws of domains. According to Rashbam it is a law in the laws of domains. According to Maimonides it is a law in the laws of doubts. Okay? Therefore it does not relate to the definition of the domain.

[Speaker F] Now, if it’s a different kind of impurity, does that change things?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. According to Rashbam it’s a new story. It depends when it arose.

[Speaker D] According to Rashbam… or… okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot continues, look. I’m going back to Tosafot now. “And furthermore, Rava’s statement here can only be established according to the one who says in the first chapter of Sabbath: and this is only when it has a fence on all four sides.” What is that?

[Speaker B] Rav Ashi, Mishnah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Rava says here is one of Tosafot’s difficulties against Rashbam. What is he asking? What Rava says here can be said only according to Rav Ashi if you accept Rashbam’s view. Here it says explicitly what I said before. What does that have to do with Rav Ashi? Is there really a dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi? Certainly not in the laws of impurity. Enclosure is not relevant to impurity. Tosafot says: not true. According to Rashbam, enclosure is relevant to the laws of impurity. And if Rashbam says that, then necessarily it certainly cannot fit into Ulla. He can say it only within Rav Ashi’s approach. That is, one of Tosafot’s difficulties against Rashbam is that the whole Talmudic discussion here is basically going according to Rav Ashi, and nobody mentions that Ulla disagrees. So he is already writing explicitly what I—or afterward the Rashash, of course—deduced from Rashbam above. This is what Tosafot understands: that Rashbam is speaking in Rav Ashi’s approach. Because he understands that Rav Ashi and Ulla disagree in a halakhic dispute: whether enclosure is relevant to the definitions of impurity or not relevant to the definitions of impurity. Then he brings Rabbenu Hananel’s interpretation. He disagrees with—so he rejects Rashbam because of all these difficulties and brings Rabbenu Hananel’s interpretation. What is Rabbenu Hananel’s interpretation? “That it is speaking regarding impurity, and this is what it means: they taught this only when this impurity had not yet had the rainy season pass over it. Then if he entered in the dry season, it is a public domain. But if this impurity had had the rainy season pass over it, then even if he entered it in the dry season and came to ask in the dry season, it is a private domain.” Exactly like we saw in Maimonides.

[Speaker B] But then he should also say that if it arose in the dry season, then even if he entered in the rainy season he would remain pure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that is the other side of Rava. Rava doesn’t say it, so Tosafot doesn’t say it, but it’s the same thing. Okay, that’s it. In short, that’s enough for our purposes. I’m finishing the issue of the definition of domains.

[Speaker F] But what is the logic of this inertia? I mean, especially in the laws of impurity, where it comes from the suspected adulteress, which is something where—because there it really matters whether they could seclude themselves or not. So what is this inertia if I passed through in the dry season or in the rainy season?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say—and Tosafot itself brings such a possibility—that this is only a rabbinic law.

[Speaker B] No, but maybe if it happened in the rainy season, then the doubt was already decided, and then there is no doubt left; in the dry season it is already certain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but they ruled about the impurity, not about the place. There are—

[Speaker C] those—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —who say this is only a rabbinic law, and if so then also the difficulties from the Mishnah in Taharot—they would agree that there you see a change in the inertia, because here it is only a rabbinic law. But in the plain sense that does not seem to be how the Talmudic text reads, and indeed it seems that there is some claim here about inertia in the laws of doubt or inertia in the status of the domain. But according to Maimonides and Tosafot this is not connected to enclosure, because enclosure is not relevant to the laws of impurity, even according to Rav Ashi’s view.

[Speaker C] So that means that if instead of enclosing it I put up a sign saying “No entry, private property,” then according to Maimonides and Tosafot, for impurity purposes it is still considered a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. After all, that is what happens in the rainy season. In the rainy season I put up a sign, “No entry,” because I planted here, I don’t want you damaging it. That is exactly the definition of the domain of the rainy season.

[Speaker B] Okay, or the rainy season itself is the sign.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Never mind, I’m speaking on the conceptual level. So okay, that is regarding the definition of domains for impurity and for Sabbath. I’m moving on to the law of a karpef. I don’t have much time left, I’ll try to finish it in the time remaining. In Ulla’s statement, what do we see? That a karpef is an area of—what is two se’ah? It’s an area in which you can sow two se’ah of—

[Speaker B] grain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They measured areas according to the question of how much grain could be sown in that area. That’s how they measured areas.

[Speaker B] But Rashi explains that it is the area of the whole courtyard of the Tabernacle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, doesn’t matter. That is the area of the Tabernacle courtyard, but “two se’ah” means the area in which two se’ah of grain are sown. Now he says, “even a kor and even two kor,” right? Meaning, even much more than two se’ah. There is no upper limit. Meaning, it starts from two se’ah and up.

[Speaker B] I heard that they sowed that amount there, or harvested that amount?

[Speaker E] No, sowed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t read it, I—

[Speaker E] I was careful when I said there is no maximum limit. Why? Because they still bring “even a kor and even two kor,” so I don’t know what they think beyond that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come on, but if there were an upper limit, they should have brought the upper limit—up to two kor.

[Speaker E] That’s why I—factually—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that it says “even a kor and even two kor”—leave it, they would have had to say “up to two kor”; otherwise it would just be confusing.

[Speaker E] True, but then why write that at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They want to say that any area whatsoever, doesn’t matter, there is no limit.

[Speaker E] I don’t know, I was cautious. I also saw afterward that there are variant readings.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some are cautious, but the simple meaning is not like that. The simple meaning is: if there is an upper limit, you need to give it. Why leave me in doubt? “Even a kor, even two kor,” but not five? Then say “up to five.” If they say “even a kor, even two kor,” the intention is: it doesn’t matter what amount it is.

[Speaker D] So it sounds like maybe such a thing could exist. What?

[Speaker B] An ocean. Could a private domain be completely unlimited?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it has four partitions, then everything is fine. Of course, the mathematicians among us can ask themselves: after all, in topology you can look at a domain defined by four fences and look at everything outside. Everything outside the four fences—the whole rest of planet Earth except for the four-by-four inside the fences—is enclosed by those same four boundaries.

[Speaker G] That assumes they knew the Earth was round and closed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They probably didn’t know.

[Speaker G] It’s already open, that problem.

[Speaker D] What? In Photoshop we have “select something” and then “deselect,” meaning choose the other side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The dual. Yes, yes. So in short, the claim is that there is no upper limit. But what do we see? We see, first, that by Torah law it is defined as a private domain, and by rabbinic law it is defined as a karmelit. That has several implications. First, it is forbidden to carry four cubits in this domain because it is like a karmelit by rabbinic law. On the other hand, someone who throws from a public domain into it, or from it into a public domain, has violated a Torah prohibition, because the stringency of treating it as a karmelit by rabbinic law is of course intended to be stricter, not more lenient. By Torah law it is still a private domain, and for purposes of stringency we view it as a private domain. Okay? Now, why the difference? Why is it not a private domain by rabbinic law? Why do they turn it into a karmelit? Because there are no dwellings in it. That is what the Talmudic text says, and that is also how Rashi explains it. What does “there are no dwellings in it” mean? We see that accessibility plays a role here—meaning, is there one person to whom it is accessible, or basically is there no specific person to whom it is accessible. But that role exists only on the rabbinic plane. Right? On the Torah plane it is clearly a private domain; it has four walls, and I don’t care that there are no dwellings there. And this strengthens what we saw in the previous part: for Sabbath purposes, what matters is the physical definitions, not the question of who uses it there or to what extent people live there or don’t live there. By rabbinic law they do take that into account, and we also saw that in the previous class: that the rabbis, by rabbinic law, are stringent and treat Sabbath domains like impurity domains, so that we do not get confused. But that is only rabbinic. Meaning, by Torah law, dwelling, ownership, accessibility do not play a role. If there are four walls, it is a private domain. In that sense, this continues exactly what we have seen until now. Okay? Now what happens if I take a karpef and carry from it to another karmelit, or from another karmelit to it? There is no problem.

[Speaker B] What? That’s not called transferring. Why? By Torah law, I mean, because a karmelit by Torah law is an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a karpef. A karpef is a private domain by Torah law.

[Speaker B] You’re saying that from a private domain by Torah law, carrying out to an exempt area is not a problem, right? By Torah law. But yes, by rabbinic law it would be forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listen, what Ruti is saying is this. Suppose we have an ordinary karmelit and a karpef next to it. Both have the status of karmelit by rabbinic law, but there is a difference between them by Torah law. An ordinary karmelit is, by Torah law, an exempt area, while a karpef is, by Torah law, a private domain. So seemingly we can put on two kinds of glasses. With Torah-law glasses, the transfer from one to the other is from a private domain to an exempt area, and that is permitted. With rabbinic-law glasses, it is from karmelit to karmelit, which is also permitted. Right?

[Speaker E] We haven’t yet decided that it is permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Karmelit to karmelit is the same domain to the same domain. What is the difference between moving within this karmelit from here to here and moving from this karmelit to that karmelit? There’s nothing there. But it’s permitted, that’s it. It’s one big karmelit. What difference does it make?

[Speaker B] And if you say it turns it into five domains. Can’t hear. If you say it is forbidden to carry from one to the other, then you’re basically saying there are five domains.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that is Tosafot’s argument; we’ll get there in a moment. But first I want to conduct the a priori discussion. Meaning: a priori, what would we say about such a thing? A priori, in such a case, if I now look at it—and this is one way of looking at it—I can look at it with Torah-law glasses and I can look at it with rabbinic-law glasses. Either way: with Torah-law glasses I did something permitted, and with rabbinic-law glasses I also did something permitted, so overall it is permitted. But not necessarily.

[Speaker E] What happens if I look at one side with Torah law and the other side with rabbinic law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then suddenly I have a private domain to a karmelit?

[Speaker E] Exactly. The question is how we rule that out—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do we reject it? But there’s another angle here. After all, in the end, defining something as a karmelit is meant to be a stringency, not a leniency. So if now a certain thing is a private domain on the Torah level, okay? And the thing next to it is a karmelit on the rabbinic level. Defining this as a karmelit rabbinically is meant to be stricter, not more lenient. And here you’re basically turning it into a leniency. Let’s say I would leave this karpef as a full private domain, not define it rabbinically as a karmelit, I’d leave it—wait—I’d leave it as a private domain, and I’d carry from it to another karmelit. Would there be a prohibition? Yes, obviously there would, right? From a private domain to a karmelit is forbidden. Now I defined it as a karmelit in order to be stricter about it, so now it becomes permitted? How? I’m trying to be strict, not lenient. Defining it as a karmelit was not meant to be lenient; otherwise, if it were meant to be lenient, then you could also carry from the public domain to a karmelit, because it’s a public domain only rabbinically—what’s the problem? It’s meant to be stricter. Wherever it creates a leniency, we go back to the Torah-level plane.

[Speaker B] But it’s meant to be stricter with respect to the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Who says? Simply speaking, that’s the definition.

[Speaker B] So that we won’t come to make a mistake, that if carrying in a karpef is permitted…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, you’re jumping ahead. All of this is written in the Talmud and in Tosafot. I’m asking the preliminary questions, before we even see the Talmud and Tosafot: what would we say on conceptual grounds? So on the one hand, the suggestion was: let’s look at it through rabbinic glasses and see that it’s permitted; through Torah-level glasses it’s also permitted; either way, it’s permitted. On the other hand, that’s not logical; that’s not the right way to look at it. Because in the normal framework, let’s say they had not turned the karpef into a karmelit, but had left it with its Torah-level status as a private domain—then taking from it to a karmelit would be a rabbinic prohibition. Now they made it stricter by viewing it as a karmelit, and because of that the rabbinic prohibition disappears? We came to be strict, not lenient. Rabbi, I didn’t understand what this is—

[Speaker E] Aside from dwelling. That people don’t live there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That people don’t live there, so a karpef—

[Speaker E] It is a private domain. If people don’t live there, it’s still a private domain on the Torah level, but rabbinically it’s a karmelit. Meaning, dwelling here isn’t the issue of people being present there; it’s an issue of habitation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s why I said that on the Torah-level plane—and on the Torah-level plane, habitation and accessibility to people don’t play a role. That’s exactly what I said before.

[Speaker E] And again we see that in the laws of the Sabbath, when we talk about a private domain, that doesn’t play a role.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. Both private domain and public domain—accessibility, to whom it’s accessible—that’s not a question that interests us in the laws of the Sabbath. Rabbinically, yes. And we already saw that rabbinically, yes, which is why they defined a karmelit. Okay?

[Speaker B] Fine, so this point about habitation—it signals to everyone that obviously this is a private domain. But in a karpef, which isn’t used for dwelling?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s rabbinic, but that’s all a rabbinic consideration. It’s all true, but it’s still a rabbinic consideration. On the Torah level it makes no difference. Now, the Talmud.

[Speaker F] But wouldn’t we say the same thing if it were two karmelits of the same type? No.

[Speaker D] No,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if it were two karmelits of the same type, then even if we didn’t determine one of them to be a karmelit, it would still be a permitted action.

[Speaker F] From an exempt area, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From an exempt area to a karmelit—that’s exactly the point. Therefore the question only arises from a karpef to a karmelit.

[Speaker D] Now, why is there a difference between karmelits? Sorry—what’s the significance?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the Torah-level plane, what were they?

[Speaker C] Where does it come from? Where does it come from?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A karpef, on the Torah-level plane, was a private domain. Yes. A regular karmelit, on the Torah level, was an exempt area.

[Speaker D] So am I relying on what it was on the Torah level? That’s the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In order to relate to it. I’m raising possibilities here. So far we still haven’t seen anything. I’m asking what we would say on conceptual grounds. So first there was the thought that either way it’s permitted—on the Torah level it’s permitted and on the rabbinic level too. And then I said, what do you mean? That’s not logical. And simply speaking, it ought to be forbidden. Let’s see the Talmud. The Talmud itself deals with this—apparently it deals with this. A passage in Eruvin 67: a space of up to two beit se’ah, where carrying is permitted throughout, the Rabbis forbade carrying not from the sea into it—like that rock, yes, inside the sea—not from the sea into it and not from it into the sea. What is the reason? Because it is a complete private domain. That’s up to two beit se’ah. More than two beit se’ah, when it already becomes a karpef, where carrying throughout it is forbidden—because it is a karmelit, so carrying four cubits within it is forbidden—the Rabbis permitted carrying from it to the sea and from the sea into it. If I stopped here, that would be very surprising. Like I said before, simply speaking it ought to be forbidden. Defining it as a karmelit is meant to be stricter, not more lenient. But notice, the Talmud itself asks: what is the reason? Meaning, the Talmud itself also doesn’t take this as an obvious law. The Talmud too understands that in principle it should have been forbidden. It just gives a reason—why? Lest people say, it is a complete private domain, and then come to carry throughout it. If we were to define it as forbidden, then people would think it’s a private domain, and they’d come to carry four cubits there in a karmelit. It’s a kind of decree upon a decree. Yes, it’s a concern that they’ll come to violate a rabbinic prohibition. But leave that aside; you do find things like that. So you see that the Talmud needs arguments to explain why they permitted it. Because really it should have been forbidden. There’s no such consideration of: either way, rabbinically permitted, Torah-level permitted. That’s wrong. More than that—the Talmud asks: what’s the reasoning? The concern is that they’ll come to carry throughout it. And what is different about within it, which is common, as opposed to from it to the sea and from the sea into it, which is uncommon? So then permit also from the sea into it and from it into the sea as well—just permit it entirely so there won’t be a problem. It says no, that’s uncommon. So again you need two conditions, two cumulative conditions, or this reasoning is made up of two components. One component: I have motivation to prevent people from thinking this is a private domain. On the other hand, I’m not going to permit everything. I’m going to permit the uncommon things. And the common things I won’t permit. And uncommon things I will permit only in order to leave a reminder that this thing is not a private domain. Tosafot there writes: up to this point, a marshland—this is a rock in the sea.

[Speaker E] Yes, I didn’t understand why it’s a karpef.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s like a karpef, because that rock is a private domain. Yes. The sea all around it, yes. You have a rock; it’s high, so it has partitions around it—the sides of the rock itself. We already saw this; it’s like a mound and a fence, right? That too is called partitions. Okay? Now—but this is a rock in the sea. Is it the same with an ordinary karpef on dry land? Apparently yes, no? Maybe yes and maybe no. On the other hand, not necessarily. Because maybe with an ordinary karpef on land, it could be common to carry from it outward.

[Speaker E] Exactly. Or maybe specifically with a rock in the sea it’s common to carry from it to the sea, and in a karpef—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, within it, carrying is forbidden in any case. Inside the karpef, carrying is forbidden in any case.

[Speaker E] But they were concerned—but why did they permit this? Because they said there’s no concern that people will carry from the rock to the sea, but there is concern that they’ll carry inside it, so they were strict about that and they said that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that there’s no concern they’ll come to carry from the rock to the sea—the opposite. They didn’t permit carrying from the rock; the concern is only that they’ll come to move something four cubits inside it.

[Speaker E] That’s the concern.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what, then—what do you want to permit in order to solve that concern? Whether to permit… from the sea into it and from it into the sea—that’s uncommon; I don’t want to permit that.

[Speaker B] The difference between a rock and a karpef is exactly the issue of commonness. Again? The difference between a rock and a karpef is exactly the issue of commonness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that could be. Apparently there is a difference here in terms of commonness, because when the two-beit-se’ah area is next to a portico, for example, or various other things, there are situations where it’s next to a regular karmelit, so it could certainly be common to transfer from one to the other. It’s not like a rock and the sea. Who makes transfers from the rock to the sea? That’s not something that usually happens.

[Speaker B] On land too there’s much more sensitivity than in the sea.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So Tosafot says: what is the reason? Lest people say it is a complete private domain. From here Rabbeinu Tam permitted—I’m reading—regarding a garden larger than two beit se’ah that was not enclosed for dwelling, yes, like a beit se’ah karpef—to carry from it, sorry, a karpef—to carry from it outward he permitted, since there was no complete public domain, such as a main thoroughfare or city plaza, passing in front of it. Yes, to another karmelit, not to a public domain of course—to another karmelit he permitted it. Meaning, he says this is not only about a rock in the sea but also an ordinary karpef on land. What about commonness? There is commonness. He ignores the issue of commonness. I think that’s—I don’t know exactly why.

[Speaker E] He writes why. What? Nothing is common. He writes afterward that otherwise—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One would have to distinguish in the case of the rock, because there it is due to lack of commonness, for the whole point of this decree is so that one not come to carry throughout it. And this reasoning applies here too. Fine—but still, he—

[Speaker E] He writes at the end that otherwise we’d end up with five domains, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s his proof that it’s not like that. But I’m asking about the reasoning: why did they establish it this way? I understand he has a good proof that this is indeed how the Sages established it, but I’m asking about the Sages themselves—why did they establish it this way? What’s the difference between a karpef and a rock? What are you saying—that it’s common? So what?

[Speaker E] Fine, but until now people are going to make distinctions between the rock? People know what a karpef is. How much can they really go into the details of whether it’s a rock or someone’s garden?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even with the rock, I wouldn’t make distinctions between common and uncommon. You could take this further. But I don’t know—there is such an element in Rabbeinu Tam, and I just want to finish, so let’s just complete the point. So he says there it’s uncommon, yes, but the whole point of this decree is so that one not come to carry throughout it. But we see in our Talmud that this is not correct. To prevent carrying throughout it, we permit only uncommon things; we do not permit common things. So you need both things together in order to permit. For some reason he ignores that. Maybe because they didn’t make distinctions—I don’t know exactly why. Look also at the Shulchan Arukh: if you notice, the Shulchan Arukh does not bring in the issue of commonness. Not the Mishnah Berurah, not the Shulchan Arukh. Any place enclosed by partitions without a roof, like a courtyard larger than two beit se’ah that was not enclosed for dwelling, the Sages forbade carrying in it, and they permitted taking from it to another karmelit, such as an open field in front of it. He too accepts Rabbeinu Tam’s ruling, even though there is no issue of commonness here.

[Speaker B] And also the Mishnah Berurah—maybe it was because of their living conditions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Again?

[Speaker B] Maybe here it was a matter of their living conditions, that in their places there weren’t eruvin and…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then let him say that he permits it because it’s difficult—but he doesn’t write that either.

[Speaker B] And also the example of the key.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t write that either—but let him write it.

[Speaker B] So why does he bring the example of the key and the house? I didn’t understand. The example he brought.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who is “he”?

[Speaker B] The earlier one too—who was it before? Rabbeinu Tam? Yes, and here too it’s about a key that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does that mean? I didn’t understand. So what do you learn from that?

[Speaker B] I want to say that if these are rabbinic prohibitions and there’s a very great public need here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t write that. He doesn’t write that it’s because of great need. He writes the opposite: in order that they not come to carry… Meaning, this leniency is not meant to make things easier for us; it is meant to ensure that we don’t violate the prohibition of carrying four cubits in a karmelit. Yes. So also in the Mishnah Berurah, when he explains it, same thing—he basically says that… he brings the law of Rabbeinu Tam and doesn’t mention the issue of commonness. It’s a bit strange how this whole point gets skipped over. Now I’m not going to go into the Biur Halakhah, which brings there the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about the measure of a karpef. He gets into the question whether there needs to be an upper limit—meaning when you can’t see the walls from the sides anymore, then it no longer counts as a private domain. Fine, that’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The question is what the essence of a partition is. You could say that maybe that’s the dispute here: is the role of a partition to give me the feeling that I’m inside a closed area of my own, or is the role of a partition to stop people outside from entering my area? We talked about this once—I don’t remember in which class—we once discussed these two ways of looking at a partition. Or maybe we talked about it when we discussed “extend upward.” When I’m standing on top of something, then I have partitions below me. I myself don’t feel that there are partitions around me, because I’m on top, but people outside looking at me see a barrier in front of their eyes. And that’s exactly the question: does it also need to project onto me? So one who says that “extend upward” applies—“extend upward” above the rock—he is basically saying that I too need to feel that there are partitions around me. Therefore “extend upward” creates legal partitions; I don’t exactly feel them, but I need to sense that there is an “extend upward” here because there need to be partitions around me. One who says no—even without “extend upward” it is a private domain—why? Because someone looking from the public domain sees partitions in front of him. And that’s enough. Exactly that same discussion can be seen here in the Biur Halakhah. Now, there is a Rashi here in our passage who writes as follows: for example, where it has partitions. It comes to teach us that even though it was enclosed more than two beit se’ah and was not enclosed for dwelling—the key phrase: that no house was adjacent to it beforehand—

[Speaker G] before the enclosure, before—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] before the enclosure—one might have said that carrying from it would make it a karmelit, etc.

[Speaker G] What do we see?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We see in Rashi that if there had been a nearby house—if no house was adjacent to it before the enclosure—even if there is a house, it just came after the enclosure, it is still a karpef.

[Speaker B] That reminds me of impurity in the rainy season or in the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it reminds me more of the law of walled cities with regard to houses in walled cities. There’s a Talmudic passage in Arakhin where they discuss “enclosed and afterward inhabited” or “inhabited and afterward enclosed.” Meaning—I’m not going to get into it here. In any case, from Rashi here the later authorities (Acharonim) infer that Rashi maintains that even if it is enclosed for dwelling, and even if there is a dwelling inside it, it still has the status of a karpef, in which carrying four cubits inside is forbidden, if the dwelling came into existence after the enclosure. Everything is determined by the question of when you built the wall around it.

[Speaker B] Which came first, the karpef—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. If when you built the wall there was already a house inside, then that wall simply defines a private domain. And it is not a karpef. Even if it’s large, that changes nothing. If there is a house inside and someone lives there, then it’s a house with a large courtyard. When does it have the law of a karpef? When there are no dwellings. “No dwellings” means no one lives there inside that karpef. Rashi says yes—but even if someone does live there, if the dwelling only began after the wall was built, it still has the law of a karpef.

[Speaker B] What can be done with the sanctity of Joshua—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] It reminds me of the saying of the Sages that Joshua sanctified it for its time, and in the Second Temple period they sanctified it on—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How is that connected?

[Speaker B] How is it connected? Because in the conquest of the Land in Joshua’s time, first they conquered the perimeter and only afterward built Jerusalem. But in the enduring sanctity of the Second Temple period, first they built Jerusalem and then conquered the perimeter. So therefore its sanctity remained for future generations. In Joshua’s case it wasn’t for future generations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How—

[Speaker C] Do you know that’s correct according to the sequence—

[Speaker B] There’s a saying of the Sages like that.

[Speaker C] I don’t know,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to look into that; I don’t know. But let’s continue, let’s continue, because I want to finish the… give me a moment to finish the topic; this is taking us to distant places. Let me just finish. So the point is this: Rabbi Akiva Eiger—did you see Rabbi Akiva Eiger? Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s note on Rashi? He refers to two Rashis, on page 80 and on page 99, where Rashi writes that even a karpef larger than two beit se’ah is not a private domain at all. If it was not enclosed for dwelling, it is not a private domain at all, not even on the Torah level. Or in other words, the law of karpef has a Torah-level dimension; it is not entirely rabbinic. If it is larger than two beit se’ah, it will not be a private domain. Maybe it will be an exempt area, but not a private domain. Rabbinically it will be a karmelit.

[Speaker B] But that’s the opposite of what it says here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it’s the opposite of what it says—

[Speaker F] Rabbi—

[Speaker B] Akiva Eiger—

[Speaker F] Half of it is really two by two beit se’ah—

[Speaker B] More than two beit se’ah is the minimum… I didn’t understand… the minimum size is more than two beit se’ah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the minimum size doesn’t matter. I’m talking about something above two beit se’ah. According to Rashi, what is its Torah-level status? If it was not enclosed for dwelling, what is its Torah-level status? We understand that on the Torah level it is a private domain. Why? Because private domain doesn’t care about habitation and accessibility; we talked about that, because that was about impurity, not the Sabbath. Rashi says that’s not true; already on the Torah level it is not a private domain. Meaning, the fact that it is not enclosed for dwelling also plays a role in defining the domains of the Sabbath on the Torah level. Again, this somewhat joins the Rashbam that we saw, and the things we saw in the previous class: accessibility to people determines the status even on the Torah level, not only rabbinically.

[Speaker B] Meaning, so he goes according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rav Ashi—

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand… Rav Ashi says that a valley with partitions, enclosed by partitions, is a private domain, but after all it’s not for dwelling. A valley isn’t for dwelling, so what difference does it make whether it’s enclosed by partitions? I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—now, that’s obvious, it goes against our Talmud. So in our Talmud you really do see that it goes against our Talmud, because in our Talmud you see otherwise, and that’s how Sefat Emet raises the difficulty; that’s how the later authorities (Acharonim) ask. I’ll do it briefly. Both the Hatam Sofer and the Sefat Emet say as follows—just a second—they say as follows: if this thing has no dwelling in it at all, then it is not a private domain. But if it has dwellings that came after it was enclosed, then it is a private domain—

[Speaker D] on the Torah level, and rabbinically it turns into a karpef. Wait, wait, that’s exactly our valley, if there’s something afterward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi there are three possibilities for a two-beit-se’ah area. One possibility: it has no—

[Speaker D] dwellings.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not a private domain on the Torah level; it is an exempt area that turns into a karpef rabbinically.

[Speaker D] If—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there are dwellings in it from the outset, then it is a private domain and does not turn into a karpef; it is just an ordinary private domain and remains a private domain. If there are dwellings in it but they came into existence after the enclosure, then it is a private domain on the Torah level that turns into a karpef rabbinically.

[Speaker D] And if there are no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] dwellings at all—that’s what I said before—then it isn’t a private domain at all; it’s a regular karmelit. A karmelit rabbinically, but on the Torah level it is a private domain. Our passage is talking about a case where there are dwellings, but they came into existence after the enclosure. Therefore our Talmud says there that on the Torah level it is a private domain that turns into a karpef rabbinically. And that is why Rashi here says: where it was enclosed and afterward there was a dwelling in it. Because Rashi wants to tell us: know that here we’re dealing with a very special two-beit-se’ah area—there are dwellings in it now, only they came into being after the wall, and there it is a private domain on the Torah level. But if there are no dwellings at all—even now there are no dwellings—then even on the Torah level it is not a private domain.

[Speaker D] According to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that, what comes out in Rashi—and here I’ll finish—is that this joins what we already saw in the previous class as well, or in the first half of this class: in this Rashi, habitation and accessibility to people play a role in defining the domains even for the Sabbath, not only for impurity.

[Speaker F] Like in Maimonides regarding a private domain, as if in an alleyway open to the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot and the Tur, not Maimonides.

[Speaker B] This Rashi fits not with Ulla’s view but with Rav Ashi. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] This Rashi fits better with Ulla’s view and not with Rav Ashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine—now that you hear this, it no longer changes anything. Once in our case, according to Rav Ashi, it was enclosed and afterward there was dwelling in it, then it is a private domain; and according to Ulla it wasn’t enclosed, so there’s no problem. Fine. Okay, we’ll stop here.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much. Thank you very, very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—Rabbi—

[Speaker D] Do you think this is going to continue like this?

Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 40

Table of Contents

Summary

General overview

The conclusion of the previous lecture and the expectation regarding the definition for impurity

A fenced valley in the passage of Ulla and Rav Ashi, and the assumption that fencing belongs only to Sabbath law

Tosafot in Bava Batra on the rainy season: Rabbeinu Chananel versus Tosafot

How the views fit the thesis about the nature of the question in impurity

Another Tosafot in Bava Batra and the claim that the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi affects impurity

The Talmud in Bava Batra on Rava: inertia of status and doubt

Rashash: resolving Rashbam through Rav Ashi and two cumulative conditions

Maimonides and Tosafot: Rava as a rule in doubts, not a rule in domains

Karpaf, beit se’atayim, and the tension between physical definitions and considerations of habitation

Eruvin 67: permitting transfer from a karpaf to the sea in order to prevent a mistake in carrying within it

Rashi on karpaf: enclosed and only afterward used for habitation, and a possible implication at the Torah level

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General overview

The conclusion of the previous lecture and the expectation regarding the definition for impurity

A fenced valley in the passage of Ulla and Rav Ashi, and the assumption that fencing belongs only to Sabbath law

Tosafot in Bava Batra on the rainy season: Rabbeinu Chananel versus Tosafot

How the views fit the thesis about the nature of the question in impurity

Another Tosafot in Bava Batra and the claim that the dispute between Ulla and Rav Ashi affects impurity

The Talmud in Bava Batra on Rava: inertia of status and doubt

Rashash: resolving Rashbam through Rav Ashi and two cumulative conditions

Maimonides and Tosafot: Rava as a rule in doubts, not a rule in domains

Karpaf, beit se’atayim, and the tension between physical definitions and considerations of habitation

Eruvin 67: permitting transfer from a karpaf to the sea in order to prevent a mistake in carrying within it

Rashi on karpaf: enclosed and only afterward used for habitation, and a possible implication at the Torah level

Full Transcript

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