Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 34
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Opening the topic: interposition versus “walking is like standing”
- Maimonides’ ruling and its connection to “caught as if placed”
- Two fundamental ways of understanding “walking is like standing” and Maimonides’ conclusion
- “Walking is like standing” in the Talmud: description of the law versus rationale
- The Rif’s approach and the nature of his work as opposed to Maimonides
- A close reading of the Rif’s ruling: does he rule like Ben Azzai?
- The Rosh’s and Ran’s objections: no proof from Rabbi Yohanan, and the law follows the Rabbis
- Rabbeinu Yonah’s proof from the previous topic: one who moves objects from corner to corner
- The proof from the chapter “These Young Women” in Ketubot and the sharpening point about nullifying the first lifting
- A proposed resolution of the Rif’s view as a dispute between Talmudic passages
- Further questions according to Ben Azzai: carrying four cubits and stopping to adjust versus stopping to rest
Summary
General Overview
The lesson continues from the topic of “walking is like standing”, after last time the focus was on the exemption of interposition. Beyond that, it presents the claim that the question of why we need a discussion of “walking is like standing” keeps coming up because the exemption of interposition is always sitting in the background. Maimonides’ ruling is brought, that walking is not like standing, and that one is liable for carrying from a private domain to a public domain through an exempt area. From his wording and his a fortiori argument, a conceptual understanding is built: for him, “walking is like standing” and “caught as if placed” are understood as completing the requirement of placing/standing, not as waiving it. Then the Rif’s ruling is discussed through the passages he chooses to quote, the possible inference that he rules like Ben Azzai, and the Rosh’s and Ran’s objections, who maintain that the law follows the Sages and bring proofs from other passages, especially from the chapter “These Young Women” in tractate Ketubot. Finally, a possibility is proposed to reconcile the Rif: that he treats this as a dispute between Talmudic passages and understands that Ben Azzai does not nullify the first lifting. This is also presented as a solution to the difficulty of carrying four cubits in the public domain according to Ben Azzai.
Opening the topic: interposition versus “walking is like standing”
The lesson states that the previous focus was on the exemption of interposition and not on “walking is like standing”, and that the question arises why we need to invoke “walking is like standing” if there is already an exemption of interposition. The Talmud asks this according to the Sages, since one could say they impose liability because, in their view, there is no exemption of interposition, and it asks how we know there is no exemption in such a case. The lesson adds that according to the Talmud’s assumption here, one could have asked the same question in Ben Azzai’s opinion as well: perhaps he exempts because of the interposition exemption and not because of “walking is like standing.” It is noted that Tosafot makes this point later on.
Maimonides’ ruling and its connection to “caught as if placed”
Maimonides rules that one who carries from a private domain to a public domain and passes through an exempt area is liable, because walking is not like standing; he rules like the Sages. Maimonides adds, “and needless to say,” that if one throws an object and it passes through an exempt area, it is not regarded as though it came to rest there. This is interpreted to mean that Maimonides is building an a fortiori argument from walking to throwing, not merely an analogy. The lesson explains that this a fortiori argument shows that according to Maimonides, standing/placing is required; the question is only whether walking or “caught” is considered to fulfill that requirement. So if walking does not fulfill standing, then all the more so an object in the air is not considered as though it was placed.
Two fundamental ways of understanding “walking is like standing” and Maimonides’ conclusion
The lesson presents one possible understanding: that “walking is like standing” means that no actual standing is needed at all; it is enough that the object is simply present in the domain. This parallels a possible reading of “caught as if placed”, according to which no actual placing is needed. The lesson distinguishes between “standing” in the sense of zero velocity and “being present” in the sense of mere presence, and mentions a philosophical article that was sent about Zeno’s arrow to sharpen that distinction. The lesson concludes that from Maimonides’ a fortiori argument it follows that he understands Ben Azzai to mean that standing is required, except that Ben Azzai counts the very act of walking as standing. Therefore Maimonides explains that “walking is not like standing” means the requirement exists, but walking does not satisfy it.
“Walking is like standing” in the Talmud: description of the law versus rationale
The lesson says that the Talmudic phrase “walking is like standing” could be read merely as a description of the law, meaning that it obligates or exempts just like standing does, without claiming that walking is literally standing, if one assumes standing is not actually required. The lesson argues that Maimonides reads it as a rationale and not as a description, because he formulates the requirement in terms of standing and rules that walking does not fulfill it. The lesson concludes that most halakhic authorities, including the Shulchan Arukh, rule like the Sages that walking is not like standing.
The Rif’s approach and the nature of his work as opposed to Maimonides
The lesson explains that Maimonides writes rulings without showing the flow of the Talmudic discussion, so figuring out how he derived his ruling from the Talmud is the learner’s job. The lesson describes the Rif as someone who quotes the Talmud and extracts from it a halakhic summary in the order of the passages, so what he brings is itself the ruling, and he skips discussions that are not practically relevant to Jewish law. The lesson adds, parenthetically, in the name of Menachem Elon, that almost no full halakhic “codex” covering all fields of Jewish law was ever written. It defines a codex as a book that decides every area and is organized by topic, presents Maimonides as the clearest codex, and mentions Arukh HaShulchan as somewhat close to that, while noting the principled controversies over writing codices at all.
A close reading of the Rif’s ruling: does he rule like Ben Azzai?
The Rif brings the baraita: “One who carries from a shop to the open plaza by way of a portico is liable, and Ben Azzai exempts, because he holds that walking is like standing.” Then he brings Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, “Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws,” and the baraita that details that Ben Azzai exempts in carrying in and out, but obligates in throwing and handing over. The lesson argues that from the continuation of what he cites, it sounds like the Rif rules like Ben Azzai, because otherwise there would be no need to clarify what Ben Azzai concedes. The lesson notes that this creates a difficulty because of the rule that the law follows the majority when the Sages dispute an individual, and it is suggested that perhaps the Rif remained uncertain. Still, the Rosh and the Ran initially understand the Rif as intending to rule like Ben Azzai.
The Rosh’s and Ran’s objections: no proof from Rabbi Yohanan, and the law follows the Rabbis
The Rosh writes, “It appears that Rav Alfasi rules like Ben Azzai,” and asks in surprise, “Why does he rule like the individual?” He rejects the proof from Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, “Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws,” because it is normal for Amoraim to explain Tannaitic views even when the law does not follow them. The Rosh concludes, “And it seems that the law follows the Rabbis,” and notes that this is what Maimonides wrote in chapter 14 of the laws of the Sabbath, and what Rabbeinu Yonah also wrote. The lesson explains that this is why the Shulchan Arukh can rule like Maimonides, since among the three pillars of halakhic ruling—the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides—two stand against the Rif in this case.
Rabbeinu Yonah’s proof from the previous topic: one who moves objects from corner to corner
The Rosh brings in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah that Rabbi Yohanan himself holds that walking is not like standing, based on the statement: “One who moves objects from corner to corner and then changes his mind about them and takes them out is exempt, because the original lifting was not for that purpose.” The proof is that if walking is like standing were enough to impose liability, then when he changed his mind while walking he should have been liable, as though he had stood. The lesson suggests that perhaps the Rif could answer that the first lifting remains determinative, and the act of walking does not nullify it; therefore even if walking is like standing, it still does not create a new lifting that cancels the first. But it is then said that the Rosh brings another proof from the chapter “These Young Women,” which weakens that defense.
The proof from the chapter “These Young Women” in Ketubot and the sharpening point about nullifying the first lifting
The lesson explains that the Rosh and the Ran refer to Ketubot, chapter “These Young Women,” page 31, where the conclusion says, “Rather, this is in accordance with Ben Azzai.” In that way Ben Azzai is presented as an alternative to the statement of Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Yohanan. The lesson adds a substantive analysis of the passage in Ketubot around the principle of “he incurs the greater punishment,” and argues that there it emerges that according to Ben Azzai, not only is walking like standing, but the walking also creates a new lifting that nullifies the original lifting; otherwise it would not help to identify the case specifically with Ben Azzai. The lesson notes that the Rosh and the Ran present this more in terms of wording and alternative framing, but one can understand them as pointing as well to this deeper point about nullifying the original lifting.
A proposed resolution of the Rif’s view as a dispute between Talmudic passages
The lesson proposes that the Rif may understand there to be a dispute between Talmudic passages, and may rule like our passage, according to which Ben Azzai says walking is like standing but the walking does not nullify the original lifting. The lesson describes this as a possible way to resolve the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yohanan’s statements about Ben Azzai here and Rabbi Yohanan’s statement in the previous passage about someone moving objects. Against this, it presents the Rosh’s and Ran’s approach, which does not create a dispute between passages, but rather explains that Rabbi Yohanan is only interpreting Ben Azzai, while for his own view he rules like the Rabbis.
Further questions according to Ben Azzai: carrying four cubits and stopping to adjust versus stopping to rest
The lesson mentions the question raised by medieval authorities (Rishonim): according to Ben Azzai, how can one be liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain if walking is like standing? It would seem that there is, so to speak, a lifting and placing at every moment, and each stretch is less than four cubits. The lesson raises another question: how does this fit with the distinction learned earlier between stopping to adjust the load, which is not considered standing, and stopping to rest, which is considered standing, if according to Ben Azzai even walking itself counts as standing? The lesson concludes by claiming that according to the proposed explanation of the Rif, the difficulty of carrying four cubits never gets off the ground, because the original lifting remains the determining one and there is no chain of new liftings that breaks up the four cubits. It is suggested that this is a good reason to adopt the Rif’s direction and continue with it in the next lesson.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s begin. Did Yael arrive? She’s in the room,
[Speaker B] This will close in just a moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in the topic of “walking is like standing.” We went over the passage last time, and really the focus of the discussion was the exemption of interposition, not “walking is like standing,” because that’s really what sits there in the background of the discussion. The question keeps coming up: why do we even need to get to a discussion of “walking is like standing”? After all, there’s the exemption of interposition here. The Talmud asks this according to the Sages: how do you know the Sages hold that walking is not like standing? Maybe they impose liability because in their opinion there is no exemption of interposition. And then the Talmud asks: how do you know that in such a case one is not exempt? And I thought that according to the Talmud’s assumption here, you could also raise the very same question about Ben Azzai and say that what Ben Azzai exempts is because of the exemption of interposition and not because of “walking is like standing.” We’ll see later—Tosafot actually points this out. Tosafot in our passage actually points this out. But for our purposes, we’re now moving on to deal with the law of “walking is like standing.” Last time I dealt with it only within the framework of the passage, but now let’s talk about “walking is like standing” itself. Maimonides rules—I’ll share the file. Maimonides basically rules as follows: One who carries from a private domain to a public domain and passed through an exempt area that was between them—that’s the portico—is liable in the course of his walking, because walking is not like standing. He rules like the Sages. And look at what follows: “And needless to say” in the case of one who throws, where the object passed through an exempt area, it is not considered as though it rested there. If in the case of walking we rule that it is not like standing, then in the case of throwing, “caught,” certainly it is not as though it was placed. Maimonides is basically comparing here the law of “walking is like standing” to the law of “caught as if placed.” That’s why he said that if we rule that walking is not like standing, then all the more so “caught” is not as if placed. You see the same in the Shulchan Arukh and elsewhere. In Maimonides’ wording, the connection he makes between the law of “walking is like standing” and the law of “caught as if placed” is not made by way of analogy; there is an a fortiori argument here. He says—look at the wording here,
[Speaker C] “And needless to say.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you say that walking is like standing—if we rule that walking is not like standing, sorry—then all the more so “caught” is not as though it was placed. Why is this an a fortiori argument?
[Speaker D] Because if when the object is on you it still doesn’t count as you standing, as having made a placement, then certainly if it’s in the air that doesn’t count as having made a placement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that basically, in Maimonides, I could have raised two fundamental possibilities for understanding the law of “walking is like standing.” And this also came up in the context of “caught as if placed.”
[Speaker C] Walking is several actions, a step, and throwing is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. You could have said it in two ways, why “walking is like standing.” One possibility is to understand that you simply don’t need standing. Even if you’re walking, the main thing is that the object is basically in the private domain and then with you in the public domain. You don’t need there to be a lifting and a placing and that you stand and so on. If you remember, these possibilities also came up regarding the law of “caught as if placed,” where the claim is not that what is “caught” is really considered as though it was placed, but rather that it doesn’t need to be placed; it’s enough that it is present. If you remember, I sent you my philosophical article about Zeno’s arrow, where I tried to distinguish between the question of where the object is, when the object is standing still, and the question of when the object is present somewhere. “Standing” means present at zero velocity. So “standing” and “being present” are not synonyms. Then one could have said that “walking is like standing”—why? Not because the walking is literally considered standing, but because standing isn’t needed. It is enough that the object is with you in the domain. Or—from the private domain and you take it out to the public domain—it does not need to stand in the private domain; it needs to be present in the private domain. Now, if that were the conception, there would be no room to make an a fortiori argument between the law that walking is not like standing and the law that “caught” is not as though placed. After all, there’s no difference between walking and “caught”; in both cases the object is in the domain, it just isn’t resting on it, it isn’t standing on it, but it is there. So there would be no room for an a fortiori argument. From the fact that Maimonides doesn’t just make an analogy but makes an a fortiori argument, that’s a hint that Maimonides probably understands Ben Azzai—he doesn’t rule like him, but what does Ben Azzai hold?—that “walking is like standing” does not mean that standing isn’t needed, but that mere presence is enough.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, Rabbi, we can’t hear you, and there’s also an echo, and just now you cut out.
[Speaker B] Can you hear now?
[Speaker E] We can hear, but the quality isn’t good.
[Speaker B] The internal microphone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How about now? Better now?
[Speaker E] A little better, yes, the echo is gone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The problem was the wrong microphone, the computer’s microphone. So the claim is that if Maimonides doesn’t just make an analogy between the law that walking is not like standing and the law that “caught” is not as though placed, but makes an a fortiori argument, that means that when he understands Ben Azzai—Ben Azzai says “walking is like standing”—it does not mean that you don’t need to stand, only that it’s enough to be present. Because if that were the case, then what difference is there between the object flying and me walking with the object? In both cases the object is in the same domain. It’s not resting there, but it doesn’t need to be resting there. In Maimonides you can see that he understands Ben Azzai as saying that “walking is like standing” means you do need standing—not that you don’t need standing—but that walking too counts as standing. We’ll see later why, but walking too counts as standing. And to that Maimonides says: if walking doesn’t count as standing, then when the object is flying that certainly doesn’t count as standing. That’s how you can understand the a fortiori argument Maimonides makes here between walking and throwing or flying. You can also see it in Maimonides’ wording—really already in the Talmud’s wording, but in Maimonides it’s stronger because he repeats it—Maimonides says that walking is not like standing. Meaning, standing is in fact required; it’s just that walking does not fulfill that requirement. So you can see that Maimonides understands Ben Azzai as not saying that standing is not required, only that it is enough for the object to be in the private domain and then pass to the public domain. Standing is required; Ben Azzai just claims that walking also fulfills that requirement, it counts as standing. And also with “caught as if placed,” Maimonides says that it is not considered as though it rested there. So you can see that according to Maimonides the object has to come to rest. Rabbi Akiva’s claim that “caught is as if placed” is that even if the object is flying, it is considered as though it is placed. But that doesn’t mean that it is not required—that the object need not be placed. It is required; it’s just that even a flying object is considered as an object at rest. That is Maimonides’ view. We’ll see later that perhaps there are medieval authorities who learn otherwise, but that’s how it seems here.
[Speaker E] Could one say that basically the whole approach—everyone who agrees with or rejects the statement that “walking is like standing”—precisely holds by this method, that walking is a kind of standing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that basically even from the wording—
[Speaker E] Of the Talmud, Ben Azzai, it’s presence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even from the wording of the Talmud you can infer this. The Talmud doesn’t say that walking is also okay; it says that walking is like standing.
[Speaker E] Meaning that the requirement is standing, there is a requirement of standing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Although with the expression “walking is like standing,” there was room to say that walking has the same legal status as standing because standing is not required—not that walking is considered standing, but—
[Speaker B] Also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Walking has the same law as standing—why? Because standing isn’t required; what is required is presence. So in the Talmud the inference is weaker. But in Maimonides, when he makes this a fortiori argument and this comparison, then it’s pretty clear that Maimonides apparently took it really as a rationale, not as a description. In the Talmud, when we say “walking is like standing,” you could understand that as describing the legal result, not giving the rationale. The legal description is that walking too entails liability just like standing, that’s all. But not that walking is considered standing; it doesn’t need to be considered standing, because one does not need to stand. Walking is like standing because standing is not needed—that’s just a description. Maimonides understands “walking is like standing” as a rationale, not a description. Walking is considered standing and therefore he is liable—or in our case, therefore he is exempt, but that doesn’t matter. Because the walking is considered standing—that means there is a requirement that there be standing, except that walking too is considered standing. That’s apparently how Maimonides understood it. In lesson twenty-nine, thirty, where I talked about this, I raised the possibility that maybe placing simply isn’t required—not that placing is required but this too counts as placing. We saw a Tosafot like that earlier in the year too. I’m not going into that here. In any case, in Maimonides it apparently isn’t so, and the plain sense of the Talmudic wording also seems not to be so. But in the Talmud one could still say that it’s only a description and not a rationale. “Walking is like standing” in terms of its legal status, like something literally standing. So that’s Maimonides, and Maimonides rules like the Sages. And that’s how most decisors, including the Shulchan Arukh, rule: that walking is not like standing. Now with the Rif the situation is more complicated. I wrote to you that in the Rif there are advantages to the Rif and advantages to Maimonides from the point of view of our trying to understand how they learned the Talmud. With Maimonides it’s a bit hard to understand how he learned, how he understood the Talmud, because Maimonides brings halakhic rulings; he doesn’t enter into the question of how to understand the Talmud and how the ruling emerges from the Talmud. That’s all our work. We try to understand how Maimonides derived his rulings from the Talmud. Maimonides writes the rulings, that’s it. The Rif, by contrast, quotes the Talmud. He didn’t write a separate book of rulings. The Rif wrote a halakhic digest that emerges from the passage in the order of the passage. By the way, as a parenthetical remark, this is something many people don’t notice, and Menachem Elon talked about it in his book Jewish Law: in the entire history of Jewish law there is no full halakhic codex at all. None was written. Except for two—really one, which is Maimonides, only Maimonides.
[Speaker E] And Arukh HaShulchan,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Arukh HaShulchan, if I include with it Arukh HaShulchan HeAtid.
[Speaker E] The future one, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that basically the standard Torah works, even those that summarize the laws, are not codices. The Rif is not a codex because he didn’t really collect the laws and classify them by topic. He goes through the Talmudic passages, and in each passage he extracts the halakhic essence. That is not what’s called a codex. Even the Shulchan Arukh, which is a codex, is a partial codex—only the laws that apply nowadays—and it also brings different opinions, which means it’s also not really a codex. The only codex we know in Jewish law is basically Maimonides, and as I said earlier, Arukh HaShulchan is also somewhat—
[Speaker C] What about a codex—what? What’s the definition of a codex?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A codex is basically a collection of laws, a law book—a collection of laws that issues a decision on every halakhic question in every area of Jewish law, organized by subject. Okay? Those three requirements are not met by any work except Maimonides. Except them. Now understand, making a codex—those of you who are lawyers know this—making a codex is monumental work, very difficult work. There are famous codices in Turkey; even in Egypt there was a very well-known jurist who did monumental work on a legal codex. I mean, the Napoleonic Code—this is usually work done by teams of experts over decades.
[Speaker F] Is it a kind of encyclopedia?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it requires a tremendous amount of work; it’s not just a simple summary. You have to classify, go through all the sources, distill the rulings—what comes out in the end, bottom line—organize it by topic, decide on a structure classified by topics across all fields, and then place all the conclusions in all fields into that classification. It’s enormous work. Here in Israel there were teams that sat on a civil code—which is only one specific part of the law—and they worked on it for many years, an entire team of people. Maimonides made a codex.
[Speaker E] Of the Oral Torah? There are things that are renewed every day.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I can’t hear?
[Speaker E] I think that when we’re talking about something like modern law, that’s something with daily developments; there’s so much Oral Torah that never ends.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. A codex has to be updated from time to time. Obviously. But at a given point in time, if I want to summarize what has happened until now, that is enormous work. Now with Maimonides, you have to understand what he did here. Maimonides took all the sources of Jewish law that existed until his time, mainly the rabbinic sources but also the Geonim, Rabbi Yosef ibn Migash, and others, and did all the work these committees of experts do—by himself. Alongside his work as a physician, and his philosophical writings, and all his many occupations—I mean, it’s inconceivable what he did there. In any case, that’s Maimonides. The Rif did easier work, work that overall isn’t all that difficult to do. It’s work where you go through the order of the passages and in each passage you extract the essence: what emerges from it for practical Jewish law. You don’t have to do all the work of classification, you don’t have to make sure you covered all the fields, you’re not creating a new order of all the laws, of that whole structure. You simply go over what Rav Ashi and Ravina did when they edited the Talmud, and in each passage you simply write what the bottom line is. You summarize the passage only in its halakhic aspects. And that’s all. So overall this is relatively simple work. Okay? In that sense, you need to understand that this is something totally different from Maimonides’ philosophy. And by the way, Maimonides took a lot of criticism for this. Right. Because the sages of the Oral Torah tradition do not like codices. Right. And not for nothing no codices were created, because there is a principled opposition to codices. There was also a big controversy surrounding the Shulchan Arukh, and likewise Maimonides.
[Speaker E] Also Shemirat Shabbat KeHilkhatah? Can you hear? Also Shemirat Shabbat KeHilkhatah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, only with Shemirat Shabbat KeHilkhatah the controversy wasn’t about its being a codex, but about the content, about the rulings it gave. But with the Shulchan Arukh and with Maimonides there was an argument over the very concept of a codex. Is it legitimate to produce a codex? Because if you write me a bunch of rulings, and you don’t write me your sources, you don’t write me your reasons—why should I accept what you say? I think differently. I learned the Talmud differently. Tell me the reasons. If you write a ruling, tell me where it comes from, what your reasons are, how you understood the Talmud, what your reasoning is—put it to a critical test. A codex basically doesn’t stand up to a critical test. You present it as if there is some objective summary here and everyone can take the relevant law and apply it. I don’t want to apply it; I don’t agree with you. Why? You have to give me reasons. What, are you God, that whatever you decide must be kept? There were many arguments about this. Okay, let’s close the parenthesis—I don’t want the whole lesson to go in that direction. So in any case, the Rif didn’t do that work. The Rif went in the order of the Talmud, and so did the Rosh. Now therefore, with the Rif, this background is very important when reading the Rif and Maimonides—how exactly to learn them and understand what they did with the Talmud. So when I want to know how the Rif ruled—the Rif in most cases does not write, “and the law is such-and-such.” Rather, what he brings is simply what he ruled. Now notice what the Rif does here. I blackened the passage—look.
[Speaker F] Also here, his note, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sages taught: One who carries from a shop to the open plaza through a portico is liable, and Ben Azzai exempts, because he holds that walking is like standing. What is the law?
[Speaker C] He doesn’t decide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says nothing; he brings both views.
[Speaker C] He’s quoting the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now he skips the whole discussion in the passage, because that discussion isn’t practically relevant to Jewish law, right? We saw that last lesson, because in the end the exemption of interposition doesn’t exist, it drops out of the picture. So in the Rif it doesn’t appear, because the Rif extracts only the essence that matters for the halakhic conclusion. What does appear? The bottom line. Rabbi Yohanan said: Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws. It was also taught likewise: whether one carries out, whether one carries in, whether one hands over, whether one throws—he is liable. And Ben Azzai says: one who carries in and one who carries out is exempt, but one who throws and one who hands over is liable. So he brings the baraita that appears at the end. Why does he need to bring it? Because that baraita expands the law regarding one who throws, one who hands over, and so on. Yes. But he brings only the essence of the passage that matters for Jewish law. Now I ask: when I read this Rif, and I ask myself whom he rules like—and this is an important point, which is why I’m stretching this out a bit—you need to get used to how to read the Rif.
[Speaker C] It seems he rules like Ben Azzai.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, apparently the required conclusion is that he rules like Ben Azzai. Because if he ruled like the Sages, then why do I care what Ben Azzai concedes?
[Speaker C] No, it could be because the Sages are the majority and Ben Azzai is an individual. So maybe he didn’t need to rule like him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying—suppose he had written “The Sages taught,” and he had stopped here, up to this point, okay? Here. Yes. He would bring only this passage. Look. There. What happens? He only brings this passage. Okay? There, true, he doesn’t write whom he rules like.
[Speaker C] He doesn’t write, “and Ben Azzai exempts.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t matter, I intentionally brought the whole thing. Suppose he had brought the entire baraita with the dispute between the Sages and Ben Azzai. That wouldn’t be a problem, because it’s the Rif’s way not to cut baraitot. So if the Rif brings something from the passage, he brings the whole baraita. Then he could add at the end, “and the law follows the Sages,” or not add it—but as Ruti said earlier, even if he doesn’t add it, I already know that when there is a dispute between “the Sages,” appearing in the plural, and a tanna mentioned by name, then the law follows the Sages. So if the Rif had brought only the section I blackened here, there still would have been room to say that he rules like the Sages, because that’s the normal approach. Usually the law follows the Sages. But the Rif continues, and now he brings an addition—what Ben Azzai concedes and what he doesn’t concede. Who cares, after all the law follows the Sages, not Ben Azzai? Meaning, from the fact that the Rif brought the continuation, it sounds like the Rif basically understands that the law follows Ben Azzai, and therefore it’s important to know in what—
[Speaker D] Ben Azzai concedes, and in what Ben Azzai does not concede. That’s why he brought this addition.
[Speaker E] Maimonides was a student of the Rif, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you hear? Maimonides was—Maimonides’ father, Rabbi Maimon, was a student of Rabbi Yosef ibn Migash, and Rabbi Yosef ibn Migash had an indirect connection—I don’t know if he was literally his student, but there was some indirect connection. But it’s true that Maimonides treated the Rif with great respect; meaning, in most cases Maimonides follows the Rif’s rulings.
[Speaker D] So that means that still, Maimonides doesn’t rule like the Rif here and—can’t hear? Maimonides doesn’t rule like the Rif here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I haven’t gotten there yet. I’m giving these introductions as part of the framework within which we’re now going to discuss this. But in general, Maimonides does follow the Rif’s rulings in most cases. Not always; sometimes he disagrees with him, but in most cases.
[Speaker D] So that’s why it surprises me, because here apparently they disagree.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, and therefore what?
[Speaker D] And that’s why I’m asking, because it surprises me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We didn’t say Maimonides disagrees with the Rif—that’s not—there’s no rule that Maimonides never disagrees with the Rif.
[Speaker C] But here on this page he goes this way because he has support from Rabbi Yohanan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, just a second, you’re already giving the reasons. First of all I want to understand how we read this, even before the question of the reasons and why. So I’m saying, with Maimonides there is no such rule that he goes with the Rif. It’s true that very often he follows the Rif, but it’s not a rule; he can disagree with the Rif, and that can happen.
[Speaker E] Just like the Shulchan Arukh often disagrees with Maimonides even though he often cites him. Just like the Shulchan Arukh often does not rule like Maimonides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, although the way of the Shulchan Arukh too is generally to follow Maimonides. In most cases the Shulchan Arukh follows Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh itself writes that it rules according to the majority among the three pillars—the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides—but it—
[Speaker E] itself—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] deviates from that rule quite a number of times, by the way.
[Speaker E] But I have a question about the Rif—does this decision make sense, that he goes with an individual opinion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Difficulties—first of all we have to decide that he is going here with an individual opinion. We’re not there yet, wait. So when we read the Rif, from his choices of what to take from the passage, it does sound like he is really ruling like Ben Azzai. Now of course the next questions arise: why? Why does he rule like Ben Azzai? Why not? Because the rule is usually that the law follows the majority. When there is a dispute between “the Sages” and a tanna with a defined name, a specific tanna, the usual principle is that the law follows the Sages. But here, even if I’m right in inferring that the Rif rules like Ben Azzai, that raises the question: why? Why are you ruling like an individual opinion? So one could have said this: maybe he has proof from the Talmud itself. Because why, in the Talmud itself, does Rabbi Yohanan bother to say in what Ben Azzai concedes? What do I care what Ben Azzai concedes if the law follows the Sages? That’s obviously a weak proof, because here and there the Talmud certainly also discusses views that are not the law, trying to clarify what that sage held even though it does not rule like him. The Talmud, unlike the Rif, is not a law book; it is a book of halakhic give-and-take. But there are definitely passages that deal with the view of someone whose opinion is not adopted in practice. We spoke about Rabbi Akiva with “caught as if placed”; according to most opinions that is not the practical law, and still the Talmud discusses that thesis quite a bit. So therefore, in the Talmud, to say that because Rabbi Yohanan qualifies Ben Azzai’s opinion and checks when he agrees and when he does not, and to see in that proof that the law follows Ben Azzai—that’s a rather dubious argument. But there are commentators on the Rif who want to claim that this was his source: because Rabbi Yohanan bothered to discuss what Ben Azzai concedes and what he does not concede, apparently that is what led the Rif to think that the Talmud itself, or Rabbi Yohanan himself, rules like Ben Azzai. And therefore the Rif too follows that and brings Rabbi Yohanan to tell us that the law here follows Ben Azzai. Okay?
[Speaker E] Could one say that the Rif didn’t decide, that he remained in doubt? You can say anything,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what to tell you, maybe. But the medieval authorities themselves—the Rosh and the Ran too, in their initial understanding—understood that the Rif intended to rule like Ben Azzai. Okay? Now remember that in the Talmud itself, the passage opens with Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Yohanan proposing an explanation of the Sages’ view,
[Speaker C] It—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] changes the whole passage.
[Speaker C] Rav Safra said in the name of Rabbi Ami in the name of Rabbi Yohanan,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m sharing the Talmud here. All I want is to put my cursor there; the site is driving me crazy—every click I make gives me an explanation of some term. I just want to put my cursor there. Okay, so you can see here at the bottom of 5b: The Sages taught: One who carries from a shop to the open plaza through a portico is liable, and Ben Azzai exempts. Granted, Ben Azzai holds that walking is like standing; but the Rabbis too—let us say that they hold that walking is not like standing—how can there be such a case in which he is liable? Now look. Rav Safra said in the name of Rabbi Ami in the name of Rabbi Yohanan—and then he brings the case of one who carries an object four cubits in the public domain, right? “Just as in the case of one who carries an object in the public domain.” Meaning that here Rabbi Yohanan explains the opinion of the Sages. So how can you tell me at the end that from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan discusses the question of what Ben Azzai concedes, apparently Rabbi Yohanan rules like Ben Azzai? Above, he explained the opinion of the Sages, so he rules like the Sages. So make up your mind.
[Speaker E] Maybe that actually strengthens that he’s with the Sages, because he explains the Sages and then says even Ben Azzai agrees in some things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so what I’m saying is that the fact that Rabbi Yohanan deals with Ben Azzai’s view is not proof that Rabbi Yohanan rules like Ben Azzai, because at the beginning of the passage he deals with the view of the Sages.
[Speaker C] So say that he also doesn’t deal with the opinion—it doesn’t mean he thinks—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] like the Sages; he’s only explaining them. Right. And then we’ve come back to the original point. So we have no proof from Rabbi Yohanan what Rabbi Yohanan rules. He explains the Sages, and afterward he explains Ben Azzai. Now I ask myself whom the law follows. So the rule is that when there is a dispute between Ben Azzai and the Sages, the law follows the Sages. Since I have no proof from Rabbi Yohanan, I go back to the ordinary rule, and the ordinary rule is that the law follows the majority. So it is very difficult to infer from the passage that because Rabbi Yohanan discusses the question of what Ben Azzai concedes, apparently he rules like Ben Azzai. Maybe—maybe—you could say that above, the discussion really is a discussion of how to understand the Sages’ view, because the Talmud asked: how do the Sages derive this, where do we find liability in such a situation? Okay, so the discussion there is presented in the Talmud itself as an analytic discussion, not as a practical legal discussion. By contrast, at the end of the passage, when Rabbi Yohanan says that Ben Azzai agrees—Rabbi Yohanan said: Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws—that’s not an analytic discussion; he’s asking what the law is. He says that according to Rabbi Yohanan, according to Ben Azzai, Ben Azzai agrees in the case of throwing. It’s just a legal determination. Above, the discussion is analytic: we had a difficulty on the Sages, and Rabbi Yohanan proposes an explanation of the Sages, an explanation that is later rejected, but he proposes one. When you’re involved in an analytic discussion, then clearly even if you deal with the Sages’ opinion that doesn’t mean you rule like them. You’re discussing their position, their reasoning—is this true, is that not true—it’s an analytic discussion. But at the end of the passage there is no analytic discussion at all; the whole issue is a matter of halakhic ruling: what Ben Azzai concedes and what he does not concede. There are no objections and resolutions and reasonings and so on. Now what is the point of dealing with what Ben Azzai concedes if we don’t rule like him? What do I care? So therefore perhaps those commentators on the Rif explain that the Rif understands that since Rabbi Yohanan discusses the question of what Ben Azzai concedes and what he does not concede, apparently he rules like Ben Azzai. But as I said before, this whole story is really very far from necessary, to put it mildly. Right? It is very far from necessary. But that is at least how they understand the Rif. Look, for example, at the Rosh, right? The Sages taught: One who carries from a shop to the open plaza through a portico is liable; Ben Azzai exempts. Rabbi Yohanan said: It appears that Rav Alfasi rules like Ben Azzai. Right? There, he brings the Rif. The Rosh, by the way, follows the Rif; the first citation is a citation of the Rif. It’s a digest of the Talmud, but basically he quotes the Rif. And now he starts adding his own comments. “It appears that Rav Alfasi rules like Ben Azzai”—yes, that’s exactly his inference. “And this is astonishing to me”—now he objects to him—“why does he rule like the individual?” How can he rule like a single sage against the majority? After all, the rule is that the law follows the majority. “And if it is because Rabbi Yohanan said, ‘Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws’”—everything I said earlier. Now, says the Rosh, maybe the Rif understands that the law follows Ben Azzai from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan writes that Ben Azzai agrees in the case of one who throws. If Rabbi Yohanan bothers to deal with the question of what Ben Azzai concedes and what he does not, then apparently he rules like him. So that was probably the Rif’s consideration. The Rosh says: this is no proof. I do not agree with that argument of the Rif, “for it is the way of the Amoraim to explain the words of the Tannaim even though the law does not follow them.”
[Speaker E] So it’s not a proof.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I already added earlier that higher up in the passage you can see that Rabbi Yohanan also explains the view of the Sages. The view of the Sages. So either way, you see that just because Rabbi Yohanan deals with a certain opinion, that doesn’t mean he rules like it. But I said it could be that there it’s presented as a conceptual discussion, while below it’s presented as a halakhic discussion. So the Rosh doesn’t get cornered by that. In any case, though, he says that’s not proof. Sometimes we say that someone concedes something even though the Jewish law does not follow that view. And then he says: “And it appears that the Jewish law follows the Sages.” Meaning, the Rosh disagrees with the Rif, “and so too Maimonides of blessed memory wrote in chapter 14 of the laws of Sabbath: one who carries from the public domain to the private domain and passes through an exempt area between them in the course of his walking is liable, because walking is not like standing still. And so too Rabbi Rabbeinu Yonah of blessed memory wrote that this ruling is not acceptable.” Okay? So Maimonides also rules like the Rosh, and now we can understand why in this case the Shulchan Arukh rules like Maimonides. Because among the three pillars of halakhic ruling—the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides—two go against the Rif: the Rosh and Maimonides.
[Speaker C] But Rabbeinu Yonah didn’t bring the reason from there; rather, he goes back to the previous passage—why? To explain why walking is not like standing still.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand, I can’t hear.
[Speaker C] You said that Rabbi Yohanan—in what Rav Safra says when he brings Rabbi Yohanan’s words—he discusses the opinion of the Sages, explains it. Right. But here, when Rabbeinu Yonah wants to show that Rabbi Yohanan—we haven’t gotten to Rabbeinu Yonah yet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? We haven’t gotten to Rabbeinu Yonah yet. In just a moment I’ll read Rabbeinu Yonah; he brings proof from the previous section of the passage.
[Speaker C] Yes, but he doesn’t bring this explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. He wants to bring a necessary proof, not from the fact that Rabbi Yohanan is dealing with a certain opinion, but a substantive proof on the issue itself. That’s a much stronger proof. We’ll get there in a second. In any case, Maimonides and the Rosh disagree with the Rif, and therefore in the Shulchan Arukh it’s no surprise that he rules like Maimonides, because that’s two out of his three. Okay? Now the Rosh continues, and he brings in the name of Rabbeinu Yonah a proof against the Rif, proof that the Jewish law follows the Sages and not Ben Azzai. What’s the proof? Not a proof against the argument that if Rabbi Yohanan discusses Ben Azzai that doesn’t mean he rules like Ben Azzai. That you might perhaps have understood from what I said earlier, that Rabbi Yohanan also deals with the opinion of the Sages. He wants to bring a frontal proof, a halakhic proof, not a methodological proof but a halakhic one. I can prove to you that Rabbi Yohanan rules like the Sages and not like Ben Azzai. How? From the previous passage. “For Rabbi Yohanan himself, who explains Ben Azzai’s reason—we hear from him that he holds that walking is not like standing still. For Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ila’a in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: if someone was loaded with food and drink and went in and out all day long, he is not liable until he stands still. And Rav Safra said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: one who clears objects from corner to corner and then changes his mind about them and takes them out is exempt, because from the outset there was no lifting for that purpose. And if he held that walking is like standing still, then when he changed his mind about them to take them out he should be liable, just as if he had stood still. And in the chapter ‘These Young Women’ as well, we also read”—yes, he brings the Talmud in Ketubot. What’s his proof from above? Rabbi Yohanan says there: one who clears objects from corner to corner—we saw that passage, it’s the passage on page 5b above—one who clears objects from corner to corner thought only to move them from one place to another within the private domain. At some point he changed his mind and decided to take them out into the public domain, so he is exempt. Why? Because the initial lifting was not done in order to take them out into the public domain, but in order to move them somewhere else within the private domain. Right? The Rosh says: if Rabbi Yohanan really, as the Rif says, rules like Ben Azzai that walking is like standing still, then why do I care what the initial lifting was? After all, while he was walking in the private domain, the moment he changed his mind and decided to take it from the private domain into the public domain, he was in the middle of walking when he changed his mind—and walking is considered like standing still!
[Speaker C] So he should have been liable!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he should have been liable. So why does Rabbi Yohanan say he is exempt? You see that Rabbi Yohanan does not hold like Ben Azzai; he holds that walking is not like standing still. Agreed? Yes. What would the Rif answer to that? Whenever we see an objection by one of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) against another, we have to think: what would the first one answer? What could the Rif have answered? The Rif isn’t here to answer; the Rosh lived after him, so the Rif can’t answer him. We’re supposed to do the work for the Rif. What would the Rif—
[Speaker G] It could be that this principle doesn’t work the same way in every area—like, in the private domain it works one way, and in an exempt area it works differently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s if you saw the Rashba in the name of the Raavad in Ketubot, maybe. But I have something more fundamental. Look, this is a case of moving objects. Let’s say I lifted the object in the private domain in order to move it to another corner in the private domain, I started walking, and at some point I changed my mind and went out into the public domain. There Rabbi Yohanan tells me he is exempt. The Rosh asks: why exempt? The moment he changed his mind while walking, he is considered—after all, walking is like standing still, and he should be liable. I say no. Since the initial lifting is the determining lifting. The Rosh assumes another assumption, beyond the assumption that walking is like standing still. What’s the additional assumption? That if I lifted it and then walked, then if I hold like Ben Azzai that walking is like standing still, the walking cancels the original lifting. Right? That’s an additional assumption. Maybe Ben Azzai doesn’t accept that? Then it could be that Rabbi Yohanan does fit with Ben Azzai. And what he’s saying is this: when I lift from the private domain and pass through a portico into the public domain, then in the portico walking is like standing still. Why? Because in the portico itself there was no prior lifting that was cancelled by the walking; the prior lifting was in the private domain. But if I’m in the private domain, I lifted and started walking, then true, during the walking I’m considered as standing still, as Ben Azzai says—but if you ask me when the relevant lifting was done, it was done in the initial lifting. After all, I actually lifted it in the private domain itself. True, afterward I also walked, but the walking does not cancel the initial lifting that I performed. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan says: since the initial lifting was not done in order to take it out into the public domain, but rather to move it to another corner in the private domain, in that case I’m exempt. I’m exempt even according to Ben Azzai. Even if I hold that walking is like standing still, I’m exempt. Why? Because the walking—true, it is considered like standing still—but that standing does not cancel the initial lifting that I did. You remember we already talked about this issue, that somehow there’s an assumption there that the walking cancels the initial lifting. That assumption may be something the Rif does not accept. Now notice: the Rosh himself, I think, senses this possibility, and therefore he says, yes, but in the passage in Ketubot I can prove to you explicitly that this is not correct. Because in the passage in Ketubot, in Rabbi Yohanan’s opinion, you see not only that walking is like standing still, but also that the walking cancels the original lifting. And that pulls the ground out from under the Rif’s possible defense. In our passage the Rif could have pushed it off. So look at the Rosh’s wording.
[Speaker D] I didn’t quite understand what was ultimately ruled in Ketubot—was it ruled there like Ben Azzai or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. In Ketubot nothing is ruled. But in Ketubot Ben Azzai’s dispute with the Sages is used. And the way the Talmud there uses Ben Azzai proves what, in our Talmudic passage, could still have remained true while still leaving him exempt. In our passage on page 5b above, you can say that Rabbi Yohanan holds that walking is like standing still. Why? Because what he exempts there is due to the fact that the original lifting was not done in order to take it into the public domain. And the walking that came afterward—even if I say like Ben Azzai that walking is like standing still—still does not cancel the original lifting, does not cancel the lifting.
[Speaker C] The walking after the standing becomes a lifting. So why doesn’t that cancel the first lifting?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should it cancel it? There was an initial lifting, and afterward I lifted again, but still, once there was an initial lifting, that lifting is the important one. And the liftings that come after that don’t count, because I already lifted once. And if the initial lifting is the important lifting, then it was not done in order to take it into the public domain, and therefore I’m exempt. But I’m exempt even though I hold like Ben Azzai that walking is like standing still. That’s what the Rif would say.
[Speaker E] So without Ketubot, the Rif can actually manage just fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And therefore the Rosh says—look at the Rosh’s wording.
[Speaker D] How do you see that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Ketubot—that Ben Azzai—
[Speaker E] That there it’s brought—what Rabbi Yohanan—
[Speaker D] Thinks.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second—
[Speaker E] One—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Second, I’ll—
[Speaker E] get to that, just a moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “As he said: and in the chapter ‘These Young Women,’ page 31, we also read: here we are dealing with a case where he took it intending to conceal it,” etc. So he brings the Talmud in the chapter ‘These Young Women’ as further proof against the Rif. Why does he bring it? You could say it’s just another proof. I want to claim that he brings it because the proof from there is stronger. He himself also senses that the proof from here could have been pushed aside. In a moment I’ll explain why the proof there is stronger, but he brings that proof because it’s stronger. Look at the Ran’s wording. Yes, maybe even here before the Ran—look at the end of the Rosh. “Until it concludes”—yes, until the Talmud’s conclusion there in Ketubot: “Rather, whose view is this? Ben Azzai’s.” So you see that Rav Safra said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan in a way that does not fit Ben Azzai. And the Talmud there presents Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, and Ben Azzai as an alternative to Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. So you see that Rabbi Yochanan does not hold like Ben Azzai. Here we can’t see that, because it could be that he holds like Ben Azzai, only that the walking doesn’t cancel the initial lifting. There the Talmud says that Ben Azzai does not go like Rabbi Yochanan, so it’s more explicit. But look at the Ran’s view: the Ran also says basically very similar things. “And it appears from the words of Rabbi Alfasi of blessed memory that he brought this statement of Rabbi Yochanan because he held that Jewish law follows Ben Azzai, since Rabbi Yochanan explains what Ben Azzai concedes. But that is not so; Rabbi Yochanan is merely explaining it, but for himself he holds like the Sages.” Because Rabbi Yochanan explains Ben Azzai, but he himself rules like the Sages. “And know this, for Rabbi Yochanan himself is the one who said: one who moves an object from corner to corner and then changes his mind about them to take them out is exempt, because from the outset there was no lifting for that purpose. But according to Ben Azzai, in such a case he would indeed be liable, for since he holds that walking is like standing still, when he changes his mind about them to take them out he becomes liable as though he had stood still.” Now look: “and thus we say explicitly in the chapter ‘These Young Women.’” In the Rosh it’s not presented that way, but the Ran says, and thus it is said explicitly in the chapter ‘These Young Women.’ Why is it more explicit there than here?
[Speaker E] Like we said, because there there are two alternatives; it’s not that he just brings the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the points. And there Rabbi Yochanan—Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Yochanan—is presented as something opposed to Ben Azzai; Ben Azzai comes against it. But I’ll say more than that: in the Talmud there in Ketubot, you really do clearly see that you also cannot explain it with the answer the Rif could have given here. Why? Because what is the Talmud discussing there? What happens there? The Talmud—
[Speaker C] There—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] discusses a thief, yes, in Ketubot. It discusses a thief who steals a certain object, a purse, on the Sabbath, and he steals it and takes it from the private domain to the public domain. Now taking it from the private domain to the public domain makes him liable to stoning, because he is carrying—he is violating a forbidden labor on the Sabbath, liable to stoning. In a place where the act of theft makes you liable to capital punishment, you do not acquire. This is an offshoot of the principle of “he incurs the greater penalty.” Yes, although one has to discuss why; not important right now. But the Talmud assumes in several places that if I really perform an act for which I am liable to stoning, then the theft is not a theft, because the transgression I committed is the transgression of Sabbath and not the transgression of theft; consequently I did not commit the transgression of theft.
[Speaker C] Couldn’t that be understood—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] differently, meaning that no theft offense was committed here because since you are liable—
[Speaker D] to a more severe punishment, you’re exempt from the lesser punishment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the idea. I’m exempt from the punishment for theft; it doesn’t matter right now whether that’s about the offense or the punishment. Yes, yes, he did steal, it’s just that he’s exempt from the punishment. Those are two possibilities; I’m not getting into that now. It’s a question of how you understand “he incurs the greater penalty.” What I only wanted to say is that the discussion is not necessarily about whether he acquired it; that’s another question, a legal one. I’m asking whether there was a theft offense here, or whether he is liable for punishment for the theft offense—that’s “he incurs the greater penalty,” okay? That’s the Talmudic discussion. Now the Talmud says: exactly what case are we talking about, so that the punishment for Sabbath would exempt him from the punishment for theft?
[Speaker C] The two—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] actions have to be simultaneous, they—
[Speaker C] have to be done at the same time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the Talmud says as follows: if he lifted—I’m not going to read the whole passage now, I just want to show the principle—the Talmud there says that if he lifted the object in the private domain and dragged it—sorry, dragged it into the public domain, okay? and brought it into the public domain, then it happens simultaneously. If he dragged it—
[Speaker C] I can’t hear. What did you say, lifted it or dragged it? Dragged it. Okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it happens simultaneously. Why? Because when did the lifting occur?
[Speaker C] Through pulling it from one domain to the other.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When did the lifting occur? At what moment? At the beginning of the dragging? At the end, when it entered the public domain.
[Speaker C] Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because when he drags, there was no lifting; he didn’t yet pick the object up. If he picked up the object, then the lifting occurred at the first moment, when he picked it up. When does he violate the Sabbath prohibition?
[Speaker F] When he passes—when he—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] crosses into the public domain. Or even when he sets it down in the public domain. When he crosses, yes.
[Speaker F] So then it’s not simultaneous.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if he drags it, the dragging causes the lifting—or the theft—to happen when?
[Speaker E] Simultaneously, at the same second—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that he passed into the public domain, right? And when is the Sabbath prohibition committed? At that same moment. So it’s simultaneous. Right? That’s what the Talmud says. A second alternative—the Talmud rejects it; the Talmud says there are problems here, it’s not that simple. It’s hard for it—when exactly does he violate it? It’s not when he passes into the public domain that he violates the Sabbath prohibition, but when he sets it down in the public domain. And in general, the public domain doesn’t acquire, so there’s also the question of how he acquires it here; there are many difficulties in the Talmud. The Talmud itself asks them. But then the Talmud gives a second answer: “Rather, whose view is this? Ben Azzai’s, who says walking is like standing still.” Now what does that mean? If it goes according to Ben Azzai, how did you solve the problem? I lifted the object in the private domain, walked with it, crossed with it into the public domain, right? When did I lift it?
[Speaker C] The moment you crossed into the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—walking is like standing still, and therefore during the walking, when I crossed from the private domain to the public domain, that is considered that I lifted it. But wait, I don’t understand. There was an initial lifting in the private domain, right? Then I walked, and you tell me that according to Ben Azzai, what is the moment of lifting?
[Speaker D] Taking it out from the private domain?
[Speaker E] No—
[Speaker C] The taking out—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] from the private domain.
[Speaker D] The step he takes between the private domain and the public domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that means that the walking, according to Ben Azzai, cancels the initial lifting.
[Speaker D] Right, and therefore—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it cancels the initial lifting, then you couldn’t explain this Talmudic passage according to Ben Azzai merely by saying walking is like standing still. Because even if walking is like standing still, the moment of lifting would still be the moment I picked the object up off the ground. Because afterward, when you say that walking is like standing still, the first lifting hasn’t been cancelled.
[Speaker C] So that contradicts what was said earlier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I wanted to show you: from the Talmud here, the proof is much stronger than from our Talmudic passage. Because here we see that Ben Azzai’s view is not only that walking is like standing still, but that if you lifted and then walked, the moment during the walking when you are considered a new lifting cancels the original lifting. Otherwise it would not help at all to establish it according to Ben Azzai. That is already crushing against the Rif. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes.
[Speaker G] That’s what Rava said—that from there we still can—exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore the Ran basically says that in the Talmud in Ketubot it is explicit against the Rif. In our Talmudic passage, he may have felt that the Rif still had a way out. The Rif could answer that true, walking is like standing still and Rabbi Yochanan holds that walking is like standing still, but he does not hold that this cancels the original lifting, the first lifting. So there were many liftings here, and the first lifting is the relevant one. In the Talmud in Ketubot you can’t say that. There it is clear that the subsequent liftings cancel the first lifting. Not only is walking like standing still, but every moment in the walking also cancels the first lifting. That is already crushing against the Rif.
[Speaker C] So according to Ben Azzai in Ketubot, it comes out that he won’t be liable both for payment and for stoning? Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only for one. Right. But I’m saying: how can you get to that? Only if—it’s not enough to say that walking is like standing still. That’s what I want to say. According to the Rif, if the Rif explains Ben Azzai as saying that walking is like standing still but the first lifting still is not cancelled—if that were Ben Azzai’s explanation—then the Talmud in Ketubot, which brought Ben Azzai, gained nothing. Because even if you bring me Ben Azzai, the moment of lifting is still the moment I picked it up off the ground, not the moment I crossed into the public domain. Because the first lifting is not cancelled. Therefore, according to the Rif, you can’t understand the Talmud in Ketubot, even according to Ben Azzai. That is proof that the Rif is not right in his understanding of Ben Azzai. Do you understand what I’m saying? Now, interestingly, just as an aside, when the Rif and the Rosh—I mean, the Rosh and the Ran—bring the Talmud in Ketubot, they don’t bring the inference that I brought here. They don’t say that the Talmud in Ketubot proves against the Rif because there you see that it is cancelled. Rather, they say that the proof from the Talmud in Ketubot is because the Talmud in Ketubot presents Ben Azzai as an alternative to Rabbi Yochanan. They bring a linguistic proof; I’m bringing a substantive proof. Because in the Talmud in Ketubot it is clear that the interpretation of Ben Azzai is not the Rif’s interpretation—not because stylistically Ben Azzai is brought there as an alternative to Rabbi Yochanan, but substantively, you see in the Talmud there that it certainly did not understand Ben Azzai the way the Rif did.
[Speaker C] It could—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] be that what the Rosh and the Ran mean is this itself. Meaning, the fact that Ben Azzai appears as an alternative to Rabbi Yochanan—what does that mean? That Ben Azzai holds that the moment of lifting is the final moment.
[Speaker C] Otherwise it wouldn’t be an alternative.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if that’s so, then it really is proof against the Rif. Meaning, maybe indirectly they really do mean what I’m saying, because what I’m saying really is a crushing argument. I don’t see how the Rif can defend himself against it. It’s a crushing proof. In our Talmudic passage it remains open. Now I want to claim that if so, it could be that the Rif simply learned that this is a dispute between Talmudic passages. Meaning, the Rif here says as follows—the line of thought goes like this: here, Rabbi Yochanan explains what Ben Azzai concedes. From that the Rif learned that apparently Rabbi Yochanan rules like Ben Azzai. The Rif then asks himself: wait a second, but in the previous paragraph of the Talmud, Rabbi Yochanan says something contradictory—one who clears an object from corner to corner. So the Rif apparently says: there’s no contradiction between two adjacent passages for no reason. Apparently our passage understands that Rabbi Yochanan accepts Ben Azzai, but does not see the walking as cancelling the first lifting. Because otherwise there is a contradiction between our two passages, consecutive here on page 5. But in the Talmud in Ketubot it’s not like that. So apparently the passages are in dispute. And the Rif rules like the passage here. Okay? If you understand the difference between the passages, then in the end you can also reconcile the Rif’s position. The Rif rules like the passage here, and in the passage here the claim is that Ben Azzai holds that walking is like standing still, but the walking does not cancel the first lifting. True, in the Talmud in Ketubot you see that Ben Azzai holds that the walking also cancels the first lifting, but the Talmud in Ketubot contradicts the Talmud here, and the Rif rules like the Talmud here; it’s a dispute between passages. The Ran and the Rosh, of course, claim otherwise. They say that Rabbi Yochanan is only explaining Ben Azzai, but not ruling like him. Consequently there’s no reason to create a dispute between passages here. So when you see in the passage in Ketubot that Ben Azzai holds that the walking also cancels the first lifting, then in our Talmudic passage above we should also understand Ben Azzai that way, and then there’s no need to create a dispute between passages and everything is fine—the Jewish law follows the Sages. These are the different ways in which the Rif, the Ran, and the Rosh disagree in understanding Ben Azzai. Now another question comes up here. I don’t have much time left, so let’s try.
[Speaker C] And according to Ben Azzai, in the case of throwing, does the first lifting count?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again? I can’t hear.
[Speaker C] And according to Ben Azzai, in the case of throwing, is the first lifting the determining one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, exactly.
[Speaker C] But I’m asking—suppose in the case of throwing, he lifted it from somewhere in the house and walked to the doorway of the house, and from there he threw it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t be that exact. There will always be a millimeter where he still passed through the private domain. If you could really manage to release the throw exactly at the point, at the seam where the public domain begins, maybe you’d be right. But you can’t be that exact, meaning you can’t do such a thing; it never happens. You can never know whether you didn’t start the throw already in the public domain itself, in which case he didn’t carry it out at all, and if you did it in the private domain then there’s some millimeter where it still passed through the private domain. Now the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—also Tosafot in Ketubot, also Tosafot here, also the Rashba, whom I referred you to—ask two questions according to Ben Azzai. One question is: how can one who carries something four cubits in the public domain be liable according to Ben Azzai?
[Speaker C] After all, walking is like standing still—so what comes out?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If walking is like standing still, then basically he moves it each time less than four cubits. Each time the walking takes him another millimeter and another millimeter—lifting, setting down; lifting, setting down; lifting, setting down. None of those steps is four cubits, so carrying four cubits in the public domain should be exempt. How does it come out that he is liable according to Ben Azzai?
[Speaker E] We brought the Rashba’s explanation that you can distinguish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait—that’s the Rashba, those are explanations. That’s the first question. Second question: we saw in the passage above that there is a difference between standing to adjust the load on one’s shoulder and standing to rest.
[Speaker C] Standing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to adjust the load is not considered standing; standing to rest is considered standing. So we explained that standing to adjust the load is part of the way of walking, and so on, right?
[Speaker C] And it’s also to improve the carrying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. But still, standing to adjust the load is not considered standing, whereas standing to rest is. According to Ben Azzai, where even walking is considered standing, then is standing to adjust the load a worse kind of standing than walking?
[Speaker C] It could be, because his purpose here is to improve his ability to carry it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?
[Speaker C] So intention matters too, not just the action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. While walking too, he intends the same thing. I don’t understand. In what sense can standing to adjust the load be less of a standing than someone who is actually walking? At most you can tell me that if he stands to adjust the load, that isn’t considered standing; it’s considered walking. But walking too is considered standing according to Ben Azzai. So standing to adjust the load can never be worse than actually walking. At most you can tell me that standing to adjust the load is not considered standing but rather walking. But walking too is considered standing according to Ben Azzai.
[Speaker C] Maybe—maybe when he adjusts the load he is making a lifting here?
[Speaker F] No, on the contrary. I think—I thought that if he adjusts the load then he really is like standing in Ben Azzai’s sense. And if both cases are part of his walking, then there’s no problem. I simply wouldn’t bring the issue of adjusting the load into Ben Azzai’s walking, because it’s part of the standing. But the Talmud brought it.
[Speaker E] But—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Ben Azzai, walking is like standing still. The Talmud doesn’t have to—
[Speaker F] So he can also be adjusting the load during that standing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why is adjusting the load not considered standing?
[Speaker E] How is it that standing to adjust the load is not considered standing, but walking is considered standing?
[Speaker F] No, but you can’t say that Ben Azzai holds that adjusting the load—because it has no significance here at all. He can stand, he can stand at any stage of his walking; he can stand, he can adjust the load, it doesn’t matter what he does during that standing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How can it be that adjusting the load is not considered standing, but walking is considered standing?
[Speaker F] Another status—according to Ben Azzai it has no significance at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the question. So why do you tell me that standing to adjust the load is not considered standing, not like standing to rest? After all, even walking is considered standing. It’s possible to say that Ben Azzai simply does not—
[Speaker D] hold that way? I can’t hear. Is it possible to say that Ben Azzai holds that adjusting the load is not considered—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that Ben Azzai disagrees with this distinction between adjusting the load and standing to rest,
[Speaker D] but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but the medieval authorities (Rishonim) assume that he does not, and in the Talmud too it does not appear that Ben Azzai disagrees with that. That’s one possibility; we’ll talk about it. I just want to make one remark, and with that I’ll finish. Notice that according to the explanation I gave earlier in the Rif, the first question does not arise. I asked myself: how can one be liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain, if at every moment he walks he is considered standing still?
[Speaker D] Because the first lifting is the one that counts. Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And all the walking moves it on—and according to the Rif, this question doesn’t arise at all. And that’s the reason the Rif says what he says. Because the Rif was troubled: according to Ben Azzai, how can it be that carrying four cubits in the public domain incurs liability? The Rif says: there is no choice but to say that even Ben Azzai, who says walking is like standing still, still means that the walking does not lift anew or does not cancel the first lifting.
[Speaker C] And therefore he also rules, in the dispute between passages, like our passage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly so.
[Speaker C] That’s a wonderful proof for the Rif, and the medieval authorities—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] have to struggle here now and get squeezed, and maybe say it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai, and tricks, tricks like these and other tricks. According to the Rif it’s smooth. In my opinion that’s why the Rif interpreted it this way and forced a dispute between passages here, because otherwise it’s very hard to understand how carrying four cubits could incur liability.
[Speaker G] If I understood correctly, then in the public domain too there is a concept of an initial lifting?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Because we know that for carrying four cubits in the public domain there has to be a lifting, carrying four cubits, and then setting down; otherwise he is not liable. We already saw that. And I think this is a good proof for the Rif’s position, and a good reason to adopt his conception as well: that even Ben Azzai, who says walking is like standing still, does not mean that the original lifting was cancelled. Okay, we’ll continue next time. Did you finish the page? Yes. Okay, so we’ll take care of you for next time.
[Speaker D] Okay, thank you very much.
[Speaker C] Thank you very much, goodbye.