Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 35

Table of Contents

• Conclusion of the discussion and the overall framework
• The dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) over the interpretation of Ben Azzai and its connection to Rabbi Yohanan
• The law of the stoa and multiple domains
• The relation to the Ran and the Rosh, and defending the Rif’s reconciliation
• First difficulty: how one can be liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain according to Ben Azzai
• Second difficulty: stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder versus stopping to rest in relation to Ben Azzai’s position
• The proofs brought by Birkat Avraham and the response to them
• Resolving the second difficulty according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) and according to the Rif
• The medieval authorities’ answers to the four-cubit difficulty: the Rashba and the Raavad
• A conceptual explanation for the distinction between the private domain and the public domain
• Tosafot in Ketubot and the combination of a law given to Moses at Sinai with the concept of “a place of liability”
• The Jerusalem Talmud: the answer of “while hopping” and understanding “walking is like standing” as actual stopping points
• Conclusion and sending out a summary

Summary

General Overview

The speaker concludes the discussion of the dispute over Ben Azzai’s position that “walking is like standing,” focusing mainly on the gap between the Rif’s interpretation and that of most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Rif rules in accordance with Ben Azzai and reconciles the contradiction with Rabbi Yohanan by distinguishing as follows: “walking is like standing” does not cancel the original act of lifting in that same domain, whereas most of the medieval authorities reject this because in their view, if walking is like standing, then it is literally like standing and therefore cancels any previous act of lifting. From this arise two central difficulties: how liability is possible for carrying four cubits in the public domain according to Ben Azzai, and how the distinction between stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder and stopping to rest can fit with the view that walking counts as standing. The speaker presents the medieval authorities’ various answers (a law given to Moses at Sinai, a distinction between the private domain and the public domain, and the answers of Tosafot and the Jerusalem Talmud), and explains that the Rif has a systematic advantage because he resolves certain difficulties without resorting to forced answers.

Conclusion of the Discussion and the Framework

The speaker says he wants to wrap up the discussion of “walking is like standing” after two short meetings, and presents what remains as a final completion of the topic / passage. He says that the dispute is not only whether the Jewish law follows Ben Azzai, but mainly how to understand Ben Azzai’s own words as interpreted by the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

The Dispute Among the Medieval Authorities (Rishonim) Over the Interpretation of Ben Azzai and Its Connection to Rabbi Yohanan

The speaker explains that the Rif rules in accordance with Ben Azzai and says that Rabbi Yohanan apparently agrees with him, whereas most of the medieval authorities hold that the Jewish law does not follow Ben Azzai, and they prove this from the earlier Talmudic passage where Rabbi Yohanan does not fit with Ben Azzai. The speaker proposes a reconciliation for the Rif’s view: even if “walking is like standing,” that does not mean the walking cancels the original act of lifting, and therefore there is no contradiction to Rabbi Yohanan when the walking does not create a new act of lifting. He explains that according to the medieval authorities who disagree with the Rif, “walking is like standing” means literally standing, and therefore it ought to cancel the previous act of lifting; that is the source of their difficulty with the earlier Talmudic passage.

The Law of the Stoa and Multiple Domains

The speaker analyzes a case in which a person walks through a stoa, and explains that according to the distinction he suggested, the walking does not cancel an act of lifting in the private domain; but once one enters a different domain, a new framework is created in which there is no act of lifting in the stoa itself, and therefore the law changes. He emphasizes that the exemption in that case stems from the fact that the stoa is a different domain and from its status as a place that does not itself generate an act of lifting, not from the idea that walking cancels a prior act of lifting.

The Relation to the Ran and the Rosh, and Defending the Rif’s Reconciliation

The speaker says that the Ran and the Rosh reject the Rif because of the difficulty from the earlier Talmudic passage, and that he has not found anyone who actually reconciles the Rif. He argues that the reconciliation he proposed is the most natural one and even preferable, because it avoids difficulties that the other medieval authorities are forced to confront.

First Difficulty: How One Can Be Liable for Carrying Four Cubits in the Public Domain According to Ben Azzai

The speaker formulates the question raised by the medieval authorities and by the Jerusalem Talmud: if “walking is like standing,” then at every moment of walking there is something like standing, and it follows that the person is not carrying four cubits continuously, but rather less than four cubits at a time, so he should be exempt. The speaker explains that according to the Rif, the question does not even begin, because even if there is a series of quasi-standings, they do not cancel the original act of lifting, and therefore liability for carrying four cubits remains in place. He adds that this may actually be the Rif’s fundamental basis, because the halakhic reality of liability for carrying four cubits teaches that “walking is like standing” does not cancel the original act of lifting.

Second Difficulty: Stopping to Adjust a Burden on One’s Shoulder Versus Stopping to Rest in Relation to Ben Azzai’s Position

The speaker presents the argument of the later authorities (Acharonim) cited in Birkat Avraham: the Talmudic text earlier distinguishes between stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder and stopping to rest, and this is presented as accepted without tying it to the dispute between Ben Azzai and the Sages. But apparently, according to Ben Azzai, for whom walking is standing, there should be no room to say that stopping to adjust a burden is not considered standing. The speaker first suggests a simple solution: Ben Azzai does not accept that distinction, and the distinction was said in a Talmudic passage that follows Rabbi Yohanan’s view, which according to most of the medieval authorities is not Ben Azzai’s view. He notes that Birkat Avraham argues that this is not a possible answer according to the approach of the other medieval authorities, and brings three proofs for that claim.

The Proofs of Birkat Avraham and the Response to Them

The speaker brings a first proof from the Rivah in Tosafot, on the words “granted,” who is uncertain about someone carrying four cubits in the public domain and then stopping in the middle to rest according to Ben Azzai, after it has been stated that there is a law given to Moses at Sinai that imposes liability for carrying despite “walking is like standing.” The speaker notes that the Rivah formulates the doubt in terms of stopping to rest and not stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder, and suggests that this might indicate a distinction even within Ben Azzai’s view, but rejects that reading, saying that the formulation stems from presenting the more extreme novelty, not from a principled ruling. He brings a second proof from the Ritva: “that is to say, it is like stopping to rest,” and explains that Birkat Avraham sees from this a distinction even according to Ben Azzai; but the speaker argues that the Ritva can be understood simply as sharpening the point that Ben Azzai compares walking to full-fledged standing, not to a lighter kind of standing. He mentions a third proof from Nachmanides, in similar language, and concludes that the proofs are not conclusive, so there is no necessity to say that the second difficulty really exists.

Resolving the Second Difficulty According to the Other Medieval Authorities (Rishonim) and According to the Rif

The speaker says that according to the other medieval authorities, the second difficulty is resolved by saying that the Talmudic passage distinguishing between stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder and stopping to rest is not following Ben Azzai, and therefore there is no need to claim that Ben Azzai accepts that distinction. He says that according to the Rif, who understands the earlier Talmudic passage as also following Ben Azzai, the distinction already proposed also resolves the second difficulty: walking, or stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder, does not cancel the original act of lifting in that same domain, whereas stopping to rest does create a standing point that defines a new act of lifting. He concludes that both difficulties actually strengthen the Rif, because the same principle organizes both of them.

The Medieval Authorities’ Answers to the Four-Cubit Difficulty: the Rashba and the Raavad

The speaker cites the Rashba in Ketubot, who asks how liability for carrying four cubits is possible according to Ben Azzai, and offers two answers. He presents the first answer: “it is a received law,” a law given to Moses at Sinai that imposes liability for carrying four cubits in the public domain, even though according to “walking is like standing” there would otherwise have been reason to exempt. He presents the second answer in the name of the Raavad: Ben Azzai said “walking is like standing” only with respect to walking in the private domain or in an exempt area, but not in the public domain, because there even “stopping to adjust a burden on one’s shoulder” is not considered a standing that creates exemption, and from that it follows that walking certainly is not considered standing there. The speaker formulates a practical difference between the two answers: in a case of transferring from the private domain to the public domain, where once in the public domain he keeps walking without putting the object down, according to the special law given to Moses at Sinai for carrying four cubits there may still be liability for transferring according to Ben Azzai, whereas according to the distinction between domains, in the public domain “walking is like standing” does not apply, and so he would be exempt for transferring without an act of placing down.

A Conceptual Explanation for the Distinction Between the Private Domain and the Public Domain

The speaker suggests a conceptual explanation for the answer that distinguishes between the domains: in the private domain, one can define the object as “being present” within the area, and therefore no literal act of placing is needed; whereas in the public domain, which is a “space” and not a bounded place, “being present” has insufficient significance without an actual placing down or actual standing. He connects this to the analogy made by the medieval authorities to the law of “caught in the air is as though placed down,” and explains that in the model of “presence,” the individual steps are not significant, as opposed to the model in which the very placing of the foot is what defines the standing points.

Tosafot in Ketubot and the Combination of a Law Given to Moses at Sinai with the Concept of “a Place of Liability”

The speaker cites Tosafot in Ketubot, who establishes liability for carrying four cubits as “a received law,” and says, “and we do not derive from it, for there it is a place of liability,” whereas Ben Azzai is speaking of walking from the shops to the plaza through a stoa, which is an exempt area. The speaker explains that Tosafot distinguishes between deriving from the law given to Moses at Sinai in a place of liability such as the public domain, and not deriving from it in an exempt area such as a stoa. In this way Tosafot combines the direction of a law given to Moses at Sinai with the distinction between different kinds of places.

The Jerusalem Talmud: the Answer of “While Hopping” and Understanding “Walking Is Like Standing” as Actual Stops

The speaker says that the Jerusalem Talmud raises a difficulty against Ben Azzai and answers: “while hopping.” He explains that the Jerusalem Talmud assumes that even in the public domain, “walking is like standing,” and therefore it is forced to narrow the case of liability to one in which there are no intermediate standing points. The speaker suggests two understandings of “while hopping”: either literally jumping, so that the foot is not placed on the ground in the middle, or running, where there is no stage in which both feet are on the ground together. He concludes that the Jerusalem Talmud fits the direction associated with the Rif, according to which “walking is like standing” is a law of actual standing points created by placing the foot down, not merely a law of presence as such; from that follow practical differences such as passing through a stoa without placing one’s foot down, or performing an action by hand without walking.

Conclusion and Sending Out a Summary

The speaker concludes by saying that he will not return to this topic / passage again, and announces that he will send out a written summary because the points were said quickly and some of the details were omitted. He wishes everyone a happy holiday and says that the next meeting will be next Tuesday.

I want to wrap up the discussion here about “walking being treated like standing.” We had two short meetings, so this is more or less what will finish off the… one regular meeting and two short ones. So this is more or less, I hope, what will bring this topic / passage to a close for us. We saw the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about Ben Azzai’s view—Ben Azzai, who says that walking is like standing. Again, according to most opinions, the Jewish law is not in accordance with him, but the dispute is about his own position. The Rif rules in accordance with him and explains that Rabbi Yohanan apparently agrees with him, while most of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that the Jewish law is not in accordance with him, and their proof is precisely that it doesn’t fit with Rabbi Yohanan in the previous topic / passage. And the question really came up: how does the Rif deal with that? How does the Rif adopt the assumption that Rabbi Yohanan agrees with Ben Azzai when in the previous topic / passage it seems he doesn’t? And I said that basically the Rif probably understands that when Ben Azzai says that walking is like standing, that still doesn’t mean it’s literally considered exactly like standing. For example, if he lifted it up and then walked, the walking—even if according to Ben Azzai he is considered as standing—does not cancel the initial lifting. Okay? And therefore there is no contradiction from the previous topic / passage, because in the previous topic / passage, walking does not cancel the initial lifting, and Ben Azzai does not disagree with that. Here he is only claiming that walking is like standing, but that doesn’t mean it cancels the initial lifting. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with the Rif and rule not like Ben Azzai are apparently unwilling to make that distinction. They apparently understand that if walking is like standing, then it is really standing—it’s as if someone actually stood, even stood in order to rest, as we’ll discuss today, and therefore according to Ben Azzai too it should cancel the initial lifting. And if in the previous topic / passage we see that walking does not cancel the initial lifting, then apparently that topic / passage is not going with Ben Azzai. Just one small question—maybe I got mixed up. In our topic / passage, where he is walking through a portico, even if there we say that his walking does not cancel his initial lifting in the house, then why would he be exempt? No—because, as I said, that’s because it’s a different domain. When he is in the portico, the portico itself had no lifting. So I ask myself: did he stand in the portico? The answer is yes. Did he stand in the private domain? No. Because in the private domain the initial lifting is what determines things, and the walking that comes afterward is subordinate to it. But when we moved to a different domain, that is already something else. Yes, and therefore everyone agrees, Ben Azzai too. Right, so this—as I say again—I have no other way to reconcile the Rif. The fact is that the Ran and the Rosh really do reject the Rif’s opinion precisely because of this difficulty, and I didn’t find anyone who resolves the Rif—maybe there is, maybe I just didn’t look enough—but it seems to me this is the natural way to resolve him. And more than that: I even brought proof in favor of the Rif, not just a resolution of his view. There are good reasons to adopt his opinion specifically. Meaning, he escapes difficulties that the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not escape, and in that sense this is not just some forced answer; it’s actually a compelling view. And that brings me to the two questions with which I ended last time. The first question is what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the Jerusalem Talmud ask: how can someone become liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain? After all, every step he takes between the beginning of the path and the end of the path is considered like standing, according to Ben Azzai. So it comes out that he is really carrying epsilon in the public domain, stopping, another epsilon, stopping, another epsilon, stopping—so really he is going less than less than four cubits. Not epsilon—a step. No, according to Rashi in Ketubot it’s a step, but we haven’t gotten to that yet. At this stage it seems that the walking itself is standing. So every moment that you walk, it is considered as if you are standing still. Rolling—roller skates, rollerblades—rolling. So that’s what I’m saying, we’ll get to Rashi later, who says that really every single step is the setting down, but on the face of it the medieval authorities (Rishonim) also compare this, if you remember, to “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” Right, that’s one of the possible explanations, and therefore for example the medieval authorities (Rishonim) compare it to “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” “Caught in the air is as if it was set down” is something that flies—there are no steps there. We’ll still see more, but for now I’m saying: the assumption in Ben Azzai is that the walking itself is considered like standing, not each step individually. And then it really comes out that you are simply carrying less than less than four cubits, and you ought to be exempt. That’s what everyone asks: according to Ben Azzai, how can it ever happen that a person violates the prohibition of carrying four cubits in the public domain? That’s the first question, and on that question I said that according to the Rif, for example, on his own approach this question doesn’t arise at all. Because according to the Rif, the claim is that even if he is considered standing at each and every step he takes in between, that does not cancel the initial lifting that took place at the beginning. Ben Azzai never said that it does. Which is a huge bonus, because the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) get pushed into saying things like a law given to Moses at Sinai, scriptural decree, all kinds of things like that, whereas for the Rif—why should he? For him this is simple; if anything, the opposite. It could be that this is the source of the Rif’s position—from the very fact that there is such a concept as carrying four cubits in the public domain, and apparently Ben Azzai doesn’t disagree with that either. From here the Rif learned exactly his basic principle: even if walking is like standing, that doesn’t mean it cancels the initial lifting. So in that sense this is really a strong consideration in favor of the Rif. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) are squeezed, and we’ll still talk about that today. Is this a question in favor of the Rif or in favor of Ben Azzai? What? In favor of the Rif or in favor of Ben Azzai? No, because all the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) also concede what Ben Azzai says. I’m asking: what does Ben Azzai mean? So let’s distinguish between the Rif and the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Rif’s interpretation of Ben Azzai gets support from this consideration. Now regarding the second question—it’s basically about… this is a question that comes up more in the later authorities (Acharonim). What—after all, the Talmud above says that there is a difference between standing in order to adjust the load and standing in order to rest. Now the later authorities (Acharonim) say—I sent you today the Birkat Avraham so you could see it; it just summarizes it, there are other later authorities (Acharonim) too—but the claim is that we don’t find anywhere that Ben Azzai disputes this distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. The Talmud presents it as an accepted point. It doesn’t note that this depends on a dispute between the Sages and Ben Azzai. Now how can it be that Ben Azzai accepts such a thing? After all, Ben Azzai says that even if you are walking, it is considered as if you are standing. So if you are standing only to adjust the load, that is not called standing? That’s more standing than somebody who is just walking. So it makes no sense that Ben Azzai would say that someone who walks is considered standing, but someone who stands in order to adjust the load is not standing—he’s walking. How can that be? So of course the obvious way out here—and I’m a little surprised that they reject this so easily—is that really Ben Azzai does not accept the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. Ben Azzai does not accept it. And notice where this distinction came up. This distinction came up in the topic / passage on 5b above, right? Regarding someone moving objects from corner to corner, and the question is what happens if he stood in the middle before changing his mind and deciding to take it outside. Meaning, the whole discussion there arises in that very topic / passage of Rabbi Yohanan. And according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim), Rabbi Yohanan does not go according to Ben Azzai’s view. So there it is presented as accepted that there is a difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. But there there is a difference between the private domain and the public domain, we don’t have… No, those are already answers. We’ll still get to possible answers, but first I’m asking whether there is even a question here. So on the face of it, it looks like this: if I said that the question of how one violates carrying four cubits in the public domain—the Rif says the question doesn’t arise at all. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) answer it—you saw in the Rosh, you saw in Tosafot, we’ll still get to it—the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) answer it explicitly. There is another question, a question of the later authorities (Acharonim), yes? What—how can it be that you tell me that standing to adjust the load is not called standing, only standing to rest is? Standing to adjust the load is not standing? Yet walking is standing? Walking is less standing than someone who stands to adjust the load. Right, according to Ben Azzai. So now the simplest claim is that Ben Azzai simply really doesn’t accept that. Ben Azzai, who says that walking is like standing, obviously also says that standing to adjust the load is like standing. That’s a fortiori. Ah, so why doesn’t the Talmud above say that Ben Azzai disagrees—that the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest was not said according to Ben Azzai; that it depends on a tannaitic dispute? Very simple. According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), not the Rif, the Talmud above plainly does not go according to Ben Azzai’s position. That’s exactly what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) point out—that Rabbi Yohanan there, in the case of moving objects from corner to corner, doesn’t fit Ben Azzai. Because according to Ben Azzai, even when he walks he would in fact be liable, because even walking is standing. So if he stands to adjust the load, obviously he would be liable. This whole discussion arises in Rabbi Yohanan’s view, who does not say like Ben Azzai. Obviously. The whole discussion there goes according to Rabbi Yohanan, who does not rule like Ben Azzai. So there we are working within the view that walking is not like standing. In that view, it is indeed accepted that only standing to rest counts, not standing to adjust the load. But Ben Azzai, who says that even someone who walks is considered standing, then obviously someone who stands to adjust the load is standing, and someone who stands to rest is of course standing. So all of them are cases of standing. So there is no question as to why they didn’t bring that Ben Azzai disagrees. That whole topic / passage there simply isn’t going… According to the Rif, in a moment we’ll get to it. No—according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). But the Birkat Avraham that I directed you to argues that this is not a possible answer within the approach of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). Why is it not possible? He basically brings three proofs for this. The first proof is the Rivah in Tosafot, under the opening words “Granted.” The Rivah wonders about someone who carries four cubits in the public domain and stands in the middle in order to rest. Right? At the end of Tosafot “Granted.” You saw that Tosafot today. So at the end of Tosafot he wonders what happens according to Ben Azzai, who says walking is like standing—what happens if someone carries four cubits in the public domain and stands in the middle in order to rest? After he said that there is a law given to Moses at Sinai that in carrying four cubits in the public domain one is indeed liable despite the fact that walking is like standing—that is the way out adopted by the other medieval authorities (Rishonim)—he says, yes, but I still wonder: if the walking in the middle does not exempt you when you carry four cubits in the public domain, then maybe standing would also not exempt you. Right? Now it’s interesting that he points out that he wonders specifically about standing to rest. And what about standing to adjust the load? That’s closer to walking. Well, but what? But it could be that for him that case is obvious—that it’s obviously like walking, but standing to rest is not. So what do we see? That even in Ben Azzai’s view they distinguish between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. Because the difficulty is about Ben Azzai. The Rivah is wondering according to Ben Azzai. Ben Azzai says that walking is like standing—what happens if someone carries four cubits in the public domain and in the middle of the four cubits he stands in order to rest? A law given to Moses at Sinai—why is that happening? Exactly. But this is all within Ben Azzai’s view. Yes, yes. But within Ben Azzai’s view he wonders about standing to rest. What about standing to adjust the load? In standing to adjust the load, it is obvious to him that it is not an interruption, because it is like walking. Meaning that the Rivah… Rabbi, I’m completely with you. I just need one second—is it okay if I stop you for a second? Yes, of course. First of all, the Birkat Avraham does not agree with the claim that Ben Azzai says that adjusting the load is also called standing. Okay. And now what proofs does he bring for the fact that he does not agree with that? I said he brings three proofs; I already brought the first one. Can you repeat the first proof? The first proof is the Rivah’s doubt in Tosafot. The Rivah in Tosafot wonders, according to Ben Azzai’s view that walking is like standing: there is a law given to Moses at Sinai that says that the walking in the middle—for someone who carries four cubits in the public domain, one could ask what about his walking in the middle? After all, he stood in the middle; according to Ben Azzai, walking is like standing. There is a law given to Moses at Sinai that says no—that in carrying, there is no exemption if he walked in the middle. The Rivah wonders what happens if he literally stands in the middle. Since you tell me that intermediate standings do not exempt, because walking is like standing, maybe actual standing would also not exempt. But notice. But I didn’t understand how he can bring that, because the Talmud explicitly tells us on page 5 that if he stands, then he is exempt. According to Ben Azzai, no. Because Ben Azzai says that walking… according to the halakhic view, which is not like Ben Azzai, there is no problem, because walking is not like standing. If walking is not like standing, then in carrying four cubits in the public domain, the fact that he is liable needs no novelty and no law given to Moses at Sinai. Obviously he is liable. According to Ben Azzai, who holds that walking is considered standing, the question arises: then how can someone who carries four cubits in the public domain be liable? After all, he walked in the middle, so it is as if he stood still at every single centimeter. So according to Ben Azzai one has to say that there is a law given to Moses at Sinai that here those intermediate standings do not exempt. Now the Rivah wonders whether that was said only regarding standings of the sort represented by walking, where walking is like standing, or even regarding actual standing. Right? Meaning, what happens if he literally stands in the middle of the four cubits? That is the Rivah’s doubt. And this is all according to Ben Azzai. But what is the difference between literally standing and “walking is like standing”? That’s exactly what he is wondering about. No—what exactly his doubt is, we’ll discuss, but he definitely wonders about it. Meaning, he wonders whether walking may indeed be like standing, but still not literally the same as standing. So the law given to Moses at Sinai in the public domain, which makes one liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain—meaning that the walking does not exempt you—the question is whether it also says that about actual standing in the middle or not. That’s the Rivah’s doubt. Okay? But when the Rivah formulates his doubt, he formulates it as someone who stood in order to rest. And the question is why he points out that it is specifically in order to rest. He should also wonder about someone who stood to adjust the load. What difference does it make? Because he says that when it is to adjust the load, that is not called setting down. To rest is certainly setting down, but that means that in the case of standing to adjust the load he does not wonder? No. No? Maybe one could say: walking is like standing to adjust the load too. Okay, but then I say that if in the case of standing to adjust the load he does not wonder, and in the case of standing to rest he does wonder, then at least according to one side of the doubt there is a difference between standing to rest and standing to adjust the load even according to Ben Azzai. Because obviously, there, says the Birkat Avraham, because obviously in standing to rest he made an actual setting down, but that was only for the sake of… not because he wanted to leave the object there, but because he really wanted to continue, but… No, I’m not looking for the reasoning. The reasoning is clear to me. It’s clear to me why standing to adjust the load might resemble walking and not resemble standing to rest. But I’m proving from here that the Rivah is willing to accept the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest even in Ben Azzai’s view. Because if he presents a doubt, then what comes out from that doubt? It could be that the law would be that standing to rest does exempt according to Ben Azzai, right? One side of the doubt is that it does exempt. But in standing to adjust the load it is obvious to him that it does not exempt. So according to one side—the one side in the doubt—it comes out that standing to rest and standing to adjust the load are different even within Ben Azzai’s approach. Right. So he too accepts the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. And therefore the question really arises: then why doesn’t the Talmud above point that out? No, but you said that the Talmud above is according to Rabbi Yohanan and not according to Ben Azzai. I didn’t understand. You said the Talmud above is according to Rabbi Yohanan. I didn’t say that. I didn’t say that. I said the opposite: one possible answer was to say that the Talmud above simply does not go according to Ben Azzai. But if the Talmud above does not go according to Ben Azzai, that means the assumption is that Ben Azzai does not make a distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. But here we see that the Rivah says he does. So therefore that’s not… And notice: Tosafot in our topic / passage is among those who disagree with the Rif, right? Tosafot here claims that in Rabbi Yohanan above we see that this is not like Ben Azzai. He writes that explicitly. Meaning, Tosafot belongs to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with the Rif. What do you mean belongs? All the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree with the Rif. Let’s say only the Rif stands against the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). And nevertheless Tosafot is willing to accept the difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest even according to Ben Azzai. That is apparently a good proof. But I think one could reject it. Because the claim is that what Tosafot wants—he wonders both about standing to adjust the load and about standing to rest, the Rivah does—but he wants to present the doubt in its more novel form, its more extreme form. So he says: I wonder whether perhaps even standing to rest would not exempt you. But according to the side that standing to rest does exempt, it could be that standing to adjust the load also exempts. It’s not certain that he makes the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. The fact that here he formulates his doubt with regard to standing to rest is because there it is really more novel. If you were to tell me that even if a person stood in order to rest, he would still be liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain, that is a big novelty. Therefore when he formulates his doubt in Ben Azzai’s view, he chooses to formulate it regarding someone who stood in order to rest, not someone who stood to adjust the load. But in truth the doubt applies to both standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. And in fact Ben Azzai does not accept the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. So in my opinion this proof is not conclusive. The second proof he brings is from the Ritva here. I’ll share the file with you. That’s why I brought the Birkat Avraham, because he already collected everything, but look at the Ritva itself. The Ritva says as follows: “And we say: granted, according to Ben Azzai, for he holds that walking is like standing—meaning, like standing in order to rest.” What does “like standing in order to rest” mean? According to Ben Azzai there is no difference between standing to rest and standing to adjust the load. So what is this “meaning”? That’s already harder. Because clearly in the Talmud—I don’t remember exactly—but we read that when it says standing, “standing” means standing in order to rest. Meaning there is no treatment of standing as standing to adjust the load, but rather… Fine, but the question is whether Ben Azzai accepts that distinction. The claim is that Ben Azzai does not accept it. He says that standing to adjust the load is also like standing. Because from his standpoint even walking is like standing. Exactly, because everything there is standing. Exactly. So then what room is there, according to Ben Azzai, to distinguish between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest? But the Ritva does bring it, yes. “And we say—look at the Ritva again—granted, according to Ben Azzai, for he holds that walking is like standing, meaning, like standing in order to rest.” What does “to rest” mean? According to Ben Azzai there is no distinction between to rest and to adjust the load. No, but not in Ben Azzai’s own view—in Rabbi Yohanan’s view. Fine, but he’s explaining that when Ben Azzai means “standing,” from the Ritva’s point of view, if in the Talmud “standing” means standing in order to rest, then not adjusting the load. So most likely Ben Azzai also means to rest. And adjusting the load—what? What is the law regarding standing to adjust the load? So is he exempt? What? Blessed be God, is he liable? Standing to adjust the load is like walking—and what? But walking is standing. Others will say so. But what I think—maybe what you, Yael, mean to say—is what I said earlier regarding Tosafot. I really think this too is not a conclusive proof. Why? Because what he wants to say, again, is how far the matter goes. When Ben Azzai says that walking is like standing, you might have thought it means like standing to adjust the load, maybe—that would make a practical difference. So he says no, no: it’s actual standing, meaning standing in order to rest. And then of course everything is like standing in order to rest. Walking is like standing in order to rest, standing to adjust the load is like standing in order to rest, all of them are like standing in order to rest. That the Ritva merely wants to sharpen what Ben Azzai’s novelty is. There is something here—if you think about it, with standing to adjust the load he is in fact standing in order to rest, because in the end he is arranging the burden somehow because he has to somehow… No, fine, that’s the reasoning why. Let’s first discuss what he says, and afterward think about the reasoning behind it. So therefore I think that even in the Ritva this is not a proof. Because what the Ritva says—“meaning that someone who walks is like someone standing in order to rest”—is: don’t think that Ben Azzai says walking is like standing to adjust the load. Rather, Ben Azzai says walking is really standing—standing in every respect. Obviously standing to adjust the load would be the same thing. If walking is like that, then standing to adjust the load is certainly like that. No, but why is that a contradiction? What? Why did we say that the Birkat Avraham does not agree that Ben Azzai says that adjusting the load is also called standing? So the Ritva doesn’t contradict that. The Ritva also says that adjusting the load is also like standing—it’s really like standing to rest. What contradiction is there in the proof? How does this proof contradict that claim? Why am I disagreeing with the Birkat Avraham? No, no. We said that the Birkat Avraham brings three proofs against the claim that Ben Azzai says that adjusting the load is also called standing. The second proof is the Ritva here. The Ritva says not that adjusting the load is called standing, but rather that according to Ben Azzai there is no difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. He doesn’t have standing to adjust the load at all. For him there is no such thing—walking is also standing. But that supports the claim; it supports Ben Azzai’s claim that adjusting the load is also called standing. It actually supports the claim, not proves against it. So why does the Ritva specify “like standing to rest”? Because the Talmud says there: what does “standing” mean? “Standing” means standing in order to rest. But not according to Ben Azzai—it’s in a view that is not Ben Azzai. Wait, there is a point here. Why does the Ritva need to state that walking is like standing in order to rest? According to Ben Azzai there is no such distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. So I say that this is not a proof. Why? Because he means to say that when Ben Azzai says “walking is like standing,” he means completely standing in every respect—that’s what “like standing to rest” means. Obviously standing to adjust the load would also be the same thing, so this is not a proof. I didn’t understand what the Ritva is saying. The Ritva explains Ben Azzai’s position: when Ben Azzai says that walking is like standing, he means like fully standing, like standing in order to rest. From this the Birkat Avraham proves that the Ritva understood that the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest also exists according to Ben Azzai, because otherwise why would he need to specify that walking is like standing in order to rest? It’s just like standing—according to Ben Azzai there is no difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. We see in the Ritva that the Ritva thinks that even according to Ben Azzai there is a difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. I didn’t understand. But if standing is standing to rest, then all the more so standing to adjust the load is standing to rest. That’s the question—you’re repeating the question. Meaning I don’t understand the Ritva’s claim—why, I don’t understand why the Birkat Avraham says that the Ritva is against the claim. You’re mixing the reasoning with the proof. We are proving that according to the Ritva there is a difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest even in Ben Azzai’s view, and I didn’t manage to understand that, because the Ritva here specifies that standing—sorry, that walking means like standing to rest. Meaning he is sharpening that it is like this kind of standing and not like that kind of standing. So we see that according to Ben Azzai too there is a difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. Now in light of that, the Birkat Avraham’s question arises: why? How can that be? After all, even actual walking is like standing. So standing to adjust the load would not count as standing? Standing to adjust the load is more standing than someone who walks. Fine? And the third proof is the Ramban, which is basically the same thing as the Ritva, and again I’m going… Wait, wait, that’s too fast for me. Okay. I haven’t gotten to the Ramban yet. Fine, the Ramban is like the Ritva; there isn’t anything new here. The Ramban is like the Ritva? Almost the same wording; the Ritva takes it from the Ramban. But it’s obvious that standing to rest and standing to adjust the load are not the same thing. Again? It’s obvious that standing to adjust the load and standing to rest are not the same thing. Why? Why is it obvious? Because you also have to relate to what stands behind their standing. I didn’t understand. Someone who stands to rest—obviously he is making a setting down. Ruti, we are not dealing here with reasoning. According to Ben Azzai, even someone who is actually walking is standing. So what room is there here to distinguish between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest? Even someone who is literally walking is considered standing. Fine, so the Ramban also has the same wording. Again, we won’t go into this now, but all these medieval authorities (Rishonim)—the Ritva, the Ramban—they are of course all medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with the Rif. In the Ramban it is written explicitly: “He does not accept what Rabbi Yohanan said, that one who moves objects from corner to corner and then changes his mind and takes them out…” Yes, Ben Azzai disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan. The Ramban says it, the Ritva says it, the Rashba, everyone, all the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Okay. The Rosh, the Ran, everyone—except for the Rif. Okay? So those are his proofs. And I said: the proofs are not conclusive, and therefore in principle this question itself I could resolve even according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). The question of what the difference is between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest—the answer is that really there is no difference. When the Talmud brought the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest, the Talmud was dealing with Rabbi Yohanan’s view, and in fact that topic / passage does not go with Ben Azzai. Ben Azzai really would not accept that there is a difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest. Right. Not between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest—he would not accept that there is a difference between walking being like standing and standing to adjust the load; there is no difference there. Same thing, same thing, because even actual walking is like standing to rest. So standing to adjust the load is also like standing to rest, they’re all the same. So in the public domain according to Ben Azzai you would always be exempt? That is the question they ask. Now we have to see what the answer is. And then they ask the question: so how can carrying four cubits in the public domain be liable according to Ben Azzai? Okay? Now according to… according to the Rif, as we said, let’s now discuss the Rif’s approach and the approach of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). According to the Rif, the difficulty of how carrying four cubits in the public domain can be liable—we solved that; it doesn’t arise at all. What about the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest? I remind you that according to the Rif, the topic / passage above, Rabbi Yohanan’s case of moving objects from corner to corner, which also makes the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest, also goes according to Ben Azzai. So there too there is no significance to… the initial lifting is what determines things. Why? On the contrary. So the distinction the Talmud makes between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest was actually also said within Ben Azzai’s view according to the Rif. Because according to the Rif, the topic / passage above also goes with Ben Azzai, right? So now the question is: according to the Rif, what do we do with that? How can that be? According to the Rif it is even harder. In fact, that’s another proof the Birkat Avraham brings. According to the Rif it’s even harder. Because according to the Rif it comes out like this: Ben Azzai accepts the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest, and on the other hand says that walking is like standing. So walking is like standing, and standing to adjust the load is not standing according to the Rif? And the answer is—what do you say? But there’s something here… Ben Azzai says this only when there are three domains. Okay, and what I said regarding the first question according to the Rif—what Yael is saying is right. I’ll say the same thing regarding the second question. What does that mean? When is walking like standing? When he is in a domain of its own, a stoa, a distinct status. But if this is in the same domain where the lifting had already occurred earlier, then we already saw that walking does not cancel the initial lifting; similarly, standing to adjust the load does not cancel the initial lifting either, but standing to rest does. Everything we said in answering the first question will also answer this question in the Rif, because the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest—in what context is it brought in the previous topic / passage? When someone is transferring from the first place in the private domain. I took an object and wanted to move it to another corner in the private domain, and then I changed my mind, right? Now what happens when I changed my mind? They say: if I stood, and then changed my mind—okay? Or not exactly, but when I changed my mind, then that is already a new lifting, so I really am liable, and it doesn’t matter that the first lifting was not done in order to take it out; the second lifting, once I changed my mind and stood, was done that way. Abaye says: but that is only if he stood to rest, not if he stood to adjust the load. Why? Not because standing to adjust the load is somehow less than walking; even walking in that situation would not help. Standing to adjust the load preserves the initial lifting. Exactly. Meaning, just as walking does not cancel the initial lifting, standing to adjust the load also does not cancel the initial lifting. Therefore indeed, yes, standing to adjust the load is not less standing than someone who is literally walking. Whatever we say about walking, we would also say about standing to adjust the load. It’s just that in the topic / passage before us, from corner to corner, even walking is not like standing. Because after all it does not uproot—it does not cancel the initial lifting, and therefore standing to adjust the load does not cancel the initial lifting either. There is no problem at all for the Rif. Whatever answers the first difficulty also answers the second difficulty in the Rif, since the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest is brought in the previous topic / passage in a case where one is taking from one point in the private domain. So that’s another proof for the Rif’s position—both difficulties. What happens with the other medieval authorities (Rishonim)? With the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), they themselves ask the first question against themselves: how can carrying four cubits in the public domain be liable according to Ben Azzai? And according to them, this really is difficult, because according to their understanding it does cancel the initial lifting. I am asking against them the second question, what the Birkat Avraham asks: how can it be that according to Ben Azzai they distinguish between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest? But on that one can absolutely say what I said earlier—that this distinction really is not said within Ben Azzai’s approach. Ben Azzai disagrees with it; the whole topic / passage above is not according to Ben Azzai. Therefore the second difficulty is not difficult against the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), and no wonder they don’t bring it. The first difficulty really is difficult, and in a moment we’ll see how they answer it. So you have to understand that if I do not accept all the Birkat Avraham’s proofs, then one can return to the obvious answer, and the second difficulty is not difficult even against the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), not only against the Rif. Rabbi, the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) claim that walking cancels the lifting? According to Ben Azzai, who says walking is like standing—so why does it matter that I originally lifted not with intent to take it out? Once the later walking is in order to take it out, then according to them that later walking counts as a new lifting; it cancels the initial lifting. But that’s all, right? So how does this now explain the first difficulty—the difficulty of four cubits in the public domain? We’ll get to that in a moment—that’s what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) themselves ask. Okay, and regarding the difficulty of standing to adjust the load? I said: regarding the difficulty of standing to adjust the load, this solves the problem. Why? Because according to Ben Azzai, even walking here is not like standing, since it does not cancel the initial lifting—so standing to adjust the load also does not cancel the initial lifting, exactly. But standing to rest does, because standing to rest is actual standing, and then it is a new lifting; the previous lifting is canceled. Therefore even according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is no problem regarding Ben Azzai. There is no place where standing to adjust the load is worse than someone who is walking. In a place where walking counts as standing, standing to adjust the load also counts as standing. Okay, it’s just that in both of them it is standing, only it does not cancel the initial lifting? Exactly, because it does not cancel the lifting. Standing means to rest? Right. No, he says that it does cancel. No, it does not cancel—only in that same domain it does not cancel. According to the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—ah, according to them it does cancel. Okay, and then the difficulty of… then standing to adjust the load also cancels, right? Okay, so both of them cancel—both standing to adjust the load and walking-as-standing, both cancel the initial lifting. So why did the topic / passage above say that standing to adjust the load does not cancel? Because it is not according to Ben Azzai. Ah. In the topic / passage on page 5, where they say that standing to adjust the load does not cancel, that simply is not according to Ben Azzai. Correct. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim), who say that Ben Azzai holds that walking cancels the initial lifting, obviously would also say that standing to adjust the load cancels the initial lifting. So why does the topic / passage above say otherwise? Because the topic / passage above is not going according to Ben Azzai’s view—that is exactly what those medieval authorities (Rishonim) say. Okay, so therefore that difficulty is not difficult. And according to the Rif it isn’t difficult either, because if you tell me that the topic / passage goes like Ben Azzai, then you also have to say together with that that the walking there and the standing to adjust the load there, even according to Ben Azzai… according to Ben Azzai it is not considered standing, because it does not cancel the initial lifting. So once again, there is no problem. Okay? So therefore the question of four cubits still remains. What? Yes. What remains for us is only the first difficulty, and no wonder that when the medieval authorities (Rishonim) raise objections, they raise the first difficulty, not the second. Because the second difficulty really isn’t difficult; therefore in my opinion the Birkat Avraham is just overcomplicating things here. There’s no problem at all, and there is no proof from the Ramban, nor from the Ritva, nor from the Rivah in Tosafot. Okay. So let’s go into what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) themselves say. The Rashba in Ketubot really asks the first question: “Rather, who is this according to? Ben Azzai, who says that walking is like standing. And if you say: according to Ben Azzai, one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable—how can you find such a case? It would be as though he is carrying less than less than four cubits.” Yes, the first difficulty: how can it be that one who carries is liable? Now, okay, and of course he does not accept the distinction between the topics / passages, what the Rif said—that there is no cancellation of the… meaning, if walking is like standing, then it also cancels the initial lifting. Therefore according to the Rashba’s approach, the difficulty is indeed difficult, because he does not follow the Rif. “One can say,” first answer, “that this is a law given to Moses at Sinai.” In principle it really ought to cancel. Notice: according to this answer, walking is like standing even in the public domain. There is just a law given to Moses at Sinai that with regard to carrying four cubits in the public domain, nevertheless one is liable. Right? But there is no principled difference between the private domain and the public domain, unlike what will emerge in the next answer, the Ra’avad’s answer. At the moment we are not making a distinction. There is a law, for example, when I take something out from the private domain to the public domain, but then in the public domain I keep walking. I didn’t set it down. What would be the law according to Ben Azzai? Wherever you set it down, you are liable, right? Because the walking I do in the public domain is considered like standing. So I am liable. Only in the case of carrying four cubits in the public domain, the fact that I walk is not considered like standing. There is a law given to Moses at Sinai that nevertheless I am liable, but there is no essential distinction here between private domain and public domain as there is in the Ra’avad’s next answer. There is a difference between the answers—that’s what I want to sharpen. Okay? But we also see this from the Talmud on page 5, because it brings the example of adjusting the load and it speaks about transferring from private to public but brings specifically the example from four cubits. It brings it from four cubits to the private domain. No, where it was taking out. Right, it brings that example; that means it doesn’t make a distinction between the domains. Correct. Now, yes. Do they interpret these as two unrelated answers, and what would be the practical difference? Could it be that it’s the same answer, except that if it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai then it says there is a difference… No, no, because the medieval authorities (Rishonim) themselves—Tosafot itself points this out, and we’ll see it in a moment—it asks: then why don’t we learn from there? It asks that, right? So why don’t we learn from that law given to Moses at Sinai that in the public domain we really do not say that walking is like standing? And it explains why not. Meaning, it means specifically for carrying four cubits, not a distinction between the public domain and another domain. It is a special law in the case of carrying four cubits in the public domain, while in principle in every other context… Yes, exactly. And in the second answer, not so. We’ll see in a moment. But also what Shmuel said—that they speak about carrying specifically within that law of carrying four cubits in the public domain, and there I will say that walking is not like standing? I will not say that walking is not like standing; rather, even though it is like standing, that still does not exempt. Meaning, let’s put it like this: if in fact in the Tabernacle they carried four cubits from the private domain to the public domain, then we see that this is labor that was done in the Tabernacle. Consequently, if I do it here, then I have done something that was done in the Tabernacle. Therefore I am liable regardless of the question whether the walking in the middle is considered like standing. Even if it is considered like standing, still that is exactly how it was done in the Tabernacle, so why should I be exempt? Okay? So the law given to Moses at Sinai says that although walking is like standing even in the public domain, specifically with regard to carrying four cubits in the public domain this does not exempt. A special law for carrying four cubits in the public domain. “Alternatively, one can say,” second answer, “that Ben Azzai said this only regarding someone walking in the private domain, or in a place of exemption. Know that they bring it only in connection with this case—someone who picked it up in the private domain,” etc., it doesn’t matter, “but with regard to carrying in the public domain, Ben Azzai did not say this, because it is no better than standing to adjust the load,” this is the Ra’avad’s answer. What is he saying? He is saying that this only happens—walking is like standing—only when one transfers from the private domain to the public domain or from a place of exemption. But in the public domain itself, if he is only in the public domain, there he does not hold that walking is like standing? Walking is not like standing, because even standing to adjust the load is not like standing there. Meaning that he also makes one liable for standing to adjust the load. What? I can’t hear. Meaning that he also makes one liable for standing to adjust the load. Right, that’s what it means. Correct. “Since it is no better than standing to adjust the load.” Yes. So if he makes one liable for standing to adjust the load in the public domain, then certainly he will make one liable for walking in the public domain. Correct. Meaning that basically the claim is that in the public domain this law of walking being like standing was never said, because even standing to adjust the load is not like standing there—precisely by the a fortiori argument of the second difficulty. Okay? By the way, I didn’t understand the difference between them, between the two answers. The first answer says it is a law given to Moses at Sinai: in carrying four cubits in the public domain, there is no exemption on account of walking; walking is not like standing. This answer says that in the public domain in general, Ben Azzai did not say that walking is like standing. And why didn’t he say it? For what reason? So he doesn’t write it. The Ra’avad does not explain. He only proves it. He says: if in standing to adjust the load you are not exempt—that means it is not considered standing—then walking certainly is not considered standing. But why really not? What really is the difference between private domain and public domain? He did not explain that. What’s the reasoning? Especially since if he says that someone who adjusts the load is not called standing in the public domain, that means he is indeed relating to that, and in the Talmud we saw that standing to adjust the load was discussed both between private and public and also within the public domain. So how does Ben Azzai, so to speak, take the Talmud on page 5 and take only part of it? He agrees that someone who stands to adjust the load is not called standing, and on the other hand he still distinguishes between the domains? No, he says that in the public domain, walking and standing to adjust the load are not considered standing. In the private domain, walking and standing to adjust the load are considered standing. Yes, but on page 5 of the Talmud it’s not like that. On page 5, also in the public domain, someone for whom walking is like standing is considered not standing. There is no “walking is like standing.” And likewise someone adjusting the load. So that contradicts the Talmud. No, it does not contradict the Talmud, because the Talmud on 5b does not go according to Ben Azzai’s view according to the Rashba and the Ra’avad. Right, that’s what I’m saying. In other words, Ben Azzai does not go according to the Talmud on page 5—that’s not Ben Azzai’s view. In what part of the Talmud? That’s exactly what I’m saying—only one part. Correct, but that doesn’t matter; there is no contradiction. The Talmud itself is not going with Ben Azzai. One of the two laws there, Ben Azzai also agrees with. It’s irrelevant; the topic / passage doesn’t go with him. But that law—that when one stands to adjust the load in the middle of carrying four cubits in the public domain, that does not exempt him—Ben Azzai also agrees with that. The law that also in the private domain standing to adjust the load is not like standing—that was not said according to Ben Azzai’s view. There’s no contradiction. The topic / passage doesn’t go with Ben Azzai; as it happens, one of the laws there also fits Ben Azzai. Fine. Okay? Now by the way, I think from here—from here the Birkat Avraham could have brought a better proof. Because here it really seems they assume that the difference between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest also exists according to Ben Azzai. Because he says that if in carrying four cubits in the public domain you stand in order to rest—in the middle of carrying four cubits in the public domain you stood in order to rest—are you exempt or liable? Liable? To rest? Exempt. Exempt from four cubits. But in the case of standing to adjust the load, he says you are liable when carrying four cubits in the public domain. Right? Meaning that he does accept the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest even according to Ben Azzai. True, that’s only in the public domain; I don’t know what happens in the private domain. But at least regarding the public domain, there is apparently proof from the Rashba—or from this Ra’avad—that the distinction between standing to adjust the load and standing to rest was also said within Ben Azzai’s view. Okay? Now as I said, the practical difference between the two answers is: what happens according to Ben Azzai if someone takes something out from the private domain to the public domain, but in the public domain he does not stop, he keeps walking around? So according to the first answer, the law would be that according to Ben Azzai he is liable. Because “walking is like standing” applies according to Ben Azzai even in the public domain. It is specifically regarding carrying four cubits in the public domain that we say there is a novelty there that says otherwise. According to the second answer, according to the second answer, in the public domain the rule that walking is like standing was never said. It is not a special law given to Moses at Sinai about carrying; it is a difference between domains. Right. So if in the public domain “walking is like standing” was never said, then also with regard to taking out he will be exempt. That is the practical difference between the two answers. Right. But it sounds—it sounds unreasonable that in taking out he would be exempt. Why? He didn’t set it down. If he didn’t set it down. But if he—he walked. If he didn’t set it down and still passed four cubits in the public domain. No, no—he didn’t pass four cubits. He took it out from the private domain to the public domain, and in the public domain he did not set it down. No, he didn’t set it down, he didn’t stop; he keeps strolling around there. Not four cubits. He strolls a cubit here, a cubit there, but he never comes to rest. Okay. Fine? Or Sabbath ended immediately—it doesn’t matter, some case like that. So according to the first answer he would be liable. Right. Because according to Ben Azzai, walking is like standing even in the public domain. Specifically regarding carrying four cubits there is a novelty that says not so. According to the second answer, in the public domain the rule of walking being like standing was never said. Not only with regard to carrying, but also with regard to taking out. Okay? Because it is a matter of domain, not of what action you are performing. Now why indeed—wait, a question. Is taking out not in any case liable even if he didn’t pass four cubits? No, he has to set it down in the public domain. If there is no setting down… So what really is the difference between them? Why according to the second answer would the public domain be different, such that walking there would not be like standing? Because in the private domain, he has ownership over that place. It could be that really the idea is as follows. In the private domain, even if I am walking, you can still say that the object is in the private domain. Right, it is not set down there, but it is there. And therefore it could be that what Ben Azzai means when he says that walking is like standing is simply that one does not require setting down. What is required is that the object be in the private domain. We already discussed the difference between setting down and merely being present. Okay? So what Ben Azzai means when he says “walking is like standing”—and I asked you about this on the page—is not necessarily that walking is considered standing, but rather that standing is not required. If you are in the private domain, that is enough. Now in the public domain there is no such thing as simply being in the public domain; the public domain is not a place. Therefore in the public domain you have to stand or set it down so that I can say the object has been set down in the public domain. Merely being in the public domain is not a defined category. Therefore according to Ben Azzai, walking is not like standing in the public domain. There is no defined place there? Yes, it is not a defined place where you can say the object is in the public domain. The public domain is a space. Right, exactly. So you cannot say the object is in the public domain until it is actually set down there, or until you actually stop. Now notice all the implications. I’m already nearing the end, so I’ll try to include all the continuations here. The implication basically is that now it is clear why according to these medieval authorities (Rishonim), if Ben Azzai says walking is like standing, it also cancels the initial lifting. Why does it cancel the initial lifting? Because after all I am in the private domain. Right? Can you say that I wasn’t in the private domain at the moment I decided to pass into the public domain? I was there. I don’t need to cancel the initial lifting because no lifting is really needed at all. What is required is that you be in the private domain and transfer it to the public domain. Therefore those same medieval authorities (Rishonim), unlike the Rif, say that since they understand that when Ben Azzai says walking is like standing, it means that walking also counts as being present—not that the walking itself literally counts as standing, but rather that the walker is in the private domain. And that is only in the private domain, not in the public domain. That is the first implication. The second implication is that in the private domain, if he is already there, then I don’t care that before that he lifted it in a way that was not intended for taking it out to the public domain. Since after all, later too, when he changed his mind… he is in the private domain. So if he is in the private domain, you cannot say he wasn’t in the private domain before he passed into the public domain. Wait, the lifting isn’t important, because no lifting is needed. What is needed is that you be there. Were you there? That’s it, you are liable. By contrast, according to the Rif—one second—by contrast, according to the Rif, this is exactly the point on which the Rif disagrees. Because the Rif claims that when Ben Azzai says walking is like standing, he means that the walking is literally considered standing. Not that one need not stand, but that he is considered standing. Therefore, says the Rif, fine—but that does not cancel the initial lifting. Because when are you considered to have stood and then set out? At the beginning. After that, all the stages in which you walk—even if every single moment is considered as though you are standing—the determining standing is the initial one. Because according to the Rif, walking is considered like standing, and standing is required. It’s not that the object is simply there and no standing is needed. And this is the root of the dispute between the Rif and the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). And this dispute actually reappears in the two answers of Tosafot here, and also in the two answers of Tosafot in our topic / passage here in Tractate Shabbat. I asked you both there and here what exactly the point is on which the answers disagree. I can already see that I’m simply not going to have enough time to get to it, so I’m trying to squeeze it in here. Tosafot in Ketubot, for example, asks this question: walking is like standing? Also in Rosh HaShanah. What? In Ketubot and also in Rosh HaShanah. Yes, one second, we’ll see right away. This is the dispute between the Jerusalem Talmud and Tosafot’s answer. Look. “Walking is like standing,” this is Tosafot in Ketubot, “and yet one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable—that is a law given to Moses at Sinai, as we say in ‘HaZorek,’ and we do not derive from it, for there it is a place of liability. But Ben Azzai is speaking of one who walks from the camps to the plaza through a portico, which is a place of exemption.” Okay? So what is he basically saying? “It is a law given to Moses at Sinai, as we say in ‘HaZorek,’ and we do not derive from it.” What does “we do not derive from it” mean? That is what I answered one of you earlier. One might have said: there is a law given to Moses at Sinai regarding carrying four cubits in the public domain—let us learn from that law that apparently walking is not like standing, or at least that in the public domain it is not like standing. But no, we do not derive from it, because there it is a place of liability. Okay, so we do not derive from it. Wait, wait—isn’t “place of liability” an explanation? I didn’t understand. I thought the continuation was an explanation of the reasoning, like a second opinion. Right. No. What do you mean? It is a law given to Moses at Sinai; that isn’t a reasoning. But why explain it as a law given to Moses at Sinai? Why explain that it is a place of liability? Because otherwise the question is why we do not derive from that law given to Moses at Sinai to other contexts. Ah, it’s a distinction. Exactly. Here it is a place of liability, so it is something else. Only to a place of exemption can we… but not to a place of liability. The question is why, from a place of liability, we cannot derive. On the face of it, Tosafot here introduces the exemption of interruption itself. You remember that in the topic / passage of interruption there was a difference: if it is a place of liability, then it does not interrupt; if it is not a place of liability, then it does interrupt. Here he inserts that into this exemption of walking-as-standing, not into the exemption of interruption—but that’s… I’m not going to get to that now. Yes. And what is Ben Azzai speaking about? About someone walking from the camps to the plaza through a portico, which is a place of exemption. Fine? So in a place of exemption this is really something else—there indeed walking is like standing. Now Tosafot here combines the two answers. He starts with the law given to Moses at Sinai and then explains that from there we learn to every place that is a place of liability. Meaning, what will happen now in other matters in the public domain that are not carrying four cubits—taking out from the private domain to the public domain? Will walking be like standing or not? According to Ben Azzai? In the public domain it will not be like standing. In the public domain it will not be like standing. Why? Because regarding the public domain, this can be learned from the law given to Moses at Sinai. Because the public domain is a place of liability. Why can’t we learn from the law given to Moses at Sinai? To a place of exemption. Only in the portico does Ben Azzai say that walking is like standing. And that cannot be learned from the law given to Moses at Sinai. It turns out that he begins with a law given to Moses at Sinai but ends with a general exemption for the public domain. Meaning, in the public domain walking is not like standing. He combines the two directions of the Rashba and the Ra’avad. Because he begins with a law given to Moses at Sinai but says: from the law given to Moses at Sinai we will learn to all public-domain cases. To the public domain one can learn, but not to a place of exemption; only to a place of liability can one learn. Okay? Who is Ben Azzai? By the way, I think that “place of liability” means what he intends to say is the reasoning I mentioned earlier—that the public domain is not a place. And therefore one is liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain even though you supposedly stand in the middle. If it is not a place, then also with regard to taking something out from the private domain to the public domain, walking there would not count as standing. Okay? Basically this is the same reasoning I gave in explaining the Ra’avad, except that he extends it within the approach of law given to Moses at Sinai. Then afterward he brings the Jerusalem Talmud. Could there be a second explanation? Yes. So the Jerusalem Talmud says: “And the Jerusalem Talmud asks according to Ben Azzai…” and answers, “where he jumps.” What does “where he jumps” mean? First of all, what is the point? It’s less than a pause—just one jump. Yes, but first what does the Jerusalem Talmud assume? That even in the public domain walking is like standing, otherwise it wouldn’t need to arrive at this answer, right? Again, it disagrees with the first answer brought in Tosafot; those same two approaches accompany us everywhere. The Jerusalem Talmud claims that even in the public domain, walking is like standing, and therefore there is no choice but to explain: how then can one be liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain? It does not accept law given to Moses at Sinai, abstract reasoning, and so on. So it says: we are dealing only with someone who jumps. But if he really were walking—if he really were walking—then carrying four cubits would indeed be exempt. So it gives an interpretive restriction for the case of carrying. Wait, sorry for the somewhat… I imagined something else with the jumping. What does “he jumps” mean? Meaning he jumps—can you jump four cubits in the public domain? Like some kind of bolt, like… You mean, how can he jump four cubits? Or that he says… I… I think there are two possibilities in the Jerusalem Talmud that occurred to me. He jumps two cubits over the exempt space, and the exempt space is very narrow… No, no, we’re speaking about carrying, there is no exempt space here; we’re speaking about carrying four cubits in the public domain. No, I mean, he jumps from the private domain over… No, no, it’s all in the public domain. The whole thing, that’s it. We are speaking about carrying four cubits in the public domain. Yes, you can jump. Jump two meters? Maybe, I don’t know. But I’m not sure… Maybe. I’m saying there are two possibilities. Basically what underlies this is one of two possibilities, I think. Either it really means that he jumped two meters, like some kind of kangaroo, okay? Without walking at all. Then what does the Jerusalem Talmud assume? Notice: that “walking is like standing” in the Rif’s sense. “Walking is like standing” means that walking is not mere presence; rather, walking is literally considered standing. I directed you to Rashi in Ketubot, who says that placing the foot down while walking counts as acts of stopping. And to that the Jerusalem Talmud says: yes, but if he jumps, then there is no placing down of the foot. Sorry—did the Rif know the Jerusalem Talmud? There is a very interesting article about that by the father-in-law of Rabbi Yechezkel Abramsky, Rabbi Yerushalmiski. Did the Rif know the Jerusalem Talmud? A long article somewhere… I can send it to you if you want. He discusses it, and there is… it’s not entirely clear, yes. And if he did know it, maybe he took it from there? Maybe, I don’t know. In any case, though, it fits. Even if he didn’t take it from the Jerusalem Talmud, it is a compatible approach. Is the Jerusalem Talmud the Talmud? Because he said “did he know it, not know it”… That’s one possibility. There may be a second possibility. It could be that what the Jerusalem Talmud means to say is someone who runs. Do you know what the definition in sports is of the difference between running and walking? That at no stage are both feet on the ground together. That is called running. In walking, when you place the front foot down, the back foot is still on the ground. In running, you lift the first one and only then place down the second one, and so on. Meaning, there are never two feet on the ground together. And it could be that what the Jerusalem Talmud means by “jumping” is running. That is, there are never two feet on the ground, and then indeed we say that walking is not like standing. For walking to be like standing, both feet need to be on the ground. Those are two possible ways to understand the Jerusalem Talmud. In any case, though, here I’ll finish: what we see in the Jerusalem Talmud is that it apparently goes in the direction of the Rif. Because it basically says… yes, yes. Because it basically says that “walking is like standing” is not mere presence, as I explained in the view of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with the Rif, but rather that walking itself counts as acts of stopping. And therefore it is also clear that those acts of stopping do not uproot the initial lifting, as I explained above. Then the Jerusalem Talmud says: yes, but if so, then also in the public domain—if walking is like acts of stopping, then what do I care that the public domain is not a place? The difference between public domain and private domain exists only if you are speaking of mere presence. But if you are speaking of walking itself really being acts of stopping, that ought to be true in the public domain too. And that is exactly what the Jerusalem Talmud assumes. Therefore the Jerusalem Talmud said: you have to say he was jumping. What happens when he jumps? When he jumps, there is only one lifting. Exactly, so there were no acts of stopping in the middle at all. Fine? I directed you to a few practical differences: what happens if he passes through the portico without putting a foot down inside the portico—would Ben Azzai there too say that walking is like standing? If he thinks that “caught in the air is as if it was set down,” then yes. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, no, right? According to the Jerusalem Talmud and Rashi in Ketubot, “walking is like standing” is because when I place my foot down while walking, that counts as my having stopped. But in the portico I didn’t put my foot down, so Ben Azzai also would not say that I am exempt. Right, that’s a practical difference. Okay. If he extends his hand and takes something out into the public domain, or carries four cubits in the public domain with his hand but without walking, would that count as my having stopped in the middle? No. Because only placing the foot down counts as stopping. This is not “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” Therefore according to the Rif, for example, unlike our Tosafot, there is no basis to compare “walking is like standing” to the rule of “caught in the air is as if it was set down.” There is no connection. “Caught in the air is as if it was set down” is about presence, but walking is literally acts of stopping—the claim is that when I place my foot down, I am stopping. But what if he is moving the whole time and very fast? That is an interesting question: does dynamic standing also count as standing? I don’t know; one could check. That’s something else. Meaning this whole topic / passage here relates to two factors? Right, but you’re not static. Yes. Okay, I’ll stop here. I suggest you look at my summary, because I did things a little quickly and skipped some details, but I really don’t want to come back to this topic / passage again. So I’ll send you the summary—look at it there. I hope it will be clear after the explanations I gave here. Thank you very much, happy holiday. Thank you very much, happy holiday. Thank you very much, happy holiday. We’ll meet next time on this coming Tuesday.