Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 33

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Speaker F] You didn’t share. But okay, right, we understood that it’s sort of not… you can’t learn from this; there’s no contradiction here between Rashi and Tosafot, just that each one explains it from a different angle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yael is speaking separately and Idit is speaking separately.

[Speaker F] Sorry, I didn’t hear you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Idit, speak.

[Speaker F] I didn’t mean to say that there really isn’t any essential contradiction here between Rashi and Tosafot. Each one is shining a kind of projector from another direction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you need both of them, right? That’s what I’m saying. Okay, Yael.

[Speaker B] I’m saying, if I’m not mistaken, at the entrance to the Tabernacle there was some sort of entrance area, right? A courtyard, an inner court. Courtyard. Is that an exempt area?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A courtyard, no.

[Speaker F] That’s the courtyard of the Tabernacle.

[Speaker B] A private domain and a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Tabernacle, yes, in the Tabernacle it’s a public domain.

[Speaker B] In the Tabernacle in the wilderness, not in the Temple.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a public domain; in the Temple too it’s the same thing.

[Speaker B] In the Temple we learn from the Tabernacle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s a place…

[Speaker B] …that people pass through there,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] all Israel enters there.

[Speaker B] So the balcony is a public domain. Not a karmelit. The balcony, the courtyard, the courtyard. Okay. Okay, now…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—

[Speaker H] Wait a second, I have a question about the interposition. Yes. When we learned the case of throwing, there was a labor in the Tabernacle where they transferred from one private domain to another private domain, and in the middle there was a public domain, and that was prohibited. Seemingly that’s also an interposition. They didn’t bring that in our Talmudic passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Passing.

[Speaker I] But there it was…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With passing, and we talked about above ten handbreadths and below ten handbreadths. But passing is something else. Because in passing, that’s what they did in the labor of passing. It’s considered a labor in its own right—passing. In ordinary carrying out, when I take the object and walk with it and put it down in the public domain, there, if there’s a place in the middle, so the Talmudic text here claims, then I would not be liable. That’s not similar to passing.

[Speaker H] Because that’s not moving the hand across but walking there myself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the whole body—walking with the object from domain to domain. When you move your hand across, I don’t care that you pass through a private domain because you yourself aren’t passing there. And that’s also how it was in the Tabernacle: they passed from the wagons, if you remember. We talked about how there were wagons on both sides of the public domain, and when you pass above ten handbreadths in the public domain, you’re actually passing through an exempt area. The labor of passing is itself defined from the outset that way. Okay?

[Speaker H] Yes, no, but that’s exactly interposition. But if it matters whether I pass through or my hand passes through… in the labor of passing, the interposition doesn’t interfere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Talmudic text here… now here too, apparently, interposition doesn’t interfere; the Talmudic text is just asking why.

[Speaker H] Wait, the labor of passing—isn’t that transferring from domain to domain? Is it a labor in its own right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s not one of the thirty-nine labors; it’s a derivative labor, a derivative of carrying out. But it’s a derivative that existed in the Tabernacle. And since that derivative existed in the Tabernacle, then whatever was in the Tabernacle is binding for me, no matter whether logic says that interposition could make a difference. Because in carrying out in the Tabernacle there was no interposition, and therefore the Talmudic text here says that once there’s interposition, maybe you can’t learn from the Tabernacle that one is liable. But in passing there was interposition. Passing, after all, is from one private domain to another private domain when a public domain is in the middle. It’s not at all from private domain to public domain.

[Speaker H] No, it’s the same idea of interposition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the whole context is different, because there the interposition is between two private domains. If I were doing a passing from one private domain to another private domain directly, obviously I wouldn’t be violating anything. The whole definition of passing exists only because there is a public domain in the middle. Even though in the end it reaches another private domain, since there is a public domain in the middle, you can still see this as a significant labor. Therefore there… the labor of passing simply would not be defined if there weren’t an interposition in the middle. The interposition not only doesn’t interfere—the interposition creates the prohibition. If one private domain were adjacent to another private domain, it would not be the labor of passing. It would be nothing. But if—

[Speaker H] Halakhically, if I walked and didn’t stop in the middle, then that’s exactly the same idea, no? It was just from the other side, to exempt or to obligate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if I walked from one private domain to another private domain through a public domain and didn’t stop? Yes. Then it would depend on the dispute between Ben Azzai and the Sages. Yes. But the opposite—still, their dispute is about whether walking counts as standing. Not because of interposition; interposition there isn’t the issue. Right. Okay? Okay, so that’s regarding the logic of the passage. Now, what we’re starting now is basically the passage’s journey to look for what exactly the source is for there not being an exemption due to interposition. Right? That’s basically the course of the passage until the end. It’s an important point, because you can get a little lost here in the passage and in the various possibilities. You need to understand: basically, the explanation of the Rabbis and the dispute between Ben Azzai and the Sages is over. We know what the dispute is. The dispute is over the question whether walking counts as standing or not. There is no exemption of interposition. The rest of the Talmudic discussion is only to explain why there is no exemption of interposition, or where we learned that interposition does not exempt. But in terms of the passage’s conclusion, that ends here, and that’s very important. Because when you read the Talmudic text, you can lose the thread and not remember in the end what each side holds. That’s why I told you: after you finish the passage, make yourselves a summary of what Ben Azzai holds and what the Sages hold, both regarding interposition and regarding whether walking counts as standing. That summary could actually already have been made here. Here already I see that the Talmudic text says that their dispute is about the law of whether walking counts as standing. The Talmudic text just has a side question: why doesn’t the exemption of interposition also come into play here? Because if it did come into play, then the Rabbis too would exempt—not because of whether walking counts as standing, but because of the exemption of interposition. And for that the Talmudic text brings several attempts to show from where we learn that there is no exemption of interposition. Even if it rejects the first, rejects the second, rejects the third, in the end it brings a source, and after we brought the source we returned to the point where we are standing now: that there is no exemption of interposition. Therefore, in the conclusion, there is no exemption of interposition. Okay? It’s only the Talmudic text’s question why—that’s all. So basically, in terms of the framework of the passage, it ends here. Okay? Now the Talmudic text starts bringing attempts from which we learn about the exemption of interposition—why there is no exemption of interposition. Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Just as in the case of one who carries an object through the public domain—there too, even though as long as he is holding it and going he is exempt, once he places it down he is liable—so too here, it is no different. Meaning, the first attempt of the Talmudic text: someone transfers an object four cubits in the public domain. Now if the person—say, you transferred four cubits—if you had placed it down in the middle, you would have been exempt. Why would you have been exempt? They call it less than less than four cubits. No—I placed it down in the middle and then continued; I completed the four cubits, I just stopped in the middle. Okay? So I took an object, picked it up in the public domain, carried it three cubits, put it down, picked it up again, went another cubit, and put it down. I am exempt. Why? Because here I did two transfers, each one less than four cubits. In the language of the Talmudic text this is called less than less than four cubits. Meaning, I do it in steps, each one less than four cubits. Okay? But still, if I did it continuously, without putting it down in the middle, I am liable. Rav Safra says in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: so here is the proof that interposition does not exempt. Because if interposition exempted, then in this case too I would be exempt. By the way, there is another interesting question here, one discussed by the medieval authorities (Rishonim): why doesn’t the rule that walking counts as standing exempt in a case like this? About the second exemption, not the exemption of interposition—the exemption of whether walking counts as standing. But the Talmudic text does not deal with that. And again, you have to keep your head straight. Seemingly it looks like the medieval authorities (Rishonim) are going back to the Talmudic question when they ask: how can there be liability for transferring four cubits in the public domain? You saw Tosafot and the Rashba and others. How can there be liability for transferring four cubits in the public domain according to Ben Azzai? After all, with every step he takes, it’s considered as if he is standing, because walking counts as standing. When you transfer four cubits in the public domain, it’s as though you placed it down in the middle. So how can anyone be liable for transferring four cubits in the public domain? But that’s a different question from the one in the Talmudic text here, because here the Talmudic text is talking about transferring four cubits in the public domain from the angle of the exemption of interposition—why there isn’t one. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss why one who transfers four cubits in the public domain is liable from the angle of the exemption of whether walking counts as standing. Okay? So it’s very important to keep your bearings. The Talmudic text here is talking only about the exemption of interposition, not about the exemption of whether walking counts as standing. The exemption of whether walking counts as standing appears only in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Talmudic text doesn’t deal with it. And the Talmudic text here asks why one who transfers four cubits in the public domain is liable, when in fact you have interposition in the middle, because you pass through a place that, if you had put it down there, you would have been exempt. Why would you have been exempt? Because you didn’t transfer four cubits, only less. So why doesn’t that separate between the first place and the second?

[Speaker B] Yes, but if I transfer four cubits in the public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then—

[Speaker B] it’s still the public domain; I don’t have any interposition here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you? Because in the middle, when I’m standing, say, after one cubit—okay?—if you had put it down there…

[Speaker B] I understand what you’re saying regarding if I had stopped in the middle, but from the place where I start walking, that’s my four cubits.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, four cubits of length, not a zone. From here to here, a distance of four cubits. In the middle, I also pass through places that are one cubit, two cubits, three cubits distant from my starting point, and so on. If in every such place, had I put the object down there, I would have been exempt, then for me that place is an exempt area. So I didn’t put the object down there; I continued directly to after four cubits. But I still passed through interpositions where, if I had put it down, I would have been exempt. The Talmudic text’s question is so strange—the rejection almost suggests itself. But the question itself is very, very strange. That’s… but that’s usually how it’s understood. I’ll just say parenthetically—maybe we’ll get to this at some point, not today—regarding one who transfers four cubits in the public domain, this was already discussed by the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and the later authorities (Acharonim) elaborate on it a bit more. There are those who… after all, transferring four cubits in the public domain also comes from the section of carrying out; it’s not a separate primary labor. It’s one of the derivatives of carrying out, or a kind of quasi-primary category of carrying out. We talked about that. But it’s not a separate primary category. What is the connection between transferring four cubits in the public domain and carrying out? What does that have to do with it? If you learn it from some verse, then I would make it a separate primary category. But if you’re linking it to the primary category of carrying out, then you have to show me the connection between them. Why is transferring a certain kind of carrying out? There are those who want to claim that transferring four cubits in the public domain is because a person standing in the public domain has four cubits around him—two by two cubits around him—that are his. Not two by two; it’s four by four—that are his. Okay? Then if I transfer four cubits in the public domain, I have in fact gone outside my own area, and therefore it’s called carrying out from domain to domain, because basically… this is admittedly a rabbinic law, but the Rabbis say that I can acquire an object lying within my four cubits in the public domain. Why? Because the four cubits around me are considered a domain that belongs to me. Even though it doesn’t really belong to me—it is a public domain—but for matters of acquisition it is considered my domain. So there are those who want to claim that in the laws of the Sabbath this conception has a Torah-level status. That when I stand in the public domain, there is some zone around me that is in fact my domain; when I go outside the zone that is my domain, then I have effectively carried the object out from private domain to public domain—to another domain.

[Speaker D] But why not say that your domain goes with you the whole way through the public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could understand it that way, and then that wouldn’t be the explanation. But I’m saying: there is such an explanation.

[Speaker D] Maybe it’s only when a person is standing that he has four by four, but maybe when he’s walking he doesn’t have four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but first he was standing, right? After all, for transferring you need an act of lifting at the beginning. So at the beginning you stood; now you started walking. So you take the object from where it had been resting in a private domain, and now suddenly you carry it out into the public domain.

[Speaker E] Then there is really a question why carrying out from private domain to public domain exists at all. Say, the poor person who stands outside the house—you hand him an object, so you’ve transferred it from one private domain to another private domain, because the poor person has four cubits around him that are effectively his private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. In that regard it’s obvious that it won’t be a private domain. Relative to my original private domain, anything happening in the public domain is public domain. It’s obvious that this whole way of looking at it comes from the laws of acquisitions; it’s entirely a rabbinic perspective. There isn’t really a private domain in the middle of the public domain; it doesn’t truly belong to me. But there are those who want to claim that that same rabbinic perspective underlies the Torah-level definition of the labor of transferring—transferring four cubits in the public domain. But clearly that’s only with respect to someone standing in the public domain, not with respect to someone standing in his private domain. Now if that’s so, then maybe we can understand why transferring four cubits in the public domain is some kind of derivative of carrying out, because there is actually some sort of carrying out here. If you look at it that way, maybe you can understand a little better the strange question of the Talmudic text here—that when you transfer it through the middle, then you’re basically saying that as long as you haven’t arrived there, you’re not yet in the public domain. So what happens in the middle? In the middle too it is apparently some sort of other place.

[Speaker B] Maybe an exempt area? What? Again? And then he holds like Ben Azzai?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, Ben Azzai is not relevant, because we are not discussing here the law of whether walking counts as standing. Here we are talking only about the exemption of interposition. Obviously you also have to bring in Ben Azzai and whether walking counts as standing—that’s a primary issue. I’m just reading the Talmudic text right now. Okay? Maybe according to this one can understand it a bit better, but it really is a strange question, this question of the Talmudic text. By the way, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) noted here—I pointed you to it—also in Tosafot, Tosafot HaRosh and others asked here: Since it is like one who transfers an object in the public domain, it should have said one who carries out, because that is what it was dealing with above, where as long as he does not place it down, he is exempt. What is Tosafot asking? Why—after all, we are dealing with the labor of carrying out, right? Someone who carries out.

[Speaker D] So why do you say transferring?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the way he put it. Now if you want to bring an example, why do you bring me an example from the labor of transferring? Bring me an example from the labor of carrying out itself. Someone who takes an object from a private domain and carries it out into a public domain is liable, right? But in the middle, in fact, as long as he hasn’t placed it down in the public domain, he is exempt, right?

[Speaker B] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so basically you could have brought your proof that there is no exemption of interposition also from the labor of carrying out, not only from the labor of transferring. And after all, we are dealing here with the labor of carrying out. So why did the Talmudic text move to discuss the labor of transferring instead of discussing it in the labor of carrying out? Now notice: this is an interesting point, because there is still a difference between these two things. I’ll remind you of the wording in which I formulated the question of the Talmudic text: that the Talmudic text asked maybe we can learn that there is no exemption of interposition from one who transfers four cubits in the public domain. How did I explain the comparison the Talmudic text is making? Why is there interposition in one who transfers four cubits in the public domain too? Because I said that at every point in the middle, if you put the object down there, you would be exempt, right? So in effect that’s like an exempt area. If that’s so, then you couldn’t ask this from private domain to public domain, because in private domain I carry the object out into public domain; as long as I haven’t placed it down, I’m walking in the public domain. But if I put it down now, I would be liable. That would be a placing in the public domain. True, I am exempt because I haven’t yet placed it down—but not that if I had placed it down I would also be exempt. In the public domain, in the public domain, even if I had placed it down I would be exempt because I had not transferred four cubits.

[Speaker H] Okay? Or let’s phrase it this way.

[Speaker D] But Tosafot holds that even if it’s in his hand that is called being placed. I didn’t understand. After all, Tosafot holds that even when the object is in his hand, that’s already called at rest.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but not when he’s walking.

[Speaker F] Yes, so the answer—what you said—that’s exactly the answer, why they ask about transferring.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there is here—the opposite, wait, exactly. What comes out is that Tosafot, who asks this question, apparently did not learn the question from transferring the way I did, because otherwise what is difficult for him? According to my approach, you can ask only from transferring; you can’t bring proof from carrying out. But Tosafot says: wait, why did they go to transferring? Let them bring proof from carrying out. Meaning Tosafot apparently understood that the focus of the comparison to transferring is not because if I had put it down in the middle I would have been exempt, but because of the fact that I am walking and have not put it down, so I am exempt until I put it down. And that is true also in carrying out from private domain to public domain.

[Speaker H] She simply sees it as one single action. And according to the Talmudic text—according to the Talmudic question—it’s actually two actions. I have one action as long as I haven’t yet passed four cubits; now when I’ve passed four cubits I start a new action, and Tosafot doesn’t see it that way.

[Speaker F] No, within those four cubits there is theoretically some interim moment when I can stop and then I’m exempt. And that doesn’t exist in the labor of carrying out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s obvious. Noam is trying to suggest a definition according to Tosafot for why this distinction doesn’t bother Tosafot. As long as you’re walking, there is no placing. Look, also in transferring—also in transferring—say I’m walking ten cubits in the public domain. I lift it, walk ten cubits, and place it down. Okay? After six cubits, if I had placed it down, I would have been—

[Speaker D] liable, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I would not have been exempt. Meaning, in any case, as long as he is walking there is no placing here. And if I want to talk about the path in the middle as an exempt area, then Tosafot says it’s not because if I had put it down I would have been exempt, but because I am—

[Speaker D] walking and haven’t placed it down, therefore I’m exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, as long as he is walking—

[Speaker D] meaning, as long as you are walking there is no placing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And the question is not based on the fact that if I had put it down I would have been exempt, but rather on the fact that as long as I am walking I am exempt. And that is enough to constitute an interposition. And if that is so, then Tosafot’s question is in place. You could have brought that also from carrying out from private domain to public domain. So what does Tosafot answer? Tosafot says: Rather, because later on it uses transferring, it also used it here now, and in all matters of transfer in the public domain that is what it means. What did he mean to say?

[Speaker D] In the next topic too they’re speaking about transferring, so therefore it used the language of transferring.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But basically it’s carrying out.

[Speaker D] It—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] could prove it also from carrying out from private domain to public domain, right? Tosafot doesn’t give an essential explanation. He only says why it used transferring and not carrying out—because it suited the continuation of the passage. But in principle, the very same proof could also have been brought from carrying out. That’s where he stays even in the conclusion, not only in Tosafot’s question. Also according to Tosafot’s conclusion there is no difference between transferring and carrying out. You could prove it from carrying out and you could prove it from transferring. They chose to prove it from transferring because that continues the passage. But in principle, it could also have been proven from carrying out. I’m just reinforcing what I said earlier about Tosafot—that this is not only his view in the question, because otherwise he would have answered what I answered. No—he doesn’t answer that.

[Speaker E] But I didn’t understand. If Tosafot says that this could also have been brought from carrying out—it doesn’t matter whether from carrying out or from transferring—that means he thinks carrying out and transferring are the same thing. Meaning transferring is derived from carrying out, like you explained, that a person has four cubits around him that are his private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t merely agree that carrying out and transferring are the same thing; transferring is a derivative of carrying out according to everyone. There is no dispute here. There is no other primary labor category called transferring.

[Speaker E] So I didn’t understand what Tosafot does not hold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying this: when I formulated the Talmudic question—not the question, the proof of the Talmudic text. The Talmudic text tried to bring proof why there is no concept of interposition regarding the colonnade. What was its proof? From one who transfers four cubits in the public domain. Where does the Talmudic text see interposition there? So I explained it like this: I said that when I walk four cubits in the public domain, if I had put it down after one cubit, I would have been exempt, right? Why? Because the place where I put it down was only one cubit away. You need four cubits in order to be liable, so I would have been exempt. Since that is so, I am basically passing through places where, if I had put it down there, I would have been exempt. So those places are de facto an exempt area. And we see that it does not interpose, because in fact one who transfers four cubits in the public domain is liable. That’s how I explained it. But if that is the explanation, then Tosafot’s question doesn’t arise. Because according to that explanation, what does Tosafot say? Come prove it from one who carries out from private domain to public domain. Let’s think how we’d prove it. We carry out from private domain, lift it there, walk with it into public domain, and put it down in the public domain. Tosafot asks: what happens at the moment you arrive in the public domain? You crossed the boundary, you’ve arrived in the public domain. You’re still walking, say, another cubit or two and then put it down. That first stage is an interposition, right? That’s what Tosafot says. So why didn’t they prove from there that interposition does not exempt? But according to my approach that isn’t true. Because what would happen if I put it down at the very first moment I crossed into the public domain?

[Speaker E] Then you would be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I would be liable, and therefore—

[Speaker E] that’s not an interposition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that place is not an exempt area, so it is not considered an interposition. Meaning, according to my formulation, the definition of a place as an interposing place is only a place such that even if I put it down there I am exempt. According to Tosafot, no. According to Tosafot, the definition of the interposition is a place such that as long as I am walking through it I still have not become liable. And then that is true also in carrying out from private domain to public domain.

[Speaker H] But why not ask about the part before the carrying out? I lifted it, I haven’t yet crossed into the public domain. That too is this kind of exempt area where, as long as I walked and didn’t cross… after all there are three parts. Where?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The path inside the private domain?

[Speaker H] From where I lifted it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There? There too, according to my approach, you would say that if I had put it down, I would also have been exempt, because it’s still in the private domain. Yes—but that isn’t a different domain. It’s the same domain from which I lifted it.

[Speaker H] Also in the public domain within four cubits it’s the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the public domain, the moment I crossed into the public domain I am already in a different domain from the private domain from which I came out.

[Speaker H] No, in the course of the four cubits. Again. Basically, if I compare walking four cubits, then as long as I haven’t passed four cubits I’m kind of in one domain. Yes. Now that I’ve passed four cubits, it’s as if I’ve crossed into another domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the public domain—what do you mean, one domain? The way of viewing the public domain as one domain is correct.

[Speaker H] But I mean in terms of exemption and liability.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that that could have been the Talmudic question—that for this purpose it is indeed a separate domain, for the purpose that it should serve as an interposition. And the proof that there is no interposition, that interposition does not exempt. But in a private domain, the whole essence of a private domain is that it is one domain. A public domain, you can see as some collection of many, many things that together I call a public domain, but you can see them as separate places when I look at each one on its own. A private domain is by its essence defined as the domain of a single person; meaning that whole area is one thing.

[Speaker D] For carrying, where it’s all in the public domain, both lifting and placing are required—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or—yes. The carrying itself, more than four cubits—

[Speaker D] over four cubits is already…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we saw that. Lifting and placing are required also in transferring. Don’t you remember? Two forces in one person, that passage there: if I didn’t do the placing and only transferred, I am exempt. Lifting and placing are required.

[Speaker F] Can you go back for a second to what you said about Tosafot’s conception of the place of interposition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot assumes that the interposition created in transferring or in carrying out is not because if I had put it down I would have been exempt, but from the very fact that I am walking, therefore I have still not become liable, and that itself is called a place where I am exempt. Yes. It’s not a characteristic of the place; it’s a characteristic of my action. According to how I formulated it earlier, I’m looking for—and it’s more logical in the Talmudic text too. This whole Talmudic question is strange. But according to my formulation you can understand it better. Because in my formulation I am basically saying there is a place in the middle that, in its nature as a place, is an exempt area—not because of my action that I haven’t yet become liable. And then the question is whether it interposes or not. In Tosafot this isn’t about a type of place at all. I am not liable not because I passed through a place where one is not liable; I am not liable because I haven’t yet stopped. Yes. So then, according to Tosafot, it isn’t understood at all how the Talmudic text wanted to connect this to the issue of interposition. The issue of interposition is a place that interposes between two other places. Here, the fact that I am exempt is simply because I am walking, not because the place is interposing.

[Speaker I] A difference between whether he is exempt by condition or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so we said we’re dealing here with the question of interposition, not with the question whether walking counts as standing. Walking does not count as standing.

[Speaker I] No, but maybe…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but we are going according to the Rabbis against Ben Azzai: walking does not count as standing. We are assuming right now that walking does not count as standing. And we’re saying: what would happen if he were standing—a kind of hypothetical experiment. If he were standing, would he be exempt? Then that means that this place through which he is now passing while walking is a place defined as an exempt area. And then the question is whether it interposes or does not interpose. And from the fact that one who transfers four cubits in the public domain is liable, there is proof that there is no interposition—that an exempt area in the middle does not interpose. That’s my formulation. Tosafot’s formulation is different. That you are walking in the middle—not because if you had put it down you would have been exempt, but because from the fact that you are walking you are exempt because you are walking.

[Speaker G] But that’s similar to it, walking that is not like standing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, walking does not count as standing according to everyone—according to my approach and according to Tosafot—because the whole discussion in the passage is according to the Sages, who hold that walking does not count as standing. Still, I can ask the hypothetical question: if I had stopped, stopped walking, halted and put it down, would I have been liable or exempt? I would have been exempt. So since that’s the case, I define that place as an exempt area even if I hold that walking does not count as standing.

[Speaker B] I understand. If I stop and don’t put it down…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s lifting—

[Speaker B] placing of the body. So, ah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that’s how Tosafot learned. In any case, this question really is a strange question. And on that the Talmudic text rejects it; it says: Are these comparable? There, wherever he would place it, it is a place of liability; here, if he places it in the colonnade, it is an exempt area. What distinction is the Talmudic text making? In the public domain—in the public domain, anywhere he would put it down is in principle a place of liability.

[Speaker D] Now, what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] does that mean? After all, after two cubits, if I had put it down, I would have been exempt?

[Speaker D] No, that’s in the case where you left the private domain and kept walking…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, right now we’re talking about transferring in the public domain.

[Speaker E] It’s relative to the person. The exempt area is relative to the person himself, but for others it’s still a place of liability.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So that does not distinguish the place as an exempt area here. The exemption here characterizes the action, because I, having set out two cubits earlier, did not pass four cubits, therefore I am exempt. But the place in itself is not a different kind of place. Therefore there is no interposition there. But it can still be that in a colonnade, which is a place of a different character regardless of the person, maybe there there would indeed be interposition and then exemption—that is basically the Talmudic question. This sharpens very much the distinction I made earlier between my suggestion and Tosafot, because here in the Talmudic text—at least in the Talmudic rejection—we see that in order to talk about interposition, the place must be defined as a separate place, not that the person in his action is exempt. Because otherwise, when we talk about interposition between private domain and public domain, what is interposing between… cubits in the public domain—even if you would be exempt in the middle, that exemption is because you walked, because you haven’t yet transferred four cubits. That’s irrelevant. Since two cubits away from you is not a place that is an exempt area; it’s a full public domain. Therefore it certainly does not interpose. So there it is obvious that it doesn’t interpose. And this also takes us back to what Noa said earlier: why indeed doesn’t it interpose? Because if it’s public domain, then it’s the same domain as the domain to which I arrive in the end; it isn’t another domain. If it’s not different, why should it interpose? Okay? And furthermore—

[Speaker D] in a way that this domain can be the private domain of each and every member of the public, that turns it into a public domain, as opposed to a real private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Without getting into the point I noted earlier—that transferring is basically taking from the domain of my four cubits, as if it were my private domain in the middle of the public domain—we don’t need to get to that. There is a domain that is defined as public domain. Those are conceptual analytic moves. There is a domain that is defined as public domain. And if you want to define an interposition between my place of departure, my act of lifting, and the place of placing, there has to be in the middle a place that is a separate place, another place. And in one who transfers four cubits in the public domain, what there is in the middle—the exemption there in the middle—is not because of the type of place, but because I haven’t yet put it down. That’s all. According to the Sages, who hold in particular that walking does not count as standing, yes? So I haven’t yet put it down; therefore I am exempt. So that exemption is not an indication that I am in a place of a different character. Therefore no proof can be brought from there that a place of a different character would not exempt me, because there we are not talking about a place of a different character.

[Speaker H] But how does that fit with Tosafot’s answer that, fine, for transferring too it would work? Here too there are indeed two places and not only with respect to the person himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there too there aren’t. Why? Because when I walk—say I carry out from a private domain, cross into the public domain, walk another, say, two cubits there, and put it down—then immediately when I crossed into the public domain, my exemption does not stem from the fact that it is an exempt area. The place in itself is a public domain. My exemption stems from the fact that I still haven’t put it down. So it cannot serve as an interposition between the private domain of the lifting and the public domain of the placing.

[Speaker F] Because it’s the place that’s defined as exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is indeed different from the private domain of the lifting, but it is identical to the public domain of the placing; it’s the same public domain. And in order for the place to interpose, it has to be different from both the starting point and the destination point. Therefore it has to be an exempt area that is neither private domain nor public domain. Okay?

[Speaker B] But that turns—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, Yael is asking.

[Speaker B] The moment I took the first step in the public domain, that turns it into an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Yael is asking: in the first step in the public domain it turns into an exempt area. No, it doesn’t turn into an exempt area. I am exempt because I haven’t yet put it down. That’s exactly what the Talmudic text says. Since I am exempt, my exemption stems from the simple fact that I have not yet done the act that creates liability, not from the character of the place.

[Speaker B] Wait, so what—

[Speaker F] creates the exemption, not the place?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait.

[Speaker B] You walk ten meters and then don’t put it down—from what point does it become four cubits?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, are you talking about carrying out from private domain or about transferring four cubits in the public domain? Transferring four cubits. Whenever you put it down. There have to be four cubits between the lifting and the placing. At least four cubits.

[Speaker D] Maybe someone who is walking doesn’t have four cubits at all in the public domain? Again? Someone who is walking has no four cubits at all in the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what? No, again, you’re taking me back to the conceptual definitions of the labor of transferring—leave that, that no longer belongs to the gate here. I noted it parenthetically earlier. I’m saying: the Talmudic text is basically saying that in order to interpose between private domain and public domain there has to be a domain of a different type—an exempt area—that is neither private domain and does not resemble the starting point, nor resembles the destination point. That does not exist here. By the way, that exists neither in transferring in the public domain nor in carrying out, which Tosafot asked about, from private domain to public domain. It doesn’t exist. Because what is in the middle is basically just ordinary public domain. The only reason I am exempt is that I haven’t put it down. That’s all. Not because the place is a different place. But in a colonnade, even if I had put it down I would still have been exempt, because the place is an exempt area.

[Speaker B] Meaning, there is a difference between—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In order to speak about the exemption of interposition, we must have the place in the middle that interposes be a place of a different character. Not that I, when moving around there, am exempt. Because otherwise the concept of interposition is a geographical concept: place B interposes between place A and place C. So now the Talmudic text brings another source: Rather, just as in the case of one who transfers an object from the beginning of four to the end of four—domain, ah, what’s that? That’s transferring exactly four cubits.

[Speaker B] Ah, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rather, just as in the case of one who transfers an object from the beginning of four to the end of four—that is talking about exactly four cubits in the public domain, where my exemption, in fact—ah, now I suddenly understand why Tosafot didn’t explain it the way I explained it. Because now this point comes in. One who transfers an object from the beginning of four to the end of four—here, if in the middle I had put it down, then too I would have been exempt. Earlier we were talking about someone who transfers four cubits in the public domain—ten cubits in the public domain—there, after six cubits if I had put it down I would have been liable; I just hadn’t put it down. Here the Talmudic text asks about exactly four cubits, where in exactly four cubits, at every point in the middle, even if I had put it down I would still have been exempt, right? That’s what it says.

[Speaker H] It’s not clear. After all, it’s exactly the same case—well, what do you mean exactly the same case—it has the same problem with a solution. Why doesn’t the previous solution work? It’s not the action, it’s the place. Why are they suddenly bringing this too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] What does this answer add over the previous answer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we’re talking about exactly four cubits, and above it was talking about one who transfers, say, ten cubits. What happens with ten cubits? With ten cubits, the problem is, say, after eight cubits. After eight cubits, if I had put it down, would I have been liable or exempt? Liable. Right? Because I passed four cubits. So in fact there the exemption in the middle is an exemption only because I didn’t put it down, not because even if I had put it down I would have been exempt. And therefore Tosafot did indeed ask—now I suddenly get it—therefore Tosafot understood the question the way he understood it and not the way I said. Because what I said is what happens here. This is what the Talmudic text is asking now. The Talmudic text here is talking about where I transferred exactly four cubits in the public domain, not more. Here, at any point in the middle, even if I had put it down I would have been exempt, right?

[Speaker D] So—

[Speaker H] What? But that’s still the person and not the place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re saying only that the answer I could have given to this would be the same answer. But I can understand why the Talmudic text asks this question in addition to the previous one. The previous question was the question as Tosafot understood it. This question is the question as I understand it.

[Speaker B] Here he’s talking about exemption and there he’s talking about liability in these two cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right?

[Speaker D] No, it’s not that four cubits—

[Speaker B] Wait, Yael is asking. In the first case he is basically defining why he would be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the second case he says where I would—

[Speaker B] yes, be exempt if I am within… no, no, in both cases liable. Again. Within the exactly four cubits, I’m not exempt? Within the exactly four cubits?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Within—yes.

[Speaker B] If I… to say what I’m thinking, that the first discussion was where he would indeed be liable if he passed beyond, and the second section says where I would indeed be exempt if I am within… no, no, no. Again. Look, the difference between the two questions of the Talmudic text, between the two stages in the Talmudic text, is exactly the difference that I made—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Earlier I got mixed up between Tosafot and myself, and now suddenly I caught it. The Talmud’s first question was actually the question the way Tosafot understood it; he understood it correctly, and I was the one who was mistaken. You can’t put that in there, because it comes up here. What was the question there? The question there was, say I take an object, lift it up, carry it ten cubits, and place it down in the public domain. Okay? I’m liable. Tosafot says—the Talmud says, sorry—I’m liable. And that shows that an intervening space does not exempt. Why? Tosafot says: what happens after eight cubits? I’m still walking with the object. After all, I’m still exempt. Four, five, six, seven, eight cubits—only at ten, when I place it down, do I become liable. So you see that I passed through various stages along the way—not actual stations where I stopped, but I was walking—and in all those stages I was still exempt, and that does not create an interruption.

[Speaker F] Because you didn’t put it down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The Talmud says, obviously, because there the exemption is simply because you didn’t put it down. If you had actually put it down, you would have been liable. Therefore that does not create an interruption. Then the Talmud asks: wait a second, what about an exact four cubits? In an exact four cubits, the intermediate stages… the exemption is not because you didn’t put it down, but rather this already does seem to be a definition of place. It’s also a definition—it already defines a place. Because the fact is that there, even if I had put it down, I would still be exempt, because four cubits have not yet been traversed. Okay? The Talmud answers: that too is not a definition of place. Fine, but that’s the progression in the Talmud’s question. The progression in the Talmud’s question is that the first question was basically what Tosafot brought, and the second question is what I had thought.

[Speaker E] I want to ask about that for a second. Tosafot explains the Talmud’s first attempt as basically a case where he carries, say, ten cubits, so in the middle it’s an exempt place because I didn’t put it down. Right. And that’s exactly it—so why does the Talmud reject that? That’s exactly the previous example, where someone transfers from the private domain to the public domain by way of a karmelit. So he didn’t put it down. That’s exactly the point. What difference does it make what was in the middle? The whole point is that he didn’t put it down.

[Speaker H] No, we’re

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] talking about exemption because of interruption, not exemption because of not placing it down. That’s why I was careful at the beginning: this whole passage deals with exemption by interruption.

[Speaker E] But the exemption there—according to Tosafot, if he went ten cubits and didn’t put it down in the middle, then he’s not talking about interruption, he’s talking about carrying. Why does he call it interruption?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not interruption. The Talmud is talking about interruption; that has nothing to do with Tosafot. The Talmud here is talking about interruption. The Talmud is looking for a source that interruption does not exempt.

[Speaker E] But why is that called interruption?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll explain. It brings a source that interruption does not exempt from liability from the case of carrying ten cubits in the public domain. That is the first proof. How do you see it there? How do you see that interruption does not exempt? From the fact that after eight cubits I was still exempt, right? Why was I exempt? Because I was still walking. Because I hadn’t put it down. Right? And nevertheless, when I place it down after ten cubits, I’m liable. So in the middle I passed through a stage in which I was exempt, and that does not prevent me from becoming liable for the placement at the final stage.

[Speaker E] But that’s exactly what… if we go back to the beginning, to the first question: if I transfer an object from the private domain to the public domain, apparently it makes no difference at all what’s in the middle. As long as I’m walking and didn’t put it down, I’m still exempt.

[Speaker C] I can’t manage to understand this.

[Speaker E] Meaning, in every place I passed through, whether it’s a karmelit, a private domain, or a public domain—because I didn’t put it down—does it matter at all what kind of domain is in the middle? Does it matter at all whether there’s an intervening space?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The very fact that I don’t put it down—that is the interruption, because I’m exempt.

[Speaker H] You’re mixing up the question with the answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re mixing up the question with the answer. The Talmud, according to the Sages, says that such a person is liable. Right? Someone who takes an object out from a shop to the plaza through a portico is liable.

[Speaker E] The Sages, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t bother them. The Talmud asks: why? After all, there’s an interruption in the middle, so he should be exempt. That’s the question.

[Speaker E] The Talmud says: and if there weren’t an interruption in the middle, would he be exempt? He’d still be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, listen. The Talmud says: after all, there is an interruption here in the middle—there is an exempt place between the private domain and the public domain. I don’t care whether he stood there or not. Once there is an interruption, that should exempt him. That’s how the Talmud asks the question. Then the Talmud brings proof that an exempt place in the middle does not interrupt, does not exempt. What is the proof? From carrying ten cubits in the public domain. Why? Because at the eighth cubit he is exempt, right? Because he hasn’t yet put it down. And nevertheless, when he gets to the tenth cubit and puts it down, he becomes liable. So you see that in the middle you passed through an exempt stage, and that did not exempt you; in the end you are still liable. You see that interruption does not exempt. That’s the proof.

[Speaker E] So he’s defining for himself a place… meaning, basically this defines an exempt place as a place where one does not become liable, but one also does not become liable there even if one was just walking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. It doesn’t matter whether you walked or didn’t walk—you are not liable, because, as it were, you’re not liable. In this case, the reason is because you walked.

[Speaker H] It’s more an exempt walk than an exempt place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—and that is already the Talmud’s answer. The Talmud’s answer is that here the exemption is not because of the character of the place, but simply because you didn’t put it down. And for the law of interruption, we are looking for a situation where there is a place with a different character that interrupts between the private domain and the public domain, and there we’ll see whether it exempts or not.

[Speaker E] That’s why it brings the second case of

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] four

[Speaker E] exact cubits.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And now it brings the second case—why? Because in the second case, of exact four cubits, even if I had put the object down after one cubit, not only because I’m walking—even if I had put it down, I would be exempt. So the Talmud says: ah, that’s a good example of an exempt place, and you see that an exempt place does not interrupt. The Talmud answers that too: no, that is also not a good example. Why is it not a good example? “Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to this particular person it is an exempt place, but for everyone else it is a place of liability. Here, for everyone it is an exempt place.” What is the Talmud really answering? It’s basically the same answer, even though… the same answer even though the question is stronger. Basically the Talmud says: here too, it’s not really the character of the place. True, if you had put it down you would be exempt, but you would be exempt not because it is an exempt place; you would be exempt because, for you, it is not yet four cubits from where you lifted it. That is not a definition of the place; it is still a definition that depends on the action and on the person. And for there to be an interruption, I need something defined as a place with a different character. And you still haven’t found that, even in this context. Okay? Yes. Okay, now: “Rather, just as in the case of one who takes out from the private domain to the public domain through the sides of the public domain.” The sides of the public domain—a fence that fell there, you saw that I assume—so someone who transfers through an exempt place, and nevertheless we see that he is liable. And the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already discuss where exactly we see that he is liable, but afterward the Talmud says that this is a dispute among the tannaim. The Talmud says: “There too, is it not so that even though if he put it down at the sides of the public domain he would be exempt, yet when he puts it down in the public domain he is liable? Here too, it is no different.” So here we have an example: the sides of the public domain are already a place with a different character, and nevertheless, if you pass through it you are liable. So that really is a good source that interruption does not exempt. And indeed, that is the source that remains.

[Speaker D] Okay, but here we need to ask what the difference is between a portico and the sides of the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no difference.

[Speaker D] They’re the same thing? Because it seems to me that the sides of the public domain—as Rabbi Steinsaltz explains it—are stakes to keep it from reaching the walls of his wall, no? That’s not the sides of the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The “sides of the public domain” that appear later are with a barrier. The barrier is the stakes. The sides of the public domain here are a fence that fell between the private domain and the public domain—the place of the fence itself, or something like a wall, something like that. So that place is called the sides of the public domain. As far as the Talmud is concerned, it is very similar to a portico. Except that the Talmud has difficulty because there is a tannaitic dispute about it. According to one of the tannaim, fine, the discussion ends here. “Rav Pappa objected: this works out according to the Sages, who say that the sides of the public domain are not like the public domain,” and then it is basically some kind of exempt place. Why is it an exempt place? Because it doesn’t have walls around it, right? “But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the sides of the public domain are like the public domain—what can be said?” Meaning, he holds that this too is public domain, and then once again there is no separate place here that can function as an interruption. So you can’t bring proof from there that interruption does not exempt, because perhaps a portico would exempt. So the upshot is like this: according to the Sages, the discussion really is already over. The sides of the public domain are a good source that there is no interruption. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the discussion is not yet over, and for that they bring the case with the barrier. Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika said to him: “Say that you heard Rabbi Eliezer saying that the sides of the public domain are like the public domain only where there is no barrier. But where there is a barrier, did you hear him say that?” Therefore, this case is comparable. In the final analysis, we remain with the sides of the public domain with a barrier. According to the Sages, you don’t need the barrier. But according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, who says that ordinary sides of the public domain are like the public domain, then what we saw above cannot serve as a source for interruption, because it is not a domain with a separate character—neither private domain nor public domain—an exempt place. So according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov we still have a problem. He says: yes, but if there is a barrier there first—these kinds of stakes that keep wagons from crashing into this wall before it fell, right?—then there too even Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov maintains that the sides of the public domain are not like the public domain, and the fact is that there as well one is liable. So that is a good case to show that interruption does not exempt. In the end, if I summarize, I’d say it like this. The dispute between Ben Azzai and the Sages is about whether walking is like standing still. Exemption because of interruption does not exist in practice; it was the Talmud’s initial assumption, and it was rejected. We are not interested in the fact that there is an interruption in the middle. What is the source that interruption does not matter? The sides of the public domain. With or without a barrier—that depends on the tannaitic dispute—but the sides of the public domain. And only a domain of that kind, meaning one that is different, an exempt place, different from both the private domain and the public domain, can even potentially serve as an interruption. But again, in the conclusion, even such a domain does not exempt, because interruption does not exempt. Okay? Therefore, in the final analysis, the whole Talmudic discussion is not relevant. Once we reached the conclusion that interruption does not exempt, what difference does it make what counts as interruption and what doesn’t? In practice, the whole law of interruption is no longer relevant, because interruption does not exempt. Okay? That’s the summary of the passage, and I just want to finish by reading. Rabbi Yochanan said: and Ben Azzai agrees

[Speaker D] in the case of throwing,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] yes, Ben Azzai agrees that in the case of throwing one is liable. Throwing is not like standing still—that of course is related to “caught in the air is as though placed down.” Here you see that there is no connection. Because according to Ben Azzai, “caught in the air” is not as though placed down, but walking is like standing still. So make a note of that; we’ll discuss it more. A baraita also teaches this: “One who transfers from a shop to the plaza through a portico is liable—whether one who takes out, or one who brings in, or one who throws, or one who passes hand to hand. Ben Azzai says: one who takes out and one who brings in are exempt; one who passes hand to hand and one who throws are liable.” What’s the novelty here? I asked you what the novelty of this statement is. I might have thought that Ben Azzai disagrees across the board; it comes to teach us that he does not. Ben Azzai speaks only about taking out and bringing in, where walking is like standing still. But passing hand to hand and throwing are not like standing still. Okay? And that basically means that Ben Azzai is not talking about exemption because of interruption, but rather about exemption because walking is like standing still. That is what the Talmud wanted to sharpen here. I already said that at the beginning, just in order to explain the Talmud’s line of thought, but really the Talmud wanted to sharpen that point here. Because I might have thought that what Ben Azzai exempts is because he does in fact accept the exemption of interruption—according to the Hillel Sages, according to his view, it exists. If that were so, then in throwing and in passing hand to hand he should also be exempt. Okay? But since in passing hand to hand and in throwing Ben Azzai agrees that one is liable, it is clear that he does not accept the exemption of interruption. In the case of walking he disagrees because walking is like standing still. That is exactly what they wanted to sharpen here.

[Speaker D] So basically, both the Sages and Ben Azzai require there to be continuity in the action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite—they do not require it. Neither of them requires there to be continuity. Even if there is no continuity, one is liable. Because interruption does not exempt. I’m not interested in the fact that there is an interruption. Okay? All right, so up to this point we simply went through the Talmud with a few small clarifications. From here on, in the next class, we’ll already get into it. Where are you holding in terms of the page?

[Speaker E] I think we finished eight. Meaning, we got to the Rif, the Ran, and the Rosh, and we still haven’t opened tractate Ketubot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, that’s more or less where I’m up to in the class too.

[Speaker E] We still haven’t opened tractate Ketubot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nechama, what about you?

[Speaker D] Yael? We got up to ten. We got to the Rif; we finished up to ten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so I think that’s more or less as far as I’ve gotten in the class too. Now I’ll start talking about the halakhic ruling, and about the Rif and the Ran and the Rosh and so on. Okay, all right, good. So, goodbye. Thank you very much.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much.