Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 3

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Speaker D] It’s a bit like two people doing it together, except here each one did one hundred percent of half.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Two people doing it together” isn’t “a bit like” that — it is exactly two people doing it together. One lifted it up and the other put it down. Now the question is whether, in a case of two people doing it together, there is also a rabbinic prohibition on the one who put it down. In Rashi it seems not, but other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say yes, and I also said — and some of Rashi’s commentators say this too — that he also meant that. But I’ll come back to that. Why? What’s the idea? The idea is this. You could understand it in two ways. You could understand that if I permit you to do the putting-down alone, then there could be another situation in which someone will permit himself to do the lifting alone, and then he’ll also do the putting-down and will end up violating a Torah prohibition. True, in the act you’re doing right now, if you only put it down and someone else lifted it, you won’t get to a Torah prohibition. That’s obvious. But decrees often work by reference to other cases. If I allow you to do the putting-down alone, someone else may get confused and do both the lifting and the putting-down and violate a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker D] So that’s a decree?

[Speaker B] A decree for a decree?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a decree for a decree. If I let you now do the putting-down alone, then you yourself, or someone else in another situation, will do both the lifting and the putting-down and get to a Torah prohibition. You’ll think that in fact there is no Torah prohibition of carrying out, and then you’ll come to commit a prohibition. I have another question.

[Speaker C] Wait, wait, wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Rashi explains here is a concern about what will happen in this very act that you are doing right now. With putting-down, that kind of concern really doesn’t exist. But there can be concerns not about this very act you’re doing now, but that if we permit you this act, then in another situation you’ll come to do actual carrying out.

[Speaker D] So that’s an extension of Rashi? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it an extension of Rashi? Not an extension — it’s a different definition. And that’s why other medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree.

[Speaker D] Why? Because I’m still worried about prohibiting half an act lest it lead to another act. The issue of timing is — but it’s not the same mechanism.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Talmud; it’s not Rashi. The Talmud itself says that two people doing it together is a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] Now we have to understand the Talmud.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi says that in the case of two people doing it together, the rabbinic prohibition is not on both sides, only on the one who lifted it, not on the one who put it down.

[Speaker J] But how is it possible — I have a question — how can there be putting-down at all without lifting-up?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone else lifted it and the second one put it down.

[Speaker J] Fine, but for the person himself there’s no such possibility — it only exists when there are two people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, of course. That’s what I’m saying: one lifts it and the other puts it down.

[Speaker J] One lifts it —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — and the other puts it down.

[Speaker J] That turns the act of putting-down into something much more dependent — either on someone else or on my doing the lifting. By contrast, lifting is a completely independent act; I can violate a prohibition even if I do it alone, even without someone else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Rashi says, and that’s why it creates a stringency for the act of lifting.

[Speaker J] So really it’s much more severe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but again — what does “more severe” mean? It’s more severe only because I can complete it and get to a Torah prohibition. The lifting itself is not necessarily more severe; it’s just that the potential to reach a Torah prohibition exists. In putting-down, it’s not less severe and not more severe in itself; it’s just that there is no potential to complete the act and get to a Torah prohibition. That’s all. Okay? So if I’m talking about completing this very act itself that I’m doing, then there really is an asymmetry between lifting and putting-down. But the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi will explain: no. My concern is not that you will complete this very act and reach a Torah prohibition, but that once someone sees people lifting and not violating a rabbinic prohibition — no problem — and putting down and not violating a rabbinic prohibition, then afterward he’ll come to both lift and put down, and he’ll think there is no Torah prohibition of carrying out at all. Therefore we prohibit both lifting alone and putting-down alone, because in another situation someone may come to a Torah prohibition. Not that in this case you can complete it and get to a Torah prohibition. That is one way to understand the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi. Another way to understand it: if you remember, when I spoke about rabbinic restrictions, about rabbinic prohibitions, I said there are two kinds of rabbinic restrictions. In the first introductory class I said there are two kinds of rabbinic restriction. There is one kind from which you can come to a Torah prohibition — for example, someone riding a horse might tear off a branch and come to a Torah prohibition. And there is another kind where maybe you can’t. For example, selecting food from waste. The labor of selecting is defined as selecting waste from food. That is the Torah-level selecting. But someone who selects food from waste is doing selecting at the rabbinic level. Now, someone who selects food from waste cannot come to selecting waste from food in that very same act. I selected food from waste, and that’s it, finished.

[Speaker C] But the waste is separate, meaning —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I removed the food, and that’s a rabbinic prohibition. The Torah prohibition is to remove the waste, not to remove the food. Okay? Now if I removed the food and left the waste in place, then in that very act itself it is impossible to reach a Torah prohibition, because I did it in the rabbinic way, that’s it. But it could be that in another case, once we permit you to remove food, one time someone else will come to remove waste. He’ll think that if so, then there’s no problem of selecting. So that is a decree because of another case, not because here in this very act you’ll reach a Torah-level prohibition. Rather, there could be another case in which you’ll do a Torah-level prohibition. But there is also another definition. There’s a definition that says: since this resembles separating food from waste in a way that is prohibited by Torah law, the Sages want to prohibit this too — not because you’ll get to a Torah prohibition, but because this too has some problematic dimension, since there is a certain component here that exists in the Torah-level act. I expand the Torah-level act and say there is also a rabbinic prohibition on selecting food from waste. Then it’s not because of fear that people will come to a Torah prohibition. It is an expansion of the Torah prohibition by the Sages. Everything similar to it, we also prohibit — not out of concern that you’ll get to a Torah-level violation, but because in itself it is a problematic act. Okay? Along the same lines, I can say the same thing here. All in all, someone who did the putting-down has here components from the Torah-level act of carrying out. So even if I don’t get to — I cannot get to violating a Torah prohibition — still, the Sages see this as sufficiently similar to a Torah prohibition to prohibit it in its own right. And therefore one can also prohibit someone who did the putting-down alone. That too is an explanation of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi. Okay?

[Speaker C] Can I ask —

[Speaker K] — something?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, does it depend on timing?

[Speaker C] Again? Does it depend on timing? Meaning, someone lifted it and put it in my hand, and I didn’t do the actual putting-down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about not doing a putting-down. I’m talking about where I do perform the putting-down.

[Speaker C] No, so I’m asking: do both the lifting and the putting-down have to be at the same time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a case of two people doing it together? The example is the poor person, okay? I take the object from the public domain where I’m standing, bring it into the private domain, and it remains in my hand there, and the homeowner takes the object from my hand. So the homeowner did the putting-down, right? He is the one who — no —

[Speaker C] He did the lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he did the putting-down. I did the lifting from the public domain, and the homeowner took it from my hand and did the putting-down in the private domain.

[Speaker C] And if he doesn’t do the putting-down? Or after some amount of time — I don’t know — a time gap with no connection between the acts?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, the timing here doesn’t matter. I transferred it into the private domain and he took it from my hand, so he is considered the one who put it down. I was the one who lifted and transferred it, and he was the one who put it down. Lifting it from my hand in this case counts as putting-down, because my hand is what brought it from the public domain, and now he took it from my hand and now it is in his hand in the private domain, and maybe he also has to put it down there — we saw that in Rashi — but it doesn’t matter, that’s a different discussion. Okay? So he put it down.

[Speaker J] Rabbi, a question just about the prohibition of putting-down — I’m simply trying to understand this. The prohibition of putting-down can be relevant only as a fence around the prohibition of lifting, right? Not independently?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. It’s a rabbinic prohibition. It’s clear that it’s a rabbinic prohibition. The question is whether it’s a fence or not a fence — those are the two possibilities I mentioned before. One possibility is to say that it’s a fence: if we permit you to put it down, someone else will come to do the whole thing. That makes sense; it’s a fence. But one could say no: putting-down contains some dimension of the carrying-out itself, and if carrying-out was prohibited by the Torah, then the Sages expand it and prohibit also the putting-down alone, because after all it too is a problematic act. True, it is not problematic enough to be prohibited by Torah law, but it too is a problematic act, and the Sages decide to prohibit it at the rabbinic level. Okay? Not because I’ll get to a Torah prohibition — and then it’s not a fence, not a safeguard — but rather an expansion of the Torah prohibition. Two possibilities.

[Speaker J] I was trying to compare it — a comparison came to my mind — to, say, if they said it is forbidden to fly from place to place, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So —

[Speaker J] There’s a prohibition on flying, including takeoff and landing. Right. So to prohibit takeoff makes sense, because once you’ve done that act you’ve basically already started it — that’s like the lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not only that — in the end you’ll also land.

[Speaker J] Right, exactly. But how can you say — and you can say that you —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — only lift, only lift, and not put down, and that itself is prohibited because there could have been a situation in which you would also put it down.

[Speaker J] Okay, but how can you say — how can you say that a prohibition on landing alone is itself a prohibition? I mean, what is that? It’s not possible without something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? There is a certain component here from flying. So if flying is seen by the Torah as a problematic act… But that’s the point — the person —

[Speaker H] — took off in order to land, that was his goal. Wait, just a second. Landing was the goal.

[Speaker J] Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, let me explain for a moment.

[Speaker H] So why isn’t the landing important?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait.

[Speaker J] No, because it’s either together or both together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, give me one second to explain, I’m in the middle. The Torah says that flying is a problematic act, okay? Now the Sages say: look, part of the problematic nature of flying is also the landing, right? Now someone who only did the landing, without takeoff and so on, still has a problematic dimension here. It’s not problematic enough to be prohibited by Torah law, but it is problematic in a certain sense, and therefore the Sages say: in order to preserve the character of the Sabbath, we will prohibit even landing by itself, rabbinically. Not because you’ll get to a Torah prohibition. This is not a concern, not a fence, lest you do a Torah prohibition; rather, there is some dimension of the Torah-level problematic aspect that exists here too, and that is enough for the Sages to prohibit it. That is what I call a prohibition that is not a fence-type prohibition, but an independent prohibition.

[Speaker J] But is it with the same severity as the lifting, as the takeoff?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rabbinic prohibition, yes. A full-fledged rabbinic prohibition. There are rabbinic prohibitions of this sort, and there are rabbinic prohibitions of that sort. It’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim), not important right now, but in principle people speak about two kinds of rabbinic prohibitions: prohibitions that are a fence or a safeguard, lest you come to do a Torah-level prohibition, and independent prohibitions, which are an expansion of the Torah prohibition — not lest you come to a Torah-level violation, but because the Sages understand that the character of the Sabbath is damaged even if you only put it down, without lifting it. It is not damaged in a very, very fundamental way, so by Torah law there won’t be a prohibition here, but it is damaged enough for the Sages to prohibit it. They want us to broaden the preservation of the character of the Sabbath, okay?

[Speaker K] I want to ask something for a second, okay? Rashi — if for a moment we don’t take all the explanations we brought and just take his straightforward meaning — he basically says that lifting is a rabbinic prohibition and it is exempt but forbidden, and he didn’t include putting-down. So putting-down is basically permitted. So how does he explain the Mishnah? He contradicts the Mishnah. The Mishnah says both are exempt, and we said that “both are exempt” means both are exempt but forbidden, so apparently Rashi contradicts the Mishnah. And how could Rashi contradict the Mishnah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the opening words —

[Speaker I] On the Mishnah, in the opening words, he explains the Mishnah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent question, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) do indeed ask this about Rashi. And therefore some of the later authorities (Acharonim) really explain that Rashi also did not mean to say that. But there are later authorities (Acharonim) who do learn Rashi that way, and what is written in the Mishnah, “both are exempt,” means both are not liable. One of them is exempt but forbidden, but the second is completely permitted. That’s what you’d have to say according to Rashi, and it really is strained.

[Speaker I] Can’t you explain according to Rashi that he isn’t talking about one case in which both are exempt, but there are four cases there, two for each one, so “both are exempt” on both sides? Meaning, since he says there are two for each one: lifting for the poor person and lifting for the homeowner. Meaning, it’s not in one case that both are exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but in the case of two people doing it together, it says that both are exempt — not only in the Mishnah. And according to Rashi, in the case of two people doing it together, only the one who lifted is exempt but forbidden, while the one who put it down is permitted. In the Mishnah itself, when it says in the two cases that they are exempt — the wording of the Mishnah — there are —

[Speaker I] Two cases there for each one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and in those cases we are speaking only about liftings, and in the cases of lifting we are indeed speaking only about the one who lifted, and the one who lifted is indeed exempt but forbidden. So —

[Speaker I] That’s what Rashi writes there; after all, those are opening words on the Mishnah. When he writes “both are exempt,” then really in the two cases they are exempt, so he says we’re only talking about the lifting, and that explains Rashi on the Mishnah.

[Speaker K] But that’s not what it says there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, look at the language of the Mishnah. “The acts of carrying out on the Sabbath are two that are four inside, and two that are four outside.” How so? The poor person stands outside and the homeowner inside. If the poor person stretched out his hand inside and placed it into the hand of the homeowner, or took from it and brought it out, the poor person is liable and the homeowner is exempt. Okay? If the homeowner stretched out his hand outside and placed it into the hand of the poor person, or took from it and brought it inside, the homeowner is liable and the poor person is exempt. What does “exempt” mean here?

[Speaker I] Exempt but forbidden.

[Speaker K] Exempt and permitted.

[Speaker H] Completely exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exempt and permitted, because when one is liable, the other did nothing. “Exempt but forbidden” is when we’re speaking about two people doing it together at the rabbinic level. “If the poor person stretched out his hand inside and the homeowner took from it, or placed into it and he brought it out, both are exempt.” What Chani was talking about is this.

[Speaker I] Right, but that’s also Rashi on the Mishnah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, that’s the Mishnah — I’m talking about the Mishnah.

[Speaker I] Right, so “both are exempt” — he wants to say there’s another option on the other side for the homeowner too. Meaning that “both are exempt” means in the two cases — I don’t know, I’m trying to explain Rashi — in the two cases the one who lifted is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what you have to say according to Rashi: in the two cases, the one who lifted is exempt and the one who put it down is completely permitted. And that is what is written there explicitly.

[Speaker I] What? He writes that explicitly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, that’s what he writes. It’s also in the Rashi we read earlier. But in the Talmud itself, look at “in doing it” — look here. Look. Do you see? This is the Talmud that Rashi is really referring to on the Mishnah. “Both are exempt.” The Talmud asks: But hasn’t a prohibited labor been done between them? One lifted and the other put down; in practical terms there was carrying out here done by both of them. The Talmud brings a baraita: Rabbi says, from the verse “from among the people of the land, in doing it” — one who does all of it, and not one who does part of it. If one individual did it, he is liable; if two did it together, they are exempt. Now, “if two did it together, they are exempt” — here it is already clearly speaking, unlike the Mishnah. Here, “two did it together are exempt” means the one who lifted and the one who put down. Here you can no longer say what Noa said. Here it says both are exempt. This is what I mean when I say that according to Rashi you have to say that “both are exempt” means both are not liable. The one who lifted is exempt but forbidden, and the one who put it down is permitted. In the Mishnah itself, “both are exempt” is what Noa said: the two lifters are exempt. Okay? In any case, let’s get back to our subject because we’re dragging this out a bit too much, and I still want to finish it today. So Rashi basically — as I said — in Rashi it seems that for the acts of lifting, the rule is exempt but forbidden, while for the acts of putting-down it is completely permitted. I said that because of these difficulties, some later authorities (Acharonim) understood Rashi to mean that the one who put it down is also exempt, and that means exempt but forbidden. What Rashi only wants to say is that the Mishnah mentioned only the lifters and not those who put it down, but not that for those who put it down there is no prohibition. For them too there is a prohibition; the Mishnah just didn’t mention it. It mentioned only the lifters because it mentioned only prohibitions of the kind that can lead to a Torah-level prohibition; it did not mention rabbinic prohibitions that cannot lead to a Torah-level prohibition. But that is only a discussion of what the Mishnah included; it is not a distinction in the question of who is exempt and who is permitted. There is no “permitted.” Also one who put it down alone is exempt but forbidden according to Rashi. That is how some understand Rashi. The straightforward meaning of Rashi is not like that, by the way. Now let’s take a quick look at Tosafot. I’m going to do this relatively quickly because I want to finish it. Look at Tosafot. “What Rashi explained, that the acts of lifting are what are counted, does not seem correct to the Ri.” Notice that Tosafot does not ask against Rashi: how can it be that as for acts of putting-down, they are completely permitted? That objection does not exist. Apparently Tosafot understood Rashi the way I said before: Rashi does not mean that acts of putting-down are completely permitted, but rather that the Mishnah did not mention the exemption regarding acts of putting-down, only the exemption regarding acts of lifting, because this is, in some sense, a more severe rabbinic prohibition. But there is also a rabbinic prohibition on putting-down alone. Still, Tosafot is not happy with what Rashi says: “it does not seem correct to the Ri.” First, lifting without carrying-out is only ordinary moving about, and it has no connection whatsoever to liability for a sin-offering. If someone lifted and did not put it down and did not even transfer from one domain to another, but only lifted and the other person transferred and put it down — that doesn’t belong here at all. He says: what does that have to do with anything? Think of a case where I only lifted something in the private domain and then put it back down afterward in the private domain. Would there be a rabbinic prohibition in that? No. There would be nothing there, right? So why, if someone else comes and takes it from my hand and transfers it, should I violate a rabbinic prohibition there? After all, it is just ordinary moving about; I did the same thing. Therefore Tosafot says he doesn’t accept what Rashi says.

[Speaker D] Okay, but he has difficulties with Rashi.

[Speaker K] But what matters to me is what Tosafot himself says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And the Riv"a explains that the one who can come to liability for a sin-offering is the one who stretches out his hand and brings it in or takes it out, since in the corresponding first clause he is liable for a sin-offering. And here he is exempt because he did not perform the whole labor, since he lacked a small part of it — either lifting or putting-down.” What is he saying? He says that what the Talmud — what the Mishnah — includes is not only liftings, but either liftings or puttings-down together with transfer. Meaning, if I do a lifting and transfer to the other side, and then the other person puts it down. Or I’m on the other side — the other person lifts, and then I take it and put it down on my side. It is always an act that is either lifting or putting-down, but accompanied by transfer — that is what the Mishnah is speaking about. That is significant. If you did only lifting or only putting-down, but in the same domain, without doing the transfer, then there is not even a rabbinic prohibition; it is nothing. It is just ordinary moving about. That is how Tosafot explains it.

[Speaker F] And is that the same as what Rashi mentions, that liability is for that labor which begins with stretching out the hand — because that means transfer, as it were, the beginning of transfer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good. If you do lifting and transfer. Tosafot says lifting alone is nothing.

[Speaker F] No, no. He said — the rabbi said just now that Tosafot emphasizes the transfer. Right. Yes. But in Rashi it says that stretching out the hand is what creates liability, so to speak. Why stretching out the hand? Because it is the beginning of transfer, as it were.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to Rashi you don’t need that; lifting alone is enough. That’s Tosafot’s point.

[Speaker F] No, no. What he said afterward — for the rabbinic prohibition they say —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. I’m speaking about the rabbinic level.

[Speaker I] But I don’t think Rashi says that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand. Of course Tosafot…

[Speaker I] It’s basically a denial of Rashi. It’s obvious that this is not what Rashi writes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s Tosafot… Tosafot understood Rashi not that way. Tosafot understood Rashi as talking about lifting by itself. Okay? It could be that Rashi also meant this, but…

[Speaker F] No, no, no, that’s not what I mean. That’s the first part of Rashi, where he speaks about lifting. And afterward he says that at the rabbinic level they say stretching out the hand creates liability.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Our Rabbis.” “Our Rabbis,” yes — the second explanation Rashi brings, yes. I’m not going into that now. That’s a different whole section.

[Speaker F] Fine. That’s why I wanted to ask whether it’s identical or different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Rashi himself it says “acts of lifting,” okay? So therefore in Rashi it does not say…

[Speaker F] No, I’m talking about the second explanation. Fine, if the rabbi doesn’t want to talk about it.

[Speaker I] But there is a way to understand Rashi only in terms of lifting. After all, it is clear that he’s speaking about a lifting that in the end results in transfer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it results in transfer, but it could be that the other one, the one who put it down, did the transfer. I only lifted it.

[Speaker D] Without transfer. He’s not talking about transfer at all.

[Speaker I] And then the one who lifted would be rabbinically liable if the act involved transfer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Rashi says. And Tosafot argues no: if you only lifted it and the other person then transferred and put it down, it cannot be that you violated a rabbinic prohibition. You did nothing. What is it like? It’s like lifting in one domain and then putting it down afterward in that same domain. Why should it matter to me that the second person afterward transferred and put it down? So he is liable, but what does that have to do with me? In such a case, Tosafot says, there is no liability even for the lifting. Right. So therefore Tosafot says we must say that this is speaking about an act accompanied by transfer. And then what happens here is that Tosafot, as opposed to Rashi, says that when the Talmud says the four rabbinic cases listed in the Mishnah are those that can lead to a Torah prohibition, what does that mean? Not four liftings, but four acts that are either lifting or putting-down together with transfer. Lifting and transfer from the public domain; lifting and transfer from the private domain; transfer and putting-down in the public domain; transfer and putting-down into the private domain. Those are the four rabbinic acts that appear in the Mishnah. The four that do not appear in the Mishnah are liftings or puttings-down not accompanied by transfer, and they really are not rabbinic prohibitions. That is Tosafot’s claim. Okay? So then it’s not just liftings versus just puttings-down, as in Rashi, but only acts bound up with transfer. Now in Tosafot itself, you can also see from his wording very clearly that Tosafot understands the essence of carrying out to be the transfer. The lifting and putting-down are not really important. Yes, that’s what he says: “Here he is exempt because he did not perform the whole labor, since he lacked a small part of it,” either lifting or putting-down — but basically he did perform the essence of the labor. The transfer is the essence of the labor.

[Speaker C] Wait, I have a question. And I’m going back to Iris’s example of flying. If I took off, right, the plane took off on Friday evening and landed on Saturday night, then is the transfer alone, which took place during the Sabbath…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now you’re getting to practical implications; in a moment I’ll comment on them, okay? First let’s just try to understand what’s written. I’ll get to that in a second. According to Tosafot, the essence of the prohibition of carrying out is the transfer. Therefore Tosafot says against Rashi: if you do only lifting, you didn’t do half of the act of carrying out — you just did ordinary moving about, you performed an act with no significance at all. Because the essential significance of carrying out is the change of domain — the transfer from one domain to another. Notice that Tosafot here seems to follow his own view that we saw, that he understands the essence of the act of carrying out as movement, as a change of domain. And therefore here too Tosafot is consistent with his view and says: what do you want, Rashi? What is this? If you only did lifting without doing transfer, you didn’t do half of the act of carrying out. You did nothing. You performed an act that has no significance at all. The significance of the act of carrying out is transfer. It is the change of domain. And therefore Tosafot here is following his own view. In Rashi there is room to discuss it. It could be that Rashi also learned that way, as Noam said earlier, and Tosafot simply did not understand him properly. Or Rashi really understands differently, and Rashi thinks that lifting alone is half of the act, and then according to his view maybe transfer is not the essence of the act, but perhaps lifting is the essence of the act. But as Nechama pointed out earlier, that is not necessary. Because it could be that what Rashi means is not that lifting is more important, but simply that lifting is the only thing that can be completed into a Torah prohibition. But that does not mean that the essence of the act is lifting. Therefore with Rashi I don’t think one can infer how he understood the essence of the act of carrying out. In Tosafot it really does seem, as I said in the previous class, that the essence of the act of carrying out is the movement. The movement — therefore, passing from one domain to another. Therefore Tosafot says that without doing that transfer there is nothing here of carrying out. If you did that, then the essence of the act of carrying out is present. It just lacks either lifting or putting-down, so you cannot reach Torah liability, and therefore it will be a rabbinic prohibition. But the essence of the act of carrying out is here. And notice that unlike Rashi, according to Tosafot the rabbinic prohibition is really not because of a decree lest you come to a Torah prohibition, but because you performed the essence. What is missing is a technical condition. And if I had to be precise, I think Tosafot really does say that the essence of the act of carrying out is the transfer. The lifting or the putting-down — and Tosafot makes no distinction between them — both are side conditions. What you basically need is transfer. The lifting or the putting-down are side conditions. That’s how Tosafot understands the act of carrying out.

[Speaker I] Right, and then that really is the practical implication you brought at the beginning of the class with Friday evening. According to Tosafot, after all, there was no prohibited lifting at all, so there he would indeed say — that’s really one of the practical implications.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There there would simply be no prohibition according to Tosafot, straightforwardly.

[Speaker I] Right, though I do have a question.

[Speaker J] Yes. I don’t know — suddenly while we’re talking, it seems funny to me altogether: why did they divide this labor into two in the first place? After all, any act, any labor, I can divide into many parts, not only into two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are essential parts, then divide it.

[Speaker J] No, what — for example, I don’t know, say lighting — turning on the light or kindling a fire — so I could say the labor is divided between making a spark and kindling the fire. You can divide any labor into lots of parts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see that. You see that you’re not succeeding.

[Speaker D] Why? The Talmud distinguishes between one who brings the fire and one who brings the wood.

[Speaker J] Right, in Bava Kamma.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what does bringing the wood and the fire have to do with anything?

[Speaker D] So also —

[Speaker J] You can divide labors, you can divide labors into all kinds of parts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not. First of all, one brought the fire and the other brought the wood — that is not in the laws of the Sabbath; that is in the laws of damages. And in the laws of damages we are not asking who performed the labor of kindling, but who is responsible for the damage. That is something entirely different. The labor of kindling is placing the fire onto the wood, igniting that wood with the fire. There is no division there in any way. There are two ways to perform the labor of kindling: either to put wood into the fire, in which case I kindled the wood, or to take the fire and use it to ignite wood. But those are not two parts of the act; they are two different ways of performing the labor of kindling. That’s one point. And second, even if you can divide it, then fine, you can divide it. What’s the problem? Who said that with other labors it can’t be divided? If it can, then it can. So what happened? What’s the question?

[Speaker J] Because here, when we divide it, we start saying that even just the beginning is forbidden, and even just the end is forbidden. I was persuaded by Tosafot that both together are forbidden because only when both are done together does the purpose actually get realized.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, that’s all mixed up — everything is mixed up. Again: if the thing — if we divide it — the discussion here is on the rabbinic level. Someone who did the first part without the other parts incurs only a rabbinic prohibition. For the Torah prohibition, obviously you need all the parts. You can have this discussion with other labors too. If in other labors you find that there are several parts, then certainly there too the question will arise whether someone who did one part incurs a rabbinic prohibition or not. No problem, absolutely. But that is only a rabbinic prohibition. For the Torah level you have to do all the components; that’s obvious. According to Tosafot it’s not related. Tosafot is not saying that you need all the parts. Everyone says you need all the parts. Tosafot says that what matters in the labor of carrying out is the transfer — not the carrying-out, not the lifting, not the putting-down — the transfer.

[Speaker H] It’s not the joining —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — of the two, not the joining of the two with each other, but the transfer. That is a third component.

[Speaker H] So why, then, if the homeowner stretches out his hand with an object and brings it back — he did a transfer — so why according to Tosafot would he not be liable? I don’t understand. If the homeowner stretches his hand out into the public domain with an object and brings it back with that same object to himself, Tosafot would not consider that a transfer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t put it down. You need putting-down.

[Speaker H] Until there is putting-down, there is no transfer. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the condition, that’s the condition.

[Speaker F] It’s not the essence of the labor, but it’s the condition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s important to me that you understand — don’t get confused here. No one disputes that Torah liability exists only if we have lifting, transfer, and putting-down. That is mandatory; there is no argument. The dispute is a theoretical dispute about what is the essence and what are conditions, but everyone agrees that all three are needed in order to violate a Torah prohibition. There is no argument about that. Therefore if one of them is missing, there will be no Torah prohibition. Okay? Let that be clear. Now look — that’s regarding Tosafot. Look at the second explanation of the Rashba; I need to hurry a little. “And some explain the opposite” — the opposite of Rashi. He brought Rashi’s explanation. “And some explain the opposite,” a third explanation in the Talmud, “that what is counted is the acts of putting-down.” According to Tosafot, what is counted in the Mishnah? The transfers. According to Rashi, what is counted in the Mishnah? The liftings. According to the second explanation, what is counted?

[Speaker H] The puttings-down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here too it also says why: “because through him the labor is completed, and it is the essence of the labor, since through the putting-down one can in an ordinary case come to liability for a sin-offering.” In the Rashba here it says explicitly that putting-down is the essence of the labor of carrying out. So if I need to be precise: in Rashi you can’t infer it. In Tosafot it seems to be the transfer. In the Rashba’s second explanation, in the “some explain” of the Rashba, it seems that putting-down is the essence of the labor. And lifting is a condition. Of course, if you didn’t lift it from one place, then putting it down elsewhere has no meaning. Obviously the putting-down receives its meaning when it completes a lifting from elsewhere. But in essence, the labor of carrying out is the putting-down. Okay?

[Speaker F] But what does the Rashba count as putting-down? Just — does it mean, say, if I took the object from the homeowner, do I then have to put it down? Or is simply taking it already considered putting-down?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what we discussed in the previous class in Rashi — whether it’s enough that the hand stops, or whether you have to place it somewhere. It’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim), not important right now.

[Speaker F] So according to the Rashba, taking it from the other person’s hand is putting-down, and he is liable, yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rashba does not get into that question. Whatever you say on that question, fine. But what is called putting-down — if you did that — that is the essence of the labor of carrying out. What exactly is putting-down? That’s the dispute we saw there, without going into the details.

[Speaker H] But then maybe the factor that determines what the essence is is also the person’s intention. If he wants to clear stones off his property, then for him the main thing is the lifting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say that. It’s a nice idea, but the Rashba doesn’t say that. The Rashba says the essence is the putting-down. So we have three approaches here among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). One approach is Rashi.

[Speaker K] But according to Rashi, lifting is not the essence of the labor; they simply decree regarding it because it can lead to a Torah prohibition. But that doesn’t make it the essence of the labor. According to Tosafot, the essence of the labor is transfer, and according to the Rashba, the essence of the labor is putting-down. But according to Rashi, you can’t understand what the essence of the labor is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, absolutely right. You summarized the summary I was just beginning to say — that’s exactly the summary. We have three approaches in the Talmud, three approaches among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) for reading the Mishnah in light of the Talmud’s conclusion on page 2 — yes, that it counts what can lead to a sin-offering, and what cannot lead to a sin-offering it does not count. According to Rashi, the Mishnah counts four rabbinic cases of lifting. According to Tosafot, it counts four cases that involve transfer. According to the Rashba, in the “some explain” of the Rashba, it counts the four acts of putting-down. For our purposes, what matters — and why I’m bringing this — is that it matters for defining the essence of the labor of carrying out. In Rashi, one cannot derive a conclusion about the definition of the labor of carrying out, because Rashi ties it to a technical matter: whether it can be completed into a Torah-level violation or cannot be completed into a Torah-level violation. He does not enter the question of what is primary and what is not primary. According to Tosafot, the essence is the transfer, or movement, or change of domain. Okay? What I said in the previous class — what I suggested as the explanation of the essence of the labor of carrying out — fits best with Tosafot here. And that is also consistent with Tosafot we saw there. According to the “some explain” in the Rashba, the essence of the labor of carrying out is the putting-down. Attaching a new location to the object, placing the object in a new location — that is the essence of the labor of carrying out. But if you didn’t do the lifting, then it doesn’t count. Those are the approaches. Those are the approaches of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that we’ve seen. There are two practical implications here. I’ll do this briefly because I really don’t want to continue this into the next class too. I have two practical implications. One practical implication concerns taking out the meat of the Passover offering. Regarding the Passover offering, the Talmud in tractate Pesachim discusses the prohibition of taking it out from its place. You know that the meat of the Passover offering has to be eaten in the place designated for its eating. The group is registered for it there, the group sits there, and that’s where they eat it. It is forbidden to take the meat of the Passover offering outside its place. The Talmud there discusses what counts as “taking it out.” So Rashi says there that one must perform lifting and putting-down. Rashi explains why: just like on the Sabbath, where we require lifting and putting-down, because until one puts it down the labor is not completed. Regarding the Sabbath, in all liabilities for a sin-offering it says “in doing it” — one who does all of it and not one who does part of it. And this too — also with the Passover offering — even though it is not a matter of a sin-offering, it is not said there regarding carrying-out that it is a sin-offering like carrying-out on the Sabbath; we are speaking about a completely different prohibition. There too there is a concept of taking out, but it is unrelated to carrying-out on the Sabbath; it is something else. Rashi says: it is the same as on the Sabbath. Why? Because from the Sabbath we see that taking out is not completed until you put it down, and therefore so too regarding the Passover offering. Now understand: according to Tosafot it is very hard to say what Rashi says here, because according to Tosafot the definition of carrying-out is transfer from one domain to another. The need for lifting and putting-down is only a side condition. Who says that this side condition is not a law specific to the Sabbath and has nothing at all to do with taking out the meat of the Passover offering? With the Passover offering, the main thing is that it left the house. Why do you need lifting and putting-down? According to Tosafot it is very hard to say what Rashi says here. What Rashi is saying here is that apparently he understands that it is not the transfer, but that the concept of taking out is defined as lifting followed by putting-down, and therefore with the Passover offering too, if I want there to be a “taking out,” it must include lifting and putting-down. According to Tosafot, the Talmud there is indeed a bit difficult, because the Talmud there learns that lifting and putting-down are needed from carrying-out on the Sabbath, and you have to say that this is some kind of verbal analogy. Not really a substantive comparison, but a verbal analogy: “taking out” there and “taking out” here. If “taking out” here means lifting and putting-down, then “taking out” there too means lifting and putting-down. But not that there is really a substantive similarity according to Tosafot. Okay? Yes.

[Speaker E] Can I? Okay, what you said makes sense, but what bothers me here about the verbal analogy is that, yes, there really is the same word, “taking out,” but the essence — putting aside for a second which component — the essence of taking out on the Sabbath is about transfers; we’re talking about one domain and another domain. On the Sabbath we don’t care where it is, as long as it doesn’t pass into the other place. With Passover, the issue of taking out is not because I really care so much about the change, but because I care that it remain within the walls of the house. I have a specific interest that it stay inside. And therefore I think the comparison here is not —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one way to formulate it, but another way to formulate it is that I care that it not be somewhere else, not that it be here. That could also be.

[Speaker E] But why? For Passover, can I do it outside in the courtyard? Outside in the street?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to establish some place where you eat the Passover offering. Does it have to be defined specifically inside a house? I don’t think so. No?

[Speaker E] Can I establish a place to eat the Passover offering in the public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the public domain I don’t know — maybe yes too. I don’t remember the laws of Passover right now.

[Speaker E] Because that’s exactly the point. If I can establish it in the public domain,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then one more thing. Sorry? It has to be fixed in a place. What is that place? At the moment I don’t remember whether there’s an exact definition there of what counts as the place.

[Speaker E] If I’m not mistaken, it’s also kind of derived from the verses about not going out of the house, where there really is an idea of being inside a house. I don’t think it would be possible, in halakhic terms, to define it as possible in the public domain. And another difficulty: even if we say it is possible in the public domain, then what does that mean? If we compare the laws of transfer regarding Passover to the laws of transfer on the Sabbath, then if I fixed a place in the public domain, that would mean I could walk back and forth on the Ayalon highway wherever I want.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because it could be that in the public domain—

[Speaker E] Why? But if I’m comparing it to the Sabbath, then I haven’t changed domains.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in the public domain, four cubits is the place. Once you went outside your own four cubits in the public domain, that too is called changing place.

[Speaker E] Is it true that on the face of it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the face of it, the whole public domain—

[Speaker F] For the sake of the sacrifice.

[Speaker E] But that’s on the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The four cubits that you fixed might perhaps—I don’t know, this needs to be checked—might perhaps be in the public domain, but it’s still those same four cubits, not the whole public domain. Why?

[Speaker E] Because in the case of transfer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This has to be checked in the laws of the Paschal sacrifice. What I want to say here is that the comparison Rashi makes is very hard to make within the approach of Tosafot. And that’s because Rashi does not follow Tosafot’s approach. Rather, Rashi understands removal and placement as essential elements in the labor of transfer, in the definition of the concept of transfer. Okay? Tosafot, on the other hand, says that removal and placement are incidental conditions. What matters is that there be a transfer, that’s all. Therefore, regarding removal and placement, how do you learn from the Sabbath to the Paschal sacrifice? You have to say that it’s some kind of verbal analogy, but not really an essential similarity between the two things. Another practical implication, as I said earlier—I referred you to Rashi on page 3b, where Rashi says that if a person extended his… what… the practical implication before that Rashi. The practical implication I mean is: what happens if someone removes something before the Sabbath and places it down on the Sabbath? Okay? For example, Rashi on page 3b says that if a person extended his hand before the Sabbath and placed the object in the public domain on the Sabbath, he is not liable by Torah law. Okay? He says, his wording is: “Since there was no removal on the Sabbath, only placement alone, and there is only a rabbinic prohibition, because he did part of it.” The removal was not on the Sabbath, only the placement. That somewhat echoes his view here, where he says that removal is really the essence—if I understand that removal is the essence. Earlier we said there’s no necessity to read Rashi that way, but if we do read Rashi that way, then it fits very well with what he says here: basically the removal has to be done. What would happen if I removed it almost at the end of the Sabbath and placed it down after the Sabbath ended?

[Speaker H] Rashi is probably committed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it could be that maybe then he would be liable, I don’t know.

[Speaker H] Right, because here there’s a concern lest he still place it down on the Sabbath. So why isn’t he liable? You didn’t give her an answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about Torah law, Ruti, not about a rabbinic prohibition. The concern “lest” doesn’t interest me.

[Speaker K] Where would he violate Torah law if he only removed it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in the end he placed it down. So the fact that he did that after the Sabbath—so what? It could be that if removal is the essence, right—removal is basically the essence of the labor of transfer, but there is a condition that there also be placement. Maybe that condition can also be fulfilled after the Sabbath? Because after all, the core and essence of the labor I did on the Sabbath—I did the removal on the Sabbath. And the condition was fulfilled. So what if it was fulfilled after the Sabbath? After all, what I need in the placement is not really part of the essence of the labor, but simply that if I didn’t eventually place it down, then the removal is not meaningful. So once I did the removal on the Sabbath and placed it down after the Sabbath, that reveals to me that the removal I did on the Sabbath was meaningful. So if that’s the case, then I’m liable. Why should I care that the placement was after the Sabbath?

[Speaker K] But I have a kind of contradiction in Rashi, because according to what he says here, since no removal was done and there was only placement after the Sabbath, he says that he is exempt but it is forbidden. But according to how we explained Rashi earlier, he says that it’s only removals we’re talking about, whereas placements are permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—

[Speaker K] There’s a contradiction in Rashi between the two places.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent question, and that’s exactly why I brought this Rashi. The later authorities raise this difficulty; they prove from this Rashi that what we explained in Rashi above is not correct. I understand. The Rashi above says that even for placement alone there is liability… not liability, a rabbinic prohibition. Here we see that a person did only placement on the Sabbath, and there is a rabbinic prohibition here. True, there is no Torah prohibition, but there is a rabbinic prohibition. So we see that when Rashi above speaks about placement alone, he does not mean there is no prohibition at all, but rather that the Mishnah didn’t bring that prohibition, though there is a rabbinic prohibition. I claim that this is not necessary; it’s not a proof. Why not? It could be that Rashi really does say that someone who does placement alone is in fact completely permitted. Here Rashi says it is a rabbinic prohibition because I also did the removal. True, I did it on Friday, but I did the removal. Once I did the removal, you can’t say that the placement I did on the Sabbath is meaningless. It is meaningful. That is not enough for Torah liability, but a rabbinic prohibition may well apply. But this is not proof that Rashi would say that someone who does placement alone, and did not remove it—not even on Friday—did not remove it at all; someone else removed it, okay? In that case too there would be a rabbinic prohibition. That is far from certain. Okay. Another point—maybe one could say, in another formulation, that the requirement that there be removal and placement is so that the act be considered an act of transfer, or so that the concept of transfer exists here. It is not a legal requirement in order for you to incur liability; rather it is a conceptual requirement. And for the concept of transfer, you need removal and placement, as we saw in Rashi regarding the Paschal sacrifice, right? That is exactly what we saw there. After all, there it is transfer that is not a Sabbath labor. And still Rashi says that without removal and placement, the concept of transfer does not apply. In other words, Rashi understands that removal and placement are required in order for the concept of transfer to appear here. If that is so, then it is certainly possible that the placement can be done on the Sabbath and the removal on Friday, or that the placement can be done after the Sabbath and the removal on the Sabbath itself. As long as there was removal and placement here, then there was transfer, and therefore it could be that you would be liable in any case. Because the requirement—and notice, this is an important point—the requirement for removal and placement is not a legal requirement. If it were a legal requirement, then that is how the labor is defined: the labor has to be done on the Sabbath in order for me to be liable for it. And both the removal and the placement would have to be done on the Sabbath. But if the requirement is not a legal one, if it is simply the meaning of the concept transfer, then I removed and transferred, but I did the placement after the Sabbath. Okay?

[Speaker H] And then according to the Maharshal, the transfer is the main thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, and then what I want to say is that once I did the placement, that reveals that the action I did on the Sabbath was transfer. And therefore it could be that I would be liable, even though I did the placement after the Sabbath. And all the more so according to Tosafot, who says that the main thing is the transfer itself—then it could be that if the removal was done after the Sabbath, I might even be liable. Not just that it would be a rabbinic prohibition, as Rashi says here. Maybe I would actually be fully liable. Okay? So that, for example, could be a halakhic implication of what I said. Fine. Let me do the continuation really in telegraphic fashion because, from my perspective, this isn’t the main point. I just want to finish this passage. So now I want to talk about carrying out and bringing in as primary categories and derivatives, in the quarter hour we have left. And I’ll say this. There’s the Talmudic passage—did you manage to go over the page I sent today? Yes. All of it?

[Speaker C] Except for section four. Yes. Here’s Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll do this telegraphically, and if someone doesn’t follow it all the way through, read the summary. This point appears in the summary, because I don’t want to come back to it next class. Next class I already want to move forward into the passage itself.

[Speaker G] A person sick with leprosy or something like that—obviously there are differences. But basically the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so I want to move to that point. Look, at the beginning of Bava Kamma—wait, at the beginning of Bava Kamma—the Talmud there discusses primary categories and derivatives. I’ll do this briefly. Look. I’ll enlarge it a bit. The Mishnah there brings four primary categories of damages. The Talmud asks: from the fact that it teaches primary categories, it follows that there are derivatives. Are their derivatives like them or not like them? Does the derivative have the same law as the primary category or not? Then the Talmud brings two kinds of primary categories and derivatives: in impurity and in the Sabbath. The discussion there is about damages. On the Sabbath, the rule is that their derivatives are like them. In impurity, the rule is that their derivatives are not like them. The Talmud asks: what about the derivatives of damages? Is it the same as the primary categories, the same laws, or not? And then the Talmud says: some are and some aren’t. What is the question? What is the difference between derivatives in Sabbath law and derivatives in impurity? Why, on the Sabbath, are the derivatives like the primary categories, while in impurity they are not? There’s a simple explanation for this, and it appears in Nachalat David, which I referred you to. I won’t read it; I’ll just explain. The derivatives of the Sabbath—you can call them learned derivatives. Learned derivatives means derivatives that I learn from the primary categories because they resemble them. Say carrying out is a primary category; bringing in resembles carrying out, so bringing in is a derivative. Okay, for the sake of discussion. So I learn bringing in from carrying out because it resembles it. That is what I call learned derivatives. In other words, the Torah mentions the primary category, the derivative resembles the primary category, and therefore I say that just as the laws of the primary category are such-and-such, so too with the derivative. Obviously such derivatives will be like their primary categories. After all, the whole idea is that they resemble the primary categories, and therefore they are forbidden like the primary categories, and all the laws that apply to the primary categories will apply to the derivatives too because of the resemblance. In impurity, the derivative is not a learned derivative. When someone dies, he is the ultimate source of impurity. Okay? If I touch a corpse, I am considered a primary source of impurity. Something touches me—what is it? First-degree impurity. That is the derivative. Why is it a derivative? Because it resembles me? No, because it touched me. These are derivatives of causation. Not derivatives of resemblance. A chain. Exactly. I caused it to become impure.

[Speaker D] A progression. Some kind of progression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that it is impure like me because it resembles me, but rather it is impure through my power. This is not comparison by resemblance, but causation, a progression. Okay? In derivatives of progression, obviously the derivatives are not like the primary categories. Why should they be like the primary categories? They do not resemble the primary categories; they are generated by the force of the primary category. It is certainly possible that that is not strong enough for some of the laws. Fine. On the Sabbath, the derivatives are derivatives of a primary category because they resemble it. If they resemble it, then the same laws that apply to the primary category will also apply to the derivative. By the way, in damages too it is like that, and if you saw it, the one exceptional case is half-damages for pebbles. We saw this when we studied Bava Kamma in previous years: half-damages for pebbles. Why is that really the only exception? Because it is the only derivative by progression among the derivatives of damages. Half-damages for pebbles is when an animal kicks a stone and then the stone causes damage, and that is considered a derivative of foot-damage. Why? It doesn’t resemble foot-damage; it is caused by the foot. Therefore it resembles the derivatives of impurity, and there the derivatives are not necessarily like the primary categories. And for our purposes, what matters is what the Talmud says regarding derivatives of the Sabbath. The derivatives of the Sabbath are derivatives of resemblance. They are not derivatives of causation or progression, and therefore it is obvious that the laws in the derivative are the same as the laws in the primary category, and the basis of the relationship between them is resemblance. So what is the primary category itself? We already saw: the primary category itself is what was in the Tabernacle—important—a combination of both; we discussed this in the first class. Okay? That is what defines the primary category. So what is the derivative? Something that was not in the Tabernacle, or was not important enough, but resembles the primary category. Notice: not important enough in the sense of not distinctive enough. Okay? But it resembles the primary category, so it was not in the Tabernacle, and therefore obviously its laws will be like those of the primary category, because basically I classify it that way because it resembles the primary category. Okay? That is essentially what emerges from the Talmud in Bava Kamma. Now, what we see in the Talmud at the beginning of the chapter HaZorek is that the Talmud says there that throwing is a primary category—sorry, carrying out is a primary category and bringing in is a derivative. From where is carrying out written? “And Moses commanded, and they proclaimed throughout the camp,” etc.—the Levite camp. So all the discussions there. Or “let no man go out from his place”—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities whether they derive carrying out from this or derive boundaries from this; those are the medieval authorities we saw in the previous class. There are verses from which they derive carrying out, either from the Tabernacle or from such verses or others. Then the Talmud asks: we have found carrying out; from where do we know bringing in? It is logical. Just as carrying out, so bringing in. But afterward it becomes clear to us that in fact bringing in was also in the Tabernacle, right? We know this from the wagons, where they loaded the beams into the wagons, and then in the chapter Bameh Tomnin it becomes clear that bringing in was also in the Tabernacle. So the question returns: if so, why is carrying out a primary category and bringing in a derivative? What exactly… Is it not important?

[Speaker D] Right? Is bringing in not important?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe; we’ll see in a moment. But what does it mean, not important? Is it less creative than carrying out? It is no less creative than carrying out. What difference is there between taking out and bringing in? The Talmud says it is the same thing. It is not important, right.

[Speaker D] What was the instruction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Carrying out is not important only in the sense that it is not distinctive. We said that importance has two parameters, right? The degree of creativity involved and how different it is from the other primary categories of labor. So I’m saying that bringing in is not essentially different from carrying out. Whether it is creative or not creative, there is no difference between it and carrying out. You decide for yourselves: if it is sufficiently creative, then both are creative; if it is not creative, then neither is creative. But on that plane there is no difference between carrying out and bringing in. You should understand that in light of this, the obvious conclusion is what?

[Speaker D] That it is one labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That carrying out and bringing in are both primary categories. It makes no sense to say that carrying out is a primary category and bringing in is a derivative. Why? Because both were in the Tabernacle, and both are on the same level of importance. So decide for yourselves: either both are primary categories or neither is forbidden. But how can it come out that carrying out is a primary category and bringing in is a derivative? How can such a thing be explained? Since that is what the Talmud in the chapter HaZorek says, right?

[Speaker C] It said there—I don’t remember—about one of them that because carrying out is explicitly mentioned and bringing in is not mentioned in Scripture.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in fact the answer is exactly what Yael said. After all, the verses explicitly mention carrying out, right? The Levite camp there, which the Talmud brings—so there are explicit verses that this is carrying out. That is the difference between carrying out and bringing in. Bringing in was in the Tabernacle, but there is no verse saying that bringing in is a labor. So then what? The Talmud in the chapter HaZorek says: since carrying out has a verse attached to it—both carrying out and bringing in were in the Tabernacle, but as we saw, the fact that it was in the Tabernacle is not enough to define it as a primary category. Why not? Because this is an inferior labor. People also walked in the Tabernacle—so is walking also a primary labor? No. Therefore you need the verse; the verse says that carrying out is nevertheless a primary labor. It was in the Tabernacle and it has a verse. Bringing in, true, it was in the Tabernacle, but there is no verse about its importance. Right? And here the passages disagree—or perhaps they disagree. The Talmud in the chapter HaZorek says: carrying out is a primary category, so carrying out—sorry—carrying out has a verse, and it was also in the Tabernacle, therefore carrying out is a primary category. Why… what is bringing in? Bringing in resembles carrying out, therefore it is a derivative of carrying out. What difference is there between taking out and bringing in? It is similar. Fine? The fact that it was in the Tabernacle is not enough to define it as a primary category, because it is an inferior labor, right? I define it as a primary category only because it is similar; I define it as forbidden only because it resembles carrying out. The fact that it was in the Tabernacle is not enough to forbid it; it is an inferior labor. So why is bringing in forbidden? You tell me. Why is bringing in forbidden? After all, there is no verse about it. It was in the Tabernacle—that does not matter because it is an inferior labor; people also walked in the Tabernacle. So why is bringing in forbidden at all? Because it resembles carrying out, right? By the logic of “what difference is there between taking out and bringing in?” That is exactly the relationship between a primary category and a derivative. Carrying out is forbidden because there is a verse prohibiting it, not only because it was in the Tabernacle, and therefore it is a primary category. Why do you need a verse? Because it is an inferior labor. Therefore you need a verse. Other labors, which are significant labors, the very fact that they were in the Tabernacle makes them a primary labor. Carrying out is an inferior labor, so the fact that it was in the Tabernacle is not enough. You need a verse to turn it into a primary category. So now I know that carrying out is a primary category. Let’s move to bringing in. Bringing in has no verse. It was in the Tabernacle—the beams and so on—but there is no verse. So basically, in principle, I would think that bringing in is not forbidden on the Sabbath at all. Why is it forbidden? Carrying out has a verse and bringing in does not. Except that bringing in resembles carrying out. What difference is there between taking out and bringing in? This is a relation of resemblance. Therefore, says the Talmud, carrying out is a primary category and bringing in is a derivative because it resembles the primary category. And of course the laws are the same, because this is a learned derivative, and since they resemble each other, the same laws that apply to carrying out also apply to bringing in. But it is still a relationship between a primary category and a derivative. By contrast, in our passage, Rav Pappa quite plainly disagrees with the Talmud there. Rav Pappa says—and so say some of the medieval authorities; that is what is written in Rashi—that Rav Pappa says that both carrying out and bringing in are primary categories. Why? Why are there not forty primary categories of damages? Why is bringing in a primary category? Why are there not forty primary categories of damages? So here the question is…

[Speaker C] In any case it’s still transfer, it’s moving from one domain to another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the point is this: “what difference is there between taking out and bringing in,” according to this conception, is not the resemblance of a derivative to a primary category. It is the same thing. Otherwise, even between private domain and public domain—say, carrying out from a private domain to a public domain is written in the Torah, right? But perhaps from a private domain that is a house to a public domain that is not the Levite camp but some other public domain, maybe that would be a derivative, or maybe it would not be forbidden at all? No—I say it resembles it. What difference does it make which public domain? Well then, that too is similar. What difference does it make whether it is from private to public or from public to private? What difference is there between taking out and bringing in? And then what? This resemblance is enough for bringing in to be considered actual carrying out, not something merely similar to carrying out. And that is what the Talmud here says: even bringing in we call carrying out. Therefore the Talmud says that the relationship between carrying out and bringing in—our Talmud—is not a relationship of derivative to primary category. They are both primary categories. Why is it not forty? Because it is the very same primary category, the category of transfer. Bringing in is also the primary category of transfer. It is not two different primary categories. They are two primaries because it is the same thing, not two primaries because both are separately listed. Therefore both of them are the primary category of transfer. And this is also implied by the fact that the Mishnah in the chapter Kelal Gadol teaches that transfer from one domain to another is one of the primary categories of labor, without specifying from which domain to which domain. Why? Because it is one primary category, one category that includes both carrying out and bringing in. It is one primary category. And this is the disagreement between the passages. The passage in the chapter HaZorek says that bringing in is a derivative of carrying out because carrying out is written in the Torah and that is the primary category, while bringing in resembles it. Resemblance is a relation between derivative and primary category. Our passage—Rav Pappa in our passage—says no, it is so similar that it is actually carrying out itself. It is not that it resembles carrying out; it is carrying out. In the pure sense, as I said in the previous class, as I said today. What is carrying out? Carrying out is changing the map; it is moving something from one domain to another. So bringing in and carrying out are not two things; they are the same thing itself. It is not resemblance; it is the same thing. Two primary categories. Now if you look at… Maimonides says there explicitly that there are things that are in the nature of a primary category, and there are things that are derivatives. Things that resemble the primary category in a complete way are not derivatives; they are the primary category itself—this is called “in the nature of a primary category.” Things that resemble the primary category but are not literally the thing itself are derivatives and the like, and they have the same laws, but they are derivatives. And Maimonides there explicitly distinguishes between these two things. And what I want to claim is that our passages may even be the source for Maimonides, because our passages disagree—at least according to Rashi they disagree—precisely on this point. The Talmud here, in Rav Pappa, says that carrying out and bringing in are both a primary category, meaning that bringing in is in the nature of the primary category of carrying out. The Talmud in the chapter HaZorek says that bringing in is a derivative of carrying out, because it resembles it and therefore it is a derivative. That is the argument. Okay? Because carrying out is written in the Torah and it was also mentioned and was in the Tabernacle. Bringing in is not written in the Torah, though it was in the Tabernacle, and it also resembles carrying out completely. By the way, if it is complete resemblance, then you don’t need at all the fact that bringing in was in the Tabernacle. If bringing in is itself carrying out, then it is enough for me that carrying out was in the Tabernacle in order to say that bringing in is the same thing. Why should I care that bringing in was in the Tabernacle? It is the same thing. If I say that bringing in is only a derivative—it is not really carrying out, as our passage says, but like the chapter HaZorek—then it is very important to say that it was in the Tabernacle, because otherwise, since this is an inferior labor, maybe I would not forbid it. But if it was in the Tabernacle and it also resembles carrying out, then I say fine, this is a derivative and it will be forbidden. According to our passage, it is not clear that bringing in has to have been in the Tabernacle at all; even without that I would say that bringing in is forbidden. Why? Because bringing in is literally called carrying out. Bringing in is simply transfer; transfer is not from private to public specifically. Transfer is moving from a domain of one kind to a domain of another kind. I don’t care which one to which one—whether carrying out or bringing in. So bringing in does not need separately to have been in the Tabernacle; it is enough that carrying out was in the Tabernacle. And one last remark: from Tosafot here it sounds like he learns that there is no disagreement between the passages. Even Rav Pappa here understands that bringing in is a derivative of carrying out; they just call it carrying out, but it is still a derivative of carrying out. Our Talmud does not disagree with the Talmud there—that seems to be how Tosafot here understood it. Fine. I really did this briefly. I suggest that maybe in the next study session you devote a little time to review from my summary—or whoever can manage it, do a bit more on your own—in order to close this issue, because it really is less important for our purposes. As I said, the discussion of what bringing in is—whether it is a derivative or a primary category—has no practical implication. It doesn’t matter, because on the Sabbath their derivatives are like them: the same laws that apply to bringing in apply to the primary category and to the derivative, so it makes no difference.

[Speaker D] There is one practical implication: if he does bringing in and also does bringing in plus another primary category, he gets lashes twice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is true in any case.

[Speaker D] Also if he does both bringing in and carrying out, he gets lashes twice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too is true in any case.

[Speaker I] No, but if it’s a derivative—if it’s a primary and a derivative—then he is only liable for the primary; that was Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and also if it is a derivative and its own primary, then only for the primary. But if they are two primaries—if it is a primary and something in the nature of a primary—then he also gets only one, because it is the very same primary category. Yes, there is no difference on this point; there won’t be any difference.

[Speaker I] Why? It’s not twice? It’s not two?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is the same primary category itself—that’s what I’m saying. Even someone who says that carrying out and bringing in are both primary categories does not mean two different primary categories; there are not forty primary categories, there are thirty-nine. That too is precisely implied by the Mishnah. What does the Mishnah say? “One who transfers from one domain to another”—that is one primary labor. “From one domain to another” could be from any domain to any domain. In any case he would not get lashes twice here. Therefore there is no practical halakhic difference here; this is only a conceptual discussion, it’s not important. Okay? Have a good holiday; we’ll stop here.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much, thank you very much, thank you very much, to you as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll move on, God willing.

[Speaker I] Next class, are we starting the first passage or—?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m still not completely settled on it. I’ll try to send it as early as possible.

[Speaker I] Thank you very much.

[Speaker E] Okay.