Chapter One of Tractate Shabbat – Lesson 4

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No. To hand a limb from a living animal to a gentile is forbidden. Do you understand? After all, all the gentiles being discussed here are gentiles who are not resident aliens. And about that they tell us: it is forbidden—not only regarding idolatry and not only regarding a limb from a living animal. It is forbidden to cause him to stumble in any of his transgressions. Understand? So if this were a commandment between one person and another, it would apply only toward a resident alien. From the fact that the Talmud applies it also to an ordinary gentile, apparently this prohibition is not a prohibition of interpersonal ethics. Okay. So now let’s see the… the Rosh. I’m sharing the file with you again, we’ll now look at it inside. “And in the first two cases,” yes, I’m reading here, “it teaches that the homeowner is exempt and the poor person is exempt.” The Talmud explains that “exempt” means completely permitted, because he did nothing at all. The other one did both the lifting and the placing, and he was just a bystander, statistically speaking, so therefore he is exempt and it is permitted. And the Rosh asks: how can it say that exempt means completely permitted? He violated “do not place a stumbling block before the blind,” like one who hands a cup of wine to a nazirite, or a limb from a living animal to the descendants of Noah. After all, say the homeowner is holding the object in his hand; now the poor person comes, takes it out of the homeowner’s hand, carries it outside, and places it down. So clearly the homeowner caused him to stumble here in a prohibition. Without the homeowner holding it in his hand, and giving him permission to take it—giving him the charity, say, if it’s charity or something like that—the poor person could not have violated the prohibition. This is really also a case of “the two sides of the river.” So therefore, says the Rosh, why do they say here that for the homeowner it is permitted? It isn’t permitted. There is a prohibition here of “before the blind.” So the Rosh says as follows: “And one cannot say that here we are dealing with a case where even had he not given it into his hand, he could still have taken it, and then there would be no issue of ‘do not place a stumbling block before the blind,’ as is proven in the first chapter of tractate Avodah Zarah, where they explain that this law of giving a cup of wine to a nazirite or a limb from a living animal to the descendants of Noah refers to a case of ‘the two sides of the river,’ where he could not have taken it unless he handed it to him.” Tosafot says maybe we are talking here about a place where the poor person could have taken it even without the homeowner’s help, and then that parallels “one side of the river,” and in that case there is no prohibition of “before the blind,” and therefore the Talmud says it is permitted. So in effect he is proposing a forced reading of the Mishnah. And he says: just as he proves from the Talmud in Avodah Zarah that we just saw, that if it is “one side of the river,” then there is no prohibition of “before the blind.” By the way, I think this answer doesn’t belong here at all, regardless of the explanation he’s about to give in a moment. Why? Because without the homeowner giving him permission to take it, he cannot take it. Even if the homeowner is not holding it—after all, he is giving it to him as charity, and it belongs to him—he can refuse to allow him to put his hand there. That too counts as assistance from the homeowner. But Tosafot ignores that point and says, fine, maybe that could have been an answer. Tosafot says it cannot be an answer. Why not? “For in any case,” I’m reading here, “there is still a rabbinic prohibition,” because even in “one side of the river,” what I mentioned earlier, there is still a prohibition—admittedly rabbinic, not Torah-level. In “two sides of the river” it is a Torah-level prohibition, but in “one side of the river” there is also a prohibition, only a rabbinic one. That is what the Rosh says; Tosafot here says it too, the parallel passage that I’ll mention in a moment—it overlaps with the Rosh more or less. So these are the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who essentially argue that even in “one side of the river,” although from the plain meaning of the Talmud it sounds as though there is no prohibition, they say: no, there is no Torah-level prohibition, but there is a rabbinic prohibition even in “one side of the river.” And therefore here you could not have said that the homeowner is “exempt and permitted”; he is exempt, but forbidden—there is a rabbinic prohibition of assisting. That is what Tosafot says. The Rosh brings a proof: even if a minor is eating non-kosher carcasses, the religious court is commanded to separate him from it; all the more so, an adult should not be helped in doing so. Yes, if I see a minor who is about to eat a carcass—now, a minor is not obligated in the commandments—still I am obligated to stop him; this is called “a minor eating non-kosher carcasses—the religious court is commanded to separate him.” By the way, it is not specifically about eating carcasses; rather, if a minor is about to commit any prohibition, then I need to stop him. And all the more so if we are talking about an adult, and you are actually going to assist him—not just fail to stop him, but actively help him. So this argument of the Rosh is an argument that needs a lot of clarification. This a fortiori argument is not really an a fortiori argument, and the assumption behind it is apparently incorrect. Because in the case of “a minor eating non-kosher carcasses,” in Jewish law we rule that the religious court is not commanded to separate him. There is a dispute in the Talmud, but in practice we rule—and all the halakhic authorities bring this—that if a minor is eating non-kosher carcasses, there is no halakhic obligation to separate him from the prohibition. If he has reached the age of education, that’s something else; there is a commandment of training. But if a two-year-old child takes a piece of pork and wants to eat it, there is no obligation to separate him from it.

[Speaker G] But why isn’t that an a fortiori argument? What? Why isn’t it an a fortiori argument?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It isn’t an a fortiori argument because here, for example, if we’re talking about a gentile, then maybe with a gentile it’s altogether different from a Jew—on one hand. On the other hand, the minor is not obligated in commandments at all, so it’s very strange—what does it have to do with being commanded to stop him? The minor is not actually committing a prohibition at all. He’ll eat—even if he eats the pork—he is not committing a prohibition. So one way or the other, it is clear that the obligation on me to stop him is something else; it is not because of concern that a prohibition not take place here, because in any event no prohibition is taking place. So what exactly is to be learned from here?

[Speaker G] Fine, if first of all we’re saying that no prohibition is taking place at all, not that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, no prohibition is taking place, so what does that have to do with anything?

[Speaker G] But his a fortiori argument is surely: if you have to separate him, then all the more so you certainly must not help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but that a fortiori argument is built on only a partial picture. If you bring the full picture, there’s no a fortiori argument here at all.

[Speaker C] Why regarding a minor is there no obligation to separate him? We know—I mean, is that only when he has parents, or if he doesn’t have parents is the religious court also not commanded?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has nothing to do with parents. The obligation of separation is stated regarding the religious court, not the parents. In principle, every Jew would have been expected to separate the minor from prohibition according to the view that there is such an obligation. In the end we rule that there is no obligation to separate him. Not on the parents—wait—not on the parents, not on the minor, not on the religious court, and not on anyone. If the minor has reached the age of education, from a certain age onward, that is something else. There there is an obligation on the parents to separate him from prohibition because of the law of education.

[Speaker C] We saw in Maimonides that he has two parts to the commandment of education, right? There’s the part that at every stage where the child understands something, there’s some sort of obligation, even though it’s not the commandment of education. The commandment of education starts from around age five, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand—if the child…

[Speaker G] A year before,

[Speaker C] We saw in Maimonides that there is an element of education at every stage at which the child understands something.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know such a Maimonides. Regarding the age of education, I don’t know such a Maimonides. In my opinion there is no such Maimonides.

[Speaker G] Maybe not Maimonides, but I also remember that we learned it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot in tractate Sukkah—we learned it—there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot that perhaps the minor himself violates a rabbinic prohibition if he does that act. That is how they explain the law of education—a year before. That is how they explain the law of education, but it is still under the law of education. It is only a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot how to define the law of education. There is also a case of “with one’s own hands”: if I give a minor a prohibited thing directly—not merely failing to separate him, but actually giving it to him, feeding him the prohibited thing—that is something else. That is forbidden even for a one-year-old. That too is Torah-level prohibited, whereas education is only a rabbinic law. But that is a completely different law; it is not the law of education. Okay? The obligation to separate does not exist; it is only when I actively feed him.

[Speaker G] But to separate an adult—that is an obligation, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it an obligation? Where is that obligation?

[Speaker G] I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there is an obligation to separate him from prohibition—the question is what its source is. So in principle, yes.

[Speaker G] So then there is an a fortiori argument here. Maybe not as far-reaching as “if with a minor then certainly with an adult,” but if with an adult—if with a minor there is an obligation to separate, then with an adult certainly it is forbidden to help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but from a minor it is not an a fortiori argument. You are proposing a different a fortiori argument, fine. But from a minor there is no a fortiori argument here. Fine—but that is what the Rosh says. Again, it could be—and this would be a major novelty, I do not know such an opinion—that the Rosh claims there is a rabbinic obligation to separate a minor. Meaning, true, we rule that “if a minor is eating non-kosher carcasses, the religious court is not commanded to separate him,” and that is at Torah level. But rabbinically, perhaps he holds that there is an obligation to separate him, and here after all the whole discussion is only rabbinic. So he says: if there is a rabbinic obligation to separate the minor from prohibition, then certainly there is a rabbinic prohibition to cause an adult to stumble in “one side of the river.” Maybe—I don’t know—it’s possible. In any case, that is what the Rosh argues, and therefore he says our Mishnah cannot be explained as dealing with a situation where the homeowner did not really help him, because there is still a rabbinic prohibition here. So how can it say “exempt and permitted”? It should have said “exempt but forbidden.” There he brings another possible resolution.

[Speaker I] Wait, I want to ask something about that. Seemingly, if we go with the idea that it’s “two sides of the river,” then it shouldn’t have said “exempt” at all—he’s actually liable. Right? So why does he relate to it as “exempt but forbidden”? He also raised the possibility that maybe it’s “two sides of the river,” meaning the homeowner really did hand him the object.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any event, what the Rosh is asking is why the Mishnah says he is exempt and permitted. If it is “one side of the river,” there is a rabbinic prohibition, so it should be exempt but forbidden. And if it is “two sides of the river,” then he should actually be liable. Right. So that is his question.

[Speaker I] Therefore it certainly isn’t “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly what the Rosh is asking—why is there no “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” here?

[Speaker I] The answer, as we saw later, is that it means permitted in the laws of the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait—we’ll get there. We’ll get to the continuation. One step at a time. “And if you would say that here we are dealing with a gentile, to whom ‘before the blind’ does not apply.” And in that case, a Canaanite, for example, is a gentile, and then “before the blind” does not apply to him. “But then when it teaches ‘the poor person is liable’”—if he is a gentile, then he is not liable for anything; there is no prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath for him. “And when it teaches ‘the poor person is liable,’ it is only as a sign”—meaning, if he were a Jew, he would be liable. The Rosh says: even so, there is still a rabbinic prohibition. There is still a rabbinic prohibition in this—appearance to observers. I don’t want to get into all those details; it’s a discussion not directly related to “before the blind.” There is a rabbinic prohibition here to give something to a gentile because of appearance to onlookers. Okay? By the way, this comment that we’re talking about a gentile—if you remember the Bartenura, I noted there that the Bartenura says we’re talking here about giving charity to a poor person. And that comes to teach me that this is a commandment fulfilled through a transgression—not to give charity that way. So according to the Bartenura it is obviously not a gentile, right? But the Rosh says maybe there’s an option to say perhaps we are dealing with a gentile. The Rosh says that too cannot be, because even with a gentile there is some other prohibition here—not “before the blind,” but a prohibition of appearance to onlookers. Okay? So here too he rejects that. In a moment we’ll get to his final answer. In the Turi Even—I referred you to the Turi Even, I think, right?

[Speaker C] Yes, yes. And it’s quoted in Rabbi Akiva Eiger, I think, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So Rabbi Akiva Eiger brings the Turi Even. The Turi Even proves from the Talmud in tractate Avodah Zarah that in “one side of the river” there is not even a rabbinic prohibition of “before the blind.” And in fact he challenges the Rosh that we just saw, who says there is. Why? Because there it says about a gentile who studies Torah, that he is liable to death. A gentile is forbidden to study Torah—that’s what the Talmud says. So now what happens if someone teaches Torah to a gentile? Then he violates “before the blind,” right? He causes the gentile to stumble in a prohibition, because a gentile is forbidden to study Torah. So he says—and they answered that we are dealing with a case where he could have learned anyway from another gentile. I’m now reading from the Turi Even. Meaning, he can learn from another gentile, and then the transgression does not depend on me. By the way, if he had the possibility of learning from another Jew, that would not help, because that other Jew would also violate “before the blind”; one of us would still be violating “before the blind.” But if he has the possibility of doing it without any help from a Jew at all, then what I am doing is not a prohibition. That is what Tosafot says. “Nevertheless, one must still examine,” says the Turi Even, “in such a case, where the transgression could be done anyway”—yes, if it is a situation where the person can commit the transgression without me. “Although there is certainly no Torah-level prohibition, one must still consider whether there is perhaps a rabbinic one or not.” A Torah-level prohibition certainly is not present here, but one should consider whether perhaps there is a rabbinic prohibition. Then he says: “Know that we read in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah…” He brings the Talmud there, quotes it all, and then he says: “And in such a case, is there a rabbinic prohibition? If so, what is the Talmud teaching us? After all, even if he already has his own, it should still be rabbinically forbidden.” The Talmud says that if the gentile already has an animal, I am allowed to sell him another animal from the standpoint of “before the blind,” right? The Turi Even says: what do you mean? It should be rabbinically forbidden. True, he already has an animal and can commit the transgression with it, but still, if he commits the transgression with my animal, then I have violated the rabbinic prohibition of assisting. Yet from the Talmud we see not. If it is “one side of the river,” there is no prohibition at all—not even rabbinically. Otherwise the Talmud would not have said it was permitted. Here he proves that in a case of “one side of the river” there is no prohibition at all. Okay? And Tosafot here—and here he says… you can’t hear? You can’t hear? Can’t hear me now? Wait, I’m muting everyone. Can you hear me now? Can you hear or not? Can you hear? The Zoom froze here, I don’t know what happened. Can you hear me now?

[Speaker C] Yes, yes. Okay.

[Speaker I] I couldn’t understand the Turi Even. On the one hand he says there’s no rabbinic prohibition in “one side of the river,” and on the other hand he says there is a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. He says—the words of the poor man…

[Speaker C] With the animal,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He proves there is no prohibition of “before the blind” in “one side of the river” from the Talmud in Avodah Zarah. And he also says that Tosafot and the Rosh write this in other places. And now he says, “And I wonder about the Rosh”—wait, I’ll mark for you where I’m reading—“And I wonder about the Rosh, who in the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, regarding that which we learned there, ‘the poor person stretched out his hand’”—yes, there the Rosh writes that there is a rabbinic prohibition in such a case, but from the Talmud it is proven that there is not. Fine. So the Rosh will say that from the Talmud it is proven that there is no Torah-level prohibition, but there may nevertheless still be a rabbinic prohibition. That’s possible. There’s also another possibility, by the way: in the Talmud, when we’re talking for example—at least in some of the situations—the proofs that there is no such prohibition are proofs dealing with a gentile. It could be that with a gentile there is no rabbinic prohibition of assisting, only the Torah-level prohibition of “before the blind.” But with a Jew there would also be a prohibition of assisting. But I want to move on, because we’re getting stuck here too long. So I’m moving past the Turi Even, and that is basically what the Turi Even claims. The Turi Even proves from there that there is no rabbinic prohibition in “one side of the river,” against what the Rosh and Tosafot write here, and he shows that the Rosh and Tosafot themselves in other places also agree that there is no rabbinic prohibition. In the end he leaves it as a very major unresolved difficulty regarding renting to a gentile and so on. As I said, there is a dispute here among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the halakhic authorities in any case, so there are opinions in both directions. So for our purposes, the Rosh at this point is left with his difficulty. Why does the Mishnah say “exempt and permitted” when there is a rabbinic prohibition? And now he says as follows: “And one can say that here we are dealing with an object belonging to a gentile, and in such a case there is no prohibition.” And again, he is still continuing with this whole business of appearance to onlookers. Then he says: if the object belongs to the gentile, then there is no issue of appearance to onlookers. In the end he rejects that too. He says it is not reasonable; in Ashkenaz they seem to rule it forbidden, and it doesn’t seem reasonable to him. So what is his conclusion in the end, after he rejects the other possibilities? “And all this close analysis does not seem right to me.” After he has analyzed this whole thing in a long passage, he says: this whole discussion is unnecessary. The close analysis—yes, all this dealing with the topic—is simply unnecessary. The question just isn’t a good question. “For we are always dealing with a Jew,” we’re talking about a Jew and not a gentile. “And even though there is indeed a prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block before the blind,’ we are dealing here only with the prohibitions of the Sabbath. And it calls it ‘exempt and permitted’ because there is no prohibition here with respect to the Sabbath.” But true, there is a prohibition of “before the blind.” All that the Mishnah means when it says “exempt and permitted” is exempt and permitted from the standpoint of the carrying prohibitions of the Sabbath. As for the carrying prohibitions of the Sabbath, there is nothing here at all—neither Torah-level nor rabbinic. But “before the blind”—that may indeed be here, even at Torah level. If it is “two sides of the river,” then it is “before the blind” even at Torah level. But from the standpoint of the laws of the Sabbath, it is exempt and permitted. Why does that matter? So if you saw Rabbi Akiva Eiger, I won’t read him inside now, but Rabbi Akiva Eiger essentially says that there is a difference between whether I violate a Sabbath prohibition or I violate another prohibition—even a rabbinic prohibition of the Sabbath, because here we’re talking about a rabbinic prohibition. Why? There is a practical difference. One who violates Sabbath prohibitions is considered an apostate with respect to the entire Torah. Violation of the Sabbath is unique, because it is like denying the act of creation and all sorts of things like that. There is a unique stringency to Sabbath prohibitions. There, one who violates a Sabbath prohibition is an apostate regarding the whole Torah. In contrast, someone who violates “before the blind,” which is a prohibition unrelated to the laws of the Sabbath, is a sinner, but not an apostate regarding the whole Torah. Therefore, says Rabbi Akiva Eiger, when the Mishnah says “exempt and permitted,” it means exempt and permitted from the standpoint of the laws of the Sabbath. There may be other prohibitions—that’s a separate matter, other prohibitions. But from the perspective of the laws of the Sabbath, this thing is permitted. Okay? The Sefat Emet wants to claim that here we are dealing with an unintentional act, and in an unintentional act there is no “before the blind.” Again, a nice novelty regarding “before the blind,” but I don’t want to get into that now. Now, the claim is the following. So in the end the Rosh argues that this whole question… what?

[Speaker I] Just a second—still, regarding the Sefat Emet, what does he say? That regarding an unintentional “before the blind,” there is no prohibition of “before the blind”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When the one causing the stumbling is acting unintentionally. Not when the one who stumbles is unintentional; if the one who stumbles is unintentional, of course there is a prohibition. If the one causing him to stumble is unintentional—only if you intentionally cause him to stumble have you violated “before the blind.” But if it happened that you caused him to stumble without noticing, or you didn’t know, you are unintentional—then there is no “before the blind.” Okay?

[Speaker E] Now, can I ask something about that? Yes, yes. The question that came up in our study pair—mine and Nurit’s—was, say, that example with the nazirite, but it’s only an example: I know that Nurit is a nazirite, I know that nazirites are forbidden to drink wine, I know that I’m serving her wine, but from the fact that she asked me for wine, I assume—and we have this tendency to try to explain the situation—so you say, well, she knows what she’s doing, so apparently it’s okay. So that’s kind of somewhere between unintentional and intentional.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what we saw in Tosafot in Avodah Zarah. If in your assessment she is not going to commit the transgression, there is no “before the blind.” “Before the blind” applies only where in your assessment she will use your act in order to commit a transgression. That has nothing to do with the exemption of unintentional action; it’s something else. Okay. Here you are not acting unintentionally; you know everything. You just have a certain factual assessment and are acting on that basis. It is legitimate to act according to your factual assessment, even if in the end it turns out you were mistaken and did not correctly assess her intentions. But if that was your assessment, then you did not violate “before the blind.” Okay. Now here I want you to notice: Tosafot takes a parallel path, right? I won’t read it because it’s the same line as the Rosh, but he stops there with the gentile and the issue of appearance to onlookers. Meaning, according to Tosafot, Tosafot does not accept the Rosh’s final answer that here we are dealing with Sabbath prohibitions and not with the prohibitions of “before the blind.” Okay. Now the question is why. Seemingly, it’s an obvious answer, and instead he gets into these forced answers there—this dispute between the sages of Spain and the sages of Ashkenaz about the appearance to onlookers in the case of a gentile and an object belonging to a gentile, and so on. So here it could be—I’m not sure—but it could be that there is a dispute here about the nature of the prohibition of “before the blind.” What do I mean? The claim I want to make is that according to the Rosh—after all, the Rosh says, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains him this way, that the Mishnah deals with Sabbath prohibitions, and therefore when it says “exempt and permitted” it means permitted from the standpoint of the laws of the Sabbath. The prohibition of “before the blind,” of course, exists, as the Rosh says, but that is not what we are dealing with. Why Tosafot—and there are other commentators too who do not accept this—why does Tosafot not accept it? So I want to…

[Speaker C] Like a person who slaughtered a valid slaughter on the Sabbath. Again? Like a person who slaughtered on the Sabbath with a valid slaughter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that… what does that have to do with it?

[Speaker C] In order to distinguish between Sabbath prohibitions and the laws of what is forbidden and permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Someone who performed a valid slaughter on the Sabbath violated a Sabbath prohibition, not any other prohibition. The prohibition of taking life—what’s the problem? If someone slaughtered on the Sabbath in an invalid way, then one could ask—but even there, he violated a Sabbath prohibition and he violated a slaughter-related issue, that’s something else. By the way, invalid slaughter is not itself a prohibition; it’s only forbidden to eat it afterward. In any event, for our purposes, what I basically want to claim is that the medieval authorities who disagree with the Rosh may understand that the prohibition of “before the blind” actually is a prohibition within the laws of the Sabbath. You’ll ask: but “before the blind” applies also to idolatry, to a limb from a living animal, to eating pork, to all the prohibitions of the Torah. So how can you say that when I say someone violated “before the blind,” I am basically saying he violated a prohibition in the laws of the Sabbath? What I want to say is this: there are two ways to understand the prohibition of “before the blind.” One possibility is the simple one: that it is a prohibition of causing someone to stumble in a transgression. Meaning, if I cause someone to stumble into eating pork, then he violated the prohibition of eating pork and I violated the prohibition of “before the blind.” That is the simple possibility. But there is another possibility. There is a possibility of saying that I myself violated the prohibition of eating pork. Why? Because if I caused him to stumble, then responsibility for what happened here rests on me. And then it comes out that the prohibition of eating pork that he violated, the responsibility for it is actually on me, and it is considered as though I ate it, as though I violated the prohibition of eating pork—not the prohibition of “before the blind.” Where is the difference? Just a second—where is the difference? If I cause someone to stumble in the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath, then what prohibition have I violated? Not “before the blind”; I have violated the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath. Therefore I have violated Sabbath prohibitions, and therefore Tosafot does not accept the Rosh’s answer, because he says: true, the Mishnah deals only with the laws of the Sabbath, but the prohibition of “before the blind” is also a prohibition in the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore he needs a different answer. Okay, now—yes, Rachel?

[Speaker H] But is that considered, in terms of the count of commandments, “do not place a stumbling block before the blind”—is that counted as a separate commandment in its own right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent point. In principle, according to what I’m saying now, it should have been the case that “before the blind” would not be counted in the count of the commandments. Why? Because “before the blind” merely expands the prohibitions—say, the prohibition of pork—so it’s a detail within the prohibition of pork; it’s not another prohibition. The prohibition of pork is violated also when I cause someone else to eat pork. Fine—but that is only a detail or a halakhic definition of how one violates the prohibition of pork; it is not another prohibition among the 613 commandments or among the negative commandments. So apparently I would have expected that it not be counted in the count of the commandments, right? But it is counted in the count of the commandments by every authority who counts the commandments. Why? I think—and we’ll soon see this—that perhaps in “before the blind” there are really two things. There is also the prohibition of causing someone to stumble, and also, when in a given case the responsibility is on me—for example when the person who stumbled was unintentional—then I also violate the prohibition that the other person violated. But if the one who stumbled acted intentionally, then responsibility for that prohibition is on him. I violated only the prohibition of causing someone to stumble. And then it turns out that within “before the blind” there are two distinct laws. One law of “before the blind” is the prohibition of causing someone to stumble, and that is counted as an independent commandment in the count of the commandments. Besides that, there is another law: if I am the one responsible for what the other person did—when am I responsible? When he is unintentional and I am intentional. Say I caused him to stumble into a prohibition and he himself was entirely unintentional. I was intentional. Then they place responsibility for the prohibition he committed on me. In that situation I violated the Sabbath prohibition, not only the prohibition of “before the blind.” And of course that is not a separate prohibition that needs to be counted independently. But there is also the other side of “before the blind,” namely the causing of stumbling, and that is what is counted in the count of the commandments as a separate commandment. If you were to look at Maimonides, that is basically what he writes. Now we’ll move on to him.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, I wanted to ask now: what is the reasoning behind the prohibition of telling a gentile to do work on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is a rabbinic prohibition, so that you should not come to do the prohibition yourself. You’re trying to outsmart the Sabbath prohibitions, and the Sages did not want you to outsmart the Sabbath prohibitions. But it is only rabbinic, not Torah-level. Now look: I brought you Rashi in the portion of Matot. Rashi basically says there as follows: a husband can annul his wife’s vows on the day he hears them. On the day he hears that she made a vow of a certain kind, he can annul the vow and the vow is canceled. What happens if the husband confirms his wife’s vow—he heard about it and says, “I confirm the vow,” not annulling it—and then the vow stands. Fine? After that he says to his wife, “It is annulled for you,” which is not true, because the vow has been confirmed. He caused her to stumble. So Rashi says: one who causes his fellow to stumble enters under him to bear his punishment. Yes, we learned from here—I’m reading Rashi—that one who causes a mishap to his fellow enters in his place for all punishments. Now I ask you: this husband who did that to his wife, what prohibition did he violate?

[Speaker D] He basically violated two prohibitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also “before the blind,” right? He did not violate the vow. The wife violated the vow. He violated the prohibition of causing someone to stumble, the prohibition of “before the blind.” But there is no punishment for “before the blind.”

[Speaker D] But if he gets the punishment together with her, that means he apparently also violated the prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s why I brought the Rashi. After all, there is no punishment for “before the blind.” There is no lashes, no death, no punishment for the prohibition of “before the blind.” What does it mean that he enters under him for all punishments? Now first of all, one could say maybe this means heavenly punishments. But in the simple sense, it means that he is considered the one who violated the prohibition of “he shall not break his word,” the prohibition of vows. Even though she made the vow and she violated the prohibition, if I caused her to stumble and she was unintentional—after all, she didn’t know, she thought the vow had been annulled, I told her the vow had been annulled, and in truth that was false—I will receive the lashes. Now there are no lashes for “before the blind”; lashes are for violating a vow, not for “before the blind.” That means that I violated the prohibition of vows. How can that be? Because we’re talking about a case where she is unintentional and I am intentional. If she is unintentional and I am intentional, then besides the fact that I caused her to stumble, the vow prohibition that she violated is charged to my responsibility. That is what you see in Rashi.

[Speaker I] But she’s not unintentional—she’s actually coerced because he told her something and… why is she unintentional?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every unintentional act is a kind of coercion. She did not know that the vow still existed. Maimonides says the same thing in three places. Really in two, plus one more. One is regarding someone who dresses another person in a garment of forbidden mixture. Do you see? One who dresses another person in a garment of forbidden mixture—if the wearer acted intentionally, the wearer receives lashes and the dresser violates “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” And if the wearer did not know that the garment was forbidden mixture, and the dresser acted intentionally, the dresser receives lashes and the wearer is exempt. Exactly what we said before. Why? After all, there are no lashes for “before the blind.” And here it is already lashes. In Rashi, where it says “punishments,” you could say that means heavenly punishments. But in Maimonides it says lashes—that is a court-administered punishment. There are no lashes for “before the blind.” There are lashes for forbidden mixture, not for “before the blind.” So we see that the dresser violates the prohibition of forbidden mixture even though it is not on him—he did not wear a garment of forbidden mixture, he dressed the other person in it. Okay? Maimonides repeats this also in the laws of mourning, regarding one who defiles a priest. Okay? And he repeats it in another place, in the laws of the nazirite, and there that Maimonides is interesting because there he brings a verse teaching that this rule does not apply in the case of a nazirite. Look: one who defiles a nazirite—if the nazirite acted intentionally, the nazirite receives lashes and the one who defiled him violates “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” And if the nazirite was unintentional and the one who defiled him was intentional, what would we expect? That the one who defiled him receives lashes. So he says: no, neither of them receives lashes, neither the one who defiles nor the one defiled. Why? “And why does the one who defiles the nazirite not receive lashes? Because it says, ‘and he defiled his consecrated head’—he is not liable to lashes unless he defiles himself knowingly.” There is a special verse regarding the nazirite that says this rule does not apply there. So why is this Maimonides important? Because precisely this Maimonides, who says that here the rule does not apply, teaches us that this is a general rule, and we need a verse if we want to say that in a certain place it does not apply. Because if I had read only Maimonides in the laws of forbidden mixture and in the laws of mourning, I would have said: fine, maybe this is a special rule in the laws of forbidden mixture or in the laws of impurity in mourning or something like that. But here we see that that is not so. We see the opposite: a verse is needed to say that here the rule does not apply. Which implies that the default rule, everywhere there is no verse, is that it does apply.

[Speaker C] That he does receive lashes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, who challenges Maimonides? “Where is your source for this rule?” Which rule? “Where did you invent this rule from?” The Rosh. The Kesef Mishneh brings—it looks like you managed to see it—the Kesef Mishneh brings that the Rosh challenges Maimonides, along with many other later authorities, sorry, earlier authorities. “Where did you invent this rule from? It has no source anywhere. Where did you invent this rule from?” My claim is that here the Rosh is consistent with his own approach. Because the Rosh understands—after all, what is Maimonides writing here? Exactly what I said. Maimonides claims that the concept of “before the blind” means that the one causing the stumbling violates the prohibition of the person who stumbled. The prohibition of the one who stumbled is charged to the one who caused him to stumble, right? That is what Maimonides claims. Therefore he receives lashes. And the Rosh asks him: what are you talking about? I—the Rosh says—“before the blind” is only a prohibition of causing someone to stumble. It is not the prohibition that the other person violated being charged to me. It is a prohibition of causing someone to stumble. And that is exactly the Rosh in our passage. The Rosh in our passage says: leave it alone—the prohibition of “before the blind” is not a prohibition from the laws of the Sabbath; it is another prohibition. Therefore the Mishnah does not deal with it. My question was: and what does Tosafot say? Tosafot says no, the prohibition of “before the blind” is a prohibition in the laws of the Sabbath. Why? Because Tosafot learned like Maimonides and like Rashi in the portion of Matot—that if I cause him to stumble in the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath, then I have violated a Sabbath prohibition. Therefore the Rosh is consistent with his own view when he challenges Maimonides, because he thinks that “before the blind” is not that I enter under the one who stumbled for punishments. And in our passage too that is exactly what he says—that “before the blind” is another prohibition. But Tosafot is not troubled by this, because Tosafot would learn like Maimonides and like Rashi in the portion of Matot. And I think that is really the explanation of their dispute. And I’ll just finish with this: the Radbaz here asks this question. “And the Rosh was astonished by him”—you see? Here is the Radbaz in the laws of forbidden mixture. The Radbaz, one of the sages of the sixteenth century, a commentator on Maimonides and among those who accompany Maimonides, asks about Maimonides: “The Rosh was already astonished by him; I do not know from where there are lashes for the one who dresses another.” Why do you give lashes to the dresser? Did he wear a garment of forbidden mixture? After all, who is liable to lashes? The one who wears a garment of forbidden mixture. But he dressed someone else in it. “‘You shall not wear’ refers to the wearer.” “You shall not wear”—that is the prohibition of forbidden mixture. It speaks about the wearer, not the dresser. Yes? And if you interpret it about the dresser, then why, when the wearer acts intentionally, does the dresser not receive lashes? If there is a prohibition on the dresser to dress someone in forbidden mixture, let him receive lashes always! Even if the wearer acted intentionally—why only if the wearer was unintentional does he receive lashes? What the Radbaz did not understand is exactly what I said earlier. What is Maimonides claiming? Maimonides claims as follows: if the wearer is unintentional, then responsibility for the prohibition is on the dresser. In that situation the dresser is considered the one who violated the prohibition. But if the wearer is intentional, then the dresser violated “before the blind” by causing him to stumble, but he is not considered the one who violated the prohibition of forbidden mixture, because the one who violated forbidden mixture is the wearer. I only caused him to stumble. So I violated “before the blind”; there are no lashes for “before the blind.” But if he is unintentional and I am intentional, I am considered the one who violated the prohibition of forbidden mixture, and therefore I receive lashes. The principle is that two people do not violate the prohibition of forbidden mixture. The one who is responsible for the fact that there was a prohibition here—that is the one who violates the prohibition. If the wearer himself was aware of the matter and acted intentionally, then he is responsible for the prohibition. I caused him to stumble, so I violated “before the blind.” But if the wearer is unaware, then who is responsible for there having been a Jew wearing forbidden mixture? The dresser, because he acted intentionally. And therefore the dresser receives lashes—he violated the prohibition of forbidden mixture. And this is a fascinating principle, a fascinating halakhic principle. Maimonides is basically claiming that all the Torah’s prohibitions are not really prohibitions on the person who physically did them. They are prohibitions on the person who is responsible for the fact that they happened. I can violate these prohibitions without having done them at all, if the responsibility for their happening lies with me. It somewhat reminds you of what I said at the beginning about “before the blind”: why is “before the blind” a commandment between man and God? Because the problem is not that I caused him to stumble; the problem is that I caused a prohibition to be committed in the world of the Holy One, blessed be He. I am responsible for the fact that a prohibition happened in the world. That is Maimonides’ idea. Do you understand? Therefore he says: if he is unintentional, I am responsible for the fact that the prohibition of forbidden mixture happened in the world, so the Holy One, blessed be He, says: fine, then punish him—for because of him there was a prohibition of forbidden mixture here. He is responsible for it. True, in practice he did not wear the garment of forbidden mixture. The prohibition is to wear the garment of forbidden mixture, but the lashes are for the one who is culpable for the prohibition, not for the one who physically performed the act. Okay?

[Speaker H] What happens if both of them are unintentional?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then neither one receives lashes.

[Speaker H] For an unintentional act there are no lashes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. According to what we saw in the Rosh, there is even room to say—the Sefat Emet, sorry—there is even room to say that if the dresser is unintentional, then he did not even violate “before the blind.” Not only does he not receive lashes. But I didn’t understand: what happens if both of them are intentional?

[Speaker I] If both of them are intentional?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If both of them are intentional, then the wearer receives lashes because responsibility is on him, and the dresser violated “before the blind.” First of all, we examine the one who did the prohibition himself. If he is responsible, then he violated the prohibition. But if he is unintentional and I am responsible for it, and I am intentional, then the prohibition shifts to me. There are not two people responsible for the same prohibition. That situation does not exist.

[Speaker G] This idea of responsibility is sort of the flip side of the coin of what Yehudit mentioned—that we learned a few years ago about either public commandments or the law of education—that basically, although here it’s that I need not cause someone to stumble and there it’s that I need to ensure the matter gets done, and the whole idea that we’re all…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One human fabric, and we need to make sure that the commandment gets done. I claim that there it is true according to all views, not only according to Maimonides. There even the Rosh would agree.

[Speaker G] But it’s the same idea—that we’re all one human fabric and we have to make sure that the commandment gets done.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A public commandment—because a public commandment is defined as a commandment whose fulfillment each individual member is responsible for. That is how the commandment is defined. Maimonides claims that even if the commandment is not defined that way, there is a general halakhic definition like that. But there it is really part of the very definition of the commandment itself. But yes, it is similar. All right, we need to stop here because the ceremony has already started, so—

[Speaker I] Can I just ask that you devote a few minutes at the beginning of the next class to go back over that last line of thought? I just missed at the end who—whether Maimonides follows the Rosh or not. It was just too fast for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he does not follow the Rosh, and Tosafot is like the… look, look at the summary I’m sending. If there’s any problem, ask me at the beginning of the next class and I’ll explain it again. Okay?

[Speaker I] Okay, fine. Okay. Thank you very much. Sabbath peace. Thank you very much, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker F] Do you know what happens…