Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 5

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture I spoke about lifnei iver, and we saw there that we had started from the point that in the Mishnah there are cases where one person violated a Torah-level prohibition and the other did nothing at all; that one is exempt and permitted. And there are cases where one person did the lifting up and one person did the setting down, and therefore neither of them is liable at the Torah level, but there is a prohibition — simply speaking, a rabbinic prohibition — but there is a prohibition. And the medieval authorities (Rishonim) asked, regarding the first type of cases, why in those cases the one about whom it says he is exempt and permitted did not violate the prohibition of lifnei iver. We saw several answers there. The Rosh says that this passage was not dealing with lifnei iver at all, but only with prohibitions of Sabbath labor. Tosafot, and in the Rosh too this came up as a possibility, talked about this being an object of a non-Jew, and maybe that it’s talking about a non-Jew, and all sorts of things of that kind. Various answers were raised there to explain why the issue of lifnei iver is not present here. The question I might want to open with is: why do those medieval authorities (Rishonim) ask specifically about the cases where it says exempt and permitted? The very same question could have been asked about the cases of exempt but prohibited. When there are two people, one did the lifting up and one did the setting down, then each of them violated a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, right? There too I can ask: and besides that, he also violated the Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver. In other words, why do they focus their question specifically on the cases of exempt and permitted? I didn’t write this on the handout, because really it’s just a didactic point to begin with; I’m not actually going to deal with it. And that really is a good question. In terms of the various answers of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), those answers can in principle resolve this question too. It’s not that in the end I’m left with some difficulty that has no answer. For example, the Rosh’s answer, that the Mishnah dealt only with prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath and not with the prohibitions of lifnei iver. Right, there is a prohibition of lifnei iver, but the Mishnah is focused on the prohibitions of Sabbath labor. That answer can also be said regarding the situations where there is a rabbinic prohibition. I asked, then why doesn’t the Mishnah say that there is a Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver? Because it is dealing with the prohibitions of carrying out on the Sabbath and not with the prohibitions of lifnei iver. The same answer that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) bring regarding the question in the situations of the opening clause, where it says exempt and permitted, can also answer the exempt-but-prohibited cases. So my point is only a comment on the question of why they direct the difficulty toward these cases and not the others. It’s not that after they answered, I’m left with some unresolved question. The questions are resolved, everything is fine. It’s only a comment on why the medieval authorities (Rishonim) chose to ask specifically about these situations. Maybe you can’t say — sorry, maybe you can’t—

[Speaker B] say that in Torah prohibitions, because he incurs the prohibition of karet, which is more severe perhaps than "do not place a stumbling block," then we always charge for the more severe one — and I forgot what that rule is called.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Kam lei be-rabba minei. But that’s not relevant here, because we’re talking about the second person. After all, regarding the one who actually violated the Torah-level prohibition, we are not discussing him from the angle of lifnei iver. On the contrary: we’re talking about the second one, who is exempt and permitted, who caused the first one to stumble into the Torah-level prohibition that he committed. Okay?

[Speaker C] But in the question of exempt but prohibited, they don’t need to ask the question, because it says it’s prohibited. So they don’t explain what it’s prohibited from. The big problem is where it says permitted. How can it say permitted if there is also a prohibition of lifnei iver, "do not place a stumbling block"?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, Hani is suggesting here a possible solution. She’s basically saying that those medieval authorities (Rishonim) were willing to say that perhaps in the case where this one lifts and that one sets down, what we say — that there is a rabbinic prohibition but no Torah-level prohibition — maybe that’s not a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out on the Sabbath, but rather a Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver.

[Speaker C] I’m not sure, but I’m saying that the Mishnah didn’t explain to us why it is prohibited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, and therefore the medieval authorities…

[Speaker C] But in the first case, when it says exempt and permitted, then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the question—

[Speaker C] then they have to raise the question. In the second case they don’t have to

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] raise it, because it’s prohibited. Why is there no difficulty there? Because the exempt but prohibited would be a prohibition of lifnei iver and not a prohibition of carrying out on the Sabbath.

[Speaker D] But now suddenly there’s a big novelty here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s unrelated. But in both cases there is lifnei iver, which is a Torah-level prohibition, so why didn’t they mention it?

[Speaker D] No, because here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] already you can ask that question. So I’m saying, if indeed — and I also thought like Hani — if indeed that is so, then a very, very, very far-reaching novelty comes out here. Why? Because what follows from this is that the whole question and answer revolve only around the cases where you are exempt and permitted. And as for the cases of exempt but prohibited, we really remain with the idea that this is not a rabbinic prohibition of the labor of carrying out, but a prohibition of lifnei iver. And therefore I don’t ask, because there they really did mean lifnei iver, and the whole question is only why, in the cases where it says exempt and permitted, the prohibition of lifnei iver disappeared. But then it comes out that our whole discussion today, for example, doesn’t even get off the ground. Or rather — what do I mean it doesn’t get off the ground? At least it takes on a very different color. Because when I do only the lifting up, our assumption is that I’ve violated a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, and then the question is why this isn’t half a measure, or two people who did it, and things like that. But according to this understanding, this is not two people who did it and it’s not a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out; it’s simply a prohibition of lifnei iver. Now here there’s room to note: if this were a prohibition of lifnei iver, then it would be a Torah-level prohibition — so what does it mean, exempt but prohibited? It says exempt. Exempt — not a Torah-level prohibition. No, lifnei iver is Torah-level, not rabbinic.

[Speaker D] Lifnei iver is Torah-level. Right. We—

[Speaker E] We defined that the second person is also liable, didn’t we? The second person is liable, so the aider is exempt — that’s what we saw in Maimonides last week.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] Last week we said that only one of them incurs liability.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here both are rabbinic. Here both violated a rabbinic prohibition, either of carrying out or of lifnei iver.

[Speaker E] No, but yes, if the assumption is that it’s lifnei iver.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so if it’s lifnei iver—

[Speaker E] then it’s not exempt; it’s exempt from punishment, sorry. Right, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the term exempt should apparently mean exempt from punishment, but the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. And we’ll come back to this later too — the term exempt is often associated with a rabbinic prohibition, but that’s not necessary.

[Speaker C] The question is whether for lifnei iver, "do not place a stumbling block," we haven’t yet sufficiently defined when it is Torah-level and when it is rabbinic. And maybe if you cause someone to stumble in a rabbinic prohibition — once we expanded this concept and took into account that there is responsibility for the transgression — then the responsibility for the transgression is responsibility for a rabbinic transgression, and therefore maybe here the "do not place a stumbling block" prohibition is rabbinic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meira, that’s a good point. But in just a moment I’ll take it one step further, because you’ll see there’s a contradiction in what you’re saying. Your good point is basically this: since the other person violates a rabbinic prohibition, then I, who cause him to stumble — even if this is a case of the "two sides of the river" — cannot be violating more than a rabbinic prohibition, because all I caused him to violate was something rabbinic. In truth, the halakhic authorities disputed that, both medieval and later authorities. For example, there is a Rema in Yoreh De’ah in the laws of interest, who says that witnesses violate the prohibition of lifnei iver: the witnesses to an interest-bearing loan cause the parties to violate the prohibition of lending with interest, and therefore they violate lifnei iver. The Rema says that even where the prohibition of interest is only rabbinic, the witnesses violate lifnei iver at the Torah level. Why? Very simple logic. If causing… once you cause someone else something bad, you violated lifnei iver. I don’t care — violating even a rabbinic prohibition is something bad. After all, if I caused him to fall into a pit, is falling into a pit a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah-level prohibition? Neither rabbinic nor Torah-level, right? It’s just something bad. And now, a rabbinic prohibition is also something bad, so if I caused him something bad, I violated the Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver. Why should I care about the degree of severity of the prohibition? Only if I go with Maimonides, whom we saw in the previous lecture, who says that the transgression he committed is basically attributed to me — that the responsibility is on me — then there is definitely room to say that this is a rabbinic prohibition. But here I’ll take the extra step you left out, Hani, because what really comes out is a loop whose tail is in its mouth. Why? Because if I assume that the other person violated a rabbinic prohibition, what rabbinic prohibition did he violate? A rabbinic prohibition of carrying out? But right now we’re assuming that there is no such thing. The rabbinic prohibition that appears in the Mishnah is the prohibition of lifnei iver. So how can it be that both sides violate lifnei iver, but neither one of them violates any actual prohibition? Then in what prohibition did you cause the other person to stumble, such that you violated lifnei iver?

[Speaker C] You could say that it’s in both prohibitions — both lifnei iver and the rabbinic Sabbath prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then we’re back to the first question. Why doesn’t the Talmud ask why there isn’t a prohibition of lifnei iver, while assuming that this prohibition is a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out? What you wanted to say, Hani, was: there is no rabbinic prohibition of carrying out here. The rabbinic prohibition under discussion is a prohibition of lifnei iver. They didn’t expand the prohibition of carrying out to lifting up alone or setting down alone and establish that as a rabbinic prohibition. The phrase exempt but prohibited in the Mishnah is talking about lifnei iver. But then I ask: that can’t be, because if it is talking about lifnei iver, then in what did I cause the stumbling? After all, there is no carrying-out prohibition in such a case. So the fact that I caused him to stumble by lifting up, or he caused me to stumble by setting down, is irrelevant, because we didn’t violate any prohibition except lifnei iver. Lifnei iver cannot exist unless there is some real prohibition that someone stumbled into.

[Speaker E] But can’t you say that this depends on the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot? Meaning, according to Rashi, the one who violates the prohibition — and the lifnei iver would be the setting down, and the reverse?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re making wonderful comments today. It really does depend on that dispute. If we say that setting down involves a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, while lifting up does not — sorry, lifting up involves a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, while setting down does not — as Rashi says, then the one who sets down might be said to have violated lifnei iver with respect to the one who lifted up. Although that’s a bit forced, because he did it afterwards. But according to the opposite position of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that we saw — for example in the Rashba — that there is a rabbinic prohibition only on the setting down and specifically not on the lifting up, then yes, there is room to say that the one who lifted up violated lifnei iver, because he caused the one who set down to stumble into a rabbinic prohibition. And about that maybe one could discuss whether this is a prohibition of lifnei iver or a prohibition of carrying out. But in the straightforward reading you can’t say this. You can’t say it because the Talmud itself — and this is the very Talmud we’re dealing with today — the Talmud itself says that this is the exemption of two people who did it. And in two people who did it there are two novelties: one novelty is that there is no Torah-level prohibition, and the second novelty is that there is a rabbinic prohibition. Meaning that in the case of this one lifts and that one sets down, both sides violated a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, not lifnei iver — or not only lifnei iver. And this is a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out; that is the plain sense of the Talmud, and it is very difficult to say otherwise. So the question returns — you see I’m maneuvering back and forth — but the question returns again: if so, then why did the medieval authorities (Rishonim), who asked the Mishnah where the prohibition of lifnei iver disappeared to, ask this only about the situations where one of the sides is exempt and permitted, and not about the situation of two people who did it, where both are exempt but prohibited? They should ask: exempt but prohibited from the side of carrying out, but besides that there is a Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver; where did that disappear?

[Speaker C] And is there a punishment for lifnei iver?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, except for what I said according to Maimonides.

[Speaker C] So if there’s no punishment for lifnei iver, then when the Talmud says exempt but prohibited, it usually means exempt from punishment but prohibited. And therefore they can’t ask this, because once it says exempt but prohibited, then it definitely is not lifnei iver, because in lifnei iver there is no punishment at all, so how could they not write—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the phrase exempt but prohibited? On the contrary: exempt but prohibited because he violated—

[Speaker C] the prohibition of lifnei iver and not the prohibition of carrying out. But we just saw that in Yoma it says — it doesn’t use the phrase exempt but prohibited — it says, "the sages prohibit." It’s talking about prohibited, which is a different term.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no such rule, as I said earlier. There are places where it says exempt and the meaning is exempt from punishment, but it is still a Torah-level prohibition. That’s what I already noted earlier. In fact, maybe in one of the coming lectures, when I speak about a labor not needed for its own sake, there are views according to which in a labor not needed for its own sake — that belongs to the three cases of exempt and permitted that appear at the top of the page. We skipped it because it’s not the topic, but I hope to return to it in a later lecture — there we’ll see opinions, for example, that the exempt status in a labor not needed for its own sake means only exemption from punishment, but it is a Torah-level prohibition. Anyway, for our purposes, I’m saying: this is just a comment on the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I don’t have an answer to it, I don’t have a good answer to it. Apparently all they wanted was to sharpen the question. Right, you could ask this also about two people who did it — why do you say here a rabbinic prohibition of carrying out, when you could have said a Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver? But it’s sharper to ask it where it is completely permitted. How can you say this is completely permitted if there is a prohibition of lifnei iver here? And exempt but prohibited — perhaps that refers to both things, both lifnei iver and the rabbinic prohibition of carrying out. Perhaps. But in exempt and permitted, certainly you can’t say such a thing, and therefore they ask there: what about lifnei iver? Once they asked it there and answered it, you can apply that answer also to situations of two people who did it, okay? This is just an opening comment for the discussion. In any case, now I want to enter into this issue of the exemption of two people who did it. Meaning: this one lifts and that one sets down — the Talmud says both are exempt but prohibited. And as I just said, in the straightforward reading this does not mean a prohibition of lifnei iver or some other prohibition, but rather the prohibition of carrying out, except that it is not Torah-level but only rabbinic, because the full labor was not done here, only part of it, and therefore. About that there is only a rabbinic prohibition. And indeed Rashi on the Mishnah already brings the Talmud on page 3a. The Talmud on page 3a discusses the question: where does this exemption come from? Right? So the Talmud says like this — maybe I’ll share it so it’ll be easier to see together. The Talmud says, "both are exempt" — this is a quotation from the Mishnah, from the middle clause of the Mishnah, from the middle of the Mishnah, where this one lifts and that one sets down. The Talmud asks: "but a labor was performed between the two of them!" After all, in the end, between the two of them — that is, together, in some way — they did a labor here. How can it be that both are exempt? Okay? There is a very interesting assumption in this question, because on the face of it, what do you mean? Fine, the two of them did it together, but each one by himself did only part, as the Talmud says later. So why did this initially seem difficult to the Talmud? In other words, why does the Talmud think that in such a case the assumption should be that there is liability — that this is not merely a rabbinic prohibition? The Talmud assumes — and this is exactly its language, this isn’t a fine reading, this is what it says — it says: "but a labor was performed between the two of them." After all, in the end the result is that an object was taken out, lifted from a private domain and set down in the public domain. So something happened here that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded should not happen. True, two people were involved in doing it, but bottom line a full labor was done here, so why shouldn’t they be liable for it? Okay? That is the plain meaning of the words "but a labor was performed between the two of them" — the meaning is: in the end, gather the two of them together, what difference does it make? Bottom line, look at what happened in the world. What happened in the world is that an object was lifted from a private domain and set down in the public domain — exactly what the Torah forbids. So how can you say that they are exempt for such a thing? A labor of carrying out was performed here. Two people did it, so let two people be liable. What difference does it make? Bottom line, a labor happened here. That is basically the Talmud’s assumption in the question. Okay?

[Speaker D] What does that assumption assume?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very important — and you have to get used to this. I did this in previous years too, and it’s very important to me to train you in this matter. When we ask — when the Talmud asks a question and then answers it, it looks to us as though everything settles into place. It’s always very important to understand what the Talmud thought when it asked the question, and what is new in the answer. And you’ll see that when you get used to thinking this way all the time — what exactly is new, what was the original assumption, what did they think at first and what do they think in the conclusion, and what’s the difference, what exactly changed here—

[Speaker D] Maybe the main thing is the result and not the process… wait, who’s speaking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, I said that’s where I’m heading in just a moment. What I just want to say is that it’s very important to me that you get used to thinking like this. When you see a question in the Talmud, or in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), or whoever, or in the later authorities (Acharonim), what does the question assume? Usually the answer is not inventing some wild thing no one could have thought of. In the question we thought that the principle that appears in the answer was apparently not correct. Why not? And if not, then why in the answer did it suddenly become clear that it is correct — what changed? Okay? Now here, if we try — and by the way, many times when you start doing this, it lays out the entire conceptual study of the passage for you. This is just a very important rule in analytical learning: when you catch this point, you’ll see it’s a huge opening for understanding the whole conceptual framework of the passage. After that, the words of the medieval and later authorities (Rishonim and Acharonim) just fit for you and go into a ready-made box with ready-made compartments. So it’s very important to get used to thinking this way; try to do it from now on as well. Good, so now let’s see what’s happening here; we’ll practice it on the Talmud’s question here. The Talmud here basically says: "but a labor was performed between the two of them." What does it assume? It assumes, it assumes, that the prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath are basically prohibitions of result. Right? Because it’s basically saying: once what the Torah forbade has happened, a Torah prohibition has been violated. How can you say that both are exempt? Ah, but each of them didn’t do the whole prohibited act, each one did… what do I care? In the end, what the Torah forbade happened. So what difference does each one’s contribution make? Punish them both together, give each one half a punishment, give each one a full punishment — it doesn’t matter, those are already technical issues. But on the conceptual level, you should punish them, because a transgression happened here. What do I care that two people did it? Okay? Don’t be prisoners of the answer. Before reading the answer, we need to stop here and think, so we won’t be captive to what will be revealed to us in another moment. And now we can already understand where the answer might take us. The answer, for example, could take us to the idea that this is not the correct conception of the prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath. The prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath are not prohibitions on results that happen in the world, but what I would call — in yeshiva language, in the hefza — they are prohibitions defined by the reality. What happened in reality? In reality an object was lifted from here and placed there, so that’s it, a prohibition was violated. That is what the question assumes. In the answer — again, I’m still… I haven’t read it yet, I’m trying to guess what it could be. And by the way, it’s often worthwhile to do this too. Once I’ve understood well the foundations on which the question rests, now I say to myself: okay, so the answer will probably give up one of them. And then I ask what it could give up here. It could say exactly this: what is required on the Sabbath is that the person rest. So if the person himself did not do the entire labor, but rather two people did it, then the fact that between the two of them a complete labor emerged — what do I care? Neither of them violated the rest in a complete way. And if my emphasis is on what happens to the person, not on what happens in the world, then it’s obvious that if two people do it they are exempt. Because neither of them did the full action that the Torah forbids. Neither of them violated the rest or the repose. Okay? So this analysis shows you how we can already try to guess what will appear in the answer in the next line of the Talmud. And now we need — the next stage, I’m just doing a methodological exercise here. Violating the rest?

[Speaker G] What? They did violate the rest, even though they only did half a labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Violating the rest is defined as doing a labor. If I look at myself, I didn’t do a full labor. That’s not called violating the rest.

[Speaker G] It doesn’t matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why doesn’t it matter? If it doesn’t matter, then one should also be flogged if he only lifted up and didn’t set down, because he violated the rest. Not flogged — stoned. Someone who violates a prohibition of labor on the Sabbath is liable to stoning. So what happens if I only lifted up? No one set it down. I lifted it up and that’s it. Did I violate the rest? I violated the rest — am I liable to stoning? No. The Torah defines what it means to violate rest. To violate rest sounds like a labor-union term. To violate the strike. On the Sabbath, to violate rest means to do labor as the Torah defines it. If you didn’t do that, then from the Torah’s standpoint you are considered to have rested. You didn’t do labor on that Sabbath. From my standpoint, that is called resting — not doing labor. So now, if I look from the side of the person, not from the side of what happened in the world, but from the side of the person: then one lifted up, the other set down. About which of the two can I say that he did not rest? Meaning, that he did labor on the Sabbath? If the focus is not whether the labor was done, but whether the person did the labor — that is the focus. If that is the focus, then it’s obvious why both are exempt. Neither one of them did labor that violates the rest. Okay? So now suddenly you see that the attempt to think a priori, before we read, about what the assumption might be, immediately yields for us what the answer might be as well. And now pay attention: I’m explaining the Talmud, but at the same time I’m also making methodological comments to you, because I want you to apply this from now on too. When you see questions and answers in the Talmud, in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), in the later authorities (Acharonim), work this way. It’s extremely fruitful. It will very quickly bring you into the conceptual reasoning that lies here behind the passage. You’ll now see how this continues. Everything rolls out from here. Watch now how our whole lecture unfolds from here. Meaning, this little question opened up the whole lecture. That’s how I worked. When I saw this Talmudic question, I immediately asked myself: wait, why is it so obvious to the Talmud that there should be liability? Because the Talmud assumes that the result that happened in the world is what defines Sabbath labors. So I said to myself: wait, but who says that really is the definition of Sabbath labors? Maybe it’s the person’s resting? We also talked about this in the introductory lectures. So then I really say: okay, so maybe that really is what the Talmud answers. And then I come to the Talmud’s answer and see that it’s not so simple that this is what the Talmud answers. Then I ask myself why. Let’s see. So the Talmud answers like this: It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi says, "from among the people of the land, when doing it" — the one who does all of it, and not the one who does part of it. An individual who did it is liable; two people who did it are exempt. This is a baraita of Rabbi. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the editor of the Mishnah. He is the sage cited here in the baraita. It was also stated likewise — there is another amoraic statement brought in support of the baraita. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) already comment here: what, why do we need an amoraic statement to support a baraita, which is a tannaitic source? The tannaim are an earlier generation, more authoritative. I don’t need amoraim to support tannaim. But that does happen sometimes. They bring support in order to show that this is… especially if it’s a baraita and not a Mishnah. Then you need to show that this baraita is an authoritative baraita. Because baraitot, unlike Mishnayot, are texts one cannot always rely on. Corruptions slipped into them. Not for nothing did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not insert these texts into the Mishnah, but leave them outside. A baraita is tannaitic texts that were not included in the Mishnah. By the way, baraita literally means external. From outside. Outside the Mishnah. These are tannaitic sources that are outside the Mishnah. In any case, so "it was also stated likewise," an amoraic statement: Rav Hiyya bar Gamda said, "It was cast from the mouth of the group and they said: 'when doing it' — an individual who did it is liable; two people who did it are exempt." This is not worded the same as in the baraita, notice. More than that: in the baraita itself there are really two formulations, and the formulation of this statement of Rav Hiyya bar Gamda parallels the second of them. Yes, the baraita brings a double formulation. First: the one who does all of it, and not the one who does part of it. It could have stopped there: the one who does all of it, and not the one who does part of it. Then it says: an individual who did it is liable; two people who did it are exempt. What is the difference between these two formulations? Let’s think.

[Speaker D] There are two conditions here. What does that

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] mean?

[Speaker D] With Rabbi there are two conditions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if they’re two conditions. They’re two reasons. It may be that either one alone is sufficient, but he says each of them — that there are two reasons. One of them is: the one who does all of it, and not the one who does part of it. What does that mean? Where is the emphasis there?

[Speaker D] Maybe the labor isn’t complete.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The emphasis is on what happened, on the hefza, on the labor in the world. You see how the analysis we did earlier of the question gives us sensitivity in how we read the answer. The first part of Rabbi’s baraita tells us that the emphasis is on what happened, on the labor. Only half a labor was done here. In a moment I’ll explain that more, because a complete labor was done — but I’ll explain it more in a moment. Only half a labor was done here, and liability exists only when a complete labor is done. After that it says: an individual who did it is liable; two people who did it are exempt. Where is the emphasis there?

[Speaker D] On the performer, on the gavra.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About the operation, right. In other words, the operation itself did not violate the rest of the Sabbath or the cessation of labor on the Sabbath. So suddenly Rabbi gives us two formulations. He is basically telling us that even according to the view that the emphasis is on what happened, on the labor that was done in the world, even there, even according to that view, it turns out that both of them are exempt. And besides, who says that this is the correct view? It could be that the view is that what matters is the violation of the person’s cessation from labor, and then obviously both of them are exempt. In other words, Rabbi is coming to tell us: know that contrary to what you did in your analysis of the Talmud’s question, the answer does not depend on that understanding. According to both understandings I can explain to you why both are exempt. And therefore he uses a double formulation here. And Rav Chiyya bar Gamda somehow transmitted only one of the formulations.

[Speaker D] The question is whether he means to disagree

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with the baraita or to say something a little different; that needs discussion, I don’t know.

[Speaker D] But Rabbi wasn’t precise in his exposition. Because “in doing it” refers to the person, to the human being.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s not that he wasn’t precise; rather, this is an exposition.

[Speaker D] He shifted it over to the labor even though in the verse it refers to the person. In that verse in the end it specifically says “that shall not be done,” and that really is the labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but he is still making an exposition. An exposition is not bound to the plain meaning of the verse. It is not bound to the plain meaning of the verse; if it were bound to the plain meaning of the verse, it wouldn’t be an exposition, it would be a plain-meaning interpretation. What is he basing it on? I’ll comment on that in a moment. But Rabbi says two things here. And in light of the analysis I gave earlier, those two things need to be read decisively and carefully. Notice: these are two things that are not saying the same thing. It seems here that Rabbi is dealing with the two possibilities for understanding the nature of the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath. Is it a prohibition on the result, on what happened in the world? Rabbi says: that is what you assumed in the question; know that even if I stay with the understanding you assumed, it still comes out that both are exempt. And besides, who says that understanding is correct? It could be that the focus is the person’s rest and not what happened in the world, and then obviously both are exempt. That is what Rabbi is answering. Now, how should this be understood? So I’ll say it like this. After all, in the end, if I say that the basis of the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath is what happened in the world, as the Talmud’s question assumes, still, whom do you want to punish for it? Earlier I presented this as a technical problem. It could be that Rabbi is coming to say: whom are you going to punish for it? True, it happened in the world, but there is not one single person on whom you can place full responsibility for everything that happened, because each of them is responsible only for half. And then what comes out is that indeed something problematic happened here. In a moment I’ll define a little more what “something happened here” means, but something happened that the Torah did not want to happen. And notice: something happened that the Torah did not want to happen, not merely a rabbinic prohibition. There is a Torah-level problem here, only I have no one to punish. That’s what Rabbi is saying.

[Speaker D] When we say that labor is attributed to the one who completes it, does that mean he bears responsibility for all of it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but here it isn’t “labor is attributed to the one who completes it” in that context of liability to punishment. That’s a different discussion. So what Rabbi really wants to say is this. You may be right that the definition of the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath is what happened in the world, and then on the face of it you are asking correctly: so they should be punished, because in the world exactly what the Torah forbade happened—an object was removed from the private domain and set down

[Speaker D] in the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi says: wait, wait, hold on. Before you go punish someone, it is not enough to ask whether something happened that the Torah did not want to happen. When you come to punish someone, you also have to ask whether he is responsible for what happened; otherwise why are you punishing him? Something bad happened—what can you do? But there is no one responsible. In other words, to obligate someone with a punishment, it is not enough to prove that something happened in the world. You also have to prove that he was the one responsible for what happened in the world, otherwise you cannot punish him. And then it comes out that Rabbi is basically saying: even according to you, the questioner, who wants to claim that something happened in the world—even if I do not abandon that understanding, I remain within that very understanding—even so, you cannot punish both of them. And therefore when you ask, “both are exempt”—why are both exempt? The answer is: both are exempt because there is no way to punish them. Neither of them is responsible for what happened. In an extreme formulation I would even say that according to this view a Torah-level prohibition may have occurred here, and the exemption is only from punishment. Because the people responsible for this Torah-level prohibition are two people. And there is no way to punish a person who does not bear full responsibility for the Torah-level prohibition. But then what comes out—I’m saying this is not a necessary formulation, it’s a somewhat extreme formulation, but one can definitely say it—is that “both are exempt” means exempt from punishment. But a transgression did take place here. Because the labor was in fact done between them. What?

[Speaker E] The exposition is about the offering, so maybe that really fits. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The verse says “in doing it”; Rashi also writes, if you notice, Rashi writes: it is speaking about a sin-offering. The verse deals with a sin-offering, meaning with punishment. And therefore one could certainly understand the opening of Rabbi’s words—“one who does all of it and not one who does part of it,” sorry, not one who does… yes, “one who does,” meaning one who does all of it and not one who does part of it—the meaning would be that a complete labor has to be done, and here a complete labor was not done. And the second formulation says that if two do it, then they are exempt. Why? Because each one does not… no transgression happened here at all, because there was no violation of cessation from labor by either of the two people.

[Speaker D] But when he says “one who does all of it,” he already includes the individual. Obviously. He could have used a different word instead.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he—

[Speaker D] It should have said “doing all of it and not part of it.” Here he is stressing specifically the individual.

[Speaker F] Obviously, that’s what he wants to say.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “One who does all of it.”

[Speaker D] But that already comes the second time, in the next factor that he emphasizes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, listen carefully. No, there is a difference. “One who does all of it and not one who does part of it” means that all of it was done. The labor was fully done. Wait—but here there is one who did all of it, except that both of them did it. The factor “one who does all of it”—you can punish him. You cannot punish one who did part of it even when a complete labor was done. A complete labor was done, and therefore a Torah-level prohibition was indeed violated here, but how can you punish or bring a sin-offering? That is the subject of the verse. Only if there is one person who did all of it. Right. But there is no such one person, so this is an exemption from punishment. The second formulation says: no, if one person did it he is liable; if two did it they are exempt, because there is no transgression here at all. Because the focus is the person, and there is no person here who failed to rest. Why should I care that an object moved from the private domain to the public domain? If a gentile had done it, would that bother you? The fact that it happened doesn’t interest me. If a Jew did it, then he violated the obligation of cessation from labor; but here there is no such one person. So therefore no transgression happened at all. Not just that there is no one here to punish. That is the difference between Rabbi’s two formulations… that could be the difference between Rabbi’s two formulations. And then it comes out that…

[Speaker H] But Rabbi, I have a question for a second—what is the meaning of punishment at all in matters of commandments between a person and God? I understand. If the problem is the flaw the person created, then it has to be connected to the person, to the fact that the person actually performed a complete action, because the flaw is in him. But if we are talking about a problem in reality, then really, as you said, if a gentile did it, what is the problem? If there is a flaw in reality then someone has to pay, but if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does someone have to pay? There is a flaw in reality, but no one is responsible for the flaw having happened. So what can you do? Whom are you going to punish?

[Speaker H] On the contrary, that’s what I’m saying, that’s what I’m asking. I’m saying there is a flaw in reality, but who said that anyone has to pay for it at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what Rabbi answers. What’s the question? Therefore two people are not punished. That’s what Rabbi answers.

[Speaker H] No, because you raised the possibility that the problem is that there is no one to punish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the action was done in the world.

[Speaker D] Labor was done.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle someone should have been punished here because a flaw happened here through Jews.

[Speaker H] That’s exactly it—I claim that in principle no one has to be punished here, because this is not an action connected to a flaw in someone; it’s not an action connected to any particular person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are linking the two formulations together.

[Speaker H] No, I’m comparing it in my head the whole time to theft. A thought process done regarding matters between one person and another person. So also in a case where two people did it, still someone has to fix the action. A theft took place; someone has to return it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, not true.

[Speaker H] In matters between a person and God there is nothing to fix.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, Iris. They will not be punished. The money gets returned; that’s not a punishment. You return the money—that’s unrelated. I’m talking about punishment.

[Speaker C] Even a fine?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When two people do it, there is no punishment.

[Speaker C] I want to ask for a moment: if the problem is on the object, and labor was done, then according to that it also cannot be that an unintended act is permitted. After all, an action was done. What difference does it make whether you intended it or not? And the whole issue of indirect causation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no, because if I did not intend it, then that means I am not responsible for it. That does not mean that something was not done.

[Speaker C] Why am I not responsible? I did not intend it and it still happened and it happened because of me. Even though I did not intend it, I performed the action and I have responsibility for it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what “unintended” means—the intention is part of the responsibility a person has for the act. If he does not do it intentionally, he is not considered someone responsible for what happened.

[Speaker D] And in the laws of Sabbath all the more so, right? I mean, in the laws of Sabbath…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me move on for a second, I’ll bring… can one ask something else about this?

[Speaker F] Okay. What was it in the Tabernacle—meaning, if two people did labor in the Tabernacle, then what was it?

[Speaker F] What were the labors in the Tabernacle? Was only one person responsible for the labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that when we talk about Tosafot; Tosafot asks that. Okay. By the way, this is really already a good opportunity to clarify how far you got on the page. Where are you up to with it?

[Speaker C] We finished. Up to Yoma. Did everyone finish? Yes. We also finished. We didn’t understand the last line of Tosafot, but everything else we finished.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Including Tosafot, meaning to the end. Okay. Fine, because today I probably won’t finish everything, so I’ll think about how to build next time. Okay. In any case, let’s continue. According to this, what I basically want to say is: notice that the analysis of the question told me what I expect the answer to be. Then I read the answer and suddenly I notice that it is not exactly what I expect, or not only what I expect. And then suddenly I see that in the answer there are two different nuances or two different formulations, and I understand that the answer comes to address the question according to both conceptions: both if you remain with the conception you had in the question, and also to propose an alternative conception. According to both conceptions I can still explain why both are exempt. All of this is only because I analyzed what the question was assuming. And basically here I have finished the conceptual issue of the passage. Everything else is details. This is a very important point, and it usually happens. One has to understand it. Someone who has skill, after doing the analysis, thinks to himself what is happening in the question, what is happening in the answer, and he already knows what all the medieval authorities and later authorities will say—in broad strokes, I mean. You can miss things here and there, but in general you already know what is going on. And therefore it is very, very important to do these things. Now I want to illustrate a bit what I said here regarding instructing a gentile. When we tell a gentile to do labor on the Sabbath, that is forbidden. According to most views it is a rabbinic prohibition. But the SeMaG brings an exposition from the Mekhilta, and the Beit Yosef cites it, that makes it seem this is actually a Torah prohibition. And the basis of the SeMaG is that it says, “For six days labor shall be done.” “Shall be done” is passive language. What matters is that the labor be done. So the antithesis on the Sabbath is that on the Sabbath one must cease. What does it mean to cease? That the labor not be done—not that you not do the labor, but that the labor not be done. And therefore even if you tell a gentile and the gentile does the labor, the labor was done. That is a Torah prohibition. That is how the SeMaG understands it. Admittedly this is a lone view; the Beit Yosef himself, who cites it, rejects it. Most medieval and later authorities, almost all of them, say it is a rabbinic prohibition. But already here I am showing you a consequence, or at least one source, that assumes a view very similar to the one in the Talmud’s question here—that Sabbath labor prohibitions mean that something happened in the world. Even if a gentile did it, it is problematic. Okay? And of course if the gentile did it and no Jew was involved at all, then there is no relevance, because there is no one to come with claims against. But if I told the gentile, I did not do the labor, I only told the gentile, I ultimately have contributory guilt in the fact that what should not have happened happened here, so one can come with claims against me. No one says there is stoning for this; it is not a full-fledged labor prohibition, but it is a Torah prohibition because the labor was done. Okay? So there is at least some source here for that conception that comes up in the Talmud’s question.

[Speaker D] Could this be the basis of Beit Shammai’s view that one may not put wool into the dye-pot unless it will finish soaking before the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want to continue with instructing a gentile because the analogy keeps shedding light on our passage. The simple view, as I said, regarding instructing a gentile is that it is a rabbinic prohibition. In Rashi—again, I didn’t want to get you into this; it’s just an illustration—Rashi brings two reasons why there is a rabbinic prohibition in instructing a gentile. One reason is that the gentile is considered his agent. When you tell a gentile to do something—but

[Speaker D] there is no agency for a gentile.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait. When you tell a gentile to do something, he is considered your agent, and since he is your agent, you committed a transgression: a person’s agent is like the person himself. One practical difference, for example: what happens if I told a gentile on Friday to do labor tomorrow, and he went and did it on the Sabbath? So I didn’t do anything on the Sabbath; I even made the statement on Friday. But if he acts as my agent, the act of my agent is imputed to me, and it is as if I desecrated the Sabbath rabbinically. As if I desecrated the Sabbath on the Sabbath itself, and therefore I violate a rabbinic prohibition. True, there is no agency for a gentile and there is no agency for a transgression, but “there is no agency for a transgression” is not difficult here, because for the gentile

[Speaker D] it is not a transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For the gentile it is not a transgression, so there is no problem. “The words of the master and the words of the student—which should one obey?” Whoever knows that logic there, it does not apply in a situation where the agent is not warned about that transgression. But that is not important for us right now. There is no problem of “there is no agency for a transgression.” What about agency for a gentile? So Rashi in the chapter “Eizehu Neshekh” in Bava Metzia says there that there is agency for a gentile stringently. The Sages rabbinically established that if I appoint a gentile as an agent, stringently, if I do it for a transgression, they impute the transgression to me rabbinically. Even though by strict law there is no agency for a gentile, okay? A gentile cannot be the agent of an Israelite, of a Jew. But regarding a case where I use this to commit transgressions through a legal trick, sending a gentile to do the transgressions in my name, the Sages wanted to block that loophole, and therefore they say: stringently, there is agency for a gentile rabbinically. And that, Rashi says, is also true in instructing a gentile in Sabbath prohibitions. That is one place where Rashi says this, and it is at the beginning of the chapter “Mi Shehechshikh.” Elsewhere Rashi says it is on account of “and speaking of it.” The verses from Isaiah—“from pursuing your affairs and speaking of it,” “then you shall call the Sabbath a delight,” and so on—all those verses from which they derive various commandments and prohibitions on the Sabbath, prohibitions from the words of the prophets; this is not Torah law. “Words of tradition” here means from the Prophets and Writings. In Talmudic language, “words of tradition” means verses from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), not from the Torah. So they derive from there that one may not speak weekday speech on the Sabbath. So Rashi says that when I tell a gentile to do forbidden labor, that is weekday speech, which is itself forbidden. The problem is not what the gentile did; the problem is what I told him to do.

[Speaker D] And if you told him on Sabbath eve, then it’s not speech on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait. And the practical difference is that if I speak on the Sabbath, then yes. But if I speak on Friday and he does it on the Sabbath, that problem is not there. The problem of agency for a gentile stringently is the opposite, for example if I speak on the Sabbath and he acts on Sunday. Then from the standpoint of Sabbath speech there would be a prohibition, but from the standpoint of agency for a gentile stringently there would not, because the act was done on Sunday. So there is a practical difference, okay? Now the Chatam Sofer and the Imrei Binah, two important later authorities, challenge Rashi: what does agency have to do here? What is this connected to? How is the concept of agency relevant? Can I appoint an agent to put on phylacteries in my place? A Jew, not a gentile.

[Speaker D] No, that’s a positive action, that’s something else, that’s a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there are many cases of agency in positive action. To betroth a woman is also a positive action.

[Speaker D] No, can we learn from one to the other? Certainly there are many cases of agency. Maybe to acquire something for me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—an agent for delivery, an agent for betrothal—that is agency in positive action, the source of the law of agency.

[Speaker E] Fine, so maybe through you and through…

[Speaker C] Maybe here too there is the person/object distinction. In putting on phylacteries, he will put them on himself; that is not me, the commandment was not performed by me, I did not cause the commandment to be carried out. But with a gentile agent, the labor was done.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In other words, the accepted view—and there are different formulations of it—but the common wisdom on this matter is that the commandment of putting on phylacteries is the commandment to place phylacteries on my head. What good does it do if the phylacteries are on the agent’s head? To betroth a woman is a legal act; if he does it for me, then the woman is betrothed to me, no problem. But the commandment is one that applies to my own body, so it does not help me to appoint an agent to do it with his body. His body is not my body. The actions he performs are considered as though they were done on my behalf, but not that I myself actually performed the act. For phylacteries, I need to perform the act; appointing an agent won’t help. The Chatam Sofer and the Imrei Binah say: in Sabbath labors too, why are Sabbath labors forbidden? Because you need to cease. “Six days shall you labor, and on the seventh you shall cease.” The person himself must cease; this is an obligation on the person himself. To appoint someone else to cease or not to cease—what is relevant about that? When I told a gentile to do labor, did I not cease? Of course I ceased, because I didn’t do labor. So what if he is my agent? That is irrelevant. The cessation has to be that my body not do labor. My body did not do labor. What sense does it make to talk here about appointing an agent? What is the dispute? The dispute is exactly the two sides we are talking about here.

[Speaker D] According to Rashi, agency is relevant here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because the result happened in the world and it happened because of me. That is the prohibition. Therefore according to Rashi agency is relevant to such a matter. According to the Chatam Sofer and the Imrei Binah—what are you talking about? I need to cease with my body. I do not care what happened in the world. The question is what the person did. When I appointed an agent—so what? I myself ceased. What is the problem? You see that these are exactly the two conceptions I laid out here. The question is whether Sabbath labor prohibitions are an obligation on the person not to do labor, rather he must cease; or whether the Torah does not want things to be done on the Sabbath and punishes the one who is responsible for their happening. But the prohibition is that it happened, not that I did it. The fact that I did it only makes me responsible, and therefore the punishment is placed on me. These are exactly the same two conceptions.

[Speaker D] According to the Chatam Sofer, wait. Yes. According to the Chatam Sofer there is no prohibition of instructing a gentile?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not on the basis of agency, but on the basis of “and speaking of it.”

[Speaker H] But Rabbi, the prohibition, the prohibition that labor be done on the Sabbath, in reality is always connected to a Jew doing it. It is never only object-centered; it is always connected to the person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is connected to the person in the sense that only Jews are required to ensure that this thing not be done. But still, the thing itself is the prohibition. The fact that a Jew did it, I—

[Speaker H] I think it is more in reality for a Jew. Meaning, it’s not just in reality. In reality not only from the standpoint of punishment. Reality for a Jew is that he should keep the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why—this is what I said earlier when I said I was using an extreme formulation by saying that a transgression was committed and only there is no punishment. You’re right; one could formulate it that way too. I agree. I said it in an extreme way only to sharpen the other side.

[Speaker D] So if I told a gentile on Sabbath eve to do labor for me, then according to the Chatam Sofer there is no problem with that? Right. And what is the law in practice? What? And what is the law in practice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the dispute. Oh. And according to Rabbi Yohanan? Rashi in our passage says, “‘from the people of the land, in doing it’—this is written regarding a sin-offering.” I mentioned him earlier. He comes to emphasize that the verse deals with punishment. I’m not sure one can infer from this. It could be that he is simply just explaining the verse to us. But it could be that he really means to say that the entire exemption here is only an exemption from punishment; the transgression was committed. And then indeed he means the opening of Rabbi’s words—that indeed the transgression was committed and there is no one to punish, in the more extreme formulation as I said earlier. But I’m saying that this inference from Rashi is not necessary.

[Speaker D] But is bringing an offering a punishment? What? Is bringing an offering a punishment? It’s atonement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is a punishment.

[Speaker D] In order that there should not be punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it is considered a punishment. There is also “he receives only the greater penalty” even for those liable to death penalties committed unintentionally—punishment. In any case, notice also the structure of the verse. I told you also on the page: look at the verse: “And if one person from among the people of the land sins unintentionally, in doing one of the commandments of the Lord that should not be done, and incurs guilt.” How does this inference come out of the verse? Notice: this verse really is formulated in a problematic way. Precisely here one can very well understand how the expositor derives his exposition from the verse. What is “if one person sins”? It should have said “if a person sins.” What is “one”?

[Speaker D] “One” means not two. It comes to exclude.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. And second, what is “in doing one of the commandments of the Lord that should not be done”? In doing a transgression, in doing a commandment that should not be done? What is this double use of “one”? Notice, it appears twice.

[Speaker G] Not partial, not partial.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One time we are dealing with “one” as referring to the person—one person and not two people. The second time it is “one of the commandments of the Lord that should not be done.” The labor has to be one, but this time it excludes a half, not two people. It has to be one complete act and not a half. Okay? And then according to this, what comes out here is that Rabbi’s doubled formulation simply arises directly from the exposition of the verse. Twice the term “one” comes to say: one time a problem in the number of people doing it, and a second time a problem in the amount of labor being done. And both of these things exist when two people do the labor. And by the way, through this maybe one can understand the exposition that Ruti asked about earlier—what is “in doing one of the commandments of the Lord”? “In doing it” refers to the person and not to the labor. It seems to me they mean, in a narrative way, what I said here. We are dealing with the two instances of “one.” You did the one of the commandments. Fine? “In doing” regarding the commandments means “in doing one of the commandments of the Lord,” and not half. That is the meaning. And therefore all the difficulties here fall away—many raise this question: what is “in doing it,” it refers to the person and not to the commandment, and things like that. I think this is the meaning. And I think when you read the verse, that is what is called for. The word “one” here is just stuck in there; it is completely superfluous. And twice—why twice?

[Speaker E] Tosafot say they expound it for something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, I think this is the source. I think this exposition learns it from the word “one” appearing twice. From here come the two principles written in Rashi’s words: that the person has to be one, and that the labor—“one of the commandments of the Lord that should not be done,” yes, the forbidden act—also has to be one complete act and not a half. Those are exactly Rabbi’s two sides. Now I’ll continue—it will take me a long time; I want to move on. Half a measure. Why? Why am I moving to half a measure? Because half a measure, even before the question of the Sefat Emet that really puts it on the table, half a measure is actually some kind of prohibition that one violates when one does only part of what the Torah forbade. And that touches directly on the core of our passage. Because in fact “in doing it,” this verse teaches me that when I do only something partial and not the whole “one of the commandments of the Lord,” and not half of one of the commandments of the Lord that should not be done, then only then am I liable. But for a half, no. So how does this fit with the law of half a measure? Half a measure, as a practical matter, is forbidden by Torah law. But let’s look a bit at the concept of half a measure, and that will bring us back again to that same point that has accompanied us all along. I said that the first point that arose from analyzing the Talmud’s question basically stitches together the entire conceptual dimension of the passage, in my view. So now look at the Talmud in Yoma. The Mishnah says this: On Yom Kippur eating and drinking, washing, anointing, wearing shoes, marital relations, and so on, are forbidden. Fine? That is the Mishnah. And on this the Talmud says: “forbidden”—what does it mean that on Yom Kippur eating and drinking are forbidden? “Forbidden” is the language of prohibition without punishment, a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? It is punishable by karet, says the Talmud. What do you mean “forbidden”? On Yom Kippur one who eats and drinks is liable, not merely forbidden. Rabbi Ila said—sorry—or, if you wish, Rabbi Yirmiyah: it is needed only for half a measure. Meaning, “forbidden” comes to teach you that besides liability there are also dimensions of prohibition. When? If you eat and drink half the requisite measure. By the way, half a measure of course means any part, not necessarily half; it could be a third, a quarter, a fifth—not three quarters, no matter. “Half a measure” means less than the requisite amount. Granted according to the one who says half a measure is forbidden by Torah law, but according to the one who says half a measure is permitted by Torah law, what can be said? For it was stated: half a measure—Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, and Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. So there is a dispute. Granted according to Rabbi Yohanan, but according to Reish Lakish, what can be said? Yes—according to Rabbi Yohanan, you tell me that the word “forbidden” in the Mishnah comes to include half a measure. But according to Reish Lakish, half a measure is permitted, so the question returns: then what is the word “forbidden” doing in the Mishnah? The Talmud says: Reish Lakish admits that it is rabbinically forbidden. Meaning there is a rabbinic prohibition according to Reish Lakish, and in truth that is the plain meaning of Reish Lakish’s language, because Reish Lakish said “permitted by Torah law.” Right? Rabbi Yohanan said “forbidden by Torah law” and Reish Lakish said “permitted by Torah law.” The plain meaning is that there is still a rabbinic prohibition. Only there is no Torah prohibition. Right? So the Talmud’s statement is not really a new answer; it is simply the plain meaning of Reish Lakish’s words. But Reish Lakish agrees that there is a prohibition in half a measure, only it is a rabbinic prohibition. And according to Rabbi Yohanan it is a Torah prohibition. Now notice that according to Rabbi Yohanan we have to ask ourselves: so for what purpose were the measures introduced? After all, we say that eating pork is prohibited in the amount of an olive-bulk, and eating on Yom Kippur is in the amount of a large date, which is twice an olive-bulk. Never mind; there are measures for Torah prohibitions. And according to Rabbi Yohanan the measures have no significance at all, because even for less than the measure you violate a Torah prohibition. So what is this law of measures? For what purpose were the measures stated in Torah prohibitions? Obviously the measures were stated only regarding punishment, right? Meaning: the prohibition exists on the Torah level, but for punishment—for receiving punishment—you need to eat the requisite amount or violate the prohibition in the requisite amount. Okay? Now the later authorities discuss the question: what is the nature of this prohibition according to Rabbi Yohanan? Is this prohibition the very same prohibition that existed originally, only one is not liable to punishment for it, or is this a newly introduced prohibition? Take an example. Someone ate a third of an olive-bulk of pork. According to Rabbi Yohanan he violated a Torah prohibition. According to Reish Lakish he violated a rabbinic prohibition. So according to Reish Lakish it is a rabbinic prohibition—fine, no questions. But according to Rabbi Yohanan, that he violated a Torah prohibition, what does that mean? Did he violate the prohibition of eating pork? Is it the regular prohibition of eating pork, only because he did not eat the requisite amount he is not liable to lashes, not liable to punishment? Or no—if he ate less than the requisite amount, there is no prohibition of eating pork; there is a new prohibition called the prohibition of half a measure. Meaning, one single prohibition for all Torah prohibitions. If you do less—eat half an olive-bulk of pork, or half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, or half an olive-bulk of meat cooked with milk, or whatever you want. Yom Kippur. It doesn’t matter—everything is the same prohibition. The prohibition is the prohibition of half a measure. Or not: every time I eat something, the prohibition is that specific prohibition under discussion—pork, Yom Kippur, forbidden fat, or whatever it may be—and there is no punishment if I did not eat the requisite amount. As an expansion, yes. The question is whether this is an expansion of ordinary Torah prohibitions, or whether it is a newly generated prohibition in its own right, somewhat like what we saw with “do not place a stumbling block,” which we mentioned.

[Speaker E] And also in the laws of doubts too. Also in the laws of doubts, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All these broad prohibitions that are Torah-level prohibitions but have no punishment attached to them—like a Torah-level doubt treated stringently, according to the medieval authorities who say that is Torah-level; like half a measure; like “do not place a stumbling block”; all sorts of things of this type, these sort of halakhic catch-all categories—regarding all of them one can ask: is this an expansion of the rest of the Torah prohibitions, only one is not punished for it, meaning the novelty is really the exemption from punishment and not the existence of the prohibition? Is the novelty the exemption from punishment, or not? Is the novelty the nonexistence of the original prohibition? There is no prohibition in the measure itself, only the law of half a measure says that there is a new prohibition called the prohibition of half a measure. I’ll give you an example: if I say that someone who uproots but does not set down has violated the prohibition of half a measure. You did half of the labor. Let’s say, okay? Is that a Sabbath prohibition? Remember Rabbi Akiva Eiger? If it is a Sabbath prohibition, then he is considered an apostate with regard to the whole Torah; or is it not one of the Sabbath prohibitions? The same question I asked about “do not place a stumbling block,” right? The same question can be asked here too. If this prohibition is an expansion of Sabbath prohibitions, then the person is an apostate regarding the Sabbath, like an apostate regarding the whole Torah. But if this is a newly generated prohibition, a different prohibition of half a measure, then it is unrelated to Sabbath prohibitions; it is a different prohibition, and then he would not be an apostate regarding the whole Torah. Okay? The same inquiry I made with regard to “do not place a stumbling block” I am asking here about half a measure. Let’s see how this expresses itself in the Talmud. Up to now I presented it a priori. Again, when you see that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law, one can immediately jump, a priori, before looking at the Talmud: what does “forbidden by Torah law” mean? Is it the very same prohibition that existed originally, and the only novelty is that we are exempt from punishment? Because really what I am asking is not what the novelty of the law of half a measure is, but what the novelty of the measure is. When there is a measure in Jewish law, what does it come to teach? That below the measure there is no prohibition, or that below the measure there is no punishment? That is really the dispute. Okay, so now the Talmud says as follows. Later there, one page on. To return to the main point: half a measure—Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, and Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. We already saw this earlier, but here the explanations also come. Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law because it is fit to combine; what one eats is prohibition.

[Speaker D] Just a second, hold on, hold on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Because it is fit to combine”—what does that mean? If you take this half and take another half, together you will have a whole olive-bulk, and that is certainly a prohibition of pork. So apparently in the half that you ate there is already some kind of prohibition of pork. Therefore even the half contains a pork prohibition, right? That is how several later authorities explain this point. If you were to look at Kovetz Shiurim, for example—and with Rabbi Shimon Shkop there is room to discuss—but in Kovetz Shiurim it is fairly clear that this is how he understood it. Basically, once you say that half a measure—for example, I ate half an olive-bulk of pork—and if I take another half olive-bulk of pork then I have violated a prohibition and I also get lashes and everything applies, then that means that in the half, the quality of the prohibition is already there in the half as well; only the quantity is lacking, and therefore I am not punished. From this it would follow that this half measure

[Speaker D] is basically the prohibition of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] pork, because the quality of pork meat, because of which the Torah does not want me to… because the quality of pork meat, because of which the Torah does not want me to eat it, exists also in the half-measure; only I did not do it in a quantitatively sufficient way to be punished, right? It seems from this reasoning of “fit to combine” that it is the same prohibition. And Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan. “The Merciful One said eating, and that is absent.” What does Reish Lakish argue against Rabbi Yohanan? A half measure is not eating. You are right that it is pork, but there is no eating of pork here. The eating of pork is absent, because eating less than the measure is not eating pork; it is not called eating. Eating a crumb is not eating. You need a minimum measure. By the way, for example, there is a Rashi in Sanhedrin who says that theft of less than a perutah is not forbidden under the law of half a measure. And the question is why. Some explain it because with less than a perutah it is not money in a smaller quantity. Anything less than a perutah is simply not money at all, because it has no purchasing power whatsoever; you cannot buy anything with it. A perutah is the minimal purchasing power. Anything less than a perutah—you simply cannot buy anything with it. So it is not of the same category at all. It is not a quantitative difference; it is a qualitative difference. And Reish Lakish basically wants to argue that when you eat a half measure, it is not that you ate a little. It is simply not called eating. It is just some ordinary action. Okay? Rabbi Yohanan challenged Reish Lakish—I’m reading the second section. “I know only that whatever is punishable is included in the warning. The koy and a half measure, since they are not punishable, one might say they are not included in the warning. Therefore Scripture says: any fat.” So there is a baraita that derives this, without now getting into the koy and all of the koy, koy, however people say it. Koy. I don’t know how they say it; I don’t know how people know how to say it. In any case, half a measure is derived here from the inclusive wording “any fat.” In the prohibition of forbidden fat it says, “For you shall eat no fat at all.” “Any fat” means even any amount of forbidden fat. Even the tiniest amount, even less than the measure.

[Speaker D] Which is a prohibition in itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now here there is already room to hesitate. One can say that this expands the prohibition of forbidden fat even to any amount whatsoever. And one can say no: in truth the prohibition of forbidden fat is not present here; “any fat” comes to include that there is another prohibition, the prohibition of half a measure. Okay? So here one can hesitate. So Rabbi Shimon, for example—perhaps first I’ll just… Look at Kovetz Shiurim in Bava Batra, section 367. I think you saw it, so we’ll go through it briefly.

[Speaker H] Rabbi, isn’t this really also a question of what counts? Here too we are dividing the act of eating into two: is eating called the first moment that a person tastes, or is eating called being satiated?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. We are not talking about the parts of the act of eating. We are talking about the quantity that I eat.

[Speaker H] Fine, and the quantity affects what the person is doing. A small quantity—if the prohibition is even to taste pork, or to taste something on Yom Kippur, then once a person even tastes a little, he has already violated it. If the prohibition is satiation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no prohibition of tasting. But there is no prohibition of tasting. I have to eat and it has to enter the stomach. The question is only how much.

[Speaker H] We read somewhere—I don’t remember where—that on Yom Kippur, because there is an idea of afflicting oneself, once a person tastes even a little he has already in effect broken the fast; he already feels better.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is specifically Yom Kippur; that is another discussion. There are opposite claims there too—that on Yom Kippur, since you have to fast, only satiation is a violation of the eating, not tasting. Tasting is not relevant, because you are not talking about the pleasure of eating but the pleasure of satiation. But leave it—that takes us into other corners.

[Speaker D] No, but regarding cooking… Rabbi, what you read in Yoma about the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish—so it comes out that according to Rabbi Yohanan he holds both things: that it is also a new prohibition and also an expansion. Because according to “fit to combine” it is an expansion, and according to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Maybe I really didn’t emphasize that. Notice that in Rabbi Yohanan’s view two reasons appear in the passage. One reason is a logical one: “fit to combine.” Another half like this would bring me to a complete prohibition. So apparently even in the half there is the same idea, the same quality. That is the basis of the logical explanation. Besides that there is an explanation from a verse: “any fat” comes to include even the smallest amount, any amount whatever of fat, even a little. Two different sources. Definitely.

[Speaker E] But why does the explanation of “fit to combine” specifically show that this is not a new prohibition? I actually thought it did show that it is a new prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What is the logic of “fit to combine”? If the logic is what I said earlier, then what Rabbi Yohanan is basically saying is that if you eat an olive-bulk of pork, you did something problematic and therefore there is a prohibition here, right? Now what is this problematic thing? The Torah does not want you to eat pork. Now if I eat two halves of pork, then that problematic thing is there. And in terms of quality, what is in the half is what is in the whole, only the quantity is lacking. So that basically means that even if I eat a half, the same problem is here, just not in a quantity sufficient to punish. That is the straightforward logic.

[Speaker E] Because it really…

[Speaker D] The problem with this direction in Sha'arei Yosher is that it always has some potential to lead to an actual prohibition, a full prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m about to read Sha'arei Yosher now, so let’s not get ahead of ourselves. But okay, so here there is—

[Speaker I] Can I ask the Rabbi about the relationship between reasoning and a textual derivation? Could it be that Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning also explains the Torah’s reasoning behind the prohibition that we learn from the derivation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there are quite a few possibilities here. Once you have both a reasoning and a verse, there are several ways to understand the relationship between them. You can understand that the reasoning is just the reasoning that stands behind the verse. You can understand that these are two different sources, even contradictory ones, and that they disagree about the parameters of the prohibition of a partial measure. There really are two conflicting conceptions here. And you can understand that both laws are valid. There are two laws of partial measure: the law of “fit to combine” and the law of “any fat.” And from the Talmud’s standpoint this is open—you can say it this way and you can say it that way. In the Talmud two sources are brought. By the way, in the Talmud this is not presented as a dispute. Therefore, to say that there are differing opinions here is less plausible in light of the Talmud. What is plausible is either that one explains the other, or that there are two laws of partial measure—and among the later authorities (Acharonim), by the way, some go this way and some go that way.

[Speaker B] Wait, but why doesn’t “any fat” also go back to the Torah-level foundation? It’s only inclusive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: within “any fat” there are two possibilities. You can say that, but in principle you can also say that it innovates a new prohibition, that it includes an additional prohibition. Why do later authorities who hold that this is a novel prohibition—like Rav Shimon Shkop, as you saw—certainly learn it that way? Because “fit to combine” is not a novel prohibition. So apparently that specifically emerges from “any fat.” You’re right that someone who learns it from “any fat” does not necessarily have to reach that conclusion. I said: from “any fat” it remains an open question. From “fit to combine,” in my view it is more reasonable to say that it is the same prohibition, even though Rav Shimon argues there too that this is not true. But let’s take a look for a moment. So in Kovetz Shiurim on Bava Batra he writes as follows. He discusses what happens if someone swore not to eat, say, a loaf of bread, and a kezayit remained, or half a kezayit remained. Now I want to permit myself to eat it, okay? Because even a partial measure is prohibited. I want to permit myself to eat it. “And according to those who hold that a partial measure is prohibited in an oath, even though it is another prohibition and not the prohibition of the oath”—notice that? A partial measure in an oath is a different prohibition; it’s not the prohibition of the oath—“nevertheless, inquiry helps.” So when I go to a sage and ask about the oath, he releases me from the oath. But if the prohibition is not the prohibition of the oath, then what does it mean to ask about it? To go to a sage so that he can permit it to me—he can’t permit me prohibitions that are not oath-prohibitions. A sage cannot permit me the prohibition of pork. If I took an oath, he can permit what I swore. So he says, nevertheless inquiry helps. Why? “And according to what the later Geonim explained, that a partial measure is permitted where it is not actually fit to combine, such as in the final moment of Yom Kippur.” Do you understand that idea? What happens if someone eats half an olive-bulk literally right before Yom Kippur ends, and then Yom Kippur ends? He has no way to eat another half olive-bulk and arrive at a full prohibition. So here, ostensibly, the reasoning of “fit to combine” does not exist, right? Because this half olive-bulk has no way to combine with another partial measure. Some later authorities want to claim that in such a situation there would be no Torah prohibition even according to Rabbi Yohanan, because the reasoning of “fit to combine” is absent. They are of course assuming that “fit to combine” and “any fat” are the same thing. And then he says:

[Speaker D] The question is whether that has to happen in reality or whether it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s exactly what he says. “If so, the same applies here,” says the Kovetz Shiurim. Since less than a kezayit remains—from the loaf of bread that I prohibited to myself only half an olive-bulk remains—this no longer combines with anything else, because nothing else remains from that loaf, “and it is no longer fit to combine”; according to that view, there is no prohibition of a partial measure here. The Kovetz Shiurim says: “But this does not seem correct.” It doesn’t seem right. Why? “Because that it is fit to combine is a proof and indication that a partial measure is a prohibition, and that proof exists even in the final moment; for had he eaten a partial measure before the final moment and another partial measure in the final moment, they would combine to make him liable.” What is he saying? He is saying that “fit to combine” does not mean that it must actually be able to combine in practice with another partial measure. Rather, the very fact that I can combine two partial measures and then there would be a full prohibition—that is proof that even in a partial measure there is something of the full prohibition. It doesn’t have to be that in practice I will need to be able to combine another half. It’s just a logical exercise, since half plus half—right? So here in Kovetz Shiurim you see very clearly that Kovetz Shiurim understood “fit to combine” the way I explained earlier: that the quality of the prohibition exists in every part of the prohibition. Because otherwise, even if I combined the parts together, no prohibition would be created. If a prohibition is created by quantitatively combining all the parts, that means the quality of the prohibition already exists in each of the parts individually. Okay. That is basically what the Kovetz Shiurim claims. Afterward he goes into the distinction between the person and the object; for our purposes that is less interesting. By contrast, look here at Rav Shimon Shkop in Sha'arei Yosher. “And this matter does not relate”—the context isn’t important right now—“it does not relate to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish whether a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. For the liability to lashes that one incurs for eating the requisite measure of eating”—if you eat pork, a full measure, a full olive-bulk—“does not come because of the prohibition of a partial measure. For the prohibition of eating a partial measure is another prohibition, on an act of eating that has not come to combination, and in eating a full measure there is another prohibition.” He says it like this: I ate a kezayit of pork. After all, when I eat a kezayit of pork, I ate half a kezayit and then I ate another half a kezayit, and for that I receive lashes. I violated the Torah prohibition of pork, and I also receive lashes. Rav Shimon Shkop says: what happens when I ate only half a kezayit and did not continue and eat another half? In that case it is not that I violated the original prohibition but just didn’t get lashes. Rather, it is a different prohibition. It is a prohibition of a partial measure—a different prohibition. He says: “Even though from the language of the Talmud in Yoma 74a we say there, Rabbi Yohanan said: a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, since it is fit to combine, he is eating a prohibition.” And this is against the Kovetz Shiurim we saw earlier, which says it is the same prohibition, only dependent on punishment. “Even though from the language of the Talmud in Yoma 74a we say there, Rabbi Yohanan said: a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law since it is fit to combine, he is eating a prohibition, and it sounds as though for that reason Rabbi Yohanan holds that it is prohibited by Torah law—that from the beginning of the eating the liability has already begun. But one need not say that the law of punishment has already begun, only that he has begun to transgress Torah law. For if we say that he did not begin the transgression and performed a permitted act, how does it later combine to complete the measure?” Ostensibly that is exactly the reasoning of the Kovetz Shiurim, right? He is basically saying that this only means the punishment has not begun, but the transgression has begun. Meaning: when you eat a partial measure, that prohibition is the original prohibition; it’s not a new prohibition—only the punishment is missing.

[Speaker E] Because if it’s a prohibition, he writes that it means to transgress Torah law. He doesn’t say that one begins to transgress eating pork; he begins to transgress Torah law, which is the new measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not right, because then it wouldn’t be “begins to transgress Torah law”; he is transgressing Torah law. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] No, he says in contrast to punishment, which does not begin, here from the very first moment he already begins to transgress—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Another stage of the weddings. He says “begins to transgress Torah law,” meaning: the Torah prohibition is a full kezayit. And I ate half a kezayit, so I began the transgression of the Torah’s command. So he is speaking about the prohibition of the olive-bulk. If he were speaking about the prohibition of a partial measure, then it would not be the beginning of transgressing Torah law; it would be transgressing Torah law regarding the prohibition of a partial measure. I transgressed; I didn’t begin anything. That’s exactly what he is trying to exclude. So how does that fit with what he said above, that this is a new prohibition, that it is not because of the prohibition of a partial measure? So he said there—the wording there is not completely clear. Elsewhere in Sha'ar 3, two chapters later, he says: “And the prohibition of a partial measure according to Rabbi Yohanan is another prohibition, a positive commandment.” He even says that it is a positive commandment and not a negative prohibition. But certainly the negative warning—sorry, no, he rejects that; I didn’t bring one more word earlier—he rejects it: “Rather, certainly the negative prohibition of ‘do not eat impurity’ applies to every tiny amount of impurity, but if he eats only a tiny amount he has not transgressed the negative prohibition of eating, because eating is the measure of the transgression. Therefore the negative prohibition ‘do not eat carcass’ does not apply to this half olive-bulk of impurity.” What is he saying? That if you ate a partial measure, then true, the quality of the prohibition exists even in the half, but an act of eating you did not perform. Exactly Reish Lakish’s claim against Rabbi Yohanan. It’s a little strange, because after all he is explaining Rabbi Yohanan here. This is exactly what Reish Lakish argues against Rabbi Yohanan. According to Rav Shimon’s view, Rabbi Yohanan says the same thing too; he just claims that the prohibition of eating—a partial measure of eating—is a novel prohibition. And Reish Lakish says: where did you invent a novel prohibition from? There is a prohibition of eating, and eating did not happen here.

[Speaker D] No, he could claim that the first answer was because of the reasoning, and here it’s because each part is something novel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He does not distinguish between the two answers; he—

[Speaker D] He says it also regarding “fit to combine.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He claims that the prohibition of eating, eating a partial measure, is a novel prohibition. Reish Lakish says: where did you find for me a novel prohibition? There is a prohibition of eating—

[Speaker D] —and eating didn’t happen here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he could claim that the first answer was because of the reasoning and here it’s because of “any fat,” that it is novel. No, he does not distinguish between the two answers. He says it also with “fit to combine.” After all, he explains that it also happened with “fit to combine.” Look at the previous passage. He says, “Even though from the language of the Talmud”—you see?—“in Yoma we say: a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law because it is fit to combine; he is eating a prohibition. It sounds as though for that reason Rabbi Yohanan holds that it is prohibited by Torah law.” He is talking about “fit to combine.” You’d have to see the context there as well; I deliberately pulled these passages out—

[Speaker D] So that we wouldn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —get tangled up because of the whole context.

[Speaker D] But in the original source you brought before it, in Kovetz Shiurim, there it’s because of “any fat”—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —not because of “fit to combine.”

[Speaker D] That’s something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There one has to analyze. He says here too: “A partial measure is permitted where it is not actually fit to combine.” You see? Here. Here too there is “fit to combine.” At least according to the later authorities who say that if it is at the end of Yom Kippur, then it is not fit to combine. When he argues with them, he says that “fit to combine” is only a proof—but he is still speaking about the reasoning of “fit to combine,” not about “any fat.” And both of you are basically saying that this is an intrinsic prohibition, and in both cases it emerges that it is an intrinsic prohibition even according to the reasoning of “fit to combine.” That’s a novelty. My simple reading would not—

[Speaker E] But in Kovetz Shiurim too does it come out that it’s an intrinsic prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that. Oh, wait, sorry, one second. No, no, sorry—that was my mistake, my mistake. According to Kovetz Shiurim, on the contrary, it sounds like it is the same prohibition. Sorry, right. That’s only in Rav Shimon. He says at the end—look, both at the beginning and in the way he concludes, that’s why it’s confusing. Look here. “But this requires further analysis, for a partial measure in an oath is not prohibited because of the oath but because of another prohibition that we derive from the verse ‘any fat.’” Right? So he is talking about another prohibition. So—

[Speaker D] It looks like Rabbi Yohanan is going on two tracks, two paths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One is “fit to combine” and one is “any fat.” The reasoning of Kovetz Shiurim sounds as though it is the very same prohibition, but then he says it is another prohibition, and that’s why I wasn’t mistaken—it actually is correct. Both he and Rav Shimon Shkop say that despite the reasoning of “fit to combine,” which I mentioned earlier, they still hold that we are talking here about another prohibition. Fine. But there are others who say—

[Speaker E] No, but according to—wait—according to Sha'arei Yosher, if a person began to eat, began to eat a partial measure, then in principle he has already begun to transgress the prohibition of the real prohibition—say, for example, he is eating pork.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And apparently what he is saying there—we need to understand it—but apparently what he is saying there is that the beginning of transgressing the original prohibition is itself a novel prohibition. And that is learned from “any fat.” He doesn’t stop at saying that this is the beginning of the original prohibition, the way I wanted to stop, because in the end he arrives at the conclusion that it is a new prohibition.

[Speaker E] Because he writes explicitly that it can’t be. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What can’t be?

[Speaker E] Because the original prohibition begins only at the moment one eats the full measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. For him it is clear that it applies, begins already beforehand. But when it begins, that itself is not the issue. There is no prohibition merely in its beginning. There is the prohibition of “any fat” or “fit to combine,” it doesn’t matter—the prohibition of a partial measure. He is talking about the beginning of transgressing another prohibition, and that is an independent prohibition. Okay? So from the moment he begins to eat—

[Speaker E] When he begins to eat, it has to mean that when he begins to eat he still is not transgressing the prohibition of fat, say; he is transgressing the prohibition of a partial measure. He has to say that, because otherwise it doesn’t work for him. It just doesn’t fit; it isn’t logical.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to his view—I don’t see why that’s not logical; I think you can say it. It is the prohibition of pork itself, only we are exempt from punishment. Look, for example, at the formulation of Rabbi Amiel in Darkei Moshe. He investigates there the question—I didn’t bring the quotation; I’ll tell it to you by heart—here, it’s in my summary. Look here. Yes: eating is by a kezayit. There are two understandings of a partial measure: is eating defined as a kezayit, with a decree of Scripture that even a partial measure is prohibited, or is eating defined as any amount, and there is a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai that punishment is only for a kezayit? Those are exactly the two sides I’m talking about, right? According to the second understanding, the original prohibition exists in any amount. The prohibition of pork means eating even a crumb of pork; there is a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai regarding punishments that it is only from an olive-bulk. According to the first understanding it goes the other way: only an olive-bulk is the prohibition of eating pork; there is a special novelty that even less than an olive-bulk has the prohibition of a partial measure. Okay? Kovetz Shiurim and Rav Shimon Shkop understand like the first understanding and not the second. And the big novelty is that they understand like the first understanding even according to the reasoning of “fit to combine,” not only according to “any fat.”

[Speaker D] But both of those are only according to Rabbi Yohanan and not according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—all of our discussion is only about Rabbi Yohanan in any event. The whole discussion is only about Rabbi Yohanan, both because the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yohanan and because according to Reish Lakish there is nothing to discuss—it’s a rabbinic prohibition; it’s not relevant. One of the practical differences, for example—I think I wrote this on the page, I don’t remember anymore—yes, yes, I asked you: what happens with a partial measure regarding positive commandments? If someone ate half an olive-bulk of matzah on Passover night, has he fulfilled his obligation or not?

[Speaker D] No. Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if we say that in essence the prohibition exists and only the punishment does not exist, then for positive commandments what is the analogy? I fulfilled the commandment; maybe I just won’t get reward. Right? But maybe that’s a consequential issue.

[Speaker D] A result-based one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because with commandments, unlike prohibitions, there is no question of punishment; there is only the question whether I did it or didn’t do it. So if in prohibitions I understand that I did it, only there is no punishment, then apparently in commandments I should expect that I truly fulfilled the commandment. But that can’t be. Because if that were true, then what were the measures in positive commandments said for?

[Speaker B] But if the definition from the outset is a particular measure, then as long as I haven’t fulfilled that measure I haven’t done anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s also true for negative prohibitions, so what’s the difference?

[Speaker C] What reward is there in eating matzah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reward in heaven; it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker C] But that’s not relevant. When we talked about punishment we were not talking about punishment from heaven; we were talking about whether they punish him—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —whether he is liable in religious court. You’re repeating the last sentence I said; that’s exactly the point. Because in positive commandments there is no relevant discussion of punishment or reward, it’s only a question of whether I did the commandment or not. So by analogy to negative prohibitions, apparently it should come out that I fulfilled the commandment. Period. The fact that there is no punishment, reward, and so on—that isn’t the issue. But if that were so, then there would be no meaning at all to a measure in positive commandments. Because if with less than the required measure I also fulfill the commandment—in negative prohibitions the measure has meaning regarding punishment—but in positive commandments, if I fulfilled the commandment even with less than the measure, then why were measures ever said in positive commandments?

[Speaker D] Therefore, in positive commandments it’s clear—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that it cannot be that I fulfill the commandment.

[Speaker I] Right, that’s clear. But when the Rabbi asked that, I started asking myself whether such a possibility could be imagined—maybe here too, “fit to combine.” So I said maybe truly by Torah law a person fulfills a positive commandment with any amount, but the rabbis established the measure so that it would be recognizable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, the measure is a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai. The measure is Torah-level.

[Speaker I] Right, I understand, but if we make a parallel—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By analogy I would perhaps say the opposite. Someone who ate half an olive-bulk of matzah fulfilled the commandment of eating matzah on a rabbinic level. But he still needs to fulfill the Torah-level commandment, and for that he has to eat an olive-bulk. That maybe one could say. Maybe, although I don’t know anyone who says it. But maybe one could say it. Now then, this is a bit of evidence that even in negative prohibitions, a partial measure is not that I transgressed the negative prohibition and only lack punishment; I did not transgress the negative prohibition at all. Because if in negative prohibitions that were the understanding, then why not in positive commandments as well? You can say that there is a special novelty that this is only in negative prohibitions and not in positive commandments, maybe because it is learned from “any fat,” any amount of fat, which is a prohibition of eating fat; so we learn it only about negative prohibitions and not about positive commandments. Fine, possible. In any case, that is one implication that could have been an implication. Now we come to a partial measure in the labor of transferring, and this is the Sefat Emet. Okay? I gave all of that as an introduction at the beginning—two people doing it. Notice: this whole class I’ve been talking about a partial measure, but the implications for “two people who did it” are immediate. The Sefat Emet on that Mishnah asks as follows: “Both are exempt.” He asks—notice—about the middle clause of the Mishnah, about the case where both are exempt, not like the question of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about “do not place a stumbling block,” which speaks about the case where for one of them it is completely permitted. “Seemingly it appears,” says the Sefat Emet, “that nevertheless it should be prohibited by Torah law like every partial measure.” Why shouldn’t there be a Torah prohibition here? After all, in Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. So here too, someone who uprooted alone or someone who placed alone should be transgressing a prohibition by the law of a partial measure—especially the one who uprooted, for he is fit to do the placing as well. And this is already connected to those later authorities that the Kovetz Shiurim brought—you remember? If I uprooted it, this can be completed if I afterward place it down, or if someone else places it down. If I placed it down, then the uprooting either already happened or didn’t happen, but it is not fit to combine. The reasoning of “fit to combine” at least exists in the one who uproots, even if not in the one who places. According to Kovetz Shiurim it exists also in the one who places, since “fit to combine” is only a proof; it does not need actually to be fit for combination in practice. Okay. “And one could likewise explain what we say in the Talmud: those exempt cases that can come to liability for a sin-offering are counted”—what we saw in the Talmud on page 3, that the Mishnah counted only an exempt-but-prohibited case that could arrive at Torah liability, what Rashi says only about uprooting and not about placing—“because by Torah law it is prohibited, and it does not come to a sin-offering; but placing, according to Rashi’s explanation, since by Torah law it is permitted, is not counted. However, from Rashi it sounds otherwise, and so too the Rosh wrote explicitly, that it is prohibited only rabbinically.” Meaning, one could have said that what it says about uprooting—why does the Mishnah deal only with uprootings and not with placings? Because only in uprootings is there a law of a partial measure, and a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, therefore they brought the uprootings. And what it says there, “exempt,” means exempt but prohibited by Torah law; exempt from punishment because it is not a full labor, but prohibited by Torah law because of a partial measure. And that would explain why the Talmud says, according to Rashi, that the Mishnah dealt only with uprootings and not with placings, because with placings it is not fit to combine, so there is no law of a partial measure. So there would not be any Torah law here at all; at most there would be a rabbinic prohibition of transferring, but there would be no law of a partial measure. Okay?

[Speaker C] Why in uprooting is there a law of a partial measure? I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Fit to combine.” After I uproot it, the combination can still be completed. Because of the combination? Yes, just like at the end of Yom Kippur—that reasoning we saw regarding the end of Yom Kippur.

[Speaker C] That doesn’t fit with the whole issue of quality and quantity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course it doesn’t—that’s the whole point. The Kovetz Shiurim, against the view about the end of Yom Kippur, said no, that’s not true; even at the end of Yom Kippur it is “fit to combine.” Why? Because “fit to combine” does not require that in practice it be combined; “fit to combine” is a thought experiment. If, hypothetically, I had eaten another half, then it would have become a full prohibition. That is proof that even in the half there is a prohibition.

[Speaker C] No, I meant that the action has not been done in its quality, unlike eating, where there is eating and the question is only quantity. The question is whether, when I do an uprooting, I have done, in quality, a transgression of labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re jumping to the Sefat Emet’s answer—we’re not there yet. We’re still reading his question. Okay? In his answer he says something like that, apparently. But right now we’re still in his question. Now notice: this question can really be broadened further, because I’m really asking: the whole Talmudic discussion with which we opened the class—“in doing it,” “two people who did it are exempt,” and so on—why? Why is this only a rabbinic prohibition? There is a law of a partial measure here, and according to Rabbi Yohanan that is prohibited by Torah law. The Sefat Emet presents this as though the question is: why are you speaking only from the side of “two people who did it”? “Two people who did it” is a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore here too there is only a rabbinic prohibition. But besides that, there is also the law of a partial measure. And I say: it isn’t “besides that.” “Two people who did it” is itself a law of a partial measure. Each one of them should be prohibited by Torah law, only not liable because of a partial measure. This is not another law; it is the very law of a partial measure itself. Why assume that these are two different laws?

[Speaker E] Because he assumes that it’s not—that it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He assumes the—

[Speaker E] —the second approach.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is why. Why? What’s the difference? Why does it matter? After all, it’s the same principle. Here you tell me that half a labor is prohibited, and there you tell me that a partial measure is prohibited—what’s the difference? It’s the same thing. Why?

[Speaker D] Maybe it’s not the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s like the proposals people make: I have a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict—maybe if they sit and talk together they’ll reach an agreement and behave like human beings, that’s all. Wonderful solution.

[Speaker D] No, but he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say how to do it—that’s not a solution. What does “maybe it’s different” mean?

[Speaker D] I’m asking why. I can tell you because I know from what he explains, but I can tell you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand?

[Speaker D] I can tell you, but that’s what will come in his explanation later.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s not his explanation.

[Speaker D] So the explanation is that labor is called labor only when there is a result, and what happens with half a labor—there is no half-labor. Labor is a definition of a complete thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Sefat Emet’s answer. I’m asking an earlier question.

[Speaker D] Another question already.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s what I told you, that you can tell me. But that doesn’t answer what I’m asking. The Sefat Emet answers his question. I have another question. Why does the Sefat Emet relate to this at all as two different prohibitions, and then formulate his question that way? What about “do not place a stumbling block”? Forget “in doing it”—fine, I understand—but what about “do not place a stumbling block”? I’m saying, forget that; don’t formulate it that way. After all, it’s the same thing. “In doing it” and a partial measure are the same prohibition itself. “In doing it” ought to be Torah-level—not that there is some additional prohibition called a partial measure that would be Torah-level.

[Speaker E] But he doesn’t assume that it’s a new labor, as it were; he doesn’t assume that it’s a new prohibition, he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assumes exactly—so we need to see why the Sefat Emet asks it this way rather than simply identifying these two things and asking directly: why should half a labor not be prohibited by Torah law? And then he could answer with what Ruti brought. Fine. I’m asking a question that is not answered by the Sefat Emet’s answer. Okay, we have to stop here, so I’ll continue next week, and I’ll send you some more sustenance also for the seder, so that anyone who finishes the Gemara will also have something to do. In any case, even someone who did it quickly, I still suggest doing it with more attention in light of what we discussed today; maybe it’ll also be easier to understand. Okay?

[Speaker D] Thank you very much.