Paradoxes and Contradictions in Halakha, Lesson 7, Part B
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The limits of stepping outside the logical framework and the principle of non-contradiction
- Tarski, the axiomatization of the sciences, and the difference between science and mathematics
- Paradoxes in pure logic as nonsense and proof by contradiction
- “Mere words” and the question of God’s ability versus logical contradiction
- Loops in Jewish law: conditional divorce and marriage that cancels itself
- Responsa Menachem Meishiv (Rabbi Chaim Berlin) and stopping a loop through unfolding and the impossibility of canceling a cancellation
- An everlasting condition and severance, and the formulation “from today and after 30 days”
- Undo and redo on a computer as an analogy, and “reverse” as a positive action
- The Minchat Chinukh: a bill of divorce not written for its own sake, writing over writing on the Sabbath, and apostasy that cancels itself
- The fitness of witnesses for testimony about the new month and a loop around the very determination of the religious court
- The status of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principles and his standing as a medieval authority
- The paradox of the convert judge, Rabbi Sherman, and the distinction between a legal act and discovering an error
- The story of “the guy from Ponevezh” and a non-Jew who keeps the Sabbath, and an eruv
- The red heifer, the heifer whose neck is broken, “of his own will,” and an inevitable result one does not want as ad hoc principles
- Tosafot on Bava Metzia 30 and the Ran in Shitah Mekubetzet: “its disqualification becomes the cause of its validation”
Summary
General Overview
The text argues that one cannot step outside the basic laws of logic, especially the principle of non-contradiction, and it distinguishes between real logic and “logics” that are only borrowed usage within systems built for practical needs. It claims that paradoxes in pure logic are not solved by adding assumptions from systems like law, physics, or Jewish law, but at most by proof by contradiction or by declaring that the expression is nonsense and meaningless. It then brings loops and paradoxes in Jewish law and presents principles attributed to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, especially the hidden assumption of “unfolding” along a time-axis of successive stages, and sometimes also the principle of consistency, in order to stop legal effects that uproot themselves. Finally, it presents examples in which solutions seem like ad hoc principles, and discusses how medieval authorities deal with a loop of “he wants it” in the red heifer and in an inevitable result.
The limits of stepping outside the logical framework and the principle of non-contradiction
The text argues that one can step outside any internal system such as Jewish law or physics and add or change rules, but one cannot step outside the logical system itself. It defines logic as principles that are truly correct, headed by the principle of non-contradiction, and not as a set of rules built for certain needs. It states that a system in which something is true and its opposite is also true at the same time is impossible, because then every statement would be both true and false simultaneously. It says that systems that define “their own logic” are using the term logic only metaphorically, because the logic he is speaking about is not the result of axioms but a truth that cannot be qualified.
Tarski, the axiomatization of the sciences, and the difference between science and mathematics
The text describes how Tarski, in a book on logic, presents certain areas of biology and physics as an axiomatic system similar to mathematics, and from there raises the question of what the difference is between science and mathematics if science too can be presented as axioms and derivation rules. It argues that this is not really mathematics, because the axioms in science are taken from observation, while the derivation rules are mathematical only from that point on. It emphasizes that the central question is where the basic assumptions come from, and declares that in logic there are no assumptions from which the principle of non-contradiction is derived, because the principle is simply true, period.
Paradoxes in pure logic as nonsense and proof by contradiction
The text argues that in pure logic one cannot solve paradoxes using principles imported from systems of life such as law or physics, because in pure logic “either it is true or it is not true.” It presents the “barber paradox” as a logical structure that does not depend on barbers and people but on the form “X does Y to every Z who does not do Y to himself,” and states that there is no way to solve it using Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle about an inconsistent legal effect, because there is no added assumption here from a legal world but pure logic. It offers two possible responses: to say “there is no such barber” as a proof by contradiction, or to say that the sentence is nonsense, an empty expression with no content, like a “round triangle.” It argues that questions like “a bullet that penetrates every wall” versus “a wall that stops every bullet” are not answered yes or no, because they have no meaning and therefore “there is no question.”
“Mere words” and the question of God’s ability versus logical contradiction
The text illustrates nonsense through the question “Can the Holy One, blessed be He, create a stone that He cannot lift?” and calls it “mere words,” in the language of the Sages. It states that speech is supposed to express content, and when there is no content this is just moving one’s lips and not speaking. It argues that contradictory concepts are not merely “nonexistent in the world” but meaningless, and therefore even the statement “there is no such thing in the world” is borrowed usage, because it is unclear what one is talking about. It connects this to the discussion of the laws of logic versus the laws of physics, and to the question whether the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to the laws of logic or only to the laws of physics.
Loops in Jewish law: conditional divorce and marriage that cancels itself
The text cites Rabbi Yoav Rosenthal’s paradox of a conditional divorce that leads to a loop: fulfillment of the condition makes the divorce valid and allows marriage, but that same validity prevents or cancels an earlier stage; and failure to fulfill the condition returns the woman to the status of a married woman and invalidates other marriage, and so on in a loop. It states that the move is similar to other ideas involving conditional betrothal and divorce, and that it can be solved “in exactly the same way” using Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s two principles: the principle of consistency and the unfolding along the imaginary axis of time. It notes that there is a more severe difficulty here, in which the betrothal to Levi “does not take effect,” so it seems that already “at this very moment” the condition will not be fulfilled.
Responsa Menachem Meishiv (Rabbi Chaim Berlin) and stopping a loop through unfolding and the impossibility of canceling a cancellation
The text brings a case from Responsa Menachem Meishiv, section 1: a man divorces his wife conditionally, “from now and after 30 days,” such that during those 30 days, if she avoids eating anything forbidden, it will be a valid divorce. She then made a vow forbidding a loaf to herself, and the husband “annulled her vow on the day he heard it,” producing a loop: if the divorce stands, then he is not the husband and cannot annul it; if he cannot annul it, then the loaf is forbidden and she eats something forbidden and thereby cancels the divorce; if the divorce is canceled, then he is the husband and the annulment works, so there was no prohibition, and the cycle repeats. It argues that here the assumption of unfolding across the time-axis is enough to solve the problem without needing the principle of consistency, because the eating is a physical fact and not a legal effect that can be blocked by saying “a legal effect that, if it takes effect, then it does not take effect.” It concludes that the loop stops because after the divorce has been canceled and she is his wife, “you cannot cancel a cancellation,” and it brings an example from a responsum of the Rosh about someone who canceled an agent and cannot “cancel the cancellation” but must appoint him מחדש anew.
An everlasting condition and severance, and the formulation “from today and after 30 days”
The text says that if the condition is “forever,” it invalidates the condition because this is “not severance,” and any condition that restricts the woman forever “damages severance,” while the bill of divorce must bring about a situation in which after a finite time she will be permitted without restrictions. It comments that the wording “from today and after 30 days” is imprecise and prefers “on condition that,” and presents a distinction according to which “from today and after 30 days” is understood as a legal effect that is built gradually over time, in a dispute among the Amoraim and according to Jewish law in a certain way. It emphasizes that the divorce is certainly a legal effect, while the eating is a factual act and not a legal effect.
Undo and redo on a computer as an analogy, and “reverse” as a positive action
The text distinguishes between “canceling a cancellation” in a computer context like redo, and physical and logical reality in which “there is no such thing” as canceling a cancellation as a negative act. It argues that on a computer this looks like canceling a cancellation, but in fact it is rebuilding, and suggests understanding it as “reverse,” which is a positive action rather than a negative cancellation.
The Minchat Chinukh: a bill of divorce not written for its own sake, writing over writing on the Sabbath, and apostasy that cancels itself
The text presents a case of a bill of divorce written not for its own sake, and on the Sabbath someone passed a pen over it for its own sake intentionally. In the laws of bills of divorce this validates the document, because the second writing for its own sake adds meaning relative to the first writing. It explains that in the laws of the Sabbath, writing over writing is usually exempt, but when there is a significant new meaning, such as validating a bill of divorce for its own sake, it becomes meaningful writing and one is liable, similar to one letter at the end of a scroll that turns something that is not a scroll into a scroll. It quotes the language of the Minchat Chinukh: “Now if he wrote the bill of divorce intentionally on the Sabbath, he is an apostate, and it is not a valid bill of divorce,” and presents the loop in which validating the bill of divorce makes him an apostate, and being an apostate invalidates the bill of divorce; and if the bill of divorce is invalid, then he did not desecrate the Sabbath and is not an apostate. It states that here Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle can be applied because we are dealing with legal effects, both the validity of the bill of divorce and his status as an apostate, and therefore a legal effect that cancels itself does not take effect.
The fitness of witnesses for testimony about the new month and a loop around the very determination of the religious court
The text presents an example of witnesses on the thirtieth day of Adar who come so the new month can be sanctified, and witnesses who were born 13 years earlier on the New Moon of Nisan and expose them as conspiring witnesses, creating a loop: if the exposure is accepted, then it is not the New Moon and they are not 13 years old; and if they are not 13 years old, then there is no valid exposure, and so on. It argues that this is a loop of legal effects, because it depends on what the religious court determines and not on a natural fact.
The status of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principles and his standing as a medieval authority
The text raises the question whether Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principles are a halakhic ruling or a conceptual insight, and answers that this is “a conceptual insight that was ruled,” and argues that it underlies Tosafot in Kiddushin and without it one cannot understand Tosafot. It states that no one before him said this explicitly and that after him people quote him, and adds that “there always has to be someone first.”
The paradox of the convert judge, Rabbi Sherman, and the distinction between a legal act and discovering an error
The text describes a paradox in which a non-Jewish woman converted, a child was born to her after she converted and he became a judge, and after becoming a judge he invalidated his mother’s conversion “or a group that his mother is part of,” producing a loop: if he invalidated it then he is not a judge, and if he is not a judge there is no invalidation. It argues that this is a delicate question because canceling a conversion is not necessarily “an act of the religious court” but can be a retrospective discovery that the conversion never took effect at all, similar to a “mistaken transaction.” It distinguishes between saying to a woman “on this basis she did not become betrothed,” which is not canceling betrothal but revealing that there was no betrothal from the outset and does not require a religious court, and “the Rabbis uprooted the betrothal from him,” which is a legal act that uproots a betrothal that did take effect and requires a competent religious court, even “the greatest court of the generation.” It says that canceling a conversion, when people speak about it, means cancellation in the sense of a mistaken transaction and not the rule that “whoever converts, converts with the Rabbis’ understanding in mind,” and therefore even someone who is not a judge, and even a non-Jew who knows Jewish law, can say that the conversion never took effect, because this is a halakhic fact and not an authoritative act.
The story of “the guy from Ponevezh” and a non-Jew who keeps the Sabbath, and an eruv
The text tells a story about a guy from Ponevezh who studied for years, kept the Sabbath, and prayed, but told his study partner that he was a non-Jew, and the study partner objected that “a non-Jew who keeps the Sabbath is liable to death.” It says that the fellow replied that he kept the Sabbath but intentionally did some tiny act of desecration, like carrying, so that it would not be complete rest. And when the study partner said there was an eruv, he answered, “What are you, a non-Jew? You rely on an eruv? I don’t rely on an eruv.” It uses the story to illustrate the distinction between authority to perform an act and knowledge of Jewish law as a determination of status.
The red heifer, the heifer whose neck is broken, “of his own will,” and an inevitable result one does not want as ad hoc principles
The text says that making use of the red heifer or the heifer whose neck is broken invalidates them, but only if it is done “of the owner’s own will,” because “a person cannot forbid something that is not his.” It presents a logical difficulty according to which an owner would not want to invalidate an expensive red heifer, and so seemingly it would never be “of his own will,” and compares this to the Arukh’s position in the laws of the Sabbath: “an unintended act on the Sabbath is permitted,” an inevitable result is forbidden, but according to the Arukh an inevitable result is forbidden only when it is “an inevitable result that he wants,” producing a difficulty because a person cannot want a result that will lead to stoning, and therefore seemingly there is no inevitable result at all. It argues that solutions trying to define “he wants it” without taking punishment into account are introducing an ad hoc principle beyond pure logic, and adds that Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle of consistency will not work here because wanting or not wanting is a fact and not a legal effect.
Tosafot on Bava Metzia 30 and the Ran in Shitah Mekubetzet: “its disqualification becomes the cause of its validation”
The text quotes Tosafot on Bava Metzia 30: “And if you say, if a male mounted it, why is it disqualified? Surely he certainly does not want to invalidate a red heifer whose value is great for the sake of some small thing,” and brings their answer: “One can say that if it were valid, he would want it.” It then cites the Ran in Shitah Mekubetzet, who adds: “Since, in terms of the act itself, he wants it, we cannot validate it on account of its disqualification, for then its disqualification would become the cause of its validation, and that is impossible. And furthermore, if you validate it, then certainly he wants it.” It asks why to stop after one step, because the answer itself creates a loop in which if you validate it, then he wants it, and then it becomes disqualified, and notes that the phrase “for then its disqualification would become the cause of its validation, and that is impossible” almost explicitly expresses a principle similar to Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle.
Full Transcript
You know, there’s this idea of stepping outside it and reaching the realms of nonsense. Right, that’s Lewis Carroll. No, there’s no such thing as stepping outside the framework of logic. Up to logic, you can step outside. Any internal system—Jewish law, physics, whatever you want—you can step outside and say, I’m not bound by those rules, or I’ll add some other rules. But to step outside the logical system—that’s not really possible.
[Speaker B] Maybe a different logical system?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean—that truth and falsehood simultaneously are both fine?
[Speaker B] There would be different rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the rules are the rules that, again, you’re assuming that a logical system is something that exists in me, that it doesn’t reflect—
[Speaker C] —the structure that I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —build, that doesn’t reflect truth. No. I’m talking about the principle of non-contradiction, not rules of inference. The rules of inference too, by the way, that’s the same question, but the principle of non-contradiction: that something cannot be true and its opposite true at the same time. What, can I build a system where that is so? If so, then I’ll build a system where that is so, and then every sentence you say in the system will be both true and not true at the same time. There’s no such thing. There is no system that can deviate from the basic laws of logic. Sometimes there are systems that define for themselves their own logic, but that’s only metaphorical use of the term logic. When people say there is some logical structure that I can define as some other logic, that’s just borrowed language. When I talk about logic, I’m talking about the rules that are actually true, not rules that I construct for certain purposes, okay? For example, Tarski in one of his books on logic presents biology and physics, or certain areas of biology and physics, as an axiomatic system. As if it were mathematics, which raises very interesting questions. What’s the difference between science and mathematics if you can present it as some sort of axiomatic system? But clearly that’s not really mathematics, because you took the axioms from observation. From there on, the rules of derivation are mathematics—okay, so what? Obviously, that’s how we think in every field. But the question is where the fundamental assumptions come from. In logic there are no fundamental assumptions. There are no assumptions from which the principle of non-contradiction emerges. The principle of non-contradiction is simply true, period. It’s not the result of some assumptions brought from observation, or from legislation in the Knesset, or from Jewish law, or from some source that could also tell me, okay, this is qualified. It’s just true because it’s true. You can’t qualify it. Okay? Therefore, you can’t solve real logical problems that way. That only works for problems from life—physics, law, or something connected somehow to the world—not to some artificial construct, not to pure logic itself. In pure logic itself, you can’t solve those paradoxes that way. Same thing, for example, with the barber paradox, yes? The barber who shaves all the people who do not shave themselves. That too is really a paradox in logic. Think about it—the barber here isn’t important. X that does Y to every Z that does not do Y to itself. It doesn’t matter, we’re not talking here about barbers and people, it’s a logical structure, okay? That logical structure is paradoxical. You can’t solve it by using Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle, because you can’t define a legal effect such that if it’s inconsistent then it doesn’t take effect. There’s no assumption here that you’re adding from the world of law or physics; this is pure logic. In pure logic, either it’s true or it’s not true. You can’t solve it in that way. You can say: the meaning of the sentence “a barber who shaves all the people who do not shave themselves”—there is no such barber. Meaning, there is no such barber, because if there were such a barber, he would contradict himself. Fine? A proof by contradiction that there is no such barber. Or, that sentence is nonsense—it says nothing, it expresses no idea, because there really cannot be a barber who shaves all the people who do not shave themselves. So the expression “a barber who shaves all the people who do not shave themselves” is an empty expression, it has no content. That you can say. A proof by contradiction, because its essence leads to contradiction.
[Speaker D] Like a round triangle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like a round triangle, or like we talked about—what happens when a bullet that penetrates every wall meets a wall that stops every bullet. We talked about that, right? What happens then? What do you say? There’s no such thing. There’s no such thing. If there is a wall that stops every bullet, then there is no bullet that penetrates every wall, and vice versa. You can’t have both. Okay. It sounds like a very intelligent question. You could say yes, you could say no. But here it’s not that the answer yes is right and the answer no is wrong. It’s nonsense. The question has no meaning. The answer is neither yes nor no. The answer is: there is no question. Explain the question to me. What is the meaning of your question? Once you explain the question, I’ll answer yes, no, I’ll try to answer. Okay? Very often we say things that seem meaningful to us, but actually have no meaning behind them. It’s just lip movement.
[Speaker C] Yes, like whether the Holy One, blessed be He, can create a stone that He can’t lift.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mere words, in the language of the Sages. Meaning, just verbal fluff. They express no content. Speech is generally supposed to express content. If speech is just moving lips or blowing air, that’s not speech.
[Speaker B] And how is that different from a triangle with four sides? Same thing. Same thing. It’s also—so if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand every word, I even feel that I understand the connection between them, but that’s an illusion. It’s just words.
[Speaker D] So why is a round triangle something that just doesn’t exist in the world?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not that it doesn’t exist in the world. The concept is contradictory; it has no meaning. It’s meaningless, and therefore presumably it also doesn’t exist in the world. But it’s meaningless. I can’t even really say that there’s no such thing in the world, because I don’t know what I’m talking about when I talk about it. Right? But even the statement that this thing is not in the world—yes, what—
[Speaker C] What is that “this”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. A sentence like that also contains some concept that has no meaning, so it too says nothing. Okay, I can’t say anything about it. It’s not that it doesn’t exist in the world; saying it doesn’t exist in the world is just borrowed language. The point is that there is no such thing—it’s meaningless. That’s the point. We talked about that: the laws of logic versus the laws of physics, and whether the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to the laws of logic or only to the laws of physics, yes? So that’s… okay. So that’s regarding logical or mathematical paradoxes. Let’s see more cases of loops. For example, I think I mentioned this at the end of last time. There’s someone named Rabbi Yoav Rosenthal; in one of his articles this paradox appears. Reuven divorced his wife on condition that she marry Shimon. That yes, she marry Shimon, okay? And she married Levi. Then she left Levi without a bill of divorce, okay? And married Shimon. She left Levi without a bill of divorce and married Shimon.
[Speaker E] What? But how can she?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She physically left Levi, meaning she left Levi’s house. She left Shimon and went to Levi’s house. But she left that without a bill of divorce. Okay, now what happens here? So if she… sorry, the condition is about Levi, not Shimon. The condition is that she be continuously with Levi, yes?
[Speaker B] No—
[Speaker C] No, no, the condition is that she be married to Levi, yes. That that option always exists.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And therefore I’m saying, when he divorced her on condition that she be—
[Speaker C] No, here it’s within five years.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the paradox? No, doesn’t matter. Within five years, not important. Within that time. Now she married Levi. What happens there? Okay? So if she married Levi, then she fulfilled the condition, right? If she fulfilled the condition, then she was divorced, so she’s married to Shimon, because she’s not Reuven’s wife, because he divorced her and the divorce is valid. So she is married to Shimon. But if she left Shimon without a bill of divorce and she is married to Shimon, then her betrothal to Levi does not take effect. But if she didn’t marry Levi, then she didn’t fulfill the condition, so she’s not divorced from Reuven. If she’s not divorced from Reuven, then she is Reuven’s wife, so the marriage to Shimon is invalid because she is a married woman. But if it’s invalid, then what do I care that she left him? She can marry Levi. What’s the problem? And so on. Yes, it’s the same move, only this time it’s betrothal on condition that she does marry, not on condition that she does not marry. Similar idea. Here too, of course, it goes exactly the same with Rabbi Shimon’s two principles—the principle of consistency and the unfolding along that imaginary axis like time. You can solve it in exactly the same way. Once she is divorced through the first divorce, there is no problem at all.
[Speaker C] No, but there’s a harder problem here, because the betrothal to Levi does not take effect, cannot take effect. Right. Which means that in principle we already stand here, at this very moment, knowing that he will not fulfill the condition. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like—this is also the situation in the case of her bill of divorce.
[Speaker C] At that same time the condition was not fulfilled, so the bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce, right? The bill of divorce is not a bill of divorce. And then the betrothal to Shimon did not take effect, and she’s a married woman.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So this is a legal effect such that if it takes effect, it uproots itself, so it does not take effect. Okay, now a third case—an interesting one. Because after I noticed that in Rabbi Shimon Shkop you need one more assumption that he doesn’t say, this assumption of unfolding the events one after another, suddenly I encountered a case where, as far as I understand, that assumption alone is enough. You don’t need the principle of consistency to solve it. The principle of consistency can’t solve any problem without also assuming unfolding, because what would you apply it to? You need to assume stage after stage. But here it turns out there’s a case where unfolding alone solves the problem; you don’t need the principle of consistency. Look at the case. Yes, this is in Responsa Menachem Meishiv, Rabbi Chaim Berlin. In Responsa Menachem Meishiv, section 1. He writes as follows: Someone divorces his wife conditionally, from now and after 30 days, such that during these 30 days, if she refrains from eating anything forbidden, it will be a valid divorce. Okay? He divorces her on condition that for 30 days she not eat anything forbidden. If she eats anything forbidden, the divorce is void. And if she tastes any forbidden thing, it will not be a divorce. And within those 30 days she made a vow about a loaf using the formula of a vow. Within those thirty days after the divorce, say after a week, she said, “This loaf is forbidden to me by vow.” Okay, fine. The husband who had divorced her previously annulled her vow on the day he heard it. A husband can annul his wife’s vows on the day he hears them—vows of affliction and so on—he can annul them. On the day he hears it… but he’s not the husband… okay, so that’s the question… after all, the moment she didn’t keep her word she… and of course she ate it. He annulled it. He annulled it, so there’s no problem—she can eat. What happened now? If she ate, if it’s not forbidden, then it’s not forbidden because he annulled it. Right? So she did not eat anything forbidden. If she did not eat anything forbidden, then the divorce stands. And if the divorce stands, then he is not the husband, he cannot annul it. Because she is not his wife. Then she ate something forbidden. But if he didn’t annul it, then she ate something forbidden. If she ate something forbidden, then he is the husband, because the divorce was voided. Then he can annul it after all, and so on. Okay? Now here, by my reckoning, you don’t even need the principle of consistency—sorry, the principle of consistency—you only need the principle of unfolding along the timeline. Why? Let’s do the calculation. He divorces her on condition that she not eat something forbidden. There’s no problem with that at all, right? It meets the consistency criterion, everything is fine. After that she makes a vow. That vow is also fine. She can keep the vow and not eat, and then no problem will arise, right? It’s not a vow that necessarily uproots itself. So the vow too takes effect. Now she comes to eat the—at that point she is already divorced. She comes to eat the loaf.
[Speaker C] There’s no issue of legal effect here at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It’s not a legal effect, it’s a preparation. It’s not—it’s logic, not legal law. Yes. Or in a certain sense, yes, it’s a fact. Not a legal effect. So now she comes to eat the loaf, right?
[Speaker C] Before he—
[Speaker B] —permitted it to her?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come on, he annulled it on the day he heard it. He annulled it on the day he heard it.
[Speaker B] What creates the whole mess is the act of eating—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he’s not—
[Speaker B] —not the legal effect of something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he’s not her husband. He’s not her husband, right? So if he’s not her husband, then that annulment is worth nothing. Okay? So the loaf is forbidden. Now she eats it. That certainly takes place. There’s nothing to “take effect” here—she ate. It’s not a legal effect, not a legal act. It’s a physical act: she ate something. Here you can’t apply what Rabbi Shimon Shkop said earlier. What?
[Speaker E] Like drinking wine, which we mentioned earlier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It’s not a legal act to which you can apply those kinds of constraints—that any legal effect which, if it takes effect, then it doesn’t take effect, and so it doesn’t take effect. Right? You can’t apply that legal-effect analysis here. What do you mean, impossible to eat? She ate. That’s the fact. She simply ate. So she ate something forbidden. The moment she ate something forbidden, what happened? She violated the condition. The divorce is void. Fine? If the divorce is void, then he was her husband when he annulled her vow, right? Now he annulled it, so in fact it wasn’t forbidden to her, right? Now if it wasn’t forbidden to her, then when she ate, she didn’t eat anything forbidden. If she didn’t eat anything forbidden, then she didn’t violate the condition, right? Then what will happen?
[Speaker B] She is divorced after all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then she didn’t violate the condition, and then yes, she is divorced. So she is divorced. Meaning, at some stage there is a situation where she remains divorced and you want to return her to being a married woman because she violated the condition, right?
[Speaker C] Because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if he’s her husband, then she ate on the day he heard it, so he—if he’s not her husband, then he didn’t annul it, and she ate something forbidden, and then she’ll go back to being his wife because she is not divorced, right? But there’s no such thing—how does she go back to being his wife? He didn’t betroth her again. She doesn’t—
[Speaker C] She doesn’t go back to being his wife. She was always not divorced. Rather, the bill of divorce didn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the point. If I say that events happen moment by moment, Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s first assumption, then right now she is already divorced. You want to say that after she is divorced she goes back to being married? You can’t go back to being married.
[Speaker C] Wait, but what happens in an ordinary condition? He said: this is on condition that you not drink wine for 30 days. And she ate—she drank wine after 20 days. No problem. So what, does she go back to being his wife?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly. Because from the outset the act is defined as an act under a condition.
[Speaker C] So same thing here too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That she not eat this in a forbidden way. Exactly the same thing. No. Here she goes back—here she goes back to being his wife—wait, let me think.
[Speaker C] She ate something, she did, she ate something forbidden. It’s exactly the same thing. Wait.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there she ate, she ate something forbidden, and then she violated the condition. If she violated the condition, then the divorce—
[Speaker C] —was voided.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then he annuls it on the day he heard it, so she is his wife, yes? He annuls it on the day he heard it, and then she actually didn’t—ah, no, it goes the other way. Then the divorce is voided, so she is his wife, right? And now what happened? If she is his wife, then he annulled it, right? So then she ate. Okay. Now once she ate, it wasn’t forbidden, right? So she didn’t violate the condition. But she is already his wife; the divorce has already been voided.
[Speaker B] That—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not now going to switch back—she’s not now going to go back to being divorced. It works in the opposite direction, not in the direction that she goes back to being his wife. After all, the divorce has already been voided. Rabbi Shimon’s assumption is that each stage happens after the previous one. Right now we are at the stage where the divorce has been voided. Now what do you want to happen? The divorce has been voided, meaning she is his wife. He didn’t give her another bill of divorce. There isn’t one. The bill of divorce is void. That’s it. So now what do you want to happen—that she go back to being… how? He would have to give her another bill of divorce for that. She is already his wife. In the law of conditions you’re right, a condition can undo everything, like a normal condition, but that is to undo the divorce so that she goes back to being his wife. But how do you undo the fact that she went back to being his wife? That you can’t undo.
[Speaker C] So then what happens in practice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then what happens is that she is his wife. She is his wife. Yes, she is his wife and she ate something permitted.
[Speaker C] She ate something permitted and she—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is his wife. And we didn’t use the principle of consistency. This is without the principle of consistency, because eating is not a legal effect where you can say that if it takes effect it doesn’t take effect, so therefore you can’t feed it to her.
[Speaker C] Meaning, in practice what will happen is that she is his wife, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, his wife, and she did not eat something forbidden.
[Speaker C] So basically it’s not a loop—it stops.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is a loop. It stops? No, theoretically it is a loop. What happens? If she ate something that wasn’t forbidden, then she didn’t violate the condition, so she isn’t his wife, so she’s divorced. The point is this: exactly at the moment when the bill of divorce has already been canceled and now she is his wife, you cannot cancel a cancellation. There’s a responsum of the Rosh, a responsum of the Rosh about someone who sent an agent and then canceled him—canceled the agency. Now he wanted to cancel the cancellation, to make him an agent again. Can you? The Rosh says no. Why? Because after you canceled the agency, that’s it, it’s over. You want him to be your agent? Appoint him again. You can’t cancel a cancellation. Cancellation is not a positive thing. Cancellation is the cancellation of something else; you can’t cancel cancellations. Okay? So here too, same thing. So I canceled the bill of divorce. What do you want—to cancel the cancellation of the bill of divorce? You can’t cancel cancellations. The cancellation of the bill of divorce is not conditional on her eating.
[Speaker C] Right, that you can’t cancel a cancellation—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —so that means—
[Speaker C] In practice the loop stops because you can’t cancel a cancellation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s only because of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle. Because without that, I’m not canceling a cancellation—it all happens at the same moment. It’s not that first there was a cancellation and afterward I came to cancel it. I have to relate to it as successive events. Therefore this is an exceptional case, the only one I’ve encountered. Maybe there are others, but this is the only one I’ve encountered, and there are quite a few of these loops.
[Speaker E] But the case you spoke about, where in the end the woman ate something permitted—you basically said this was limited to 30 days. So fine, eight days, 30 days, the woman is divorced, end of story. What happens if he doesn’t make it conditional on 30 days, but forever? If you don’t eat anything forbidden. Forever? Yes. No, you can’t make such a condition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not severance.
[Speaker E] The condition is void. Why?
[Speaker D] Because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A condition that restricts the woman forever invalidates the condition. You can’t do that. That’s the law.
[Speaker E] But that’s not a restriction on a commandment, it’s a restriction on a prohibition—not to eat something forbidden. Yes, but it’s forever.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter. Any condition, any condition that restricts the woman—doesn’t matter whether it’s about a prohibition or not—if the condition is everlasting, it damages severance. And the bill of divorce has to bring us to a state where after a finite period she will be permitted without any restrictions. That’s a general rule of severance.
[Speaker B] The legal effect of the divorce itself—the bill of divorce itself—after all, it doesn’t take effect immediately. It takes effect from today and after 30 days.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. It takes effect immediately. By the way, that phrasing “from today and after 30 days” is imprecise. “On condition that.” On condition that you don’t eat for 30 days—that’s not “from today.” He really uses an unsuccessful expression here, because “from today and after 30 days” is something built, something that is constructed until then. It is built gradually until then. A legal effect that is built gradually until then. But here the legal effect is the first thing; the eating is not a legal effect, it’s an action.
[Speaker B] Eating no, but the bill of divorce—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the bill of divorce, no problem—the divorce is immediate.
[Speaker B] No, if in the case where one says “from today and after 30 days,” that’s called a legal effect, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every bill of divorce is a legal effect. What do you mean? “From today and after 30 days” means that the divorce is built over the course of the 30 days, according to Jewish law. It’s a dispute among the Amoraim, but according to Jewish law the divorce is built over those 30 days. It’s as though it gradually strengthens until it reaches full force at the end of the 30 days.
[Speaker B] The question is whether it’s a fact or a legal effect?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s a legal effect. Divorce is a legal effect, certainly. A bill of divorce is a legal effect, certainly. No, but the case here is not—every bill of divorce, whether “from today and after 30,” or “on condition that”—every bill of divorce is a legal effect, obviously. It’s not a fact. Okay, so in fact here we have a case where we stop the loop without needing the principle of consistency, but only with the hidden principle that Rabbi Shimon Shkop assumes even without saying it. In fact that alone is enough. The principle of consistency can’t appear without it, but it can also work without the principle of consistency.
[Speaker C] And in practice there’s also another principle, that you can’t cancel a cancellation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I think that’s something—
[Speaker D] Yes, that’s obvious. Okay, in computer science you have that.
[Speaker C] Undo and redo.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Redo is—
[Speaker D] On a computer it’s canceling a cancellation. Redo, Control-Y. Control-Y.
[Speaker C] You can define it as rebuilding.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not familiar, but okay.
[Speaker C] You do it again.
[Speaker D] It’s canceling a cancellation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From your perspective it’s canceling a cancellation, but you understand that in the computer it doesn’t work that way.
[Speaker C] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in the computer, if you implemented it in hardware as canceling a cancellation, there would be no such thing. That’s exactly the point. In physics or in something that actually happens, that can’t be. In logic you can define whatever you want. You call it canceling a cancellation, but it’s nothing of the sort. If in hardware you created a mechanism of canceling a cancellation, there would be no such thing. There’s no such thing. You can do reverse.
[Speaker B] You can do reverse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reverse is a positive action, not a negative one.
[Speaker C] You can’t cancel lowering a switch; you can raise it again. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there’s another question. What happens? Yes, it seems to me maybe I mentioned this too.
[Speaker C] A bill of divorce written not for its own sake—the Minchat Chinukh, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A bill of divorce written not for its own sake, and on the Sabbath someone passed a pen over it for its own sake intentionally. Okay?
[Speaker C] The bill of divorce was written not for its own sake, so the bill of divorce is invalid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture I said this as an example, and I said I’d spell it out. So here it is: a bill of divorce was written not for her sake, and on the Sabbath he went over the letters again with a quill, rewrote them over the existing letters, but this time for her sake. In the laws of bills of divorce, that validates the bill. Why? Writing on top of writing is usually not considered writing, but since the first writing was not written for her sake and the second writing was written for her sake, it’s as if something was added. It takes effect on the first writing, and that is the relevant writing of the bill of divorce, so now the bill is written for her sake and it is valid. But here’s the catch: I did that intentionally on the Sabbath, that second writing. So what happens?
[Speaker B] He didn’t divorce on the Sabbath, he only wrote.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, he wrote the bill of divorce.
[Speaker B] We’re not talking about the legal effect of the divorce, we’re talking about the validity of the bill. The validity of the bill. No, what’s intentional here? He didn’t write on the Sabbath, he only wrote. He wrote on the Sabbath, wrote for her sake on the Sabbath. No, he passed the quill over it, took a quill and wrote on the Sabbath for her sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he wrote over letters that were already there. In the laws of the Sabbath, writing on top of writing makes you exempt. Okay? Even intentionally—you didn’t write. It’s a rabbinic prohibition. Yes, a rabbinic prohibition, but there’s no Torah prohibition, it’s not considered writing because you didn’t do anything; there were letters and there are still letters. Okay? You’re exempt. But if there is some additional novelty in this writing—for example here, where the novelty is that it is for her sake, which validates the bill of divorce—then it is considered a prohibition, even on the Sabbath; you are liable to stoning. Desecration of the Sabbath? No—but if you wrote for her sake, then that writing is significant from the standpoint of the laws of divorce. Once it is significant from the standpoint of the laws of divorce, then on the Sabbath too it is considered significant writing.
[Speaker C] You took a sheet of paper and turned it into a bill of divorce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. And then this is significant writing, like one letter at the end of a scroll. Normally, for writing on the Sabbath, you need two letters to violate it, but at the end of a scroll one letter is enough. Why? Because one letter turns something that isn’t a scroll into a scroll, so it’s significant. So too here: the writing for her sake, which is relevant to the laws of bills of divorce, turns the second writing into significant writing, so from the standpoint of the laws of the Sabbath now you are liable to stoning. You did it intentionally, with witnesses and warning, everything is in order. Okay, so I’m liable to stoning. So the Minchat Chinukh says: “And behold, one who writes a bill of divorce intentionally on the Sabbath is an apostate, and it is not a valid bill.” An apostate who writes a bill of divorce—the bill is not a bill.
[Speaker C] If it’s not a bill, then he didn’t write.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “So too here: if we say that it is not a bill because he is an apostate, then in truth if it is not a bill he did not desecrate the Sabbath by writing at all, because writing on top of writing is permitted on the Sabbath.” After all, the whole reason I became an apostate is because this bill is valid. By writing it for her sake, I turned the bill into a valid one; through that I committed a Sabbath transgression and became an apostate. Once I’m an apostate, then the bill is not valid. If the bill is not valid, then this writing didn’t do anything to the page. So if that’s the case, I did not desecrate the Sabbath, so I’m not an apostate. If I’m not an apostate, then it is a valid bill—and so on. Yes, this is the same principle again. What do you do in such a case? Let’s do Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s calculation again. Okay? So he wrote the bill for her sake.
[Speaker C] The moment he writes… here it’s a pause in the legal effect. What? Here it’s a pause in the legal effect. Right. Here you can make a Rabbi Shimon Shkop move, a legal effect of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of the bill, and also apostate status; turning him into an apostate is also a kind of legal effect. Clearly. Therefore here you really can apply Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle and say: he wrote over the existing writing, wrote it for her sake, at that moment the bill is a valid bill, and then as a result of that he in fact violated the Sabbath.
[Speaker C] It can’t be a valid bill because that will make it invalid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, and he became an apostate, and apostate status cancels the bill.
[Speaker C] Like betrothal, the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So this is another example. There are more examples if you want, not about divorce, okay? If he works…
[Speaker C] Something in betrothal, I don’t know… what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, there are completely different things. You want something entirely different? The fitness of witnesses for testimony about the new month. Okay? On the thirtieth day of Adar, two valid witnesses came who had seen the new moon so that it could be sanctified today. Okay? And then came witnesses who had been born thirteen years earlier on the first of Nisan. The witnesses were born on the first of Nisan thirteen years earlier; they are exactly thirteen years old and became fit for testimony. Okay? Now, on the first of Nisan they became adults, and now they disqualify the valid witnesses as plotting witnesses. Those witnesses who were born thirteen years earlier disqualify the valid witnesses and say: you weren’t here, you were with us.
[Speaker C] If they disqualify them, then it isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the first of the month, so they aren’t witnesses. If they aren’t witnesses, then they’re not yet thirteen, so they aren’t witnesses. If they aren’t witnesses, then the first pair wasn’t disqualified, so they are witnesses—and so on. Okay? So here again you have a loop. But again, here we’re talking about legal effects. There’s no problem in principle. We’re talking about legal effects because here none of this is a fact. It’s a question of what the religious court determines. It’s not a factual question.
[Speaker E] Yes, but what Rabbi Shimon Shkop determines regarding what we said about the issue that the spreading removes time and the second issue—is that something that was actually ruled as a matter of Jewish law in principle, or is it just a conceptual idea?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A conceptual idea that was ruled. He argues that this is what underlies Tosafot’s comments in tractate Kiddushin; without this you can’t understand Tosafot.
[Speaker E] Tosafot ruled that way, and he explains it. Is there anyone else who holds like Rabbi Shimon?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No one says it explicitly except for all those who quote him, those who came after him. But no one said it before him. There’s always someone who’s first. Even before Tosafot no one said what Tosafot said. There is a first one; that doesn’t disqualify you. So you’re allowed to be first. There always has to be someone first, no? Okay. There are more examples. In Peraglei Dibura there are certain examples that I won’t go into. There is, yes, the paradox of the convert judge. Okay? In tractate Yevamot 47—or not specifically Yevamot, it’s a Talmudic passage from which I can derive this paradox. A paradox—someone once asked me this paradox, I think. I never found it anywhere. Someone once asked me this, I don’t remember anymore. A non-Jewish woman converted, she gave birth to a child after she converted, and he became a judge. After he became a judge, he invalidated his mother’s conversion. Rabbi Sherman. He was born from… he invalidated his mother’s conversion, or that of a group that included his mother. What do you do in such a case?
[Speaker C] Then he’s not a judge. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he invalidated her, then he’s not a judge. If he’s not a judge, then her conversion is not void. But here the question is a bit subtler. Because we once talked about this—it was around that ruling where I once annulled a betrothal, when I sat on some religious court that annulled a betrothal. So I think I talked about it once, I don’t remember when. And I said that basically this is not even a judicial act. Meaning, suppose a woman got married, and in the end it turned out that the husband had some defect or something that she—
[Speaker C] —didn’t know about, something—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —like that. So she comes to a religious court, and the court says to her, “Had she known this, she would not have become betrothed.” Meaning, if she had known this, she would not have agreed to betrothal, like a mistaken transaction. So they annul the betrothal, okay? Do you need a religious court in order to do that?
[Speaker C] No, because it’s not really annulment of betrothal. Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not an annulment of a betrothal. All I’m really doing is revealing to her that she was mistaken. She thought she was betrothed—mistakenly. There never was any betrothal. There was no betrothal to begin with.
[Speaker C] It’s not even annulment like with a condition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a condition, the condition cancels the betrothal. Here it’s not cancellation; it never existed. You thought you were becoming betrothed—you were mistaken. You thought this was the husband, but it turns out this isn’t the husband you thought it was, so you are not betrothed. In such a case, it’s enough that there be someone who knows the material and tells the woman, “Dear woman, you are not betrothed. You thought you were betrothed; you were mistaken.” It’s enough that there be such a person for her to be able to go and marry someone else. There is no need to go to a religious court at all. When we say, “the rabbis removed the betrothal from him,” that’s something else. Because there the rabbis perform a legal act: they uproot a betrothal that took effect. That can only be done by an authorized religious court. Yes, uprooting betrothal is not something just any religious court can do—only the supreme court of the generation or something like that. It has to be an authorized court, because this is an active legal act. That requires a court. But to tell a woman that she is living under a halakhic mistake—that can be said by anyone who knows Jewish law. Now exactly the same applies to invalidating a conversion. If you invalidate the conversion as a legal act—I don’t recognize such a thing. Where does it say, “whoever converts does so subject to the rabbis”? There is no such rule. When people speak of invalidating a conversion, they mean invalidation in the sense of a mistaken transaction. You thought the conversion was valid, and then it turned out there was something there that you didn’t know. So it isn’t a conversion; no conversion ever took place. This is the kind of invalidation I spoke about earlier. In such a case, you don’t really need to be a judge in order to invalidate the conversion. Even if you’re a non-Jew. If you’re a non-Jew who knows Jewish law, and you know that in such a case the conversion never takes effect, there is no problem at all.
[Speaker B] But where does the authority come from to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need authority. It’s a fact. It’s not authority. For an action, you need authority. Here you don’t need authority, you need knowledge. That’s all.
[Speaker C] It’s like going to ask a Jewish law question to someone who knows what the law is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you know the story about the guy from Ponevezh who discovered that… yes, that his study partner, his study partner… They had been study partners for years. One of them is getting married and he says to his study partner, “Come be a witness at my wedding.” He says, listen, I’ll tell you the truth: I’m a non-Jew. What do you mean, a non-Jew? Was it for nothing that the undertakers prepared the dead, that the mourners eulogized? You’ve been studying Torah in yeshiva for years, praying, keeping the Sabbath. Yes, but I’m a non-Jew. But what do you mean? You kept the Sabbath? A non-Jew who keeps the Sabbath is liable to death—you can’t be a non-Jew. Meaning, you know Jewish law; he was a learned fellow. Okay? You know you’re forbidden to rest. So he said: right, I put a stone in my pocket so I would carry—well, not a stone, some object in my pocket that I took from a private domain to a public domain, or carried four cubits in the public domain, some tiny Sabbath violation. Yes, I did one little Sabbath violation so that this would count as proper Sabbath observance. That’s what he tells him. So he says to him, what do you mean? But there’s an eruv in the city. So he says, what are you, a non-Jew? You rely on an eruv? I don’t rely on an eruv. Okay, so it’s the same principle. Or a non-Jew invalidates the divorce. He says, what do you mean? Not divorce—it’s simple Jewish law that this doesn’t invalidate it. Fine, this is a story that could have happened, by the way; I don’t reject it at all. Okay, I just want to bring two more examples that, if I can fit them into the three minutes we have left, are very similar to one another. Again, a loop, but it seems to me that in this loop Rabbi Shimon Shkop won’t help, I think, in these loops. It says that if one makes use of a red heifer, or of the heifer whose neck is broken, that invalidates them. Okay? If a yoke was placed on it, we said that they used it, worked with it. But that use has to be with the owner’s consent. If it is not with the owner’s consent, it does not invalidate the animal. Yes, if someone else made use of my red heifer, a person cannot prohibit something that is not his. Meaning, you can’t prohibit something that belongs to me, only if it is with my consent, if I agree. Okay? Now, how can there ever be a case where an animal is invalidated as a red heifer? Say I do labor with it. Obviously I’m not doing labor in order to invalidate it—am I crazy? I want a red heifer, it’s very valuable, worth a lot of money. So obviously I don’t want the heifer to become invalid. If so, then the labor was done not with my consent, in the sense that I don’t consent to invalidating the heifer. Okay?
[Speaker C] Even if I myself did the labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The yoke was placed on it with the owner’s consent—it was agreeable to him that it should become invalid, and then that’s fine. I said: when would it ever be agreeable to him that it become invalid? I don’t want it to become invalid. “With his consent” means that he is pleased that it becomes invalid. I’m skipping a bunch of nuances here, because otherwise I’d have to get into—you know what, I’ll take a different example. This example requires further assumptions, and that drags us into the Talmudic passage, with “if water was put” and all kinds of things like that. So let’s take a simpler example. There is the author of the Arukh. He says: the rule is that an unintended act on the Sabbath is permitted. Okay? But if it is an inevitable result, then it is prohibited. Right? Someone drags a bench and creates a furrow; creating the furrow is prohibited, and this is an unintended act. But if it is an inevitable result—this is ground where a furrow will certainly be made—then it is prohibited. Rabbi Shimon agrees in the case of “cut off its head and will it not die?” But, says the author of the Arukh, that is only when it is an inevitable result that is agreeable to him. If it is an inevitable result that is not agreeable to him, then no. Okay? Now the question is: how can it ever be that someone violates a prohibition through an inevitable result? It is obviously not agreeable to him. He is not pleased that a furrow should be made here—why? Because they’ll stone him. Is he crazy? Obviously it is not agreeable to him. So if that’s the case, then the furrow is not something he wants to be created. So that means that according to the author of the Arukh there is no such thing as an inevitable result.
[Speaker B] No, what does that mean? He stands in court and he isn’t… and they didn’t catch him. So anything on Tuesday…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already an ad hoc principle; we’ll see in a second. But first of all, the question. He says: first of all the question itself. It has to be that the furrow is made with his consent. It’s not with his consent; he doesn’t want to be stoned. So if he doesn’t want to be stoned, then it’s never with his consent—but that will be true in every case of inevitable result. Every inevitable result will be not agreeable to him. And if an inevitable result that is not agreeable to him exempts, as the author of the Arukh holds—
[Speaker E] You can say the same thing about someone who turns on a light on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s an inevitable—
[Speaker E] —result, not agreeable to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, but in an intentional act there is no requirement that it be agreeable to him. In an intentional act there is no requirement that it be agreeable to him; only in an unintended act is there such a requirement. Because in an unintended act I am dragging a bench, I am not making a furrow. You want to attribute the furrow to me because it’s an inevitable result—only if it is agreeable to me. Don’t attribute to me things that are not agreeable to me. Okay? So that is exactly the point. So here there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who really want to say—actually not about the Arukh; regarding the Arukh there are no medieval authorities (Rishonim)—rather about “a yoke was placed on it with his consent,” and there there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who want to say that it has to be agreeable to him without this consideration of punishment for desecrating the Sabbath; rather, agreeable to him in the sense that he wants the furrow simply because the furrow serves him. Because the furrow is useful to him, not because it is really agreeable to him. But again, notice: this is introducing an ad hoc principle beyond pure logic. In pure logic there is no solution, and you can introduce, as Rabbi Shimon did for his loops, some other principle here, and that principle can solve the problem—but it’s a principle you are manually introducing in order to solve the problem. By the way, Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s consistency principle won’t work here, because “with his consent” and “without his consent” again is not a legal effect.
[Speaker B] What he wants or doesn’t want is a fact. You can’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s like the original source, so he can say that he would prefer to cut off the chicken’s head and have it continue living. Okay, right. Same thing. Right. And then that—is not with the owner’s consent… yes. Why this is called unintended, and inevitable result, is itself a big question, but that’s how it is defined in the Talmud. Okay, so the same thing also with “a yoke was placed on it,” where the medieval authorities (Rishonim) write this explicitly. Tosafot in tractate Bava Metzia 30 says as follows: “And if you say: why is it invalid if a male mounted it? He certainly does not want to invalidate a heifer worth so much money for such a small benefit.” If a male mounted it, then it is invalid. What do I want? Surely it is not with my consent when a male mounted it; I don’t want to invalidate the… to invalidate the heifer, after all it is worth a great deal. A red heifer is worth a huge amount of money. Okay? So surely the calves that may come from this are not worth losing all the money of the red heifer. So if that’s the case, by definition whenever a male mounted it, it is not agreeable to me. So how can there ever be a case where, when a male mounted it, it is invalidated? “And one can say that if it had remained valid, it would have been agreeable to him.” Exactly your principle. It says that the agreeableness is determined apart from the consideration that it becomes invalid. That’s what we said there. So the Ran in Shitah Mekubetzet says something else. The Ran in Shitah Mekubetzet asks: “And one can say that since the act in itself is agreeable to him, we cannot validate it on account of its invalidation, for then its invalidation would be the cause of its validation, and that is impossible. And furthermore, if you validate it, it is certainly agreeable to him.” So this “and furthermore”—that if you validate it, it is certainly agreeable to him—why does Tosafot stop here? Continue further. So what are you saying—that it does not become invalid? Ah, if it does not become invalid, then yes, it is agreeable to him, because it does not become invalid. But if it is agreeable to him, then it does become invalid. And so on. Why does Tosafot stop after one step? Keep going; this is a loop that continues. The Ran… the Ran says this. Yes? But the Ran says… but even in the Ran it’s not clear. That’s how he explains why “a male mounted it” invalidates, but I don’t understand what the answer is here. Fine, now I’ll continue the Ran one step further too. Why do you stop at saying it is invalid? Now continue one more step and you’ll see that it is not invalid. The Ran continues Tosafot one step further, but let’s continue one more step. Why do you stop there? Okay, it’s not clear why the Ran stops there, and it’s not clear what the difference is between the Ran’s two answers. In his first answer, by the way, it says something that is almost… you asked earlier whether anyone before Rabbi Shimon Shkop said this—look how he says it: “for then its invalidation would be the cause of its validation, and that is impossible.”
[Speaker C] Impossible. Almost…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is almost an explicit formulation of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle.
[Speaker C] Okay.