For the Perplexed of the Generation – Lesson 6
This transcript was produced automatically by means of artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- Public trust and rabbinic rulings
- Jewish law versus policy, and decrees the public cannot uphold
- The example of the second festival day in the Diaspora and the Chatam Sofer
- Revealing and concealing deeper ideas in the face of a boundary-breaking public
- Decline for the sake of ascent, and models from the past
- The return of questions about the eternity of the world, evolution, and the status of inquiry
- Scientific theory as hypothesis, the price of belittling it, and the comparison to Jewish law
- The place of these ideas in Rav Kook and the historical context
- Aristotelian eternity, determinism, and Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed
- Truth, morality, and a sign and proof for the truth of an opinion
- The move from the old eternity to the development and perfection of the world
- Primeval matter, formal creation, the Kuzari, Maimonides, and Nachmanides
- Billions of years as intimidation for small minds, and Rav Kook’s response
- Evolution as making the proof for God unnecessary, Russell’s teapot, and Occam’s razor
- Concluding question: evolution versus gravity
Summary
General Overview
On the 12th of Cheshvan 5771, October 14, 2010, in Rabbi Michael Abraham’s lecture on the perplexities of the generation, it was argued that the easy solution of issuing sweeping rulings of “forbidden” when something is not actually forbidden destroys public trust in rabbinic instructions, so that when there is a real prohibition, people will no longer believe it. The lecture distinguishes between Jewish law and policy, and argues that policy must be evaluated according to circumstances and outcomes rather than copied automatically from one period to another, and that on a basic level too it is problematic to lie and declare something permitted to be forbidden. The discussion then turns to modern questions about the eternity of the world, evolution, and science, examining the tension in Rav Kook between treating theories as “hypotheses” and trusting their power, and the claim that one can show there is no contradiction to the foundations of faith and even see long-term development as strengthening wonder at the “Life of the worlds.” In the end, the question is raised why evolution is seen as a greater threat to faith than other natural laws such as gravity.
Public trust and rabbinic rulings
I arrived about a quarter of an hour late to the beginning of the lecture. The simplest solution is to say something is forbidden, but it is argued that whoever says today that something is “forbidden” when it is not actually forbidden will be considered foolish, because tomorrow people will see that it is not forbidden, and the day after that, when he says about something that really is forbidden that it is forbidden, they will not believe him. People lose trust in rabbinic instructions because of this kind of use, to the point that today nothing is self-evidently really forbidden or not really forbidden, and everything is open to discussion.
Jewish law versus policy, and decrees the public cannot uphold
An opposite phenomenon is presented, where a rabbi says something, or where the Shulchan Arukh, at the practical ruling stage, explicitly permits something, but then a decree is created that the public is unable to uphold, and this is presented as a failure of policy that is not suited to the circumstances. Policy is described as something that should fit the circumstances in which it is applied, not something copied automatically from one era to another, and when we are dealing with policy rather than Jewish law, policy is judged in light of its results on the tactical level. It is also argued that even on the essential level it is problematic to lie and say that something not forbidden is forbidden, and it is emphasized that Jewish law in its narrow sense means “what is forbidden is forbidden,” whereas policy is meant to achieve goals and includes questions of concealment, simplification, and how things are presented to the public.
The example of the second festival day in the Diaspora and the Chatam Sofer
A discussion is brought regarding the second festival day of the Diaspora and the position of the Chatam Sofer, along with the question whether the rabbi thinks he exaggerated. A contradiction is described between a responsum saying it is rabbinic and formulations that present it as very severe. A responsum is recounted in which they discuss a living person washed up on shore on the second day of Shavuot, and the festival was desecrated in order to treat him, and the Chatam Sofer explains that the second day of Shavuot is more severe because on Shavuot “there was never any doubt,” since it is always fifty days after Passover. This is presented as an “amusing pilpul,” but one that in any case assumes it is rabbinic, alongside a historical explanation of the source of the second festival day in doubt, the practice of keeping two days in places where the messengers did not arrive, and preserving the custom after the calendar was fixed.
Revealing and concealing deeper ideas in the face of a boundary-breaking public
The following formulation is cited: “Even though necessity compels us to explain matters that should have been hidden and left only to sages who understand on their own,” and a dilemma is described whether there are matters one should perhaps deal with but not reveal, and perhaps matters one should not deal with at all. The confrontation with “one who throws off the yoke or breaches the fence” is described as a process that may look like surrender to new winds, but also as a process that reveals depth, hidden obstacles, and a need for explanation because of necessity.
Decline for the sake of ascent, and models from the past
It is argued that this process can de facto lead to a state in which a person is a better Jew than in the past, even though it comes through a kind of “descent for the sake of ascent.” A story is brought from Bnei Brak about the wife of the Chafetz Chaim not knowing how to read and write, and how he would do the shop accounts in the evening, with emphasis on the word “nevertheless,” and the question whether this is really a model one must long for. The claim is made that not everything from the past is an ideal model, especially not in the realm of policy.
The return of questions about the eternity of the world, evolution, and the status of inquiry
It is said that the great questions of the world’s creation or eternity “have in our times awakened again,” after having quieted down for centuries since the days of Aristotle and the Middle Ages, and then returned in the age of evolution and afterward the Big Bang. The standing of inquiry, meaning scientific research, “began to incline” toward a path that at first glance seems opposed to the foundations of faith, and it is said that although the methods of inquiry prove nothing definitively and are only hypotheses, such hypotheses are enough “to steal faith from the heart” of one who has not prepared himself to acquire knowledge and recognition of faith.
Scientific theory as hypothesis, the price of belittling it, and the comparison to Jewish law
A popular apologetic assumption is presented according to which a scientific theory is always speculation, since it is a broad conclusion drawn from facts rather than direct observation, but it is argued that this comes at a heavy price, because undermining the ability to generalize undermines a great many things in life as well. The fact that something is not a deduction does not mean it can be ignored, and even “eighty percent” or “ninety percent” means something, and most of life is conducted that way. The American discussion is mentioned about insisting on saying “the theory of evolution” in order to hint at its speculative nature, and it is said that by the same logic there is also the theory of gravity and the theory of electromagnetism, and anyone who belittles that “shouldn’t put his foot on an airplane.” It is argued that evolution too has confirmations, predictions, and fulfillments, and that to dismiss it today is simply a misunderstanding, and that if science is defined as speculation then halakhic conclusions too rest on analogy and induction and do not stand in the strict deductive sense either.
The place of these ideas in Rav Kook and the historical context
It is argued that it is not certain Rav Kook means to make a sweeping claim that everything is hypothesis, and one must remember that this was a hundred years ago and that the state of science was different, especially since evolution in 1905 did not have the empirical confirmations it has today and so it was easier to see it as something speculative. It is said that Rav Kook claims that “one who truly probes deeply” will see that even according to the new hypotheses there is nothing that harms the foundations of faith, and astonishment is expressed at that a priori confidence that there is no contradiction, because interpretive reliance on a scientific theory carries the risk that it may later change.
Aristotelian eternity, determinism, and Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed
It is said that “eternity in the coarse manner of the ancient philosophers” was a stumbling block to the faith of Israel, not because of eternity itself but because of the deterministic assumption that everything is necessary and there is no change in nature, and the damage to will and free will is seen as the destruction of the foundations of faith. It is said that Maimonides came to explain that Aristotle has no necessary proof for this, and since he is uncertain, “we return to the tradition,” and it is good for us to be “disciples of Moses and Abraham,” but the question arises how that fits with the claim that science is always hypothetical, and when there would ever be a “necessary demonstration” that would justify interpretive adjustments.
Truth, morality, and a sign and proof for the truth of an opinion
A statement is quoted: “Especially since the view of creation accords with the ways of morality and the paths of justice, and that too is a sign and proof of the truth of any opinion,” and it is interpreted as a claim that the moral consequences of a metaphysical idea are an indication of its truth. This is tied to a discussion of pragmatism and to the thought that there may be a harmony between truth and morality, while distinguishing between the naïve claim of “it is useful, therefore it is true” and a more consistent claim based on the assumption that the world is built in such a way as to lead to moral outcomes, with mention of Kant, who tries to ground God on moral obligation as a philosophical argument rather than an opiate.
The move from the old eternity to the development and perfection of the world
It is said that “the doctrine of eternity in that form has already passed and disappeared from the world,” and that through the latest inquiries “our eyes will see” ways of development and changes of form, to the point that anyone who says the world, with life and humanity, was always just as it is “will be considered misleading and foolish, not a civilized person.” It is said that the “new hypotheses” show “worlds progressing and becoming perfected” from chaos and absence to completion, and that there is no place, in the mind of an experienced person, to say that a complete world was born all at once or that it always existed that way, while rejecting ideas of the sort that it was “created as it is, with all the signs already there” as a claim that has no place in reason and experience.
Primeval matter, formal creation, the Kuzari, Maimonides, and Nachmanides
It is said that the Kuzari argues that if matter is eternal this does not touch the foundations of faith, because the Torah deals with “formal creation,” but it is noted that “this is not the view of some of the great sages of Israel,” hinting to Maimonides, who rejects the Platonic notion of eternal primordial matter and upholds creation ex nihilo. The possibility of primordial matter and of chaos is discussed, along with midrashim about the sources of heaven and earth, and the distinction between matter and form in Aristotelian terms, and it is also said that Nachmanides speaks of primordial matter, but not necessarily as eternity, rather as creation in two stages.
Billions of years as intimidation for small minds, and Rav Kook’s response
It is said that “the development that comes gradually over billions of years” frightens “the hearts of small-minded people” who think that such development would make room for denying the living God, and it is said that they are deeply mistaken. It is said that “knowledge of God is built only on knowledge of unity,” and that when one sees a great creation arranged with orders of wisdom and the patterns of life in body, spirit, and intellect in one system, one recognizes the “great spirit” that animates everything, and if the ways of wisdom require development over myriads upon myriads of years, that only makes the “Life of the worlds” all the more wondrous, since tens of thousands of years are considered as nothing, like half a moment, in achieving a desired purpose.
Evolution as making the proof for God unnecessary, Russell’s teapot, and Occam’s razor
It is argued that the main difficulty posed by evolution is not that it proves there is no God, but that it makes the proof for God’s existence unnecessary, especially the physico-theological proof from order and purpose in the world, and so it leaves an agnostic situation in which there is no reason to posit entities that are not needed for explanation. Bertrand Russell’s “celestial teapot” analogy is mentioned, along with the claim of “Occam’s razor” that one should not posit beings that are not required for explanation, alongside presenting “the hiding of the divine face” as an internal explanation for the believer, though not one that satisfies someone asking why one should posit such existence in the first place.
Concluding question: evolution versus gravity
At the end, a remark by Nadav Shnerb is brought, asking why people are more troubled by evolution than by gravity, since gravity too gives a natural explanation for an apple’s falling “and not because the Holy One, blessed be He, dropped it,” and it is said that there is an answer to this question that will be discussed next week. Thus ends Rabbi Abraham’s lecture on Thursday night, the eve of the 7th of Cheshvan 5771, October 14, 2010.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] 26 Cheshvan 5771, October 14, 2010, Rabbi Michael Abraham’s lecture on the perplexities of the generation. I’m about a quarter of an hour late to the beginning of the lecture. The simplest solution is to say it’s forbidden,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But someone who says that today is foolish, because if he says that today, tomorrow morning people will see that it isn’t forbidden, and the next morning, when they tell them something that really is forbidden, that it’s forbidden, they won’t listen anymore. And that’s what happens. That’s what happens. Meaning, people lose trust in rabbinic instructions because of this. So then, in places where the rabbinic instructions really are correct, meaning it really is forbidden, they don’t accept it. By now, nothing today is self-evident, whether it’s really forbidden or not really forbidden. Today everything is open to discussion. Why? Because in fact we’ve lost credibility. And there’s also the opposite phenomenon, that what?
[Speaker A] That some rabbi, some person, said something, the Shulchan Arukh, at the level of practical instruction, where it’s explicitly permitted, it’s because the public can’t handle it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, well, that depends which public we’re talking about, this idea that it’s because the public can’t handle it. So really these are just examples of the fact that policy is something that’s supposed to fit the circumstances in which it’s applied. Policy is not something you automatically copy from one era to another, with all due respect to the Sages and their authority. When we’re talking about policy, not Jewish law, policy has to be judged in light of results. That’s why you formulate policy, as opposed to Jewish law in its narrow and simple sense. Again, the boundary isn’t always sharp, but as policy, I think, as a principled distinction, I think this is a very important distinction. So here too, in dealing with the Enlightenment, I have no idea what I would have done in their time. I assume I would have thought like everyone else, what else could be? Most likely. But when I’m sitting a hundred and fifty, two hundred years later, it’s legitimate to draw conclusions and see that if it doesn’t work, then there’s no point in continuing to cling to it with your head against the wall. Because it won’t help. Simply because it won’t help, not a question of whether it’s true or false. It’s a question at the tactical level. Policy has to be examined at the tactical level, not the essential one. I think that even at the essential level it’s problematic to lie, to say about something that is not forbidden that it’s forbidden; that’s not right on the essential level either. But leave that aside—even if you have some policy, then check whether it stands up or not. Policy has to set goals, unlike Jewish law. Jewish law is: what is forbidden is forbidden; there aren’t goals there. But if you’re managing policy—what to conceal, what not to conceal, what to deal with and what not to deal with, whether to reveal all the cards or present things in a somewhat more simplified way so there won’t be problems—fine, there are places where there are decrees the public cannot uphold, but in very many places that’s not the case.
[Speaker A] As for the second festival day in the Diaspora according to the Chatam Sofer—does the rabbi think he exaggerated there?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what he—
[Speaker A] He said it was completely Torah-level, and anyone who—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The second festival day is Torah-level? Does it appear as if it’s Torah-level, maybe, or something like that?
[Speaker A] I’m really not sure I heard it correctly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a responsum of the Chatam Sofer where he says it’s rabbinic. And there’s a contradiction, I don’t know. There’s a responsum of the Chatam Sofer about some body washed up from the—no, not a body, sorry, a live person who was washed up on shore, and they desecrated the Sabbath to—or didn’t desecrate, it was the second day of Shavuot. And they desecrated the festival because they wanted to treat him, take care of him. Then he said that the second day of Shavuot is more severe than any other second festival day. Why? Because every other second festival day is based on doubt. Right? How did the second festival day begin? Once there was doubt; they didn’t know when the new month had been declared, so they observed two festival days. But on Shavuot there was never any doubt. Shavuot is always fifty days after Passover. The doubt only arose when the festival fell two weeks after the new month, and then the messengers couldn’t get beyond a two-week walking radius from Jerusalem. Right? Basically, beyond that radius the doubt arose. Right? But with Shavuot you have fifty days to walk. Once you know when the first of Nisan was, you know when Shavuot is. So with Shavuot there was never any doubt, and you still observe a second festival day? So the Chatam Sofer says that this second festival day is definitely not because of doubt, and therefore it’s more severe than all the others. It’s an amusing pilpul, but clearly he understood it as rabbinic. I don’t know, we’d have to see the source for what you said.
[Speaker A] No, fine, and then the doubt also on Passover, also on Shavuot, would end up bringing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once they abolished the fixed calendar, then you had to observe twice because of the doubt.
[Speaker A] In places where the messengers didn’t arrive there was doubt, but from when were there no messengers at all? So they always practiced twice. Fine, so Shavuot too they observed again anyway, but by then they were already expert in the fixing of the month, there was already a calendar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I mean no, it becomes something fixed because we perpetuate the situation of the messengers from the Temple period, what the Talmud in tractate Beitzah says, all kinds of things of that sort. But the question is where it started from. It started from a situation of doubt, and that’s where it began. Fine, we’ve reached things I don’t remember. In any case, this confrontation with the one who throws off the yoke or breaches the fence ultimately seems, on the face of it, like some kind of surrender to the new winds that are blowing.
[Speaker A] Why do you say there—because they uncover layers that weren’t—or really uncover layers of change, or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That sages understand on their own.
[Speaker A] Why should that even come up?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, he says here: “Even though necessity compels us to explain matters that should have been hidden and left to sages who understand on their own.” Yes. So there are matters that perhaps one should indeed deal with but not reveal; perhaps there are matters one shouldn’t deal with at all. We already hesitated about that in the introduction. Fine. In any case, for our purposes, in the end this process de facto leads to a situation that in my opinion is better than the one that existed in the past, even though it comes by way of a kind of decline for the sake of ascent. Yes, like in Bnei Brak they’re terribly proud of those stories that the Chafetz Chaim’s wife didn’t know how to read and write, that he would always come in the evening to do the shop accounts for her, because she didn’t know how to read and write—what a wonderful woman, meaning she didn’t know how to read and write and nevertheless she helped her husband and stood by him and so on. She was probably a wonderful woman, everything’s fine. Is that a model I have to long for? Fine, so now should I force everyone to learn to read and write?
[Speaker A] The emphasis is on the “nevertheless.” Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I heard far too much emphasis on the “didn’t” and not on the “nevertheless.” Fine. There are things—again, okay, that doesn’t mean that everything from the past is an ideal model, certainly not in the policy realm. Fine. The great questions of the world’s creation or eternity, and all the theological questions dependent on them, have in our times awakened again. The expression is of course “returns and is reawakened,” the halakhic expression, of course. They were nullified; something that was nullified sometimes returns and is reawakened. What does that mean? Once, in the days of Aristotle and, say, in the Middle Ages following Aristotle, people were troubled by the question of the eternity of the world on the philosophical plane. It calmed down for several centuries, and after several centuries it returned again, of course in the period of evolution and then also the Big Bang and all these new things. Suddenly people were once again dealing with questions that for several centuries had not really preoccupied them. So they have in our times awakened again. And the standing of inquiry—inquiry here means scientific research; inquiry and investigation, to investigate, to seek the truth, to examine—the standing of inquiry began to incline toward the path that at first glance opposes the foundations of faith. Scientific results, scientific research on these matters, led to results that in fact run contrary to the foundations of faith. It is obvious that—
[Speaker A] Why at first glance? On a superficial glance, an initial glance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. On a superficial glance, an initial glance. It is obvious that even though those methods of inquiry prove nothing at all, and are only hypotheses, nevertheless such hypotheses are enough to rob faith from the hearts of people who have not prepared themselves with what is needed to acquire knowledge of faith and its recognition. Here he’s hiding inside this sentence a very strong assumption, and one that’s very popular today in religious apologetics, namely the claim that every scientific theory is always speculation. Meaning, we are not confronting scientific facts, facts that are observed directly. We’re talking about conclusions that arise from those facts, some theory that developed in order to explain a collection of facts we observed, and therefore there is always some speculative element in every scientific theory. And that’s true, and we discussed this at length last year, that there is some element of induction, some element of generalization, some element of speculation in every scientific theory. The question is whether it is proper to hang one’s hat on that when confronting a scientific theory. Because what an argument of that type is really saying is: look, even where the scientific result or the scientific theory flatly contradicts tradition, the claims of tradition, I’ll say: fine, this is just speculation, and that’s it. That statement has a heavy price. The heavy price is that if you lose confidence in that method or in your ability to generalize, you’ll lose confidence in many other things too. Meaning, the fact that this is not a deduction and not something absolute, proven in the logical sense of the term “proof,” does not mean that automatically it can be ignored. True, it’s not certain. Not one hundred percent. But on the other hand, what’s wrong with eighty percent? Eighty percent is also something. Ninety percent, sixty percent, it doesn’t matter—that too is something. After all, we conduct most of our lives this way. There are those who would say we conduct faith this way too—that for faith we have better proofs. Meaning, in the end all these things are conclusions we draw from our common sense. Once you start undermining that common sense and clinging only to deduction, we saw at length last year the immediate price. Someone willing to accept only things that are proven in the logical sense is left, of course, with nothing, because there is no such thing as something proven in the logical sense. Therefore this comment that very often—you know, in America it’s very popular, and actually in Israel too, it all comes from America—all these dilemmas of Torah and science, this happened among Christians long before us. Everyone thinks they’re reinventing the wheel, but it’s all copied from parallel debates among Christians, much more sophisticated there, much more complex, much deeper, incomparable really, and long before us. Not the religion itself—they came after us—but this modern kind of thought, the attempt to ground everything in a more systematic way, was there much earlier. Very often some argument comes up there that evolution, for example, is a theory. The theory of evolution. There are people who are very careful always to say “the theory of evolution,” not “the doctrine of evolution,” or something like that. Because “theory” has a connotation of something speculative, something generalized, something not necessary—if you want, accept it; if you don’t want, don’t. By the same token there is the theory of gravity and the theory of electromagnetism; all these are theories to exactly the same extent. And anyone who thinks such a theory can’t be accepted shouldn’t put his foot on an airplane, nor on anything else, because tomorrow morning that theory might collapse along with the airplane, together with you.
[Speaker C] Same thing, Rabbi, you’re right, but with gravity I can repeat the experiment at any moment. Here with evolution, what experiment can I repeat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simple, the same thing—you can repeat an experiment.
[Speaker C] No, but there it gives me confirmation of the theory.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too there are confirmations. There are predictions, and those predictions are fulfilled. There are things that definitely meet scientific criteria. It’s true that you can’t do again what already happened; you can observe evolutionary processes now, and people do. But obviously you can’t recreate all over again what happened back then. Still, you can raise hypotheses in light of the theory about what you expect to find, and in fact some of those things do occur. Meaning, there are quite a few things that provide strong confirmation for this theory, and I think that today to dismiss this is simply a total lack of understanding. In any event, the price of such a view, which says that science is speculation and therefore religion is basically insulated from scientific results—I don’t know. If so, then halakhic conclusions are speculation to exactly the same extent. Last year all we did was compare how science thinks with how Jewish law thinks. It’s basically the same tools: analogy, induction, that’s all. If you think that’s speculation, then don’t execute a person according to any law in the Shulchan Arukh, not in Maimonides either. And maybe this doesn’t come across so well here, but nothing in Jewish law stands up to such a severe test. In short, because of that I think hanging your argument on something like this is really problematic. True, I’m not sure Rav Kook means here to make some sweeping statement about science in general, that everything is hypothesis. First, we have to remember that we’re talking about a hundred years ago. The science of a hundred years ago was still in a different state from the science we have today. Just as if someone speaks about science in the twelfth century, I won’t blame him too much if he writes a sentence like this. I think that Aristotelian science—that’s the same criticism.
[Speaker A] The essay, sorry, in which it was written, was apparently written before 1905.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it was written in 1905, I think, if I’m not mistaken.
[Speaker A] By 1905 he was already in the Land of Israel.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He immigrated to the Land of Israel in 1904 or 1905, something like that, he—
[Speaker A] He wrote this a little earlier. In those years scientists believed they had solved all the problems.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Believed” is nice, but still the question is—
[Speaker A] Surely there were those who—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The list of open problems in the world—
[Speaker A] Science grew, but in physics they believed they had solved everything, except for two small problems.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any event, it doesn’t matter. Since Rav Kook is speaking not about mathematics and not about physics but about evolution, I think evolution certainly was not in that state in 1905. Empirical confirmations for evolution are something relatively new, and therefore I’m not sure there is really some general statement here. When people today tend to say, with regard to all Torah-and-science issues, that science is only hypotheses and speculations and therefore there’s no problem—when you say that about evolution, and you say it a hundred years ago, it seems to me that’s something much more acceptable. It really was something fairly speculative. In any case, such hypotheses came to rob faith from the hearts of people. It really shouldn’t have; after all, they’re only hypotheses. But people are impressed by it anyway, and it robs faith from their hearts, those who have not prepared themselves with what is needed to acquire knowledge of faith and its recognition. “And because one who truly probes deeply will discover that even according to the paths of the new hypotheses, we have nothing that harms the foundations of faith.” This too is a very interesting point. Because if these things are hypotheses, hypotheses can be true and they can be false. That’s what hypotheses mean, right? Now if they are not true, then when you align them with the paths of faith, you’re in trouble. Because you’re claiming that the paths of faith fit the current scientific hypotheses, but those hypotheses may also turn out to be false. And anyone who explains the book of Genesis according to one scientific theory or another is, in some way, taking the risk that in twenty, thirty, fifty years it will turn out that that theory is incorrect.
[Speaker A] But here there’s something that doesn’t contradict. “Doesn’t contradict” doesn’t mean it therefore is true; it means that if it is true, then it doesn’t contradict, and if it isn’t true, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, but I’m saying more than that. Where does the certainty come from? He doesn’t make a concrete statement. He says in general: clearly these new hypotheses also are not supposed to contradict faith.
[Speaker A] They don’t contradict. And who told you that? That’s what he says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s both a factual question and a principled assertion. That’s why I’m saying: if you say, look, I checked it and it really doesn’t contradict, fine. But from here it sounds like he’s stating it a priori. He says: these new hypotheses too, in fact, do not—come, let’s look deeply and discover it. Meaning, he doesn’t say this after he has looked deeply. He says: I’m convinced it doesn’t contradict; come, let’s look deeply and see it. Where does your conviction come from? Meaning, if you determine this a priori, then you’re basically saying, of necessity, that these hypotheses are probably true, and therefore they can’t contradict faith. But then why are you undermining them as mere hypotheses?
[Speaker A] Not because they’re true.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but what’s the formulation? First you determined that it’s only a hypothesis. A hypothesis may be true; in that case indeed there’s no need to get excited. Now you say you have some kind of a priori confidence that a contradiction will never arise. What, with every bizarre theory that comes up, whether true or false, there will never be any contradiction with tradition? Maybe—where can we get such confidence from?
[Speaker A] It will become clear to yourself what really are the principles of faith and what are things that are not really principles of faith.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously, but still the question is—
[Speaker A] why six days or six billion days is not a principle of faith.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, but still the question is how you can determine a priori that no contradiction at all is possible.
[Speaker A] That’s not so clever. What? What does the latter half of the passage mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And because—if this happens—and because one who truly probes deeply will discover…” What does the latter half mean?
[Speaker A] If it happens that this is the case—no, he says that if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if it happens that you probe deeply—not if it happens that you probe deeply and it will become clear. If it happens that you probe deeply, then you’ll discover there’s no contradiction.
[Speaker A] No, if it happens that you probe deeply, then it will become clear—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to you—
[Speaker A] that even according to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] well—
[Speaker C] So what?
[Speaker A] What’s the continuation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no continuation. No, that’s not it. If someone probes deeply, then he’ll discover there’s no contradiction. Here it sounds as if there actually is trust in the scientific method.
[Speaker A] Maybe here he’s saying that on the principled level there are two planes here, and the whole aspect just doesn’t belong, yes—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Leibowitz? I don’t think this is Leibowitz.
[Speaker A] Leibowitz states it; he doesn’t explain it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter.
[Speaker A] On the principled level there can’t be—on the principled level, independent of the substance of the theory. Yes, but he’s not going in that direction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see later, he’s not going in that direction. And here again, he wavers between yes, there is trust in the modern tools—Rav Kook does face outward, meaning he has some trust in these tools that generally lead to correct conclusions. And because of that he thinks it cannot be that a contradiction will arise between these hypotheses and—again, this is a bit like hearing music between the words, I’m not sure this is clear proof of what he says here, but I think there are two nuances here; we see this not a little in these chapters. “Rather, one can renew certain matters of depth of understanding, though these too are not new. Therefore I think that when such matters become clarified, many hearts will rest from perplexing thoughts.” Again, he wavers psychologically, or maybe even philosophically. On the one hand he fully clings to faith, from one angle. If a historical scientific theory conflicts, he’ll throw out the theory because it’s only a hypothesis. On the other hand he has trust in the tools from outside. He thinks that generally these tools do hit the mark and the hypotheses are correct, and if not, we’ll know it by scientific tools, not because of the contradiction with faith. He has some trust in the tools. Therefore, in practice, he also fears there won’t be a contradiction. And this—what? Yes, clearly, but it’s two—
[Speaker C] The degree of hypotheticality is being used in two directions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the one hand it’s not one hundred percent, so I always have the escape hatch of saying, I didn’t find confirmation, but it’s not one hundred percent, and there’s always that. On the other hand, it’s not one hundred percent, but it’s ninety-five percent. Meaning, I trust it enough that I don’t think a real contradiction can actually arise here. “Eternity in the coarse fashion of the ancient philosophers was a stumbling block to the faith of Israel. The opinion that thought the world in all its forms has always been thus, and will never change, and nothing departs from it without a sign and proof and change in custom at all, because all the laws in all their details are necessary,” and so on. This is the eternity in the coarse sense that we discussed in chapter 1, if you remember—the Maimonides in Part II of Guide for the Perplexed who says that there are two kinds of eternity, and he says that even if we had proofs in favor of eternity we would not be alarmed by it, because with interpretive creativity you can always work it out. So here he says: this coarse eternity of the ancient philosophers is a stumbling block to the faith of Israel. But why? Not because of eternity. I already remarked on that back then. Eternity is not the problem. Rather, it is the assumption that led to eternity. Why do people really assume the world is eternal? Because they think the world is deterministic; nothing can change. That is the stumbling block to the faith of Israel. The reason that led people to believe in eternity is what is problematic, not eternity itself. Eternity itself, as I said, the six days can be made to fit, by some interpretive maneuver, even with eternity, as Maimonides writes, as Rav Kook himself repeats in the first chapter. But the problem he sees in eternity is the damage to will. Again, for Rav Kook, will and not intellect is at the center. The fact that this intellectual belief is not correct—not terrible, it’ll be one way or another, we can manage with that. But if it denies freedom of the will, there’s something destructive here from his point of view; it directly contradicts the foundations of faith. Therefore Maimonides came and explained that Aristotle has no necessary basis for this inquiry. “Inquiry” here is of course from the language of inquiry and investigation, not “homiletics” as we say today where “derush” means not serious. On the contrary, “derush” means when one seeks and investigates something serious—that is science, yes? Like the inquiry we saw above. “And since he is uncertain, we return to tradition, and it is good for us to be disciples of Moses and Abraham.” Meaning, he is basically saying: if we had necessity, like Maimonides writes—if we had compulsion or evidence for eternity—then we would already organize ourselves interpretively and adapt what is written in the Torah to that matter, just as with the anthropomorphic descriptions of the Holy One, blessed be He, and what Maimonides explains there, and so on. But since we have no proof—we talked about this in chapter 1—that it remains open, then we have no choice but to be disciples of Moses and Abraham. Now we need to understand: what counts as a necessary proof in favor of eternity? How can a necessary proof ever be obtained? If indeed we established above, Rav Kook established above, that science in the end has a hypothetical element, that it can never be a necessary proof, then again the question arises: at what point will I be convinced enough to make the interpretive effort to change our tradition a little so that it fits scientific results? Again there is some kind of middle path here. On the one hand I say there is a hypothetical element and therefore one need not be so alarmed by scientific results and the scientific method. On the other hand Rav Kook himself cites Maimonides, who says: if we have a necessary demonstration, then we will know interpretively how to make it fit.
[Speaker A] Maimonides—when? After all, it wasn’t necessary, a demonstration—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For Maimonides, this had to be philosophy; it was not science. For Rabbi Kook, there he is talking about the stage at which it had already become science, the question of eternity. Right? After all, that’s what he introduced earlier. Now the question is whether here, in the new phase of this dilemma, how do we translate Maimonides’ words into this phase? When will we feel that we are sufficiently convinced that we will have to change the tradition so that it fits the scientific results? It turns out that there probably is such a level of conviction that would lead us to that. Again, Rabbi Kook reveals the other side of scientific speculation, that there actually is trust here in this method. Okay? “The disciples of Moses and Abraham” is attributed here to something concrete, I don’t know. Abraham is the father of all, and Moses is the master of the prophets. “And especially since the view of creation accords with the ways of morality and the paths of justice, which is also a sign and proof of the truth of every opinion.” And here there is a very strong statement, and I already mentioned this one of the previous times as well. Basically, Rabbi Kook claims that if a metaphysical idea leads to conclusions that are not moral, then it is not true. Or, the moral consequences of the idea are an indication of its truth. Which basically takes us back a bit to what I said about pragmatism one of the previous times: that we test a thesis dealing with facts according to the results it leads to. Is it useful for us or not useful for us? Right? According to that, we check whether it is true or not true. Here, basically, there is some kind of pragmatist thesis. A thesis that says I will test my position regarding a fact by asking what the moral consequence of that belief is. And that is a bit strange, because on the philosophical level it is very hard to justify such a position. Why is that true? Why all of a sudden? Who said that the correct facts must lead to a moral conclusion?
[Speaker C] Is that a pragmatist view, or is he assuming a harmony principle? That truth must coincide with morality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m getting to that in just a moment; it appears here too.
[Speaker A] What? Right, exactly, okay, in short. Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there too we talked about pragmatism. And there too I mentioned this point, that you can do it in two ways.
[Speaker A] It’s not pragmatism here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, you can make this move from morality to facts in two ways, or from the desirable to the actual. Yes, the desirable and the actual in the sense of ought and is, not “desirable” meaning the ideal state versus the non-ideal state. So this transition can be made in two ways. You can do it, of course, in a naive way—we talked about this regarding Shabbetai Donnolo—that because the Jewish family is so wonderful, therefore everyone has to repent. And that is a pragmatist argument. But there is a second formulation, which is a valid formulation, or at least a consistent one. It is a formulation that says I have some basic assumption of harmony, as you called it earlier, some basic assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, who created His world, made it in such a way that it is apparently supposed to lead to moral results. If that is my assumption, then when I now ask what is the correct claim that correctly describes the world of the Holy One, blessed be He—claim A or claim B—then if belief in claim A leads to more moral behavior, then claim A is apparently also true. Of course, if I ask this question regarding belief in the Holy One, blessed be He Himself, then you can no longer answer in that way. Since our guarantor for the connection between morality and truth is the Holy One, blessed be He. So when I ask whether to believe in the Holy One, blessed be He or not, and you answer me, yes, because if one believes in the Holy One, blessed be He then one behaves more morally—that won’t work there. There that already becomes pragmatism. Okay? Therefore, here it has a limit. You know that even Kant, after he rejected the three possibilities for proving the existence of God, in another work he tries to ground it on moral obligation. But there too it is not a pragmatist argument; it is an argument in the opposite direction. It is an argument that says that if we have moral obligation, that indicates—it is an indication—that there is something that establishes this moral obligation. It is not that I created for myself an opium for the masses; I created for myself a God so that I could successfully inculcate morality or lead a society to behave morally. Rather, it is a philosophical argument saying that if there is some feeling of moral obligation, that indicates the fact that there is someone from whose power this thing comes. If the world were a physical world, or only the world that we know, then where does moral obligation come from? In simple language.
[Speaker A] He says, “a sign and proof of the truth of every opinion.” Meaning that every opinion that accords with the ways of morality and all that, we have proof of its truth. But basically you’re saying it’s the opposite. If it does not accord, then we have proof of its truth? Yes, but by negation, it doesn’t matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I have opinion A, and I want to check whether it is true. And if not-A leads to an immoral result, that is a sign that A is true. Unless there is some intermediate state between A and not-A, but it is proof by negation. Proof by negation.
[Speaker A] Here, yes—aren’t “the ways of morality and the paths of justice” something that changes over the course of history? In his view, no. The attitude toward slavery today is not… Are you asking me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so, but I don’t know what Rabbi Kook thinks about that. Rabbi Kook, to a certain extent, maybe—could be. “And the view of eternity,” page 82. “And the view of eternity in this form has already passed and disappeared from the world.” He was talking about primordial eternity, ancient eternity. “Clearly before our eyes, through the latest inquiries, we see the paths of development and the changes of form of all existence, so that one who would come today and say that the world, together with life and man, was thus from the earliest times, would be considered a deceiver and a fool who is not civilized.” “Would be considered”—or is he really such a person? Again, the same tension all the time; I’m simply trying to show that this runs through everything like a thread. I assume he does not mean merely “would be considered,” meaning it would not be popular, but rather that he really is considered such, and justifiably so. Why?
[Speaker C] He wants to be careful of the reversal the Rabbi mentioned before—that if he nails this down as absolute, then maybe tomorrow people will say that this itself has changed in a matter that was supposedly proven. He doesn’t want to take a position and base belief on one scientific position or another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but here he says that one who would come today and say such a thing would be considered a fool and uncivilized. But he doesn’t say that he… No, that is exactly what I asked him. “Would be considered a fool”—what does that mean? He isn’t really a fool, because after all this is all speculation, but it’s not popular, and we are constantly dealing only with tactics, to present the Torah in a more enlightened light? Or does he really mean to say that he is uncivilized?
[Speaker A] I think he… He says that we see clearly before our eyes, therefore—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, clearly the tone here is not like that. The tone here is that he would be considered so, and justifiably considered so. Meaning, again, we see that he does indeed accept the basic results of scientific research. Even in his day, even evolution, which was then in its embryonic stage—even then Rabbi Kook says you cannot deny such a thing. You can no longer remain with eternity in its older sense. Meaning that with Rabbi Kook there is some basic trust all the time in hypotheses, as he called them earlier. This really is a method that works; he is not demanding only a—
[Speaker C] deductive—
[Speaker A] Maybe eternity is… Eternity is in the sense that the world was exactly as it is now, that the world was eternal?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know Aristotle well enough, but that is how they describe him at least—Rabbi Kook and Maimonides describe him that way. What was is what will be; everything was always the same.
[Speaker C] Maybe here he means to add the public dimension—
[Speaker A] public, that this is the accepted opinion among the public, the public sees you that way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why I say—that’s what I asked earlier, and I don’t think he means that, because then it’s only tactics.
[Speaker A] No, he doesn’t want to say that he himself thinks so, but that the whole public has reached the conclusion that this is… Ah, but he too, yes, but to enlarge it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, it is already self-evident today—not only am I saying it—it is self-evident today that one cannot relate to it in that way. And again we see that there is some regard for scientific results. “The new hypotheses say that we see worlds going and becoming perfected”—notice: “the new hypotheses,” this game all the time. A moment ago you said that whoever says otherwise would be considered a fool; suddenly you say “the new hypotheses.” “Hypotheses” not in the sense of fantasies; “hypotheses” in the sense that he understands that this is not absolute truth, that it is not one hundred percent—well-grounded hypotheses, exactly. On the other hand, he does not mean to ignore it. “Worlds going and becoming perfected before us, from the chaos of the ether until they reach completion and perfection. And we have no way, accordingly, to incline to say that our world too was thus governed and that it was born… all at once as a full world, or that it always was so. There is no place for this in reason or experience.” Yes, the excuses, the excuses that people wave around today—he says it all in half a sentence. Yes, those who say that the world was created in its present form, with the dinosaur stages inside, everything already built in. That is, everything was created in the form it has today six thousand years ago, and everything is fine, everything is settled. He says—even that—“there is no place for this in reason or experience,” to say such a thing.
[Speaker A] With the carbon-14 isotopes? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, the truth is, look, clearly in the conception of creation, in the plain conception of creation, this is not even an excuse—it is obviously so. Because otherwise there would be no tree and no rock. Meaning, a tree and a rock are things formed through a very long process, and there is always in them some level that points to great age; otherwise it wouldn’t be a rock. Right? So if you assume, just assume, the assumption of creation, you assume that Adam was born. Fine? They will ask you: how old was that Adam when he was born? What was his brain stem like? Did it contain all the stages that exist in our brain stem? Obviously it did. All the evolutionary stages that are discovered today in the brain stem of a contemporary human being—they were there then too. Because what was is what will be. So this is not only an excuse against eternity; it clearly follows from the assumption of creation itself, not merely as an excuse for eternity. If you think the world was created in its formed state, then obviously it was also created with all the fossils and all the datings and everything we measure today. The only question is whether that is really so. In any case, he says there is no place for it in reason or experience. Again, he accepts these results. “If matter is eternal, the Kuzari says that this does not contradict the foundations of faith, because our Torah has never occupied itself except with formation of form.” Yes, only the form. “But such is not the view of some of the great sages of Israel.” Meaning, there is also the possibility of saying the Platonic position, right? That there was some primeval matter, formless matter, raw formless matter, and it existed from time immemorial and is eternal. And creation, in the final analysis, means giving form to the primeval matter. What you and I encounter today are things already composed of matter that has form on it—it has form. So the creation of the world was to knead that matter and shape it into the form we know today. But the primeval matter itself was eternal. What exactly is form here?
[Speaker A] To bring the matter—meaning in the material sense, say, just wood as opposed to a statue? Or does he mean here that, say, an ape is a creature almost like a human, but essentially as matter, for our purposes, it is matter—it does not have human form, it does not have the image of God? So it’s the same thing. If it has form, the image of God—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is the same thing, only that is a form that also includes some spiritual dimension, and there it is a physical form. But it is still the same concept; it is an Aristotelian concept—matter and form—that is what is meant in that sense. Maharal, Aristotle—I don’t think he is using different meanings here. Matter and form means the raw substrate and its specific characteristics. Those characteristics can be the spirit within it, and they can also be its geometric shape, or the material it is made from, wood or metal.
[Speaker A] Is plain wood different from metal because of form? The matter—or is that already form?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is matter with form. Certainly. Everything you know, everything you see around you, is matter with form. You cannot see around you something that is only matter without form.
[Speaker A] “Our Torah has occupied itself with formation of form.” Does the Torah care exactly how that formation came into being?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And this appears in the six days of creation. Not because of the date. He says: in the six days of creation, what was created there? It does not say that the Holy One, blessed be He, created matter. What it says is that He created sun, moon, earth, heavens, creatures—that is, human beings, animals, plants, things like that. That is basically taking matter and shaping from it all the forms. So the Torah really deals only with formation of form.
[Speaker A] Could “Let there be light” actually be the creation of matter? Maybe. There is room to discuss it, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are such midrashim: “From where were the heavens created?”
[Speaker A] There was a great craftsman, but he had materials…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides himself brings in the Guide for the Perplexed—
[Speaker A] “From where [were the] heavens [created],” yes, primordial things, chaos and void.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the world was chaos and void. So “chaos and void”—there are those who want to make a kind of Platonic claim. “Chaos and void” is primeval matter. Okay? And the Holy One, blessed be He, gave this chaos and void form. Although there too there is “chaos and void,” so there was a stage of creating matter, not that matter is eternal. There was a stage of creating matter, and the second stage is “void”—form. Meaning, “chaos” is abstract matter, and “void” is the things within matter, the forms grasped in matter—that is the “void.” The medieval authorities (Rishonim) say this; Gersonides, I think, explains it this way, and several other medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain it that way. In any case, Maimonides brings in the Guide some midrash from Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, where it says: “From where were the heavens created? From the snow beneath the throne of His glory. From where was the earth created?”—something else, I already don’t remember. And Maimonides says that he had never seen a midrash as astonishing as this one. That is what he writes about this midrash. I think Nachmanides writes and brings this midrash precisely to support some kind of Platonic claim.
[Speaker A] Kafih explains it away? What? Kafih explains the midrash.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, could be, I don’t know. In any case, Maimonides says this—why? Because this is creation from something, and that is basically a conception of primeval matter, while Maimonides was Aristotelian and not Platonic, so he says there is no such thing as eternal matter, primordial matter. The world was created ex nihilo. That is what he brings here—that if matter… it is said in the Kuzari that this does not touch the foundations of faith, but “such is not the opinion of some of the great sages of Israel”—if you look below, that is Maimonides. And then Maimonides says he does not accept the Platonic approach; he was Aristotelian. Okay? So he does not accept the Platonic approach of primeval matter. Nachmanides, in his commentary on Song of Songs—and there is also a hint of this in Genesis—Nachmanides does speak about primeval matter, but still I do not think Nachmanides means to say that primeval matter is eternal or primordial in the sense of always existing, but rather that creation occurred in two stages. There was one stage in which primeval matter was created, and the next stage was giving form to the primeval matter—the chaos and void. What? In Nachmanides’ commentary on Song of Songs there is a contradiction to Nachmanides in Genesis. And the resolution is that it is primeval matter but not eternal. Fine. “The further development, gradually over many billions of years—this is what terrifies the hearts of the small-minded.” Meaning, up to this point he has basically given a scientific introduction. The scientific introduction says: one cannot remain with Aristotle’s picture of eternity. If we are talking about eternity, it is some more refined eternity, or primeval matter—which he also hesitates about; the Kuzari says this does not contradict the principles of faith, others say it does—but some more refined something, something clearly involving some kind of development as well. Meaning, not something completely static. Now, what does that mean for us? Fine, so there was development—what does that mean now? Everything he introduced before was only the scientific claim, what exactly we are dealing with. We are dealing with the claim that the world developed; it was not always as it is now. Good. Does that say anything regarding the foundations of faith? That is the next topic, in the next paragraph. “The further development, gradually over many billions of years—the further development, gradually over many billions of years—this is what terrifies the hearts of the small-minded. They think that development will provide room to deny the living God. And they are greatly mistaken. Knowledge of God is built only through knowledge of unity. When we see the great creation, arranged in orders of wisdom, and the conduct of life in body, spirit, and intellect, all arranged in one system, we recognize the great spirit present here, which animates all and gives place to all. And if the ways of wisdom require that this come about through development over tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of years, then we ought to be astonished all the more—that all the more wondrous and exalted is the Eternal Living One, for whom tens of thousands of years are considered like a few moments, acting without pause to achieve some desired purpose.” What is he actually saying here? He first introduced with some… after all, we remember all the time, he is effectively translating the Guide for the Perplexed, right? That is his goal. We see this in the previous chapters too—that this is what he does for the perplexed of his own time. What translation is he making here? The concept of eternity we are dealing with is not the concept of eternity that Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed is dealing with. That is Aristotelian eternity. Maimonides dealt with that. I am dealing with the eternity relevant to the beginning of the twentieth century, says Rabbi Kook. Meaning, this is once again exactly an expression of the fact that this is a Guide for the Perplexed of his time, meaning for his own time. And what is this eternity? It is what he introduced earlier. It is an eternity that actually also involves development. The question is whether eternity bound up with development undermines our tradition in some way. So he says that all kinds of people of little religion, little understanding, think that yes, it undermines our faith. Why does it undermine faith? Let us now translate this into familiar questions. He is talking about development, about evolution. So the question is: why does that undermine faith?
[Speaker A] Because it is written in the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—so here it can be dealt with on two levels. One level is the biblical level, meaning the details of the tradition we received: that the world was created in six days, in some particular order, no matter, and that the time elapsed since then is roughly six thousand years. So here we have some problem with evolution in the sense of the details.
[Speaker A] Not only the time—the process. Man was created immediately as a man. Fine, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that is still within the details of the biblical description. There is another question: whether this does not undermine the very assumption that there is a God.
[Speaker A] Maybe there is no teleology, everything is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The very assumption that there is a God. In fact, in the questions raised by evolution already from its beginning, and today in a much sharper way, the questions were not mainly—or at least a large part of them were not—about the details of the description in Genesis, how to synchronize it with evolutionary science. Fine, it’s an allegory and so on; Maimonides’ tricks we know how to do too. The more essential question is whether this does not undermine the very existence of God. And it seems to me that in Rabbi Kook’s wording, I actually see the second question more strongly. Because he says that development “will provide room to deny the living God,” not to deny Scripture or the description of creation, but to deny the existence of God. And then the question arose, before we discuss the answer he gives: what is the question? He does not fully formulate what the question is.
[Speaker A] Why does it really deny the existence of the living God? Because if this is a development that proceeds on the basis of entirely random processes and without purpose, then it is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not someone—
[Speaker C] who directs it,
[Speaker A] not someone who wants to make a human being with such talents and such abilities,
[Speaker C] it just happened.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a question of—one moment—
[Speaker A] If God created, then He created something whole.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely agree; I think that is where the problem is.
[Speaker A] You would expect that if He created something, then He created something perfect. The Creator did not create something that needs to develop; He created something complete.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Guesses about the nature of the Creator. The Creator decided to create it this way. I do not understand Him anyway, how His mind works, so this too I—
[Speaker A] don’t understand, and it isn’t perceived as something illogical. One who can do everything can make something perfect.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does He want it to be created precisely through this process? He wants it also to continue further; even today this is not the final state. He wants a world that keeps becoming more perfected—that is what He wants, morally but also physically, biologically. How does this world become perfected? That is what He created it for. That is what Turnus Rufus asks Rabbi Akiva, right—if the Holy One, blessed be He loves the poor, why did He create them poor, so that people should support them? No, the Holy One, blessed be He expects the world to become perfected from below. His reasons are with Him; I don’t know why, but that is what He expects. That is what He—well, fine, it can be explained. I’m saying it doesn’t matter, because all this leads to the question of what I conjecture about the way the Holy One, blessed be He thinks. Fine, so maybe I don’t understand the way the Holy One, blessed be He thinks—but why does this undermine His very existence? As for the God you don’t believe in, I don’t believe in Him either, as people say—the God who creates everything perfect. I believe in a God who creates everything in a developing way. Okay, so what? Why does that undermine anything? So here, indeed, the first meaning is that this business appears—if it really is some random process without a guiding hand—then that means there is no guiding hand. That is the meaning: that there is not some process here that looks like the execution of a plan by some directing factor, but rather something managing itself. And if it manages itself, why assume there is someone directing the process?
[Speaker A] After all, the laws of nature—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, one second—we are already getting back to the answers. First of all I want to understand the question. I think that indeed the stronger formulation is what Yehudit said earlier. Basically, the claim is that evolution does not really undermine the existence of God; it simply makes Him unnecessary. What does that mean? Usually when we try to prove to ourselves or to others the existence of God, the perhaps most popular proof—there are three in the Kantian public—but the most popular proof is what Kant calls the physico-theological proof. Physico-theological proof means, at the end of the day, we see a complex world, we see a world that has some kind of purpose, it proceeds and fits its aims in some sense, there is what I need in order to live, all the things Duties of the Heart writes and so on, so apparently there is someone here who built and planned this. Fine, that is in a very broad and crude form the physico-theological proof. Now, the moment I say that actually this thing is not moving toward its purpose at all—it simply happens—then the proof for the existence of God has fallen away. This does not refute the existence of God; rather, now I simply have no necessity to assume that there is a God. It does not mean there is none; it only means that the necessity I had to assume that He exists has been canceled. That is the point. Since why did I decide that there is a God? I decided that there is a God because I had no explanation for how something so sophisticated was created and functions. Now I have an explanation, so what is the problem? Why do I need to assume the existence of some additional being? What Bertrand Russell brings is something called the celestial teapot. Yes, that is Bertrand Russell’s example. Someone comes to you and says: you know, orbiting around Jupiter there is some tiny transparent teapot, really millimeter-sized, spinning there at a constant speed, and this is a verified fact. Now how can I see it? You can’t see it, not with telescopes or anything—it’s too small, and it’s also transparent and unobservable and all that—but know that there is a celestial teapot there. Fine, so Bertrand Russell says: I have no proof that there is no such teapot. What can I tell him—that I have proof there isn’t? No. But I have no reason at all to assume there is one. Meaning, once you do not place things within observation and I have no reason to assume they exist, then the conclusion will be that they do not. Meaning, most atheists—or certain atheists—are not atheists who have proof that there is no God, but rather atheists who say: we have no proof that there is. And once we have no proof that there is, then why assume He exists?
[Speaker C] And for the English, a teapot is a sacred thing. Almost God.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They wanted to see. Explain him.
[Speaker A] Not that there is proof there isn’t, but it’s not reasonable that there is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think this is about probability. This is about the fact that Ockham’s razor basically says: I do not assume the existence of entities I do not need to assume. If I don’t need them in order to explain something, then why assume them? I can invent another hundred thousand demons and spirits and whole worlds and everything, for which I have no indication whatsoever that they really exist—so why assume that they do? And I have no proof that they do not. The big problem with evolution is not that it is proof that there is no God, but that it makes unnecessary or neutralizes the proof that He does exist. Now, once the physico-theological proof is gone, we remain in what is called an agnostic state. Meaning a state in which I do not know. But once I do not know, why assume that He exists? If I do not know, then I do not assume that He exists.
[Speaker A] There is a verse in the Torah that speaks about this physical state, and “I will surely hide My face on that day.” The hiding of God’s face is first of all in nature and in laws and within prophecy, but basically the process described here is also the same thing. That is, He hides in nature; the Holy One, blessed be He brings the world to a state in which nature can be explained without Him, as it were. This is a kind of very, very deep hiding of the face, which leaves us—very nice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now that is exactly the celestial teapot. From the atheist’s side, you tell him: listen, there is a God who created the world. He says to you: where do you see Him? Where is the evidence for Him? I don’t see anything—why assume He exists? You tell him: no, no, it’s hiding of the face, meaning He is transparent and can’t be observed. Okay, go convince the atheist that there really is such a thing.
[Speaker A] On the other hand, if clear traces of the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He had remained within science, that would not be hiding of the face; there would no longer be any wisdom in it, there would be no challenge in being a believer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe there would be a challenge; I’m not talking psychologically right now. I’m not talking now about the conduct of the Holy One, blessed be He, what challenges He throws us. I’m asking the question the atheist asks. Why do I need to assume He exists? I have not one reason; there is no need for it. So if I don’t need it, then why assume it? That’s all. You are inventing explanations for someone who already believes. Meaning, someone who already believes: there is a God—so why don’t we see Him? Because He chose to hide. Fine, maybe. But I am asking why assume to begin with that He exists at all. That is the real problem of evolution. Evolution is not proof that there is no God; evolution is an alternative explanation that neutralizes the proof that there is a God. That is the argument. As it were it neutralizes it—we’ll soon see whether it neutralizes it or not—but that is the minefield of evolution. Now, what is he actually answering to this? Now the question, right? That is basically the question. “To deny the living God” does not mean that this proves there is none, but that I have no proof that there is, so we deny His existence. This is not about the details of being but about existence itself. So what is the answer? That the fact that we see such a great reality, arranged in orders of wisdom and ways of life in body and spirit and intellect, all arranged in one system—therefore we recognize the great spirit that is here. There is some kind of complex system here that functions in a very, very impressive and unified way, and therefore it is clear that there is someone who directs it, that the spirit of the Holy One, blessed be He is what actually activates this matter, what directs this matter.
[Speaker A] Why does he say “in body, spirit, and intellect”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also their physical side, also their spiritual side, and also their intellectual side. Creatures that have body and spirit and intellect.
[Speaker A] Ah, you’re asking what the significance of intellect is here as distinct?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Intellect certainly exists; intellect is one of the functions of the spirit.
[Speaker A] And he assumes here that these processes cannot be entirely random. There are processes here with very, very long-term regularity, and only that could have led… It took billions of years, but if you really observe it, you will see that it is not random.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we need to understand well what exactly the answer here is. We’ll see that next time, because there are a few important points here, really in general too. Abraham our forefather and the building.
[Speaker A] Yes, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Abraham our forefather and the building—that was anthropic physico-theology from the outset.
[Speaker A] As if we are inside—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a complex, ordered, impressive world and so on—apparently there is someone who directs it. But then evolution came along, and the question is: what does Rabbi Kook buy here? Is he restoring the physico-theological proof all over again? So that is already piled up. What is new here? What was the difficulty, and why is this answer better than what we thought before?
[Speaker C] Or he is saying that it is even more complex. What? He is saying it’s not that now he created a physico-theology: there is a complex world here, so someone planned it. He says it is even more complex, because it takes someone with the patience of billions of years to plan it; one should be even more amazed by that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I would formulate it a bit differently, but I agree with the direction. I think that really is…
[Speaker A] Such a claim of Rabbi Kook is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not only the deep understanding of faith? I don’t think so. I’ll try to explain it more, and I don’t think so at all, I really don’t. But fine, we’ll see next time. I just want to—basically what he is saying is that the Holy One, blessed be He activates these natural processes. They are not a substitute; they are operated by Him. That still does not answer the question. Because someone else will say: no, these natural processes operate on their own, and I have no reason to assume that someone is operating them. And the common answers among us say: this contradicts nothing. The fact that a law of nature operates in such-and-such a way—the Holy One, blessed be He operates through the law of nature in that way—that contradicts nothing. True, it contradicts nothing, but it still makes Him unnecessary. Why assume that there is someone operating it when I can in fact explain it without someone operating it? Therefore there is a point here that one still has to insist on and understand better. I’ll perhaps finish with a nice remark from a good friend of mine, Nadav Shnayer, a physicist from Bar-Ilan—you surely know him. He once said that he does not understand, basically, why people are more troubled by evolution than by gravitation. Why is evolution a stronger threat to faith than gravitation? Gravitation too just means that when the apple falls to the ground, as in Newton’s story, it does so because there is a force pulling it downward and not because the Holy One, blessed be He dropped it. So there too you can basically say that the moment I have some natural explanation, I no longer need to arrive at the transcendent being who operates it. So why is evolution perceived among us as something more threatening to faith than any other scientific law? What is there in evolution that is more threatening? I think there is, by the way. And I very much want to explain it next time. I think there is—maybe that is the point, but just think about it until next week. What? In the end, there still remains a question.
[Speaker A] Up to this point, the lesson of the Beit Avraham preparatory program on Thursday night, the eve of the seventh of Cheshvan 5771, October 14, 2010.