חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם

Torah Study – Lesson 12

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Table of Contents

  • Summary of the discussion: the commandment of Torah study versus Torah learning and neglect of Torah study
  • Torah study as a foundational value that does not require explanation
  • Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, the concept of devekut, and the debate with Hasidism
  • Universality, “basic values,” and the use of halakhic and public examples
  • “Expound and receive reward,” “great is study because it leads to action,” and the question of enjoyment in learning
  • Value versus fact: Leibowitz and defining “value” as something not open to rationalization
  • “Do things for the sake of their working, and speak of them for their own sake” and Torah as an end in itself
  • Equivalent commandments, inclusive commandments, and Maimonides on values outside the count of the commandments
  • Learning even a “minor” point of Jewish law as devekut: Shakh, Ketzot, a mode of thinking, and the will of God
  • Methods of study: Rabbi Chaim and the Chazon Ish, and the distinction between a tool and uncovering ideas
  • An identity position: Haredi in learning, not Haredi in current affairs, and the principle of autonomy in halakhic ruling
  • The model of the rabbinate in Dvinsk: the community serves the rabbi in order to serve future generations
  • Criticism of the public and political discourse around yeshivot and kollels: don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater
  • Maimonides on making a living from charity in order to study Torah, and the Kesef Mishneh’s explanation
  • Against the model of “a thousand enter Scripture and one emerges for Jewish law”: too many learners, filtering, and proper proportion
  • A practical proposal: less kollel funding, far fewer learners, much higher pay for those who are suitable
  • Bottom-up funding: a focused fund instead of general donations to yeshivot and kollels
  • A change in perspective: not service to the public, but a collective mission to continue Torah
  • Personal devekut versus building the Torah of the collective

Summary

General Overview

The text summarizes the distinction between the commandment of Torah study in its formal sense and Torah learning as a foundational value of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, and to His will. It argues that Torah learning in this sense is not a means to some other benefit and does not depend on the question of who is obligated and who is exempt. Based on this understanding, it offers a critique of the way public and political discussion about the world of yeshivot and kollels is conducted, and develops a position according to which criticism must be made without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The text proposes reversing the usual perspective: not asking what Torah learners “contribute” to society, but how society contributes to maintaining a small, worthy, talented layer of learners who will develop Torah for future generations, while changing the funding model so that the numbers decrease and the reward for the few who are suitable increases.

Summary of the discussion: the commandment of Torah study versus Torah learning and neglect of Torah study

The text argues that one can fulfill the commandment of Torah study through reciting the Shema morning and evening, whereas Torah learning is a much broader demand to study according to one’s ability. The text defines neglect of Torah study as a situation in which a person had time to learn and did not learn, and not as failure to fulfill the formal obligation of “a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening.” The text explains that what is called “Torah study is equivalent to them all” is not the commandment of Torah study, but Torah study in its broader sense, as the foundation from which “everything comes forth.”

Torah study as a foundational value that does not require explanation

The text states that the question “why should one study Torah?” assumes that Torah study is a derivative value, whereas Torah study is a foundational value with no value “beneath it” that could explain it. The text presents a chain of explanations that ultimately ends with “that’s just how it is” in the sense of something self-evident, and argues that someone seeking an explanation for a foundational value has already lost the ability to receive an answer. The text compares this to questions about basic values such as “why not murder,” and adds that even values that are not universal can still be foundational for one who understands them.

Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, the concept of devekut, and the debate with Hasidism

The text attributes to Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, in Gate 4 of Nefesh HaChaim, the understanding that Torah study is attachment to the Holy One, blessed be He, or to His will, because He and His will are one. The text emphasizes that Rabbi Chaim opposes a Hasidic view according to which Torah study is a means of creating an experience of devekut, and argues that according to Rabbi Chaim, Torah study is not a means but devekut itself. The text concludes from this that Torah study is not one commandment among the 613 but a central foundation in the service of God, and therefore the discussion of who is “obligated” and who is “exempt” in the formal sense does not define the obligation of study in the foundational sense.

Universality, “basic values,” and the use of halakhic and public examples

The text argues that universality is at most an indication that a value is self-evident, but is not a necessary condition for a foundational value and is not a reason to observe something. The text brings an example from the Talmud about one who errs in judgment as opposed to one who errs in an explicit Mishnah, and explains that the commonly accepted practice is an indication and not a definition. It also adds an example from a dispute about acceptance of commandments in conversion and emphasizes that accepting commandments means accepting obligation, not actual fulfillment in practice. The text presents the possibility that a halakhic sage can make a mistake even if an apparent written source can be found, and describes this as an error in judgment even when it is difficult to prove formally.

“Expound and receive reward,” “great is study because it leads to action,” and the question of enjoyment in learning

The text rejects the explanation that Torah study is meant mainly “in order to know what to do,” and brings the rebellious son as proof that there is study not directed toward practice, together with the Talmudic statement “expound and receive reward” and Rabbi Israel Salanter’s interpretation that the passage teaches that study is not merely a means to action. The text raises a difficulty with the statement “great is study because it leads to action” if study is only a means, and connects this with the claim that the very question about utility misses the value itself. The text brings the Avnei Nezer in his introduction, that learning with joy and pleasure is desirable, but learning “because of the pleasure” is not for its own sake, and distinguishes between pleasure as a side effect and pleasure as a cause.

Value versus fact: Leibowitz and defining “value” as something not open to rationalization

The text quotes Leibowitz’s view that a value is something that cannot be rationalized and cannot be grounded in something else, and brings his article on Karen Ann Quinlan to explain that an argument permitting disconnection from machines places the value of life on an external condition and therefore nullifies its value-status. The text distinguishes between “that’s just how it is” in an arbitrary sense and “that’s just how it is” in a self-evident sense, and argues that every system of explanation must stop at some point of value axioms. The text emphasizes the naturalistic fallacy and formulates that pleasure is a fact whereas “one must do” is a norm, and norms do not arise from facts.

“Do things for the sake of their working, and speak of them for their own sake” and Torah as an end in itself

The text interprets, following Nefesh HaChaim, the statement “Do things for the sake of their working, and speak of them for their own sake” to mean that commandments are performed “for the sake of their working,” whereas Torah is studied “for its own sake,” in the sense of “for the sake of Torah.” The text states that Torah is an end in itself and does not serve some additional means, emphasizing that “the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah are one.” The text connects this to the widespread view that the status of Torah learners is foundational and that “Torah study is equivalent to them all” should not be understood as just another commandment within the count.

Equivalent commandments, inclusive commandments, and Maimonides on values outside the count of the commandments

The text refers to Rabbi Wolbe in the book “The Equivalent Commandments” and to six commandments, each of which is described as equivalent to all the others, and argues that the equivalence is not that of the formal commandment but of a foundational value reflected by the commandment. The text presents an explanation for the question of why Maimonides omitted the commandment of settling the Land of Israel from his count, through the principle that something equivalent to everything points to a value that is not inside the system of commandments, even though the text notes that Maimonides did not formulate this as an explicit root principle. The text argues that the Laws of Repentance in Maimonides deal with foundational values that are not commandments, and gives as an example free choice and divine foreknowledge and free choice, which cannot themselves be commanded because they are conditions for command.

Learning even a “minor” point of Jewish law as devekut: Shakh, Ketzot, a mode of thinking, and the will of God

The text asks how learning the laws of litigation, legal presumption, and rabbinic questions can be devekut, and cites Nefesh HaChaim that devekut does not mean understanding “His ways” but connecting to His will through the collection of laws. The text quotes the author of the Tanya that the laws are “garments in which the King is clothed,” and embracing the garments is embracing the King Himself, regardless of the type of garment. The text proposes that the halakhic details reflect a broader mode of thinking, and that this is the “Torah” conveyed through the concrete medium of oxen and cows, and in our day also through concepts of the contemporary world.

Methods of study: Rabbi Chaim and the Chazon Ish, and the distinction between a tool and uncovering ideas

The text argues that methodology is always human, but its role is to uncover the ideas in the Torah, and that Briskers and followers of the Chazon Ish use different tools to discover “what is down there.” The text notes that the Chazon Ish argues with Rabbi Chaim in his letters, which shows that they are talking about the same conceptual domain even though they reach different conclusions. The text attributes to Rabbi Shakh the statement that Torah is “a way of looking,” and argues that ethics and value influence are found in the Talmud and the medieval authorities (Rishonim), not in inventions of “the great sages of the generation in matters of faith.”

An identity position: Haredi in learning, not Haredi in current affairs, and the principle of autonomy in halakhic ruling

The text declares that he is “completely Haredi” with regard to the conception of Torah study through halakhic give-and-take and deepening modes of thought, but “completely not Haredi” in current-affairs conceptions, and argues that there is no necessary connection between the two levels. The text presents the value of autonomy in halakhic ruling, clarifying that it does not stem from the claim that a person is always right, but from the obligation to rule independently, even though a great Torah scholar is “usually more right.” The text rejects the concept of “the halakhic decisor of the generation” as a single authority, and defines a “great Torah scholar” as someone worth listening to mainly because he is rooted in the learning world.

The model of the rabbinate in Dvinsk: the community serves the rabbi in order to serve future generations

The text brings an article he wrote about the Or Sameach and the Rogatchover in Dvinsk and describes the differences in temperament between them in order to show that stereotypes do not determine things. The text describes a historical phenomenon in which small communities hired rabbis from a “league” irrelevant to local needs, and explains that the communities were not asking for services but saw supporting giant figures as a mission for the Jewish people across generations. The text argues that the community maintained rabbis and yeshivot so they would not have to earn a living as ordinary professionals, and in that way the Jewish people as a whole would gain Torah for generations.

Criticism of the public and political discourse around yeshivot and kollels: don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater

The text argues that there is justified criticism of the learning world, but it must come from recognition of the enormous significance of Torah institutions; otherwise it creates a reaction that cancels the value and dismisses it as idleness or imbalance. The text declares that he blesses “the soldiers of the IDF and the yeshiva students” even after writing sharp criticism about proportions and policy. The text emphasizes that Torah is not supposed to “be useful” in terms of security, economics, or happiness, but that these are domains meant to enable the continuation of Torah and of devekut.

Maimonides on making a living from charity in order to study Torah, and the Kesef Mishneh’s explanation

The text quotes Maimonides in the Laws of Torah Study and in his commentary to Pirkei Avot about one who supports himself through charity in order to study Torah, as someone who “has desecrated the Name and disgraced the Torah,” and warns against simplistic use of those quotations. The text brings the Kesef Mishneh, who writes that the practice does not follow Maimonides, and that without support there will be no learners of a high level left, because “we are not all Maimonides.” The text presents Torah study as an existential need in the sense of a goal in itself, similar to the Chinese saying about buying bread to live and a flower so there will be something to live for.

Against the model of “a thousand enter Scripture and one emerges for Jewish law”: too many learners, filtering, and proper proportion

The text argues that the current situation is “distorted” and that there are “too many learners,” mainly because many are not suited and are not learning in a way that justifies public support. The text opposes the view that brings everyone in so that perhaps a few may grow, and proposes that those who are supported should have the potential “to create Torah” and develop it. The text says he has no answer in terms of “percentages” for the proper proportion, but the right proportion is the number of people who are truly suitable, and he presents himself as a “capitalist” who expects selection and filtering to create balance.

A practical proposal: less kollel funding, far fewer learners, much higher pay for those who are suitable

The text proposes an alternative social covenant: cut the budget of yeshivot and kollels in half, reduce the number of learners by a factor of twenty, and give each worthy person “a salary ten times as high,” so that the learners will be “the elite unit, the commando, the top academy of Torah.” The text argues that the current policy is “lose-lose” because it supports many on starvation wages, pushes the talented into employment escapes, and leads talented people to become kashrut supervisors and occasional lecturers just to survive, without advancing in Torah. The text states that the new model would be “win-win,” would cost the public less, would strengthen Torah, and would reduce desecration of God’s name.

Bottom-up funding: a focused fund instead of general donations to yeshivot and kollels

The text proposes not donating generally to yeshivot and kollels, but building a fund that grants direct support to candidates who are selected and considered worthy, similar to the model of grants at universities such as NSF and NIH. The text suggests a communal example: a class in a yeshiva commits from its tithe money to support two or three friends who are suitable to remain in learning, and thus in every yeshiva a natural mechanism of selection and support would emerge. The text argues that general donations “throw money in the trash” because they fund many who are unsuitable and drive away those who are suitable.

A change in perspective: not service to the public, but a collective mission to continue Torah

The text states that Torah learners should not need to provide services to the public, and that judges and rabbis are providers of another kind of service, who do not have time to learn. The text insists that the question “what benefit will we get out of them?” is a logical and value-based mistake, because the learners themselves are the benefit and society exists “for them.” The text describes supporting the learners as a collective rather than private mission, and explains that when this is imposed on young individuals without economic horizon, the whole thing collapses, whereas if the public sees them as emissaries and gives them honor and a proper salary, a small, stable, respected layer of developers of Torah will emerge.

Personal devekut versus building the Torah of the collective

The text acknowledges the claim that every person can learn according to his own level and cleave at his own level, but adds that there are “people who build the Torah so that there will be something to cleave to.” The text presents the appearance of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world as connected to the way Torah appears in the world, and the appearance of Torah in the world as dependent on the way learners develop and formulate it. The text concludes by justifying the priority of a father’s own study over his son’s study in the wording “if he and his son both need to study—he takes precedence over his son,” because if everyone worries only about others, in the end no layer will remain that studies and carries the torch forward.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today I want to take a bit of a step back and look from above at what we’ve gone through in the last topic, and move a little into politics. Not politics in the fully simple sense, but yes, current affairs. Because there are issues that I think are connected to this matter and come up from time to time, and I think the discussion around them is not being conducted properly. After that—and I hope we’ll finish with this today—we’ll move on to topics that are also connected to Torah study and halakhic ruling, whether that’s the same topic or we define it as a separate one. But today I’m more or less summing up what we’ve done until now. Basically, I think it was the session before last, when we learned the passage in Menachot, and I tried to show that there is a difference between the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study can be fulfilled by reciting the Shema morning and evening, and Torah learning is something much broader. The concept of neglect of Torah study, for example—someone who doesn’t learn, that’s called neglect of Torah study—it has nothing to do with the commandment of Torah study, because the commandment of Torah study is a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening; if you didn’t do that, that’s not what’s called neglect of Torah study. Neglect of Torah study is when you had time in which you could have learned and you didn’t learn, and then the question is what happened. Fine? After all, a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening—that’s the obligation; you weren’t required to do more than that. So what I tried to claim and show through that passage in Menachot is that there is some fundamental demand from every person to learn Torah according to his ability, as much as he can, and that has nothing to do with the commandment of Torah study. So the commandment of Torah study is a commandment like any other commandment. What it says, “Torah study is equivalent to them all,” is not the commandment of Torah study but Torah study. And the foundation that I think this rests on is the understanding of what Torah study actually is, or what the meaning of Torah study is at all. If we understand Torah study the way—I opened this whole issue with Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin in Gate 4 of Nefesh HaChaim—that Torah study is basically some kind of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, or to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, for He and His will are one, then in fact Torah study is not the fulfillment of one commandment out of the 613, but perhaps the most fundamental thing there is in the service of God; everything comes out of it. And as I tried to argue there, since this is not the commandment of Torah study in the formal sense, there is also no point in discussing who is obligated and who is exempt. In this sense, everyone who understands the meaning of Torah study is obligated. That can include women, it can include minors—everyone exempt from the commandment of Torah study can still be obligated in Torah study in this sense. Because Torah study is really some fundamental basis on which everything is built; it is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, and of course it also enables you to know what to do. But as I said, that is not the commandment of Torah study in the sense of knowing; Torah study is not studying in order to know what to do. Maybe I’ll look at it from a slightly different angle. Once we were sitting in the yeshiva in Yerucham when I was there, and there was some evening where we were talking a bit about the nature of learning itself, and honestly the question came up: why should one study? What value is there in learning? Why is it such a central thing? So I thought about it a bit—how do you answer this—and I told them that when a person asks why one does something, he expects an answer in terms of some other principle that is more understandable. Meaning, if someone asks me why—I don’t know—why should one pay taxes? You have to pay taxes because one should obey the law, because taxes are important since they’re used for all kinds of purposes. There are explanations. Fine, and why should one obey the law? Or I don’t know, why are taxes important? Then there are more explanations. In the end, that chain of explanation will stop. Where will it stop? At some stage I’ll answer: because—and the answer will be—that’s just how it is. “That’s just how it is” meaning it is self-evident; I don’t have anything clearer on which I can base that thing. And the most fundamental thing is what begins the chain of explanation. So when I ask why one should study Torah, you are assuming that this thing is not a foundational value but a derivative one. And then you ask yourself: so what foundational value does it serve? That’s what explanation means. When you look for an explanation, you’re saying: give me another principle that is self-evident and that will explain why Torah must be studied. The question is whether there is such a principle. What is the foundational principle about which we will not ask why.

[Speaker C] But if three minutes ago you said that the shiver—that feeling—then that’s a more basic value. Right, even though it gives an answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I think—in a moment I’ll get to that, okay? Because Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin addresses exactly that point. My claim is that the value of Torah study is the foundational thing. There isn’t anything beneath it. With it I might explain other things, but to explain it is basically to cut off the branch you’re sitting on. When you explain something, you assume that it’s not a foundational value, but that there is another foundational value that serves as the basis for it. But if you understand that this is the foundational thing, then it doesn’t need an explanation.

[Speaker B] Can you say that we study Torah because we need to know what to do? So I talked about that—I said it’s not in order to know what to do. I know, but if you’re now saying what the most basic explanation is, then maybe you can say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can, it’s not—

[Speaker B] right, I think.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my view that’s not correct.

[Speaker B] We need to study in order to know what to do—that’s true—and there’s also an explanation for why that’s true, because it’s self-evident that one needs to know what to do. It’s self-evident that one needs to know what to do, but it’s not self-evident that the value of Torah study lies in that. It’s self-evident that one needs to eat, so does that mean Torah study is for the sake of eating? If you learn something, usually the most basic thing is to understand—to understand what to do. But there are things that you don’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] do for the sake of—don’t learn for the sake of doing. I brought a few examples. What about the rebellious son? And the Talmud says: there never was and never will be one. So why study it? Rabbi Israel Salanter brings proof from there. The Talmud says: “Expound and receive reward.” So Rabbi Israel Salanter asks: what, have we finished all the rest of the Torah, that we need these three verses so we’ll have something to do? So he says no: this passage of the rebellious son comes to teach the principle of “receive reward.” The principle that when you learn, you are not learning in order to know what to do.

[Speaker B] I’m not disagreeing with what you’re saying—that one needs to know what to do, one needs to know that the Torah said what to do and one needs to know that the Torah said not to do what it forbids.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then I didn’t understand the whole investigation—you emptied it of content. So everything I learn, I learn for something. But that something is not to know what to do. Obviously I learn in order to know the Torah, but not in order to know what to do. “To know what to do” means that learning is a means. “Great is study because it leads to action.” I brought that. “Great is study because it leads to action.” Apparently study is a means to action, so why is that a reason why study is great? The opposite—then it’s a means; action is the great thing. We already discussed all this. So what I basically told them there was that when one asks why study Torah, the question has already missed the point. You can no longer answer. The moment someone asks that question, it’s already impossible to answer him. It’s like someone asking why not murder. If someone asks why not murder, what am I supposed to answer him? Because it’s forbidden to murder. I don’t know what else to tell him. What does that mean? It means that the value of human life is a kind of basic value, something self-evident. Whoever needs—whoever searches for an explanation for that—will never get one. The moment you look for an explanation for that, you’ve already lost it.

[Speaker D] But there is a difference. There are things that are universal. Ask in any culture whether if if if that’s right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I understand there’s a difference, but I want to claim that there are still values which, even though they’re not universal or not self-evident to every person, for a certain group or for someone who understands them, they still have the same status. It is something self-evident; I don’t know how to explain it. Someone who doesn’t understand it—I have no way of explaining it to him. Eighteen million out of what, eighty billion?

[Speaker E] Is that something universal?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. I didn’t say it’s universal—on the contrary, I agree that it’s not universal. I’m only arguing that something not universal doesn’t mean it’s not a foundational value. Universality, in my view, is not a condition for a value to be foundational. It may be an indication. Meaning, something the whole world understands—that’s not a bad indication that it’s probably self-evident, but it’s not a necessary condition. Let me give you maybe an example. The Talmud says—we spoke about this once, I think—about one who errs in an explicit Mishnah and one who errs in judgment. So when the Talmud talks about one who errs in judgment, it tries to bring a proof—a definition, sorry, not a proof. A definition. It says this is someone who goes against the commonly accepted passage, what is conventionally ruled. So there are people who understand that what is conventionally ruled is the definition of one who errs in judgment. Meaning, there really is no such thing as one who errs in judgment. My judgment says this, your judgment says that. What does it mean to err in judgment? Rather, no, it means someone who goes against what is conventionally ruled. And I think that’s not right. Someone who goes against what is conventionally ruled—that is an indication that he erred in judgment; it is not a definition. But someone could err in judgment even if he is not going against what is conventionally ruled. Maybe it would be harder for me to show that or convince people of it. There are examples of this. There are situations in which—here, I brought this example once, about acceptance of commandments in conversion. I once wrote an article against the conversions—yes—of the governmental conversion system, meaning their policy. And I argued that there was no meaningful acceptance of commandments there, and that meaningful acceptance of commandments is required as part of the conversion process. So there were all kinds of responses and protests and so on. One of the respondents wrote—I had also made another statement. I also argued that anyone who says otherwise is simply mistaken. It’s not a matter of dispute, not something that can even be debated. Nobody ever said otherwise. Because there were claims by Avi Sagi and people like that, claims that acceptance of commandments is a late invention—just nonsense, come on. In any case, there was some response that brought the responsa Melamed LeHo’il of Rabbi David Tzvi Hoffmann. I knew that responsum. It’s pretty much the only source, I think, among all the sources people bring, where it really can be understood that he was willing to give up acceptance of commandments in the conversion process. In all the other places, it’s simply not true—that’s just an incorrect interpretation. But there, yes, it can be understood that he did that. Only I argued—so he—

[Speaker E] brought it, fine, but what was his reasoning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t give a reason. That’s simply how he answered in practice; he didn’t explain.

[Speaker C] What is the definition of acceptance of commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Acceptance of commandments means understanding that you are obligated in the commandments.

[Speaker C] Simply that you’re obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Actually carrying them out in practice is a different issue. On that point I’m very lenient. On that point I think it’s really not a condition. Meaning, you can fail to keep even a single commandment, as long as it’s clear to you that you’re obligated. Meaning, if you are not obligated, then you are a transgressing Jew. That’s how Maimonides writes: a convert who accepted the commandments and did not keep them is a transgressing Jew, as long as he understands that he has accepted the commandments and is obligated in them. There is no such thing as—acceptance is not implementation. That’s another common confusion in this area. There is no connection between acceptance and implementation.

[Speaker C] Fine, so—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The religious court has to be convinced. And sometimes—here’s another example—that too is only an indication. Implementation is an indication that the acceptance was serious. But if you were convinced that the acceptance was serious, then what happens afterward doesn’t change that.

[Speaker F] But you were convinced that the acceptance wasn’t serious across an entire system.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. I’m only bringing this as an example; I don’t want to get into the field of conversion right now.

[Speaker C] It was just in the news, with the disqualification of a woman who converted ten years ago. I didn’t hear. It was just now—the rabbinate wanted to let her marry, and they couldn’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t hear about it, I don’t know. In any case, I said there that the respondent was a scholar of Hebrew law, some professor of Hebrew law, and I said that from his perspective as a researcher, since there is such a Melamed LeHo’il, therefore there is a halakhic source. But I, as someone who feels I am inside the halakhic field, for me that doesn’t interest me at all. Meaning, so he made a mistake—so what if he wrote it? Is everything written in Rashi script and bound in a black book with gold lettering automatically a halakhic opinion? Fine—even a halakhic sage can make a mistake; what can you do? The fact that he made a mistake doesn’t mean there is such a halakhic opinion. So that’s an example of someone being mistaken even when I can’t, I don’t know, bring formal proofs against him. It’s obvious he was mistaken. That’s called erring in judgment. I’m only bringing it as an example.

[Speaker E] And erring in an explicit Mishnah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, perhaps it’s even erring in an explicit Mishnah, because I think there one can even bring proofs from the Talmud—that one who did not accept even one thing. It isn’t brought by the halakhic decisors, which is why everyone argues about it. Maimonides doesn’t bring it, and neither does the Shulchan Arukh. It appears in the Talmud, and the halakhic decisors straightforwardly do use it.

[Speaker E] Maybe let’s go back for a second to why, in your opinion, Torah study is a value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment, I’m getting to that. So right now I drifted off—you tried to bring me back, but I drifted off.

[Speaker E] I’ll help you. You said it’s a value that’s hard to explain because it’s basic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that I remember; I just don’t remember why I got to this issue of erring in judgment. Okay, never mind. In any case, the point is that the value of Torah study, as distinct from the commandment of Torah study—“Torah study is equivalent to them all”—is in fact a foundational value, and as such it cannot be explained. It is self-evident. So whoever doesn’t understand that is mistaken. Meaning, it doesn’t matter that I can’t explain it to him, just as I can’t explain to someone why murder is forbidden. And really, as Leibowitz writes several times, the moment you ask why murder is forbidden, then from your standpoint it is no longer a value. It doesn’t matter what the answer will be. Once there is an answer, it means that it is not a value; rather, there is another value that explains it. Therefore, the moment you asked, you can no longer receive an answer.

[Speaker E] But the example contradicts what you’re saying. You say murder is forbidden because life has value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s the same thing. Murder being forbidden is the other side of the coin of the value of life. Why does life have value?

[Speaker E] And that brings—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] me to your remark about Torah study. You remarked, rightly, that Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin himself explains Torah study as cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. So it does have an explanation; it’s not a foundational thing. But notice that Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin—we talked about this at the very beginning—argues against the Hasidic conception. The Hasidic conception understands Torah study as a means to devekut. Meaning, if you study Torah, that will create an experience of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, a feeling, a religious experience. And Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin argues against them: no, Torah study is the devekut; it is not a means to devekut. Meaning, devekut is not some kind of religious experience. Rather, the very engagement in Torah—that is what is called cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. It is not a means to devekut; it is devekut itself. So what he says is not an explanation. Meaning, if it were a means to devekut, as in the Hasidic conception, then indeed the value would be—this is exactly what Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin is arguing against. That is why he says—that is exactly what he says. He answers your question. Meaning, he is not explaining; on the contrary, he is explaining why there is no explanation here. Exactly. Because the Hasidim understand Torah study, as he understands them, as a means of creating an experience of devekut, and then Torah study really is not a value. But Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin argues: it is not a means to anything; it is itself the devekut. So that is only calling it by another name, but it’s the same thing; it is not an explanation.

[Speaker D] No, but here you’re talking about some conception that is universal—cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, as something, as a value. He wants to say it’s not. Yes, yes. Now, that is an explanation. What he wants to say is: what is the foundation, what is self-evident? You need to look more at what is universal. Universal—people will understand that cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, is something of value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And for someone who doesn’t believe in the Holy One, blessed be He?

[Speaker D] I don’t know, but okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More broadly, more—yes. No, I agree, but again I’m saying: universality is an indication—now I remember how I got off track—universality is an indication and not a definition, just like objectivity, which is how I started this whole thing. Universality is an indication, but not the thing itself. Therefore, if a certain group understands that a certain thing is self-evident, the fact that there is no universal agreement doesn’t mean they are mistaken. It only means they understand something that others perhaps do not understand or are not supposed to understand. Maybe yes, maybe no. Universality is not a bad indication, although even that is not always reliable. The fact that the whole world agrees about something also does not necessarily mean it is true. But I agree—you do have to give some credit that if everyone says it, then in many cases it’s not nonsense.

[Speaker C] In Nefesh HaChaim, we really know what commandments are, but here you introduced into the discussion a new concept: a foundational value. Earlier too you asked what a foundational value is in relation to commandments. There are commandments, which talk about what to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And why do you do commandments? Let me tell you, like Rabbi Shimon Shkop, who talks there about the fact that there are things that obligate us even before the Torah was given—laws of acquisition, he talks about there, and obligations.

[Speaker C] He commanded us—no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t command us, but there are things that obligate us without a command—that’s what he says—like the laws of acquisitions, like obligations, all kinds of things like that. In Shaarei Yosher he goes on about this at length. And then he asks: and perhaps you’ll say, if the Torah didn’t command it, then why is it necessary?

[Speaker C] No, those are things that were universal. Well, so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if they were universal? So what if they were universal? So what? So what if they were universal? Does the fact that something is universal mean that I’m obligated to do it? Why?

[Speaker C] But he ties it to universality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m asking if something—

[Speaker C] basic within Judaism—what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: if a certain thing is universal, that also is not a reason to observe it. So how does it help me whether it is universal or not universal? The fact that everybody thinks something—so because of that I need to observe it? At most, that is an indication that there is something here that needs to be examined. But after I have examined it, I need to understand why I should observe it. The fact that everyone does it—so what if everyone does it? Everybody also speaks gossip, fine? So should I also speak gossip? What does that have to do with anything? At most, it can be an indication—there, now I mentioned gossip. At most, it can be an indication that I need to check it, but it is not an explanation in itself that it is universal, like I said before. So a foundational value means something that itself does not need an explanation in order to ground it. Axioms, yes, exactly—value axioms, as distinct from factual axioms or axioms in geometry. There are axioms in the world of values. The axioms in the world of values are what are called values. Meaning, values are the axioms that cannot be explained. The moment you come to explain them, it is no longer a value; it doesn’t matter what the answer will be. That’s what Leibowitz writes. He has a book, Faith, History, and Values, and at the end, in the last chapter, he talks about disconnecting from machines. I don’t remember if I ever talked about this—disconnecting from life-support. There was some girl named Karen something in the United States many years ago—Karen, maybe—where there was a discussion whether to disconnect her from machines or not. So this issue came up, and Leibowitz wrote an article about it, saying that under no circumstances may one disconnect her from machines, because when you disconnect someone from machines you are basically grounding the value of life in something outside itself. It ceased to be—or all kinds of things of that sort. And then he says: the moment you say that, life has ceased to be a value. Life is basically serving something else, and then it is evaluated: either it serves that thing and then it has value, or it doesn’t serve that thing and then it has no value. Therefore he argues that under no circumstances, in no way, may one harm life, no matter what happens, in any form whatsoever. That’s what he claims. I’m not sure I agree, but there he defines the concept of value. A value is something that cannot be rationalized, that cannot be grounded or explained on the basis of something else. But on the other hand, when this impossibility comes up and people ask me why, and I say: because that’s just how it is—what does that mean? Sometimes “that’s just how it is” means arbitrary, because I feel like it. And sometimes “that’s just how it is” means self-evident. Meaning, if someone needs an explanation for it, then I have no way to explain it to him.

[Speaker D] Winning and losing in soccer—that too is something you don’t have to explain why it matters. Playing soccer? Yes. There are people who would say, why does it matter? That’s just how it is—it matters to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know such people.

[Speaker D] There are people who say that—I know. There are people who say it’s their whole life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s their whole life—that’s perfectly fine. I also like eating cream cake, but that doesn’t turn it into a value. I enjoy it, fine. So the enjoyment is the reason, and that’s a good reason—enjoyment. Enjoyment, good mood, health, I don’t know. I don’t know anyone for whom soccer is a postulate.

[Speaker D] But I’d like to say that it’s very dangerous to say it like that, because you can’t argue with it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. What can you do? I didn’t promise you a rose garden, as Churchill said. Meaning, it’s dangerous, so what can I do? By the way, even in a case where you do argue with someone and explain to him why a certain thing is correct, and then you explain it by means of something else, and he asks you about that other thing—what will you say there? So you’ll explain it by yet something else. In the end, you always stop somewhere.

[Speaker D] With first principles, I think.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But not everything you do can be explained on the basis of universal things. People also have particular values. Not every value is universal. Now, I’m not belittling universal values; I just don’t think they’re everything. In other words, universality is a certain indication, but it doesn’t really define things; it’s not a necessary condition. Meaning, there can be values. I absolutely understand that many people—the overwhelming majority of the world, of course—don’t share this feeling that Torah study is the thing. Not even most of the Jewish people, I think, share that feeling. And still, in my view, it’s a basic value. Meaning, I don’t think it needs an explanation. If someone needs an explanation, then from his perspective—

[Speaker D] I have no way to explain it to him. And it could be that it conflicts with other values, like maintaining a society, if everyone just sat and learned all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—to that—I’ll get in another moment. I said this was an introduction to current issues.

[Speaker D] Maybe Torah study also gives pleasure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but then it’s not a value. Commandments were not given for enjoyment. Will you learn in order to enjoy? That—I think I mentioned once—the Eglei Tal in his introduction. The Eglei Tal says in the introduction that some people are mistaken and think that someone who rejoices in his learning is called someone who studies not for its own sake. You’re supposed to suffer, right? Too good to be kosher, as they say. Meaning, it can’t be that something good is kosher. That’s impossible. I think I once told you that this is actually a completely correct statement. Meaning, as a thing is—well, obviously, a kosher restaurant and a non-kosher restaurant: the non-kosher restaurant will always be better. That’s a mathematical statement. Why? Because if there’s something kosher that’s better, they’ll make it. But if there’s something non-kosher that’s better, the kosher ones can’t make it. So by definition the non-kosher option always has an advantage. Therefore, what isn’t kosher will always be better. At least, better. There are fewer constraints, exactly.

[Speaker E] And if the chef is good?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the chef is good, they’ll take him to the non-kosher place too, obviously. If the kosher chef is good, they’ll take him to the non-kosher place—of course they’ll take the chef too. In short, the Eglei Tal writes that there are people who think this is study not for its own sake, and then he says that’s a mistake. Every morning we say, “Please make the words of Your Torah pleasant in our mouths, Lord our God.” We ask the Holy One, blessed be He, to let us enjoy Torah study. On the contrary: when you’re happy, it enters more, it’s understood better, it connects to us more. And therefore studying from joy, from pleasure, is of course very positive. But the Eglei Tal continues with another sentence that’s less well known. He says that someone who studies because of the pleasure—that really is study not for its own sake. Meaning, it’s not that it’s forbidden to enjoy; you may enjoy it and it’s desirable to enjoy it, but the enjoyment is not the reason you study. It’s something that comes along with it, a side effect. Meaning, you study because one ought to study, and you also enjoy it—excellent. If you also enjoy it, that’s wonderful. Do you study for the sake of the enjoyment? Meaning, if when you won’t enjoy it you won’t study, then that really is study not for its own sake. That’s regarding enjoyment. Meaning, you can enjoy learning, but someone who studies for the sake of enjoyment is occupied with pleasures, not with values. Pleasures cannot explain values. I think I’ve already spoken about the naturalistic fallacy more than once. In general, facts cannot explain values. The fact that I enjoy something cannot give it value. That goes for soccer too. The fact that someone enjoys something doesn’t turn it into a value. You enjoy it—fine, enjoy it, do it, no problem. But a value means something one must do, not something that gives me something, something that gives me pleasure. Pleasure is a fact. And the fact that one must do something is a norm. A norm cannot be explained on the basis of a fact. So if we understand learning, or the Torah, in this way—the Torah as some expression of God’s will, and study as cleaving to God’s will—then the value of Torah is simply in itself. And that’s what Nefesh HaChayim writes: it says, “Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake,” as it says in tractate Nedarim. So what does “do things” mean? Those are the commandments. “For the sake of their Maker” means for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. “And speak of them”—when you study Torah—“for their own sake,” not for the sake of their Maker. Meaning, Torah is for the sake of Torah. Commandments one should perform for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. Torah one should study for the sake of Torah, not for something else. Which is basically an expression of the idea that Torah is an end in itself. It doesn’t serve any further means. Again, Nefesh HaChayim says—the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are one—so it’s not detached from the Holy One, blessed be He. But Torah is something that is a value, in Leibowitz’s language. It doesn’t serve anything else. So maybe that’s also what stands behind the very widespread conception that Torah study really is some fundamental value, some infrastructure that doesn’t need explanation. Meaning, it’s the most basic thing there is. You can’t really explain it by saying there’s this commandment or that commandment, or by formal halakhic definitions. And therefore the status of Torah scholars, as people commonly at least understand it, really is a very fundamental status. And without understanding that there is reward for it?

[Speaker E] What, Torah study? What is there—does it have reward?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume so. I’m not an expert in matters of reward, but—

[Speaker E] You don’t see it as a commandment that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s reward even for things that aren’t a commandment. What? If something isn’t a commandment there’s no reward? If you did a good deed, just behaved nicely, but it doesn’t enter the formal definition of a commandment, I assume the Holy One, blessed be He, does not withhold the reward of good people even if they don’t perform commandments, even if it doesn’t fit into formal Jewish law. On the contrary, here it’s something so fundamental that if there’s reward for a commandment, then for this there wouldn’t be reward? Torah study is equal to them all? Yes—much more so.

[Speaker B] Torah study that is equal to them all receives reward?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m speaking generally. The whole issue of reward is a matter that… well, never mind, that’s a whole separate topic.

[Speaker B] Torah study, which is equal to them all—according to this view, that Torah study is equal to all the commandments—what does “equal” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the point: it’s not a commandment. If it were one of the commandments, then it couldn’t be equal to all of them—that’s bootstrap. Meaning, if Torah study is one of the 613 commandments, how can it be equal to all 613? It’s itself one of the 613. When you say it is equal to them all, it means you are not talking about something that is itself a commandment. That something is equivalent to the whole system of commandments. Are there other examples like this? Yes, there are, and that’s exactly the next sentence. There’s a book by Rabbi Wolbe called The Equivalent Commandments, an article or booklet like that by Rabbi Wolbe called The Equivalent Commandments. He brings there six commandments about each of which it says that they are equal to all the rest. Sabbath? Sabbath. Torah study. The Land of Israel?

[Speaker E] Tzitzit, the Land of Israel, there are several commandments—he brings six like that. What? Could it be that he’ll say this is cleaving to God?

[Speaker C] Wait, one second, let me just finish this point I wanted to make.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So when I read that, I asked myself: how can it be that six commandments, each one, is equivalent to all the others? Mathematically it doesn’t work. I mean, one commandment equivalent, say, to the other 612—not including itself—I understand. But within those 612 there are another five that are also equivalent to 612 others including themselves?

[Speaker E] No, but Torah study is not among the commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—Torah study, and six other commandments that he brings. Six commandments? Yes. So what does that mean? I argue—no, it is an example, because I’ll explain why it is an example. Because the mistake there is that it’s not the commandment that is equivalent to all. A commandment really can’t be. Rather, clearly behind that commandment there is some fundamental value—as with Torah study—that is equivalent to all 613, not to the other 612. Rather, we’re talking about fundamental values, and the value is equivalent to the entire system of commandments, including that commandment itself in the technical, formal sense. Because what does “equivalent” mean here? It’s not a question of the same weight. Rather, the intent is that it is measured against the whole halakhic existence, against the whole… this value is outside the halakhic world. It isn’t measured in the language of whether this is such-and-such a commandment, an important commandment, a less important commandment. This is the commandment, this is the most fundamental thing, it’s like the entire Torah. There are, yes, I mentioned this once, people who try to explain Maimonides’ omission of the commandment of settling the Land of Israel that way. They argue that it is a fundamental commandment that is equivalent to the whole Torah, and therefore Maimonides didn’t count it because he doesn’t count inclusive commandments. That’s simply a mistake. Maimonides’ “inclusive commandments” means something else entirely. Maimonides’ inclusive commandments, I think I mentioned this, are commandments that really speak in a general way—“and you shall keep all My commandments”—that’s called inclusive commandments. Maimonides writes this in the fourth root. Maimonides doesn’t write anywhere, in any root, that because there is a commandment equivalent to the whole Torah, it isn’t counted. There is no such root in Maimonides. But the principle is a correct principle, I think Maimonides agrees with it too, just not in the roots; it has nothing to do with inclusive commandments. Why isn’t it counted? Not because of its importance, but because it really isn’t a commandment. It is outside the system of commandments, and therefore it is also equivalent to all of them. All the “equivalent commandments,” what he called them earlier—it isn’t the commandments themselves that are equivalent, but the value that the commandment reflects is what is equivalent. And therefore it cannot enter the count of the commandments; that’s why they really aren’t counted. The commandment of settling the Land of Israel, in my opinion, isn’t there, but that’s another discussion. What other value is like that? Torah study. Love of God, for example. There is a commandment of loving God, but love of God appears in more than two places—at least two places—in Maimonides, in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and in the Laws of Repentance chapter 10, where he talks about love of God, or serving God for its own sake, which is actually not a different value but the same thing. Why does it appear there? Torah study also appears both in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance and in the Laws of Torah Study. Why does it appear in two places? Because in one place it is discussed as a commandment, and in another place it is discussed as the fundamental value. You can see that there are differences in formulation. And generally, it seems to me that the Laws of Repentance are the laws in Maimonides that deal with fundamental values that are not commandments. You can show a number of points—for example, free choice is discussed there. In chapters 5-6 of the Laws of Repentance Maimonides deals with choice, the question of divine knowledge and human choice—those are two chapters he devotes to that issue. Now, choosing is not a commandment. It cannot be a commandment, because if you don’t choose then you also are not someone who can be commanded. When someone commands you, they assume you already choose; you can’t command someone to choose. Meaning, when someone commands you something, they assume you are a choosing person and command you to do such-and-such. And Maimonides devotes two chapters there to that. Why? Because really choice too—being a choosing being—is a terribly fundamental value, and it cannot enter into the system of commandments. There are several such values.

[Speaker E] In any case—yes, sorry. According to this direction—

[Speaker D] This direction, where you turned Torah study into cleaving to God, then—

[Speaker E] It’s easier—

[Speaker D] It’s easier to understand it if I define it—as Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin surely does—Torah study in the direction of Rabbeinu Bachya, that contemplation of the Holy One, blessed be He, is the highest thing, or the foundation of foundations, or the Account of the Chariot. But if I define it as studying the Shakh on the laws of claims and counterclaims, and Ketzot here, and so on—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So on that matter—that’s a good question. I had actually just been thinking of commenting on it, although I’ve also spoken about it before. In the Talmud it says: a great matter is the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot; a small matter is the debates of Abaye and Rava. And Maimonides writes this too—he translates it as physics and metaphysics. But in practice, it seems to me we see otherwise. In practice, what is really considered Torah study, what is considered the great thing, is specifically the Shakh on the laws of claims and counterclaims and the Ketzot—not Rabbeinu Bachya and not the Guide for the Perplexed and not all kinds of books that supposedly deal with the big things. And Nefesh HaChayim itself speaks about this there. What he says is that to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, does not mean to understand His ways. You’re assuming that understanding His ways is the great thing, and Torah—fine—you should walk in the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, not in the details of how you judge thieves, but in the question of what are the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He. But he doesn’t say that. He devotes his fourth gate to this. What he says is that He is His will, and the collection of laws are the wills of the Holy One, blessed be He, and when we study Jewish law we are in effect connecting to, internalizing, the wills of the Holy One, blessed be He. So in practice we cleave to Him. It is not to arrive at insights about how He behaves. Rather, it is the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself—not how He behaves in the world. The Holy One, blessed be He, Himself is within us through the Torah. The Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah are one; Israel and the Torah are one. That’s what Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin says there. Therefore his concept of cleaving is detached from that question.

[Speaker C] Fine, and the question is how that—how that is a description of the technical side of the very late later authorities, or rabbinic matters—so basically here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the topic I wanted to deal with in the next classes. I’ll say in one sentence: I think that when people deal with the Shakh, or it doesn’t matter, with questions of claims and counterclaims, with migo, with how you catch thieves, with fines, with rabbinic laws, with all sorts of things of this kind, basically one has to understand that… this mode of thinking is what I call God’s will. Not that the ox that gored the cow—I spoke about this, I brought it from the author of the Tanya, chapter 4, chapter 5, I mentioned it one of the previous times. The author of the Tanya writes there that the various laws are garments that the King clothes Himself in. And one who embraces the King in His garments is like embracing the King Himself; the order of the garments doesn’t matter. When the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to convey His wills to us, it has to pass to us through some medium. An abstract will—how do you say it? So He says it through oxen goring cows and thieves and double payment and migo and presumption and all sorts of things of that kind. But when you study it, behind it there is reflected a certain mode of thought, a certain conception, and that is basically the Torah. Not the details, not the medium through which it passes. But I intend to devote the next few meetings to that.

[Speaker D] You only mentioned that the method of Rabbi Chaim and that of the Chazon Ish are completely different, and that mode of thinking is also completely different, one from the other. There was an innovation—Rabbi Chaim basically introduced a way of learning that wasn’t there before. Okay, so to say that the way of thinking is the Holy One, blessed be He—but the innovations in the method?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not talking about methodology. Methodology is always human. But methodology is a tool for uncovering the ideas that are in the Torah. Now, the ideas that are in the Torah—both in Rabbi Chaim’s methodology and in the methodology of the Chazon Ish—they try to understand what ideas stand behind the passage. Those ideas are Torah. The methodology, how you do it, of course you do with your own tools. So everyone does it with his own tools. People talk about it: the Briskers do it this way, the Chazon-Ish people do it that way. That’s already a question of what methodology you approach with. You can dig in archaeology with one tool or another tool. In the end, you want to discover what is down there. So the question of what technique you dig with is a question that of course depends on you, each person with the technique he prefers. But in the end, what you uncover—that’s the important thing, not the way you uncover it.

[Speaker D] The facts or the ideas? No, the ideas. But again, the ideas themselves are also things—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, in my view, they do meet. Meaning, it’s only another way to formulate it, but it’s the same thing. The proof is that the Chazon Ish succeeds in arguing with Rabbi Chaim. His Ayelet HaShachar is devoted there to an argument with Rabbi Chaim. Meaning, they are speaking about the same thing. They may arrive at different conclusions and by different methodologies, but in the end you arrive at something that really is the abstract wills. The Kotzker writes somewhere, it seems to me, that Torah is a way of looking. It’s not the collection of details that are written. Rather, it is some mode of looking that you acquire in the course of dealing with the details. Also what I mentioned—that I really don’t like these inventions of “greats of the generation” in faith and all sorts of things of that kind, which they invented in recent years: Torah scholars in faith, as distinct from Torah scholars in Jewish law.

[Speaker E] Someone once asked me: why on the Sabbath of Repentance or the Great Sabbath do you give a passage in the Talmud and Maimonides—why not give a little ethics? I told him: you want ethics? Study Talmud and Tosafot. Because that’s where the ethics are. So I think he meant what you’re saying. Right. Through the method of learning and through the sages’ mode of thinking, you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You internalize within yourself some mode of looking that has implications for many other things that aren’t connected to the migo you studied. It isn’t the migo at all. The migo is just the way you enter into the matter. Meaning, if the Holy One, blessed be He, didn’t speak through cows and oxen, how would He speak to us? That’s our world. Or the world of back then, it doesn’t matter. For us it’s cars. But He has to speak to us through concepts we understand. Yet through those concepts, ways of looking and ideas pass to us. You have to put it into some concrete medium so that one can speak. But the ideas are the principled skeleton, not the technique.

[Speaker F] Now you’re talking like a Haredi. What? You’re talking now like a Haredi. Now the great of the generation knows—the logic says that the great of the generation is da’at Torah, he’s the Holy One, blessed be He, he’s closest to Him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I say that unequivocally.

[Speaker F] You want out? No, I admit the charge.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no problem being called Haredi in certain contexts.

[Speaker F] I’m saying, the responsibility you take on yourself—that’s the responsibility, that’s your approach. On the other hand, you say the great Torah authority knows better than you, so why not just ask him and that’s it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because when I explained that the value of autonomy—that I rule for myself—is not because I’m more correct than the great of the generation, but because there is an obligation to rule autonomously. That’s separate from the other question of who is right. And on the question of who is right, then a greater Torah scholar is usually more right than I am. Yes. More than that: I really do believe that when a person studies Torah through those lenses—and therefore I won’t always agree with the person you call the great of the generation, whom I too might call the great of the generation. I don’t know. But also in other areas—areas of thought, areas of, I don’t know, society, all sorts of other fields—I think the Torah is present there. God is in the details. When you study migo and the Shakh and claims and counterclaims and all that, you can reach greatness. You won’t always reach it. Some people study it in a small-minded way. So there are those who, fine, know all the… they can be tested for rabbinic judgeship and know everything by heart, and they’re worth nothing. They’re worth nothing because they don’t really understand what this thing is saying; they control the details. You also have to study with this awareness—that you are trying to uncover modes of thought. Therefore when you arrive at a certain passage, and you found an answer to a difficulty, or divided a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim), you should immediately look—at least in my view—you should immediately look: what does this actually mean? There are two ways of looking here; this has implications for much broader things, and that is discovered specifically through the small things. If you engage with all the big things of providence and the special quality of the Jewish people and the redemption of Israel and all these bubbe-meises, you’ll get nowhere. You’ll get nowhere; it’s just empty belly-logic. But when you enter into this little halakhic give-and-take, and you try to understand what this actually says, how one looks at things—then when you look at things, you’ll look at them more correctly. I really believe that. And if that’s Haredism, then I’m Haredi in that respect. I’m for it, and that’s exactly it. Fine, then I admit the charge.

[Speaker C] Is the great of the generation the halakhic decisor of the generation, or something else?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. That’s why I say: what is the halakhic decisor of the generation? There’s no such thing as the halakhic decisor of the generation. I don’t know—he mentioned… In my view, a person has to rule for himself. I don’t know what “the halakhic decisor of the generation” means. I think that’s because of the value of autonomy, not because the person is always right.

[Speaker C] What is the great of the generation? And why is there only one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t say there is only one. I said a great Torah scholar. I didn’t mean the great of the generation in the sense of the one who has authority, but rather: who is called a great Torah scholar? Someone worth listening to—what he explains, what he thinks, what he says. Not necessarily someone you must obey, but listen to—someone worth listening to. Usually, that’s someone who is a learned analyst. Someone who isn’t a learned analyst, in my eyes, that’s not… That doesn’t mean that if he is a learned analyst then yes. There are learned analysts who are petty learned analysts. Fine. I’m saying, that’s the law of the matter.

[Speaker B] But okay, let’s put that in parentheses, because I want to return to something else. Skepticism can reach very healthy places, okay? The yeshiva world, with its litigation—what is it, a litigation lawyer?—it’s the best ethical behavior handbook there is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. Not because that’s what they study there.

[Speaker B] It’s also very healthy. It’s not healthy for society, it’s not healthy for people. What’s not healthy for people? It’s not balanced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s not balanced? I didn’t understand. What’s not balanced and not healthy? Studying migo? What? Studying migo is not healthy and not balanced? Why, what’s wrong with that?

[Speaker B] There are quite a few psychologists you could talk to… So maybe studying psychology isn’t balanced, I don’t know. Do you know a yeshiva graduate who’s just corrupt all the time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent. I wish there were more like that. Excellent, in my eyes. But again, I’m saying, that doesn’t mean all the Jewish people have to do this. It means that this is the Torah training one should undergo; after that, everyone can do what he wants. The question of dosage—someone here asked earlier how many such people there should be—in a moment I’m trying to get to that and not quite succeeding. That’s another whole topic. But that’s the background I want to set out from in order to begin discussing the more current questions, because I think people often fall into stereotypes. If you’re like this, then you’re not Haredi, and not this, and you surely don’t think Torah is the revealed legal part; rather, Torah is Rabbeinu Bachya, and Torah is the Guide for the Perplexed. So no—I’m completely Haredi on this issue. And on the other hand, in my current-day views, I’m completely not Haredi. And I don’t think there is any connection between those two things. On the contrary, I arrive there out of this very conception. And therefore it was important for me to give this background before entering the current questions. Look, on current questions, because really—I’ll give you maybe one more sentence—I once wrote an article in a book that came out from the law faculty at Bar-Ilan. They published a book on the figure of the rabbi, something—I don’t remember what the book was called anymore—it was a collection of articles. They asked me for an article, so I wrote there an article about the Ohr Sameach and the Rogatchover, who were both rabbis in Dvinsk. The Rogatchover was the rabbi of the Hasidim and the Ohr Sameach was the rabbi of the Mitnagdim. And really, these were two gigantic figures, both of them truly figures on a historic scale. Both of them found themselves in some little town with a few Jews—Dvinsk. Now there’s a fascinating book, one of those “great men” books, you know, but very entertaining, about the Rogatchover. And it describes there a truly unpleasant personality. He comes to prayer, the cantor is being a bit too cantorial, he says, nu, nu, nu, we have to go learn already, leave me alone with all this pilpul, with all your trills—come on already. People say hello to him, he doesn’t even answer; he runs straight home after prayer. He’s the town rabbi, he gets a salary. Whereas the Ohr Sameach, by contrast, was a warm, radiant person, truly broad-minded. Grounded in the realities of the world, pleasant, talks—yes, Ohr Sameach as his name implies.

[Speaker C] Was Abuchatzeira one of his Hasidim? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, Abuchatzeira was one of his Hasidim, and the Rogatchover had Hasidim and the Ohr Sameach had Lithuanians, and that shows that stereotypes don’t always hold.

[Speaker C] The Rogatchover was Chabad.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, the Rogatchover came from a Chabad home. And I wrote there why this really happens. Today we’re used to—it sounds like you also were, or still are, I don’t know—in a situation of choosing a rabbi; that’s what I understood.

[Speaker E] But here it’s a matter of continuation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Choice is a rule about the act, not the result.

[Speaker E] It’s the evening, not the result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a rule about the act, not the result. In any case, I’m saying: being in that situation, I wrote there in the article that there was a terribly strange phenomenon in Europe, because very small communities took for themselves people on a scale that simply wasn’t relevant for them. What are the people of Dvinsk supposed to do with the Ohr Sameach and the Rogatchover, really? There may have been one question there that required more than the Mishnah Berurah, but these are people in a league that is completely irrelevant to some tiny puddle of a place like that. From the Jewish perspective Dvinsk looks like New York—there are the Ohr Sameach and the Rogatchover there! What was it really? A little puddle with a few peddlers and wagon drivers. So what’s the explanation? The explanation is that communities didn’t take a rabbi in order for him to provide them services. That’s not what they expected from the rabbi. They took the rabbi in order to provide him services. They took the rabbi because they understood that maintaining figures like these is a service to the Jewish people for generations. And if they wouldn’t give them a rabbinic post, then they’d have to go become wagon drivers, and then the whole Jewish people for generations would lose out. They didn’t need him to answer the question of who says Kaddish first—the one in the twelfth month or the one in the first thirty days. They can toss a coin themselves; they don’t need him for that. They took upon themselves a mission. They forbade themselves—their money, with which they supported the rabbi, no matter; usually they also maintained a yeshiva for every such rabbi in order to support him—not that he came to provide them services, they provided services to him. And that is a completely opposite perspective from the one we’re used to. Because according to that perspective, you don’t choose the Ohr Sameach because he’s nice. The Ohr Sameach happened also to be an immense Torah scholar, so you can choose him on the second consideration too. But you don’t choose a rabbi because he’s nice and speaks well and so on—which is perfectly fine, but that is not the right criterion if you look at it from this perspective. Rather, you choose someone whose support will be a contribution for generations. You contribute to the Jewish people by supporting him. He isn’t coming to provide services to you. And you can see this at every step of the way—communities that supported people who simply weren’t relevant to them. It’s an extremely strange phenomenon. They sent emissaries to the ends of the earth to persuade people ten leagues above them to come be rabbi of their little puddle, and the phenomenon is just unbelievable. So I’m saying, why is that? Because the conception really was that these people who create Torah—people like the Rogatchover and the Ohr Sameach, who created things for generations—these are people of extraordinary power. These are the people to support; these are the people for whom we are here, not they for us. In the end, we are the ones who have to see to it that Torah develops and is passed on, because in the end that is the thing that sustains us all. And here I’ll begin to get to current issues. There is a great deal of criticism of the learning world—the yeshiva world, the kollels. These things are familiar, and I too have a great deal of criticism. But it seems that the criticism ought to come from this point of view. Very often the criticism throws out the baby with the bathwater. Because of that criticism, people completely lose the understanding or the identification with the important role that these institutions and this mode of learning have for all of us. Whenever I’m called up to the Torah, I bless the soldiers of the IDF and the yeshiva students. Even though I wrote very harsh things against them—against part of them, meaning against the proportions, or whatever, not against the yeshiva students. Because in my eyes we have not sufficiently internalized the enormous significance of this thing, how much we need it. And the Haredim take it to a certain extreme that provokes a reaction, and the reaction ends up throwing out the baby with the bathwater, saying none of this matters, it’s idleness, it’s unbalanced, or all sorts of things of that kind. I say: that’s not true. It’s completely balanced. This is how Torah should be studied; it’s a very important thing. We all need to engage in it, each according to his ability, and there also needs to be a core that is responsible for developing this thing and working at it full-time. And although Maimonides does write—and I brought the sources here, I won’t have time at all to get to them—but yes, the famous Maimonides in the Laws of Torah Study, in his commentary on the Mishnah in Avot, where he elaborates that anyone who thinks he will support himself from charity and study Torah and support himself from charity has made the Torah into a spade with which to dig, as the Mishnah in Avot says. So he has extinguished the light, quenched the light of religion, desecrated God’s name, disgraced the Torah, and all sorts of other very harsh expressions that everybody loves to quote today. And I think one has to be careful about how one relates to this statement on several levels. On one level, the Kesef Mishneh already writes in that place that in fact the custom is not like that, that people do in fact do this. And besides, he says that if we didn’t do this, then truly no high-level learners would remain. Not all of us are Maimonides. Maimonides was able to do his learning alongside medicine, alongside philosophy, alongside a hundred thousand other things. But generally people are not like that, and there has to be some layer of people who develop in Torah study; from our perspective it is existential. And it is existential not because it helps with something—that’s what I’m saying. It’s like the Chinese man who has two pennies, so he buys a slice of bread and a flower. They asked him: why didn’t you buy two slices of bread? You have nothing to eat, poor Chinese man, you got two pennies of charity. He said: I bought bread in order to live, and I bought a flower so there will be something to live for. And buying two slices of bread is a mistake. Here too, it’s the same thing. People always ask: what use is Torah study? What good is it? That’s the wrong question. All the other things exist for the sake of Torah study. So when I ask whether Torah study will bring security, or Torah study will bring, I don’t know, economic prosperity—I don’t know what answers people expect to get—or wealth and contentment and pleasure, whatever. But what do I need those things for? Why do I need to survive? Why do I need economic prosperity? Why do I need all that? In the end there has to be some goal for which everything is intended. So if we understand that Torah is our way of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, then this is basically the most fundamental thing we are meant to carry with us and pass on. I’m really talking like a mashgiach, sorry. Then these questions are turned completely upside down. Now the question is: why do we need an economy? And why do we need an army? And why do we need society? And why do we need all sorts of things? Well, we need that so that it will be possible to carry Torah forward. Now, that doesn’t mean everyone should be kollel scholars, that everyone should engage in Torah—absolutely not. I really do not think that is right, and I think the current situation is distorted. There are too many learners. There are too many learners mainly because most of them aren’t suited to it and don’t really do it in a way worthy of support. Meaning, the people who are supported have to deserve it. They have to be people with potential, people who can create Torah, pass Torah on, develop it, refine it. Those are the people one needs to support, no matter what Maimonides wrote or didn’t write. Those are the people one needs to support. One should search by candlelight for such people, and create more and more if there are such people. But of course, around that, the conception of a thousand enter study and one emerges to teach—that is a conception that says, okay, let’s bring them all into it and maybe a few will come out who grow and develop. That is a conception that in my eyes is very, very problematic. And here there really is more imbalance; here I do agree.

[Speaker B] Yes, but it already creates a distortion in outlook—the conception of doing this leads to undesirable things. Okay, and apparently that’s not good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the conception of not doing it also leads to undesirable things. What one needs is to do it in the right measure and not throw out the baby with the bathwater. That’s exactly the point. When people say this leads to undesirable things and therefore don’t do it—that’s throwing out the baby with the bathwater. If it leads to undesirable things, then try to prevent the undesirable things.

[Speaker B] I think the conception is excellent; it’s just the proportions that are wrong.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what are the right proportions?

[Speaker E] No, I don’t know. I don’t have a good answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The proper measure is however many people really fit it—that’s the measure. I assume that nature—I’m a capitalist—so I assume that nature, the invisible hand, will find its own. Meaning, if you look at who really ought to be there and support only him, the right measure will emerge. But there’s no need to set in advance that it should be five percent. I need to make sure that whoever sits there and is supported by the public is really someone worth supporting. A kind of Rogatchover or Slutsker or whoever—someone who can at least become that. We don’t have many of those. Entirely understandable. What? So no one gets hurt. No, I think—I hope nothing gets hurt, but this doesn’t come up enough in the discourse.

[Speaker E] The problem is that there’s a surplus of learners.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I agree. I said to her—I share that criticism. I’ll say more than that.

[Speaker E] Look how many soccer players there are for the sake of Messi and Ronaldo. Yes, right. But you understand that you need tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands. But the soccer league is not for Messi and Ronaldo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] People also enjoy Zehavi.

[Speaker E] Right, but I’m comparing it to Torah study. In order for two to come out like Messi and Ronaldo—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You start playing micro-soccer in first grade. But the comparison isn’t good.

[Speaker E] Because first of all, we start playing soccer—fine—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But by age 22, 25, we already understand who will be the Messis and Ronaldos. You can release the others to their own path. I didn’t say people shouldn’t study Torah. Everyone should study Torah. But in the end there are those who need to make this their full-time job, and those are the ones society should support. Those should be the ones worthy of it. Around that there will be classes, of course. Torah study is a very important thing for everyone.

[Speaker D] But the problem is the system that turns this into the basic value and leaves no other value. I didn’t say there’s no other value. I said it’s a basic value. And if they don’t leave the others—if, I don’t know… if not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave the others… I share that criticism, absolutely. I think the… tools have to be given in all directions, not only this. In my view too—who is a Torah scholar? We talked earlier about who is a Torah scholar. In my eyes, the definition is also wrong. A Torah scholar should also be someone who himself has tools in other areas. Then his Torah wisdom looks different. I mean, it’s not just that these are extra escape routes for people who aren’t suited to learning. In my view, this is important even for those who are suited to learning. Meaning, he should have a hand and a foot in additional fields. Today’s Torah scholar is not, in my eyes, the classic Torah scholar.

[Speaker D] And when you say that the learning should continue to be subsidized—what, what does that do if it isn’t practical, then what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, what I’m saying is: it isn’t practical. It’s study for the sake of study. When people ask why we need the learning, they’ve missed the point. That’s exactly the point. Why do we need them? Will they be judges? Will they be rabbis? No—they’ll be learners. We don’t need them; we need ourselves for their sake, not them for ours. The whole perspective is reversed. That’s why I gave this whole introduction. And this perspective, in my opinion, must not be lost. Despite all the criticism, and the fact that the whole business is managed crookedly—I also have criticism of the mode of learning and its scale. All true. And still, in my opinion, this point of view must not be lost, because it is the correct point of view. One must not throw out the baby with the bathwater. I’ll give you an example before we have to finish.

[Speaker B] Give an example you do like. What? In our world, or the Haredi world—give an example you do like.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s—what kind of example is there, you know?

[Speaker B] No, no, I’m not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t want to get into names, it’s not…

[Speaker B] Me neither—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter what I like or don’t like. I want people to learn the way they understand, not the way I understand. Let each person learn the way he understands, and the person will grow. You see that the person… I don’t know whether there will be influence, there won’t be influence… nothing. No, I’m not saying that. There should be influence. I think there is influence; I just think you don’t do it for the sake of the influence. The question “What good will it do?” is the wrong question. The moment you ask it, you miss the point. That’s exactly the point. I’m not specifically looking for him to become a judge on a religious court, a rabbi, influential, a spiritual influence—no. Let him sit and learn there. That’s all I want.

[Speaker E] And if he writes a book?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Let him write a book, even better. If it doesn’t suit him, then he shouldn’t write a book. There are people who are oral Torah, and they’re not suited to writing books. That’s perfectly fine; we need them no less. Torah is a very complicated thing. We transmit Torah in many, many ways, and it’s not right to create a monopoly. Even if I think something about someone—so what if I think that? Someone else thinks differently. As long as people are really learning and really worthy of it, then let each one learn in his own way; that’s perfectly fine. I’m talking about those who aren’t suited, and everyone can see who is suited and who isn’t. It doesn’t matter; he doesn’t need to learn the way I think. I just want to complete a few more points that relate to this matter. Okay, in one of the cohorts in Yeruham when I was teaching, I told them that because of this criticism of what’s happening in the world, the idea that people stay in learning because they want to be righteous for years on end—that is a very serious mistake. Those righteous types are the most destructive thing there can be. Meaning, the ones who should stay and learn are those who find themselves in learning, those who create in learning, those for whom learning matters—not someone who’s righteous. Someone who learns in order to be righteous usually produces nothing. Without drive, nothing comes out. You need some drive, some desire to create; drive and creativity, yes, it’s the same root. And what happens today is that there are no exams that a person whom the public is supporting has to pass. Kollel fellows, for example, right? There are no exams. Meaning, anyone who is willing to be there gets in. So what happens? The state, as a state, funds all the kollel fellows. Whoever is there—it doesn’t matter. As long as he doesn’t… even if they’re upright, then let’s say those who are there for the hours; if they’re not upright, then they don’t even need to be there. They’re funded, funding that is truly minimal, starvation-level disgrace. Millions like that—not millions, but there are very many people like that. The right thing is: the whole social contract around this issue is wrong. Because actually, I as a person who really does want this thing, I would propose a different social contract on my own initiative, or on the initiative of the religious public, not on the initiative of the secular public. Cut the yeshiva budget in half, but cut the number of learners by a factor of twenty, and give each one a salary ten times higher. And every one of them who is truly worthy of it—give him a salary ten times higher. Support him. This is the elite unit, the commando, the top academy of Torah, whatever you want to call it. Yes, we need these people, and our policy today destroys this thing, because talented people are not willing to live on 200 dollars a month their whole lives. There’s a limit. You need to support a family, so they leave. So today I know super-talented people who are kashrut supervisors in the morning and school rabbis before noon, and they go into all kinds of other gimmicks and tricks, all in order to stay in learning. So forget it—go be a professor at a university and leave all the rest, because you’re not learning at all. What are we losing from every direction? We pay all this money, support all these people, those people don’t contribute to the economy, they don’t grow in Torah, the whole thing is a lose-lose game. Everyone loses.

[Speaker E] And you also fund Hapoel Marmorek from League C too. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said I’m in favor of that?

[Speaker E] Doesn’t matter, but that’s what happens.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And they’re not funded all that much anyway. But who said I’m in favor over there? I’m not saying everything is fine there, but what interests me right now is the yeshiva world. The claim is that if you create a different social contract and say: Friends, cut the budget in half, but create some criteria. See whether a person is really progressing—I don’t care in which direction. Again, I don’t want to dictate the direction, like academic freedom at a university. But support those people, because it’s very important that there be such people. And we aren’t succeeding in having them because we let everyone be one of them. And therefore we don’t have them.

[Speaker F] It will never happen, because the one who has to initiate it has the opposite interest, because in his ego he wants a hundred thousand students; he doesn’t want twenty talented ones.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? And who wouldn’t let him?

[Speaker F] The head of the yeshiva. But the head of the yeshiva can filter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I once suggested—I once suggested this, I think I wrote a column about it on my website eventually—to persuade people not to donate to yeshivot, but to build a fund, a fund that would support people individually. Meaning, a person about whom I receive recommendations, and I’m impressed that he’s progressing. Like at a university. Yes, exactly. And then it would support him. Meaning, people would donate to a certain fund, not to yeshivot. Don’t donate to yeshivot—that’s throwing money in the trash. Really. It means supporting a lot of people who aren’t suited. There are some among them who are, but it means supporting a lot of people who aren’t suited. You need—not yeshivot; I’m talking about kollels right now. Yeshivot are perhaps another stage.

[Speaker D] So basically like the National Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health that give grants to those they think are worth it. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then I say, as a first stage the budget can go down, but it will be focused on the directions that are needed. Now I said more than that: since the state will never do this, and there are interested parties there who won’t let this happen, it has to be done from below. People simply need to adopt such a policy. Such a fund needs to be built from below and not from above.

[Speaker D] How do I know whom to give to?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: obviously you alone can’t do this; no one alone can do this. There has to be organization. I told the guys, for example—there was a class in Yeruham—I told them: Look, you’re now in fifth-year class, young guys. Some of you will leave, some of you will stay, some of you who shouldn’t stay will stay, some of you who should stay will leave—meaning, everything will happen. I told them: Look, there are, I don’t know, thirty guys in the class here, guys from… definitely a high-level cross-section, both in intelligence and socioeconomically. They’ll be financially established people. I told them: Are you willing to commit right now that this cohort, out of its tithing money, will support two guys who remain in learning? You choose which two guys are really suited, and take it upon yourselves to support them. Don’t donate anywhere else. Support those two guys. If every class in every yeshiva did this—if it chose the one, two, three, however many from among them who really need to stay, and supported them from its tithe money—the whole thing would look different. What happens today is that people don’t support this specifically; they donate generally to kollels, if at all. It goes to all kinds of people who shouldn’t be there, while the people whom I really know—I’m telling you, I have students—it breaks my heart. I have students who are super-talented, really, and they’ve been searching for themselves for ten, fifteen, twenty years as kashrut supervisors and I don’t know what else, synagogue lecturers, all kinds of things. Sorry, I don’t mean to belittle giving a synagogue class, but in short, they’re not progressing. They’re not progressing because they’re constantly occupied with how—with trying to make a living somehow. We lose a lot of people that way. Like in academia. Yes, fine. I’m saying, it’s an idea we once talked about. In my view, that’s the practical conclusion from the picture I described earlier. You have to understand: it’s a result of the picture I described earlier. Because if I understand that Torah is the thing that sustains us, then yes, there should be such a layer. All those Maimonides issues don’t interest me—I can deal with them; I’ll give you another lecture later if you want. That’s not the point. Obviously there need to be such people. There need to be such artists, such scientists, such academic researchers—so should a priestess become an innkeeper? Then obviously there also need to be such Torah scholars. That’s obvious. Meaning, that is the infrastructure. We are for them, not they for us. We ask what they contribute to us—that reverses the whole picture. We should be asking what we contribute to them.

[Speaker C] What kind of connection is there between them and the public?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There doesn’t need to be any connection between them. None. They don’t need to provide services to the public. The ones who provide services to the public are judges on religious courts, and that’s a different world. Judges and rabbis are something else. Judges and rabbis don’t have time to learn; they’re busy with other things. I need people who learn. I am for them, not they for me. The whole perspective is backwards. I ask what they give me? They give me nothing. I’m here for them. In the end they will pass the whole enterprise on, pass the torch onward. That is what we are here for. Yes, right, a certain kind of academia, right. And this whole conception, which is not a conception—the accepted conception, which is not an academic conception—is destructive to the Torah world. The one who loses from this…

[Speaker D] Is there a person here who just learns and never produces anything?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are such people. There are people who sit in the study hall. Of course. Why, why? No, that’s exactly the point. You see, you’re asking what the benefit is—that’s why I gave the whole introduction. Because the question that always comes up here is: Wait, so what’s the benefit? What do we get out of them? And I’m saying the whole perspective is backwards. What do you mean, what benefit do we get out of them? On the contrary—they are the benefit. I need to support them. They don’t need to serve me. The whole outlook is just upside down. I’m not asking at all what benefit they give me. You made—

[Speaker E] There’s a logical leap here between your introduction and this. Because it could be, according to your introduction, that each of us needs to learn at his own mediocre level and cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, for himself. And the fact that there’s an elite unit—that doesn’t help me. Not you—the world, the Holy One, blessed be He, the Jewish people. Who says the calculation is global and not personal? Maybe I need to sit an hour a day and do something at my own mediocre level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That really is another question that should be discussed separately—the question of what this cleaving means. For example, when you repeat the Talmud or the Mishnah Berurah or whatever it is you’re repeating, is that cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He? Or is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, the ability to develop Torah, refine it, understand what it says in other contexts, what the connections are between it and other fields of knowledge? Now that can mainly be done by the spiritual elite. Meaning, you can cleave at your level, I can cleave at my level, each person. But there are people who build the Torah so that there will be something to cleave to. The appearance of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world is through the way Torah appears in the world, and the way Torah appears in the world is through the way we build it.

[Speaker F] How do you write? It came out—how do you write? So I’m saying he has to publish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing is mandatory. Whoever wants to write will write, and whoever doesn’t want to write won’t write.

[Speaker F] But the very fact that you establish him with his Torah, I don’t establish him with his Torah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] His Torah is created and passed on, and people talk with him in the study hall and ask him a question. It’s a dynamic process; it doesn’t work in the form of providing services. This is not professional training. Today, learning in yeshivot, in the non-Haredi yeshivot, is perceived as professional training. You learn in order to become a rabbi, become a judge on a religious court, become this, become that—and whoever won’t become that leaves. That is a big mistake, and it’s a mistake through which we lose many good people and many things that, on the contrary, are the goal. The rabbis and the judges are service providers—who cares about that at all? That’s not the point. We—the whole perspective is backwards. If I understand that Torah means leaving the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world, that this is my cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, then the basic goal is the development of Torah. Everything else is created for that, not that Torah exists in order to provide me with services. The whole perspective is backwards. Now I’m saying: from that perspective, one should come with the criticism and have fewer learners and filter them more, but on the other hand give them a respectable salary and tell them, friends, you are the elite unit. Today people feel humiliated by the fact that the public supports them; they live off charity, off those two hundred dollars or something like that, and they’re uncomfortable even being in that position. They say: why? Why is it fine for academics? Why are academics, who conduct themselves in exactly the same way, at the top of the social pyramid?

[Speaker C] Because—no—because academics are perceived as people who bring benefit to the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s not true. In most academic fields it’s simply not true. Not true. In most academic fields there is no real practical benefit to the public. In my opinion, in some of them there isn’t even any non-practical benefit either. But that’s another discussion. Fine, that can be debated. But I’m saying, that’s exactly the point. The question is how you present it. If you understand that he is the elite unit, then you give him a high salary because he deserves it, because he is the best among us. Then the whole perspective is completely different. The whole perspective is not: I’m giving him some little two hundred dollars—fine, if he wants to learn so he’ll stay and be righteous and learn, at least he won’t starve to death.

[Speaker F] Because he’s a partner, he’s a partner in the one who is that—you enjoy the merit of what he does.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because this is a collective mission. It’s not the mission of a private individual. Today we dump it on a private individual. Today we place the task on the guys who finish yeshiva at age twenty-two, twenty-one, twenty-two, from a hesder yeshiva. These guys look at the horizon—there is no horizon. How will they stay in learning? They can’t. They can’t make a living. What are they supposed to live on? If he becomes a judge on a religious court—if he’s a cousin of Deri maybe he’ll become a judge—but aside from that he can’t do anything. So what exactly is he going to do? So today this mission becomes a mission laid on the shoulders of those isolated individuals—that’s it, we place it on them. But this is a mission for all of us. If we don’t take it upon ourselves, and we don’t organize these guys, and we don’t see them as our agents, and give them the feeling that they are our agents, then the whole thing will look different. Then we’ll have such a layer, and it will be correct in its proportion. Those who are suited will be there, and those who are not suited will not be there. Their effort will not be the effort of beggars and collectors living off handouts and being a burden on the public, but the opposite—they are the avant-garde, they are academics, they are the smartest people and the people we want to be there. The whole thing flips around. And everyone gains. It’s a win-win situation. Today it’s lose-lose. Today everyone loses. Torah loses, the religious public loses, and the secular public loses—and it’s only a desecration of God’s name. Nothing comes out of it besides that. And it costs more money too. I’m saying: invest less money, do it this way, and it will be a win-win situation. Everyone will agree: these will agree because it’s less money, those will agree because there are more Torah scholars and people more suited to Torah, Torah will develop, Torah will be refined, and you won’t need to run after a livelihood all the time, but to sit and truly create properly. It’s basic, but all of this depends on whether I really understand how fundamental this thing is, how wrong it is to ask the question, “What does it contribute to me?” Rather, the question is: how do I contribute to it? That’s the important point.

[Speaker F] He leads the whole world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I am for him. After all, that’s what this is for. It’s like: if he must learn and his son must learn, he takes precedence over his son. Why does he take precedence over his son? Because if everyone lives for his son, then in the end who will actually learn? There has to be someone who also learns in the end, if everyone only worries about the next person. So I’ll worry about my son, and my son will worry about his son—so who in the end will be the Torah scholar? So first of all I need to learn. I also need to pass it on, but first of all I need to learn, because in the end that’s what all this was created for. To produce a chain that in the end does nothing except keep passing itself on—that has no meaning. But all of this, of course, depends on our really grasping what the goal is, what this whole enterprise is meant for, what the means are, and what the ends are.

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Torah Study - Lesson 11

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