Torah Study – Lesson 11

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The commandment of Torah study. Last time we saw a bit of this idea that the commandment of Torah study is not studying in order to know. It’s an end, not a means. If you remember, I brought proof from the blessing over Torah, that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah, that’s written in the Shulchan Arukh, and on the other hand women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. So the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah write there that they are obligated in the commandments relevant to them, meaning they need to study in order to know what they are supposed to do. And I said that that is what in Jewish law is called being exempt from Torah study. So women, who are obligated to learn the commandments in order to know what to do, are still defined as exempt from Torah study. So that actually means that the commandment of Torah study is not learning in order to know what to do, because in that women are obligated too. So what are they exempt from? They are exempt from study that is an end in itself, not a means for knowing what to do, and that is really the essence of Torah study. I brought Rashi on the portion of Bechukotai, where he says that there are three things in serving God: “If you walk in My statutes, and keep My commandments, and do them.” So there is learning — toiling in Torah, that you should toil in Torah. Rashi brings there what the supervisors in yeshivot always bring up, and by the way it’s a novel point. Meaning, what people always say — that “you should toil in Torah” means “eat bread with salt and sleep on the ground” — that’s not what it means there. “You should toil in Torah” means that you should toil in Torah for the sake of Torah, not for something else — that Torah is the goal and not a means. After that there is learning in order to know what to do, and after that actually doing what you learned — “and do them.”

[Speaker B] And why are women exempt? It’s not time-bound. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We learn that not because it’s time-bound. “Your sons and not your daughters.” Exactly. “Your sons and not your daughters.” Okay, so as I mentioned in what I wrote now in Makor Rishon about this issue of appointing women as rabbis, I mentioned this kind of derivation, that there’s a whole series of such derivations. For example: “the men stood, and not the women,” which disqualifies women from testimony. Or “your sons and not your daughters,” which exempts women from the commandment of Torah study. Or “a king and not a queen,” which says not to appoint women to positions of authority. All these derivations are very strange derivations, as I wrote there — and just as an aside, what?

[Speaker B] Are women allowed to murder? Are women allowed to murder? It doesn’t say “you shall not murder” in the feminine. No, that’s not because of masculine language.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because of masculine language, but because the one mentioned there is men and not women. It’s not that the verb is written in masculine form. But you’re right that in the same way that the action is written in masculine form as generic language, the object or the person is also mentioned in masculine form as generic language; the Sages themselves say this. “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah.” Meaning, even if it’s written in the language of a man, it also means a woman, because it’s just general language, generic language. So why here, in all these cases, do they specifically derive men and not women? That’s why I argued there that this is a kind of asmachta, basically, and maybe it’s even something subject to change — but that’s already another discussion.

[Speaker B] And what about “a prophet and not a prophetess”? Why isn’t that said?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there are things… why weren’t women excluded there? Good question, but there are prophetesses. Yes, the whole Torah is like that. Post factum. What I mean is, the whole Torah is like that — that is, a prophet too is not someone you appoint, so there’s nothing to prohibit about a woman being a prophetess. If the Holy One, blessed be He, grants her prophecy, she’ll be a prophetess; if not, then not. A king too? No, a king we appoint. What do you mean?

[Speaker B] Usually he’s anointed by a prophet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but we appoint him, so He’s telling me: don’t appoint a queen, only a king. But when the Holy One, blessed be He, gives someone prophecy, He decides whom to grant prophecy to; He doesn’t need to impose prohibitions. And that’s like what Maimonides says in the 14th root. Maimonides brings there that the Baal Halakhot Gedolot counts punishments among the commandments: punishment by stoning, burning, lashes, everything. And among other things he counts karet. So Maimonides asks him: what do you mean, you count as a commandment the imposition of karet? Karet is given by the Holy One, blessed be He. A religious court can impose commandments or penalties. But the Holy One, blessed be He, knows when to give punishment and what punishment to give; He doesn’t need to write Himself a commandment to give karet in such-and-such a case. It can be resolved, yes. “All those liable to karet who were flogged are exempt from their karet” — meaning, if someone is liable to karet, then the practical implication is that he should be flogged, and then he is exempt from the karet. So there is some point to determining when someone is liable to karet and when not. I think I once mentioned the ordination controversy, the controversy over ordination in 16th-century Safed, that in the responsa of Maharalbach, in his last responsum — it’s called the Treatise on Ordination — that’s the source from which we learn about this whole issue. He was among the main opponents, Maharalbach, together with the sages of Jerusalem. But what people know less is that the motivation for renewing ordination was not so much a redemptive or messianic motivation — I don’t know what to call it — like there was at the beginning of the State, when they also wanted to renew the Sanhedrin, but rather a motivation to atone for the conversos in Spain. Meaning, the conversos who had sinned wanted to be spared karet because they had in fact violated a prohibition. They wanted to spare them karet, and therefore they wanted to flog them so as to enable them to gain atonement. Because those liable to karet who were flogged are exempt from their karet, and lashes can only be administered by a fully ordained religious court. It’s not enough just to beat somebody; that doesn’t help. It has to be lashes by force of a court ruling.

[Speaker D] Okay, in any case I wanted to ask you about the hierarchy you described, where the highest level is Torah study for its own sake, like in Nefesh HaChayim. But in my opinion — is that a business plan that actually works to preserve the nation? Meaning, when the answer is only this works. What? Only this works? But ninety percent of the people in the nation drop out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t drop out.

[Speaker D] And they’re not capable of learning Torah on that level. That’s the second circle, and they assimilate. Meaning, at the exact moment when Nefesh HaChayim writes all his polemic and all that, ninety percent of the Jews are…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, assimilated and all that.

[Speaker D] Meaning, it’s not sustainable. The model is not sustainable because it’s only men at a very high intellectual level who can — I don’t think so — who can live this thing, and it can’t be that God gave the Torah at Sinai only to that type of person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that’s right, and I’ll tell you why. Just in the background there’s also a saying of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk. They asked him why he wasn’t lenient in some question, and he said: if I’m lenient about the slightest rabbinic prohibition on the Sabbath, then the doctor’s apprentice in Paris will worship idols.

[Speaker C] Meaning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s some conception of circles. Now Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin writes what he writes to some elite that is supposed to be a vanguard, or an inner circle, a core. He doesn’t say that everyone else around them is worthless, or that everyone is supposed to do the same thing. What he does want to say — and this is directed against Hasidism — is that you still have to preserve hierarchy. Meaning, you still have to understand who is in the core and who is in the outer layer, and everyone has a place. Don’t think you’re the rebbe — you’re not the rebbe. So why did most people run away from this?

[Speaker D] Most people ran away, most left. The trick doesn’t work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And maybe Hasidism did work? Look, most people still left. Who’s to blame for that — the Hasidim or the Lithuanians? I don’t know. That they left is a fact, I agree, but…

[Speaker D] Who’s to blame for that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin or the Hasidim? I don’t know. Maybe both, maybe neither.

[Speaker D] There’s some mistake in the conception here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said it’s a mistake? It’s a mistake of correlation. You know, when there’s correlation between two phenomena, that doesn’t mean there’s a causal link between them. The fact that one result appeared and right next to it some other phenomenon appeared doesn’t mean one came because of the other. There were many other phenomena at that time, and maybe they’re what caused the departure. Why specifically pin it on Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin’s approach?

[Speaker D] But if we’re going to sit and think deeply and try to solve this problem — he was only occupied with himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I completely disagree.

[Speaker D] He was occupied with how he — the mechanical male who loves intellectual engagement with Torah — how he can get there, while at that same moment the whole nation was scattering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t agree, I don’t agree. I think you need to…

[Speaker D] …find some formula that the whole people can be part of. No, I don’t agree with that either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t agree with that either, because there isn’t one formula in which the whole people will all find themselves. Rather what? It’s like today when people talk about — no, this is an important discussion, so…

[Speaker E] That’s why I’m lingering on the subject.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but for example the issue of education. There are those who advocate, in today’s dilemmas, yes — whether to build education for the gifted, education for especially talented students, or to put everyone into the same class and try as much as possible to have them learn together. And I don’t know which solution is more correct; I think the first, although many people would say the second. Depends whose son it is. What? You’re wrong, you’re wrong — no, no, no, you’re wrong. It doesn’t depend whose son it is — no, it doesn’t depend. I’m saying that even for the weaker students it’s better if they are by themselves. Clearly not — you’re wrong. I think yes. But fine, that’s another discussion. I’m not trying to decide the question right now, only to show that it has two sides. It has two sides. There’s someone who wants to say: we need to take care of everyone in one uniform formula; everyone should learn the same thing. What does that lead to? Obviously lowering the bar. Let’s say okay, let’s… yes, exactly, let’s lower the bar. I’m talking here about women’s military service, a very current issue, and there too there’s a similar discussion. And on the other hand, someone says: forget it, treat each person according to what fits him. Now if there’s someone who wants to promote education for excellence, education for the gifted… he wants to focus now on outstanding people, because they really are the best. Right, and they really are the best. And physicists? Obviously, because they really are the best. How do we know they’re the best? Obviously — what do you mean? The most talented are the best physicists. What, how undemocratic is that? What do you mean? Let’s recognize everyone as physicists. That’ll be wonderful — then everyone will study physics. But in religion… But in religion too there are outstanding people and less outstanding people. Why not say that we shouldn’t have Torah scholars at all? Since after all not everyone can be a Torah scholar, so why say that Torah scholars are more important or more central? That just isn’t true. On the contrary, if I want to preserve a healthy social fabric, then we mustn’t lose the hierarchy. We need to know what the more correct model is, what is the core and what is the periphery. And every person in the periphery also has a unique contribution that he can make and others can’t, fine. And still, we shouldn’t lose, shouldn’t blur, the distinctions. I’m against this ultimate equality, this relativism. I simply don’t agree with it. I don’t think it solves the problems either. And besides, even if it did solve the problems, that still wouldn’t mean it’s right to act that way. So it solves the problems — so what?

[Speaker B] The question is what’s right. The correct answer would be if learning were in order to fulfill. But our question is valid, because if learning is not in order to fulfill but for its own sake, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is this discrimination?

[Speaker B] …then on the other hand even a commandment that is really good only…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it discrimination? The Holy One, blessed be He, determined that there is a commandment. What’s discrimination? The Holy One, blessed be He, said there is a commandment of Torah study, okay? Now suppose something discriminatory comes out of that.

[Speaker B] Then He’s discriminating!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what about the commandments unique to priests? Why is He discriminating in their favor? I want to serve in the Temple — why not? Why, by the way, does He discriminate against women, that only the husband divorces the wife and not the wife the husband? There are lots of things where there’s discrimination. But assuming the Holy One, blessed be He, intended it — assuming He intended it — then that is what He intended. We don’t do whatever we want just so there won’t be discrimination. The question is what is true. After that we have to see what to do within that framework. I don’t think this blurring of boundaries helps. This idea that everyone is equally the same doesn’t help at all, it only blurs things. It preserves the wrong thing. Meaning, you help preserve something, you nurture it, but the price you pay is that the thing you’re preserving isn’t the right thing. So how does that help me? Great, it’ll preserve everyone, and we’ll preserve Torah, and all of us will be — everything will be wonderful, only it won’t be Torah. It’ll be something else. You understand? I’m exaggerating on purpose, but…

[Speaker D] Or we’ll never include everyone in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not that we won’t include everyone, but not everyone will be in the central circle. Not everyone will be in the central circle, נכון, not everyone is Moses our teacher, right.

[Speaker D] But it drives people away. So if it drives people away, then what are you supposed to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you have to try to explain to them: come on, there’s no need to run away. But you can’t explain to them that they’re equal to Moses our teacher, because they’re not.

[Speaker B] You can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …lie to them, but that’s a lie. And it’s just not true. The central crown… Okay, let’s continue. Today what I’m going to say will somewhat soften what I said. Not really as excuses, because I don’t like excuses. What’s true is true and what isn’t, isn’t. After that you have to see what to do with what’s true, so today I’ll try to see what to do with what is true — what I think is true. Okay, so I now want to go one step further. We’ll come back to women at the end, at the end of the class. Maybe I’ll bring — I don’t know if there are enough sheets here — but maybe look two to a page or something like that if you can. There are a few sources here that can be seen inside; it’s worth seeing them inside.

[Speaker C] It’s more or less, there are… okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first source is the Minchat Chinukh, where the proof I just spoke about from the blessing over Torah actually appears. He brings — the author of the Chinukh — another Torah-level blessing, besides Grace after Meals, of course. This Minchat Chinukh is on commandment 430, which is the commandment of Grace after Meals. At the end of that commandment, the Chinukh also mentions the blessing over Torah. And regarding the blessing over Torah, Nachmanides adds it in his count of the commandments, but Maimonides does not include it in his count of the commandments. And the Minchat Chinukh writes as follows: The author brings another Torah-level blessing, namely the blessing over Torah, in accordance with Nachmanides, who listed the blessing over Torah as a positive commandment, and many medieval authorities agreed. And also, on the Torah level, one should say in elegant language this praise for the giving of the holy Torah. Only the Sages fixed the wording of the blessing, and established two or three blessings according to the various opinions, as brought in Shulchan Arukh, section 47, and in the Beit Yosef, and in the early authorities, responsa Shaagat Aryeh, and others. And Maimonides’ view is that it is only rabbinic. This is like a fulfillment-type commandment. If you want to study, then make the blessing. It’s not a fulfillment-type commandment; it’s a conditional obligation. We talked about that once. And see in the Shulchan Arukh that one who merely thinks words of Torah does not need to bless, while one who writes does need to bless. And see there in the later authorities. And it is clear there in the Shulchan Arukh that women are obligated to bless. If so, the same should apply to slaves. In any case, this matter needs examination: since they are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, why are they obligated? Even though they need to learn the laws — see there — in any case, they are not obligated by virtue of the commandment of Torah study, only so that they know their laws. Yes? So that’s the difficulty. If they aren’t obligated in the commandment of Torah study, why are they obligated in the blessing over Torah, which is apparently a blessing over a commandment? He assumes here that it is a blessing over a commandment. We’ll talk about that more. In any case, it could be like Grace after Meals, where one is not commanded to eat, but the Torah commanded that if one eats, one blesses, and that is a positive commandment. So too here, the Torah wrote that whoever studies, even though he is not absolutely obligated, has a positive commandment to bless. Yet in the case of positive time-bound commandments, women bless according to some views. Women bless over the observance even though they are not commanded. Meaning, there are situations where you are not commanded in a commandment, but if you fulfill it you can still recite the blessing. The claim here is that with the blessing over Torah it’s the same thing. Meaning, you can fulfill this commandment not as one who is commanded and acts, and still it is appropriate to bless over it.

[Speaker B] Not at all the same thing. In the blessing over Torah I’m blessing that I’m performing an action I was required to do. In Grace after Meals I don’t bless because I was required to eat; I bless because I received — or really I’m giving thanks for having received the food. I’m not blessing Grace after Meals because I was required to eat. I bless… no, no, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He claims that with the blessing over Torah it’s the same. And I brought the example of blessings over commandments. What about blessings over commandments? There I really am blessing over a commandment, not thanking for something, right? And women who fulfill positive time-bound commandments still bless. Shofar, right? Why? But also with the blessing over Torah, since they can fulfill this commandment even though they are not obligated in it, they bless the blessing — the blessing over commandments. The example from Grace after Meals is only an example showing that sometimes you bless even over something you are not obligated to do.

[Speaker B] And with food in general, Grace after Meals is not a good example, because there I’m not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He said: similar to Grace after Meals, where you bless over things even though they are not a commandment. I brought another example of positive time-bound commandments, which broadens and sharpens the point even more. I think the example of Grace after Meals is actually very good if one understands one more thing — and this is what I’m going to discuss today — that the blessing over Torah is not at all a blessing over commandments. And there are already hints of this in the medieval authorities. A blessing over commandments is, straightforwardly, a rabbinic blessing. After all, the obligation to bless over commandments is rabbinic. But the blessing over Torah, like Grace after Meals, is a Torah-level blessing according to most opinions. Grace after Meals according to all opinions, the blessing over Torah according to most opinions. When he compares it to Grace after Meals, he says…

[Speaker B] Like a person is not commanded to eat. Right, so what am I not commanded to study Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, women are not obligated to study Torah. No, he’s not talking about women, he’s talking about…

[Speaker B] He is talking about women and slaves. No. After all, if one fulfills the obligation of Torah study with reciting the Shema morning and evening, then automatically everyone fulfills…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …that, and they still need to bless in any case. Why aren’t they obligated?

[Speaker B] Women aren’t obligated. No, if they fulfill it, they fulfill it, but they’re not obligated. He says that men too are really only — if he studies, it’s a fulfillment-type positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the law regarding women you learn that even for men the blessing is not a blessing over commandments, because the fact is that even women, who aren’t obligated in the commandment, still bless. But he’s talking about women. You understand? So behind this, it seems to me, this comparison to Grace after Meals — what you noted — really points to the idea that there is something here beyond positive time-bound commandments that women fulfill. Because with blessings over commandments, you can bless even if you are not obligated, because after all there is such a commandment and the men are obligated in it. So ostensibly with the blessing over Torah one could say the same thing. There’s a commandment that men are obligated in, to study, and the blessing over that commandment can also be recited by women even though they are not obligated in that commandment. Why is that not a good example? The example of positive time-bound commandments is actually a good example. Since with positive time-bound commandments women are not obligated to bless, but are allowed to bless. But with the blessing over Torah women are obligated. And if women are obligated, why? If in the commandment itself they are not obligated, you can say they are allowed to bless — and even that is a dispute among the medieval authorities. Fine, but why are they obligated to bless? So it seems that this is not what he means. Rather, the “not-so-good” example, in quotation marks, of Grace after Meals is probably exactly what he means. And what? He basically wants to say that the blessing over Torah is not a blessing over commandments, it is a blessing of praise. Just as I bless to praise the Holy One, blessed be He, for giving me — or I thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for giving me food to eat — I thank Him for giving us Torah. And women too can thank Him for giving us Torah, even though they are not obligated in this commandment. This is not like the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah. Yet in any case, the wording “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to engage in words of Torah” needs examination. “And commanded us”? But He did not command them; they are not obligated. Yet it may be that “Who has chosen us” is praise, and they are obligated in it, like Grace after Meals, but “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us” they do not recite. He would omit the “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us.” Fine. But according to those who hold that they are permitted to bless over all commandments — that’s already the case of positive time-bound commandments, that’s no longer the comparison to Grace after Meals but to positive time-bound commandments — even though they are not obligated, and the matter is longstanding. In any event, a blessing of praise and a positive commandment, even though they are not obligated in Torah study, like Grace after Meals — and according to this, women and slaves can discharge men’s obligation, because they are Torah-level obligated, they can discharge them in the blessing over Torah. Though that’s already a second issue — whether they can discharge others through mutual responsibility or not. With Grace after Meals…

[Speaker C] You’re saying that the Chinukh — and the blessing over Torah, you’re saying, that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text in Berakhot says: From where do we know Grace after Meals before eating? So the Gemara says: And if Torah, over which you do not bless afterward, you do bless beforehand — the blessing over Torah is recited before study — then food, over which you are obligated to bless afterward, should it not follow all the more so that you must bless before it? And then the Gemara rejects it. It says the opposite: let’s learn that the blessing over Torah should also be recited afterward by a kal va-chomer. If food, over which you are not obligated beforehand, you are obligated afterward, then Torah, over which you are obligated beforehand, certainly you should be obligated afterward. And the Gemara itself makes the comparison between Torah being before and food being after. In any case, that’s the Chinukh. Now I want to put a little more content into this question of whether this is a blessing of praise or a blessing over commandments, or really to understand what Torah study is altogether, and what the connection is between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study — which are two completely different things.

[Speaker F] About the wording — what he asks about “Who commanded us” — there’s a bit of a parallel from Grace after Meals, because there too we say “which You have given as an inheritance to us,” even though… that’s true, “for the land and for the covenant.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And converts too say “which You gave to our fathers” — so how can converts say that? Right. You could continue further here, but I’m not going into his details, because for me what matters is only this point of praise — what he really means when he says that this blessing is a blessing of praise and not a blessing over commandments. And I want to explain that a little today. Let’s start with the Gemara in Nedarim. The Gemara brings two statements of Rav Giddel in the name of Rav. And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it says, “I have sworn, and I will fulfill it, to keep Your righteous ordinances.” But is he not already sworn from Mount Sinai? Rather, this teaches us that it is permitted for a person to spur himself on. A person swears to fulfill a commandment — generally an oath does not take effect upon an oath, because a person is already sworn from Mount Sinai; an oath does not take effect upon an oath. We talked about that once. So the Gemara says fine, but even so you can swear to fulfill a commandment in order to spur yourself on. That’s what in the language of the Sages is called vows of encouragement. Even though it’s really an oath of encouragement, in the language of the Gemara they call it vows of encouragement. And we learn it from “I have sworn and I will fulfill it, to keep Your righteous ordinances,” that it is possible to swear to keep the commandments. And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “I will rise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate,” has made a great vow to the God of Israel. Again it says vow, although straightforwardly it really means an oath and not a vow. What’s the difference? A vow is that the object becomes forbidden to me; an oath is that I obligate or forbid myself with regard to doing some act. Here we are talking about an oath, but the language of oath and vow gets interchanged among the Sages. But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath? Interesting — this addition wasn’t brought above. What does this come to teach us? Even if it’s only for self-encouragement, that is already the first statement of Rav Giddel. What are you telling me here? What’s new? That despite being already sworn from Mount Sinai — where? In the Torah — sworn to study Torah. Now he swears to study Torah, but he is already sworn and standing, so what does it help? Same as before. Fine, so maybe here too they came to teach us that vows of encouragement are permitted, that a person can swear — “I have sworn and I will fulfill it, to keep Your righteous ordinances.” So the Gemara says that can’t be, because that is already the first statement of Rav Giddel. We already learned that from the first statement of Rav Giddel. So why do we need this one too? Rather, this is what it teaches us: since if he wished he could exempt himself with reciting the Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.

[Speaker D] Since he can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …exempt himself with the Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him, because regarding this he is not already sworn and standing, except for the Shema morning and evening. So if he says, “I’ll learn something more,” that is already not something he is sworn about, and therefore the oath takes effect. Meaning, if he swore to say the Shema morning and evening, that he could do because of the first statement of Rav Giddel, that it’s an oath of encouragement, vows of encouragement. But if he swears to learn something more beyond the Shema morning and evening, then the oath actually takes effect, because regarding that he is not sworn at all. The Rosh there — you know that in Nedarim there is a commentary of the Rosh on the page itself — “that is the first statement of Rav Giddel… this teaches us that since he can exempt himself,” etc., “therefore the oath takes effect upon him, because it is not an obligation but optional, and it is a benefit analogous to harm.” The Gemara there says that an oath takes effect only regarding something that is “benefit analogous to harm,” meaning something you can do and can also choose not to do, because it is a discretionary matter. On that kind of thing you can swear. But to swear regarding a commandment, in principle the oath does not take effect, because the benefit is not analogous to harm. You cannot choose not to do the act, because you are already sworn and standing regarding it. So for such a thing an oath does not take effect. So he says here: since with this matter, the Shema morning and evening, you fulfill your obligation, then basically all the rest of your learning is discretionary. It is “benefit analogous to harm”; you can do what you want regarding it. And since that is so, the oath takes effect on that.

[Speaker B] So the Rosh — the Rosh doesn’t have vows of encouragement? What? He doesn’t recognize the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course there is. The Talmud says so. But the second statement isn’t about vows of encouragement, because that follows the first statement of Rav Giddel. So in Torah study itself, what is it? What does Rav Giddel teach us? He teaches us that such a thing is optional, it isn’t a vow of encouragement, it’s a real vow, because it’s not about fulfilling a commandment, it’s about doing something optional. So the Rosh says: why is it optional? Because reciting the Shema morning and evening is the obligation; everything beyond that is optional, “benefiting” parallel to “harming.” Okay? So in effect the Rosh reads the Talmud in its plain sense, and that is the plain meaning of the Talmud: that all Torah study apart from Shema morning and evening is optional. Fine, so if you want, do it; if you don’t want, don’t do it.

The Ran there on the Talmud learns it a bit differently, though not completely differently. There’s a very major novelty in the Ran. “It seems to me that one is not necessarily exempt with this alone.” Meaning, it’s not necessarily true that with Shema morning and evening you discharge Torah study and everything else you’re not obligated in at all, because every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability. Right? According to the Rosh, Shema morning and evening is the obligation, and everything else is optional, do whatever you like. So that’s it? There’s no neglect of Torah study? No value in Torah study? Shema morning and evening is enough? There you go, democracy, where everyone can do it, Shema morning and evening and everyone is equal, that’s Torah study. But in the first chapter of tractate Kiddushin we say: “Our Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall sharpen them’—the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if someone asks you something, you should not stammer and say to him…” and with Shema in the morning and evening that’s clearly not enough for this. The Talmud says you have to master the entire Torah, so that if someone asks you something you won’t stammer and you’ll know how to answer immediately. You won’t get there from Shema morning and evening.

It reminds me of a story—I think I told it once, I don’t remember—about Shlomo Kluger. He was sharp, Rabbi Shlomo. He was the rabbi in Brody. Once two people came to him from some nearby small town to ask a Jewish-law question. He thought and thought and couldn’t find the answer—a hard question. He said, listen, I don’t know, I don’t know how to answer. Fine. They go back from their town, their village, whatever, and there was some young rabbi in that village, so they went to ask him. He went into the room, came back with an answer. They returned to Rabbi Shlomo Kluger and said, listen, some unknown young Jew answered this question for us immediately. Rabbi Shlomo Kluger was amazed. He said, what a hidden genius you have in your village. He immediately summoned him. The Jew came, and he said to him: listen, I’m really amazed. How did you know how to answer that responsum? I thought and thought and couldn’t get there; it was a difficult question. He said, listen, Rabbi, I’ll tell you the truth. When they asked me the question, my eyes went dark. So I offered a prayer and said to the Holy One, blessed be He: please help me with this question, I don’t know what to do with it. And just then my eye fell on some book on the shelf that was sticking out a little. So I took the book down and opened it, and the Holy One, blessed be He, helped me—the answer was exactly there in the book. He said to him: get out of here. I thought you knew how to learn; all you know how to do is whine.

So that’s more or less Shema morning and evening as Torah study. In any event, the Ran says it can’t be that the commandment of Torah study is just Shema morning and evening. Torah study means you have to know everything. So therefore he says: “Rather, from here I have proof for what I wrote in the last chapter of ‘Two Oaths,’ that with anything derived from exposition, even though it is from the Torah, since it is not explicitly stated in the verse, an oath can take effect upon it. And here this is what we are saying: since with this he exempts himself from what is explicitly written in the verse, namely ‘when you lie down and when you rise up’ through Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes full effect upon him, even regarding a sacrifice. And that is what is meant by ‘he vowed a great vow to the God of Israel’—that for all people it is like an optional matter.”

What is he saying there? He has a very major novelty. His claim is that an oath that does not take effect on a commanded matter—that’s only on something written in the Torah. But something derived through exposition, not written explicitly in the Torah—if you swear about that, the oath does take effect. And therefore the Talmud says there, “he vowed a great vow to the God of Israel.” What does that mean? If this were a commanded matter, but one not written explicitly in the Torah, then the Talmud wants to innovate that it is like an optional matter, like a great vow—that is, an absolute vow. So that’s how the Ran learns it. And this apparently follows from the conception that we usually understand from the phrase “already sworn from Sinai.” Why doesn’t an oath take effect on a commandment? Because one is already sworn from Mount Sinai; that’s what the Talmud says in several places.

What does “already sworn from Sinai” mean? Usually we understand it as just figurative language saying that an oath cannot take effect upon an oath, and that’s a law in the laws of oaths. What does it mean? It means that only on things we are already sworn about—only on those things can an oath not take effect. So the Ran says: if there is something not written in the Torah, then we weren’t sworn about it at Sinai. It was renewed later through exposition, or through something the Sages derived from the verse—not rabbinic law, but even in interpretation, a Torah-level law that the Sages drew out of the verse. Since that’s so, it isn’t something included in the oath of Sinai. And since we were not sworn about it, an oath can take effect on it, because that is not an oath on top of an oath. By the way, that is a very unusual conception. Most medieval authorities understand that an oath does not take effect on a commanded matter simply because one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition. It’s a general rule. And even something derived from exposition from a verse is also a prohibition, so there is no difference. But the Ran takes the language literally: you have imposed something on yourself that you are already sworn about. What are you sworn about? What is written in the Torah, what was given to us at Sinai—about that we were sworn.

Okay, in any event, that is what the Ran says. For our purposes, what does that mean? That the Ran too agrees with the Rosh that there is a difference between the category of a Torah-level commandment and some more peripheral circle. The Torah-level commandment is Shema morning and evening. On that both the Ran and the Rosh agree. The difference is what happens around it, in study beyond Shema morning and evening. The Rosh claims that is optional, “benefiting” parallel to “harming.” The Ran says it can’t be optional; it is an obligation, but it is not an obligation explicitly written in the Torah, and therefore an oath can take effect on it. Meaning that the Ran too understands that it is not fully Torah-level. According to Maimonides, we already saw that something derived by exposition has the status of rabbinic law, and in the Ran here I don’t think that’s exactly what’s written, but still something is written that goes in that direction. There is some weaker obligation here. The actual Torah-level obligation is indeed fulfilled with Shema morning and evening, the standard Torah-level obligation.

[Speaker B] What about “and you shall meditate on it day and night”? Isn’t that written in the Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that in a moment; that’s a Talmudic passage in Menachot. So what emerges from the Talmud here is that for the commandment of Torah study, Shema morning and evening is basically enough. That’s it, no more is needed. Let’s look at the Talmud in Menachot 99. It’s a very interesting passage. The Talmud says this: Rav Ami said: “From the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment of ‘this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.’” Right, day and night—meaning morning and evening. So “you shall meditate on it day and night” means one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening.

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: “Even if a person recited only Shema in the morning and evening, he has fulfilled ‘it shall not depart.’” How is that different from the previous statement?

[Speaker B] Here you need to add another chapter, and here I add Shema.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is coming to be even more lenient. You say you need a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening? Forget it—even that you don’t need. Shema, you say? That too is enough. The Shema that you say anyway is also enough for the commandment of Torah study. So in effect he is emptying the commandment of Torah study of content, right? That’s basically what he is doing. Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is saying: there’s no such thing as the commandment of Torah study; you don’t need anything.

[Speaker B] Whatever you’re saying anyway, you fulfill your obligation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai?

[Speaker B] He says that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what he said. But he himself in the Talmud… in the Talmud further down in Berakhot… we’ll still get to that. In any event, that’s what it says here, and it completely empties the commandment of Torah study of content. Right? Yes, it’s Rashbi himself, personally. The Talmud then says: “And it is forbidden to say this in the presence of the ignorant masses.” But Rava said: “It is a commandment to say this in the presence of the ignorant masses.” What’s the difference? I hope I’m not sinning here. “Rava said: it is a commandment to say this in the presence of the ignorant masses.” What’s the difference?

[Speaker B] See, you’re not sinning. What…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I hope I didn’t sin in the first part either. What’s the difference between them? What is the reason to say that it is a commandment to say this before the ignorant masses, or that it is forbidden to say it before them? The simple explanation is: it is forbidden to say it before them so that they won’t suffice with… right, so that they won’t… yes exactly, so that they won’t settle for Shema morning and evening and not learn anything else. That is “forbidden to say it before the ignorant masses,” right? But that’s strange, isn’t it? What’s the problem? Right, if that’s really what is required, then what difference does it make to me if the ignorant masses do that? They’ll only do… fine, excellent. After all, that really is what is required. So what are you worried about?

Maybe he wants them to do more. Maybe he wants them to do more. But it isn’t required. What, he wants to manipulate them into all sorts of things? You’re deceiving them—for what? For something that has no value? Shema morning and evening fulfills the commandment of Torah study, so what’s the problem if they do what they are obligated to do and no more than that?

[Speaker B] The problem is there are too many ignorant people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the problem?

[Speaker B] It bothers him. What? Why? He wants there not to be ignorant people, there’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s lying to them! What? If there were a commandment, I’d understand, but if not…

[Speaker G] The commandment is day and night—it’s the minimum. It doesn’t say that’s all that should be; it’s the minimum one is obligated to do. It doesn’t mean that’s what is ideal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so, because on what’s merely a non-obligatory fulfillment, in the plain sense, you also can’t make a blessing. You can’t. You’re saying there is a non-obligatory fulfillment in the rest of the study? Shema morning and evening is an obligatory commandment, but if that were so, then even on a merely fulfillable commandment—a merely fulfillable commandment is also a positive commandment—and to swear concerning such a commandment, going back to the Talmud in Nedarim, apparently you also can’t do that. It also doesn’t take effect. It’s like… from what I once saw there is some dispute about this. In the plain sense, for example, the Raavad at the beginning of Sifra says that a merely fulfillable commandment is still a commandment that overrides a prohibition. For example, women who fulfill time-bound positive commandments, like tzitzit—can they wear tzitzit made with wool and linen? Tzitzit with wool and linen is a case of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, but women aren’t obligated in the positive commandment. The Raavad says yes. For example, women laying hands voluntarily—the whole debate over time-bound positive commandments starts there. If women lay hands though they are not obligated to, then that’s labor on a sacrifice, which is prohibited. It is forbidden to lay hands on a sacrifice not for the sake of a commandment; you’re performing labor on the sacrifice. So he says there’s no problem, because once women fulfill it, it is a full commandment in every respect. So too regarding an oath on a merely fulfillable commandment: in the plain sense, the oath does not take effect, just like with a regular commandment. And if so, then not even a merely fulfillable commandment. It’s only something resembling that, as the Rosh says—an optional matter, do what you want. Well, maybe this depends on disputes; I’m saying this more tentatively—according to certain opinions, that’s how it is.

[Speaker G] So the value of Torah itself—it can’t be that it does absolutely nothing and is just the minimum. I claim it does.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim so too, but we’ll see in a moment.

[Speaker G] So what, he sat in the chariot all those years and did nothing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain. I’ll explain all of that. You asked before. So the Talmud says it is forbidden to say it before the ignorant masses. Clearly the Talmud assumes there is value in Torah study beyond Shema morning and evening; it’s just not included in the commandment of Torah study. I would say not even as a merely fulfillable commandment. It’s simply not included at all. But there is value in Torah study that is not a commandment. Okay? And that is what the Sages were concerned the ignorant masses would not do, because they would settle for only what the commandment requires of them. Therefore don’t tell them that it is enough, because the ignorant masses don’t really understand what a commandment is and what a non-commandment matter is that still has value in the context of commandment-life. What value is there? No, not in the context of commandments—in another context. Not commandments.

We brought—I brought—Rashi’s first comment on the Torah, right? Rashi asks why the Torah did not begin with “This month shall be for you.” And the assumption there—Rabbi Yitzhak’s assumption—is that the Torah ought to contain only commandments. Right? So why is the rest there? There are huge parts of the Torah that are not commandments. Regarding Genesis, he says there “He declared to His people the power of His works,” there’s one answer or another. And what about the rest of the Torah? A large part of the Torah is not commandments. Clearly there are parts of Torah beyond Jewish law. Now the question is what their status is, and we talked about that once—Volozhin, we talked about it not long ago, a few classes ago.

Anyway, that is the issue with “it is forbidden to say it before the ignorant masses.” What is the issue with “it is a commandment to say it before the ignorant masses”? Usually people understand that…

[Speaker B] So they won’t despair.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Rava says maybe so that they won’t despair. Meaning, look, if you tell them, “By Shema morning and evening you’ve fulfilled the commandment of Torah study, relax,” that is really a tactical question, somewhat connected to what we discussed earlier—the question whether to encourage a person who isn’t where he should be by telling him, “You too are okay,” or on the contrary, to leave him feeling that he is not okay. I think it’s more than that. I claim this is not just to comfort the ignorant masses; rather, everyone agrees with me in the earlier dispute—that’s what I want to argue. What do I mean? Rava too has an educational agenda, not merely consolation. He wants to say: it is a commandment to say this before the ignorant masses in order to explain to them how great Torah study is—how great Torah study is, sorry, not the commandment of Torah study.

Because why is Shema morning and evening really enough? Why does Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai minimize the commandment of Torah study so drastically and empty it of content? Because he sees it as something so great that it cannot be contained in the category of commandment. There are things the Torah does not put into the category of halakhic obligation because they are too great, not because they are too small. There are things that are not Torah-level obligations; they do not enter the halakhic category because we are not obligated in them strongly enough. We are not really obligated in them—like separating food from waste in a weak form. So it is only rabbinically prohibited. Why isn’t it Torah-level? Because it is a weak form of selection; it isn’t prohibited enough for the Torah to prohibit it. Okay? So there are things below the threshold.

What does that mean here? If the Torah had said you have to study all day as a commandment, then you would basically be studying because there is a commandment of Torah study. But the Torah expects you to study because Torah study is the most foundational thing there is—out of the understanding that Torah study is the most foundational thing there is—not because it is the commandment of Torah study, one commandment among the 613. “Torah study is equal to them all,” as the Mishnah says in Peah. That means Torah study is not just one more of the 613 commandments. If you ask me what counts as one more of the 613 commandments, then Shema in the morning and evening is enough. No problem. From that perspective, you’re covered. But if you don’t understand what Torah study is, then there’s nothing to talk about with you at all. You need to understand what Torah study is.

Someone who understands what Torah study is studies not because there is a commandment of Torah study, but because he understands what Torah is. And someone who understands what Torah is has to study all the time. “And you shall sharpen them”—so that you won’t stammer—if someone asks him, because by Shema in the morning and evening you won’t get anywhere near that. So you need to study because you must, out of understanding what Torah means, not because there is a commandment of Torah study.

I brought several examples of this once. We discussed it once. For example, character refinement—the question of Rabbi Chaim Vital and Rabbi Kook. Why doesn’t the Torah command character refinement? Rabbi Chaim Vital says the Torah speaks to human beings; if someone is not a human being, we don’t speak to him. Meaning, why should we speak to someone who doesn’t understand that he must improve his character traits? If he doesn’t understand that, then the command won’t help him either. And Rabbi Kook takes this one step further. He says that if the Torah had commanded character refinement, then we would do character refinement only because there is a commandment to refine one’s character—but that isn’t called refining one’s character. Refining one’s character means refining it and understanding what a refined human being is, not because there is a commandment to fulfill the obligation of character refinement.

It reminds me too—I’m sure I told this once—about Adam HaKohen, one of the maskilim, who thought of repenting on his deathbed in order to refute the saying of the Sages that “even at the entrance to Gehenna the wicked do not repent.” So that’s roughly the same thing. The claim is that there are things too great to be inserted into the definition of commandment.

[Speaker D] That also connects with what you said, that the Torah blessing is somewhat…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Different. That’s where I’m heading, I’ll come back to it in a moment. The claim is that Torah is something so great that Jewish law does not want to package it as a commandment, because then you would do it simply to fulfill the commandment of Torah study—never mind, one commandment out of the 613. One has to understand that this is the most foundational thing there is; Torah study is not just another commandment. So if you ask me about the commandment—that’s what Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says, and that’s why it fits him very well. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: the commandment of Torah study is Shema in the morning and evening; you don’t need anything else. Torah study is something completely different, “you shall meditate on it day and night”—you don’t stop for a moment. Learn whatever you can. Fine, that is Torah study. But the commandment of Torah study—those are two completely different things.

And that is why he says here that it is a commandment to say this before the ignorant masses. Why? To make clear to them the greatness of Torah study. The ignorant masses are ignorant because they don’t understand what Torah study is. If they understood what Torah study is, maybe they wouldn’t be ignorant. Meaning, even the one who says it is a commandment to say this before the ignorant masses is not saying it in order to comfort them, but to encourage them to advance. It’s an educational issue, not a matter of mere consolation.

I once mentioned that yeshiva joke about the student who reached the shidduch stage, the chapter of “the man betroths.” So he started meeting girls, and rejected all of them; none suited him. The mashgiach came to him and said: tell me, what are you, some supreme authority? None of them suits you? Go work on your character traits and then we’ll talk. Fine. He works on his character for a whole year with passion, studies ethics with passion, in seclusion, crying out to the Holy One, blessed be He, disciplining his character and all that. He comes back with wonderfully refined traits, goes back and meets all the girls again, and again rejects all of them. The mashgiach asks him: tell me, what did you do for a year? Didn’t we tell you to work on your character? He says: Rabbi, I worked on my character in a marvelous way. A year ago, when I was arrogant, none of them suited me. Now that I am humble, all the more so none of them suits me. A straightforward logical inference.

That is what someone looks like when he works on his character because there is a paragraph in the Shulchan Arukh saying one has to work on one’s character, or because there is a commandment to do so. Therefore the Torah says character refinement is not a commandment. Character refinement you must do because you need to understand what character refinement is, why it matters—not because there is some commandment or other to work on your character. Some people want to include the Land of Israel in this category too. I don’t think that’s right, and therefore Maimonides does not count it because it is too foundational a commandment and therefore it is not counted. Never mind.

In any event, there is a whole series of commandments—by the way, in my opinion all of them, or not all but many of them, appear in Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance. Laws of Repentance, and the commandment of repentance too, for example, is like this. There is a whole series of commandments that do not enter the halakhic definition of commandment in the formal sense because they are too great, not because they are too small. And repentance is one of them too. In my opinion, if someone looks carefully at Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance—I may have discussed this once, I don’t remember—if someone looks carefully, those laws deal with the collection of all these laws, not only repentance. He brings other things there as well.

[Speaker B] Or basically, regarding the issue of whether study is for the sake of knowing how to do, or study for its own sake, what you’re saying now is splitting it: Shema morning and evening is study for its own sake, and everything else is study in order to know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s basically what you’re saying. No. Not in order to know what to do—in order to know. Not what to do.

[Speaker B] Then what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain. It’s something else. I’m getting there. In any event, that’s the dispute whether it should be said before the ignorant masses or whether it is forbidden to say it before them. Let’s continue and see that the whole flow of the Talmud really moves along this axis. Look.

Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Ishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Ishmael: “As for someone like me, who has learned the whole Torah, what is the law about learning Greek wisdom?” This question—once I came to the yeshiva in Yeruham on the night of Shavuot, and one student asked me: Ben Dama says to Rabbi Ishmael his uncle, “I have learned the whole Torah; may I learn Greek wisdom?” If he learned the whole Torah, how does he not know this? The fact that he asks the question is proof he doesn’t know the whole Torah. If he learned the whole Torah, how does he not know this? So I told him: no, he did learn the whole Torah. This is not a question connected to Torah. This is not a halakhic question. From the standpoint of Jewish law, he knows everything. He is asking whether there is some non-halakhic idea not to study Greek wisdom. And what does Rabbi Ishmael answer him?

[Speaker B] Sorry, that also implies that halakhically it is permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s not far-fetched at all. Look. “As it says, ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth’—might one think these words are literal? The verse therefore says, ‘And you shall gather in your grain’—conduct yourself according to the way of the world. These are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.” Sorry, I jumped to Berakhot. One moment. “He read to him this verse: ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.’ Go and find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night, and in it learn Greek wisdom.” What does that mean? This continues what we saw earlier. Since Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says that Shema morning and evening is the commandment of Torah study, and everything else is Torah study but not the commandment of Torah study—this is what Ben Dama asks his uncle. He says: fine, the commandment of Torah study—everything written in Jewish law, I know. I’ve learned the whole Torah. But there are things outside Jewish law; that isn’t included in formal Jewish law. That is what Ben Dama doesn’t know. Therefore he comes to ask Rabbi Ishmael: tell me, beyond what is halakhically required, is there something more? Is there some value in studying Torah beyond Shema morning and evening? Because after all, they say here too that it is a commandment not to say this before the ignorant masses, which means the Talmud has revealed here that there is some additional value beyond the halakhic obligation of Shema morning and evening—you also need to study.

So tell me, really, is this category of studying “day and night”? Meaning I can’t even study Greek wisdom if I want to? Is it completely binding? So that is what he says: “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.” What does that mean? He is not answering him about the parameters of the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening. He is continuing what was written above, that there is the matter of Torah study—not the commandment of Torah study—and this is binding: one should study as much as one can, and do nothing else.

And on this the Talmud says: “And this disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani.” And this statement of Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani. Before I continue, that is very strange. Why is it very strange? Because first of all, I would have said that it disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, no? After all, above we cited Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai saying that Shema morning and evening is enough, and now you are telling me “it shall not depart,” day and night. So say that it disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Yohanan who were cited above. No—it doesn’t. “And it disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani,” whom we are about to see. Why not with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai? Because he does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai also says this. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says that Shema morning and evening is the commandment of Torah study; there is a matter of Torah study that is day and night. And that is exactly what Rabbi Ishmael is explaining. He is not disagreeing with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai; he is explaining him. He says: besides Shema morning and evening, which is the commandment of Torah study, there is a matter of Torah study that is day and night. And that is Torah study, not the commandment of Torah study. Therefore he does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. It doesn’t say here “and it disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai” because in truth he does not disagree with him.

So with whom does he disagree? With Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani, who by the way is an Amora. “And it disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani.” For Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: “This verse, ‘and you shall meditate on it day and night,’ is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw Joshua, that the words of Torah were especially beloved to him, as it says, ‘And his attendant Joshua son of Nun, a youth, would not depart from the tent.’ The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, the words of Torah are so beloved to you—‘this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.’” And this disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael.

Why does it disagree with Rabbi Ishmael? What is here beyond what Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai said, beyond what Rabbi Ishmael said? Look at the interesting formulation. He says: “This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” What is this style? It is very rare in the Talmud. What does “neither an obligation nor a commandment” mean? What is the difference between an obligation and a commandment? Here there are two possibilities, and he excludes both of them and adopts a third possibility: it is a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, is blessing Joshua that this book of Torah should not depart from his mouth. But it is neither an obligation nor a commandment. What is the difference between obligation and commandment? Exactly what we discussed earlier. Here the Talmud continues in the same direction all along. No, not even merely fulfillable. Who… no, I claim it’s not even merely fulfillable. Clearly, obligation means something one must do, and commandment means my normative guidance… to do a proper thing… no, to do a good thing. That is called a commandment.

What does that mean? There is the commandment in the formal sense—Shema in the morning and evening. There is the obligation—an obligation is not a commandment. Obligation is what one has to do. What one has to do, whether because it is a formal commandment or because I understand the idea, that is obligation. Then Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani comes and says: this verse is not a commandment, but it is also not an obligation. So that disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael. And Rabbi Ishmael, who does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai but rather explains that beyond the commandment there is also obligation—he does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, he only explains him. So with whom does he disagree? With Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani. Because Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani claims that it is neither commandment nor obligation. Fine, so then it is simply optional, just like the plain meaning of the Talmud in Nedarim, right? Just an optional matter. If you want, do it; if you don’t want, don’t do it. It is only a blessing to Joshua son of Nun.

Now, by the way, in my opinion even Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani does not disagree on the basic principle. What he claims is that this isn’t the verse. That “and you shall meditate on it day and night” is neither obligation nor commandment. But he is not claiming that there is no such obligation. There is such an obligation, because otherwise he would be disagreeing with tannaim. How can he disagree with tannaim? What does “and it disagrees with Rav Shmuel…” sorry, “it disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani”—is he disagreeing with tannaim? Then it should say “it poses a difficulty to Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani,” because there are two tannaim against him: Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Ishmael. How can he say such a thing? Rather, it must mean that they are only disputing over textual interpretation. And we have already found several times that Amoraim dispute with tannaim over textual meaning. He is only claiming that in the verse “and you shall meditate on it day and night,” the obligation of Rabbi Ishmael is not written there. It is not learned from the verse; it is a logical inference.

[Speaker D] This verse is in Joshua, not in the Torah, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?

[Speaker D] Those are verses found in the Torah, not in the Prophets.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s another question. It may be just revelatory evidence or something like that. Never mind. It’s revelatory evidence.

[Speaker D] No, but it’s in the Prophets and not in the Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. There are verses that serve as revelatory evidence—they reveal what is included in the commandment of Torah study. The Talmud says in several places, in Bava Kamma, at the beginning, “And Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made for himself horns of iron.” And from there they learn that “horn” written in the Torah means a horn… detached and not only attached—that even a detached horn is also a horn, and not only an attached horn. And that is a verse in the Prophets. A verse in the Prophets can reveal the meaning, and the medieval authorities there say that there is a difference between revelatory evidence—meaning, a commandment written in the Prophets would not be fully Torah-level, though even about that there are some disputes—but revelatory evidence about the Torah does count. So he says that “and you shall meditate on it day and night” is basically… is basically neither a commandment nor an obligation, but a blessing to Joshua. Of course, from the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, blesses Joshua with this, we understand that there is value in it. Therefore there is reason to learn as Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai said—he agrees with them too. That is why they do not challenge him from tannaim, even though he is an Amora, because he is not arguing with them halakhically; he is not arguing with them about what one should do. He is only claiming that the verse does not say it. The source is some other source—a logical inference or something else.

[Speaker B] Sorry, can’t one read this differently—that he doesn’t disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Yohanan? The question being asked here by the… we have two points, I’m sorry, but can I ask him afterwards?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll wait until afterwards, okay? Okay. So the Talmud—how does it conclude? “A teaching from the school of Rabbi Ishmael: The words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” What is that? Notice, this is Rabbi Ishmael, also below. Rabbi Ishmael explains: you…

[Speaker B] But Rav…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said it is neither commandment nor obligation, right? So what does Rabbi Ishmael say? “The words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.”

[Speaker D] That…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Means it is not a commandment in the sense that you are formally obligated to do it, but you cannot exempt yourself from it. What I said above is not against Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. What I said above is an explanation—it’s the same Rabbi Ishmael, yes, the one mentioned below. It is an explanation of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: that it is not an obligation, but you are not permitted to exempt yourself from it. Which means it is not even certain that he disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani, because he too says: it is neither commandment nor obligation. But still, you are not permitted to exempt yourself from it.

And therefore this whole Talmudic discussion revolves around this axis: the commandment of Torah study and Torah study are two different things. Torah study means there is an obligation to learn all the time—an obligation to learn all the time not because there is such a commandment, not because one fulfills an obligation in one way or another. One fulfills one’s formal obligation with Shema in the morning and evening. And precisely Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, the great strict one, minimizes the commandment completely. Torah study is something great, something you should do as much as you can. And that is the meaning of this whole Talmudic discussion—it all runs on this axis.

Now, two more sentences.

[Speaker C] What is the source for that?

[Speaker B] What’s the source?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Logical reasoning. Or “it shall not depart,” or logical reasoning—depending on whether the verse says it or logic says it. Where is the source for repentance? Where is the source for character refinement? Where is the source for many things? Logical reasoning. “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” So the Talmud in Berakhot—and many later authorities ask this—the Talmud in Berakhot also brings Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, but reverses the positions. And everyone asks: this is a 180-degree contradiction.

“It is written, ‘and you shall gather in your grain’… It is not difficult: here when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, and here when Israel do not do the will of the Omnipresent. Our Rabbis taught: ‘and you shall gather in your grain’—what does this come to teach? Since it says, ‘this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ one might think these words are literal. The verse therefore says, ‘and you shall gather in your grain’—conduct yourself according to the way of the world. These are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.” Rabbi Ishmael says: you can go work a little, you don’t have to learn hysterically. Fine, as much as you can. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: “Is it possible that a person plows at plowing time, sows at sowing time, reaps at harvest time, threshes at threshing time, and so on—what will become of Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others…” And Abaye said: many acted like Rabbi Ishmael and it worked for them; like Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and it did not work for them.

So what do we see here? That Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, who said by us that Shema morning and evening is enough, here says something totalistic—you have to learn all the time, you shouldn’t even go to work. And Rabbi Ishmael, who said that “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them” and “go and find an hour that is neither day nor night”—meaning you have to learn all the time—here says no, fine, you can work, conduct yourself according to the way of the world, everything is fine. How did they reverse their positions?

So the later authorities answer this in various ways. But there is no contradiction at all. The question doesn’t even start. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Ishmael in Menachot are not arguing. One is only explaining the other. And in the Talmud there too they are not arguing. What are they saying? Shema morning and evening is the commandment of Torah study. Torah study is to do it all the time beyond Shema morning and evening, and both agree to that, as we saw. Here the argument is over the question of what is included in Torah study, not in the commandment of Torah study. Does this category of study that one should engage in go so far as not even to go to work? Not as an obligation—there is no such obligation—but as the ideal of Torah study.

Here there is a dispute. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says certainly—go all the way. It means day and night, as he said above. Because what he said in Menachot too was that the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening. But he too agrees there is Torah study all day, and he says in an even more extreme heroic way than Rabbi Ishmael that Torah study all day means not even going to work. Rabbi Ishmael says no, there is Torah study all day, that’s true, but “conduct yourself according to the way of the world.” Sometimes do this, sometimes do that. And many did so and succeeded, as the Talmud says there. Therefore there is no contradiction at all between the sugyot, because there is no disagreement between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai in Menachot. The disagreement is only here, and even here it is not a halakhic disagreement, but a disagreement over the definition of Torah study in the conceptual, value-oriented sense—not the commandment of Torah study.

One final note that brings me back to women. If so, something entirely different emerges. First of all, what the Minchat Chinukh says—that the blessing over Torah is not a blessing on commandments but a blessing of praise—now becomes much clearer. Since the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening, while Torah study itself is not a commandment at all, why should there be a blessing on commandments over it? What am I blessing—over Shema? No. What I bless over is Torah study. That is a blessing of praise; it is not a blessing on commandments. There is no such commandment. There is no such commandment; there is a matter of great value. So how can there be a blessing on commandments over something that is not a commandment? “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us”—He did not command us. Rather, it is a blessing of praise, not a blessing on commandments.

By the way, the Talmud and afterward all the halakhic decisors bring that Ahavah Rabbah, for example, in the blessings of Shema, has the status of the Torah blessing. And if after the Torah blessing you then recite Shema, that is the Torah study upon which the Torah blessing takes effect. So then why the duplication? Because Ahavah Rabbah is the blessing on commandments, because Shema is the commandment of Torah study. Ahavah Rabbah, which comes before Shema, is the blessing on commandments. So what are the blessings we recite in the morning? They are blessings of praise. They are blessings of praise for the privilege of being connected to Torah. That privilege certainly applies to women too. Why shouldn’t women bless over that? What does it have to do with anything?

According to this—and I return to what we discussed—what comes out is this: women are exempt from Torah study in the sense of Shema morning and evening. That is the entire commandment of Torah study. That’s all. But the entire Torah, with all the medieval authorities and later authorities, all the way to practical Jewish law—women are obligated to learn it, from Kodashim, Zeraim, Taharot, everything. They are obligated to learn it just like men. Exactly the same. And there is the matter of Torah study that applies to anyone who understands what Torah study is. Women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. According to what I’m saying now, this is almost like a time-bound positive commandment, because Shema morning and evening has a time, and from that women are exempt. But Torah study itself is not a commandment.

I once discussed this regarding minors and oaths and things like that: something whose basis is logical reasoning has no exemption. Whoever understands the logic is obligated by it—even minors. By the way, minors too are obligated in Torah study according to this. “And you shall teach them to your children” now can be read in its plain sense. Minors are obligated in Torah study—not in the commandment, but in Torah study. Why? Because one must educate them so that they understand what Torah is, and then there is also a claim upon them to study Torah. Because if something is rooted in a verse, then the verse can say: I’m not speaking to minors, I’m not speaking to women—there are various exemptions. But if something is rooted in logic, then everyone who understands the logic is obligated; there are no exemptions from such a thing.

So if a woman understands what Torah is, certainly she is obligated to learn all the time, day and night, not to stop for a moment—with all the medieval and later authorities, in all the sugyot, practical and non-practical alike, whether the commandments apply to her or do not apply to her.

[Speaker B] And one more sentence—but to go work now according to Rabbi Elazar…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But go to work now. It’s not that now some use will collect a fund for us. One last point: to study the commandments that apply to them—this too requires studying the entire Talmud, with medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim). Just based on the Mishnah Berurah and the Magen Avraham, do you really think you can know what to do from learning the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch that tells you the laws that apply to you? Of course not. There is almost no question that you won’t find in the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. You need to understand how the whole thing works; you need to compare one matter to another; you need to know what to do. To know what to do, you need to study the passage of the stubborn and rebellious son, Kodashim, everything, because many principles are written there, from which you will learn the laws of the Sabbath, from which you will understand everything. You can’t issue a halakhic ruling if all you know is the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch on the specific laws that interest you. That is not called knowing even what you yourself need to do, not just Torah study as a value. Therefore I think that even in the sense of studying the commandments that apply to them, they really need to study everything. So there you go—we ended up, in the end, with democracy and full equality.