Torah Study – Lesson 10
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [0:00] Context and defining Torah study
- [1:30] The connection to the phenomenon of ukimtot and the Talmud
- [2:55] The scientific parallel — pathological situations and theoretical principles
- [4:30] Rashi on “If you walk in My statutes” — an initial interpretation
- [8:58] Rabbi Yisrael Salanter — the Talmud in Sanhedrin and the connection to “expound and receive reward”
- [12:05] The Talmud in Nedarim and the blessing over commandments — preparatory acts for a commandment
- [21:17] Women, Torah, and the blessing over Torah — are they obligated in Torah study?
Summary
General Overview
The text presents two conceptions of Torah study: study as a means of knowing what to do, versus study as a value in itself. It argues that the yeshiva-analytic approach sees Jewish law as reflecting abstract theoretical principles rather than as the final goal. It connects the phenomenon of ukimtot in the Talmud to that same pattern of isolating “unrealistic” cases in order to expose a principle, much like science. Based on Rashi at the beginning of Bechukotai, the words of Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, evidence from halakhic decisors, the Rosh, Nefesh HaChayim, and the Tanya, it formulates the idea that Torah study for its own sake means “for the sake of Torah” and not for the sake of practice, nor even as a means to experiential cleaving to God. Finally, it reinterprets “study is greater because it leads to action” as a criterion for a complete form of study that ends in a practical conclusion, rather than turning study into a mere instrument.
Two Conceptions of Torah Study and Yeshiva Analysis
The text states that there are two ways to understand Torah study: as a means of knowing what to do, and as an academic value in which study is an end in itself. It describes yeshiva-style analytic study in which the purpose of in-depth analysis of a Talmudic passage is to understand the ideas and principles behind the laws, not only their practical meaning. It compares this to a scientist who looks at facts in order to uncover laws of nature, and presents Brisker analyticity as a continuation of this approach.
Ukimtot as Exposure of Principles and “Pathological” Isolation
The text argues that the phenomenon of ukimtot reflects a conception according to which a law in the Mishnah is not primarily meant to state a specific ruling, but to teach an abstract general principle of which the law is just an illustration. It explains that the Talmud places the Mishnah in a special situation in order to see the principle “in its purest form,” even if that takes the Mishnah away from its plain sense. As an example it brings an egg laid on a Jewish holiday, which in the Talmud is understood, according to the speaker, as reflecting a principle of preparedness on a holiday rather than just a specific ruling. He compares this to the sciences, where one examines unrealistic conditions such as a vacuum or zero temperature in order to isolate a law of nature from complex reality.
Rashi on “If You Walk in My Statutes” and a Distinction Within Study
Rashi at the beginning of the portion of Bechukotai explains “If you walk in My statutes” as “that you should toil in Torah,” not as commandment observance, because “and you shall keep My commandments” and “and you shall do them” already deal with observance. The text interprets “and you shall keep My commandments” through another Rashi: “toil in Torah in order to keep and fulfill,” meaning study in order to know what to do. It concludes that Torah study contains two components: study as an end in itself (“if you walk in My statutes”) and study in order to keep and fulfill (“and you shall keep My commandments”), while “and you shall do them” is the actual observance of the commandments. It emphasizes that toiling in Torah is not mainly self-denial like “bread with salt and water in measure,” but Torah study for the sake of study itself, and from there identifies study for its own sake with aiming to understand the principles behind the laws and not just the Shulchan Arukh.
Rabbi Yisrael Salanter: “Expound and Receive Reward” and the Blessing over Torah
Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, in his essay “Chok U-Mishpat,” brings the Talmud in Sanhedrin about the stubborn and rebellious son — “it never was and never will be… so why was it written? Expound it and receive reward” — as proof that Torah study is an end and not a means to practice. He rejects the simplistic understanding that verses were written “to fill time,” and explains that the passage was written to teach the principle of “expound and receive reward,” meaning that one studies even what has no practical application because Torah study itself has value. He raises a pilpul about the condemned city and the possibility that this serves as a paradigm for the whole Torah, and formulates the “Lithuanian lesson” as the principle that Torah study is not only for the sake of knowing what to do.
Rabbi Yisrael Salanter also explains the Talmud in Nedarim that scholars do not commonly have sons who are scholars “because they do not bless over the Torah first,” and argues that this is not some “strange evil inclination” but a conception that treats Torah as a preparatory means for a commandment. He cites the Talmud in Menachot according to which one blesses only over a commandment whose performance is the completion of the commandment, and not over preparatory acts. He concludes that if one sees Torah study only as a means to observance, then there would indeed be no reason to bless over it, and therefore “they do not bless over the Torah first.” He connects this to the verse “because they have forsaken My Torah” and the exposition “that is, they did not walk in it,” identifying “they did not walk in it” with Rashi’s “if you walk in My statutes” as toiling in Torah for its own sake.
For Its Own Sake, Principles, and Recitation Without Understanding
The text defines study for its own sake as study “without any external purpose,” and presents knowledge of principles as the embodiment of that ideal, because the principles are “the Torah” itself and not some external tool. It argues that someone who spends “nine to five learning, learning, learning” without understanding the principles “isn’t learning at all,” and treats understanding as a condition for the very act of study, not just for the question of whether one has fulfilled an obligation. It cites Maggid Mesharim attributed to Rabbi Yosef Karo regarding the idea of “reciting Mishnayot,” like reading a prayer, and presents this as something that plainly “isn’t Torah study at all,” even as “mantras,” while generally expressing reservations about the book and noting suspicions that it is forged, alongside the claim that those who investigated think it probably is his. He adds the view that even in studying Jewish law, “it is not correct to learn the Shulchan Arukh” in the usual way, and compares that too to rote recitation.
Evidence from Maimonides and the Halakhic Decisors: Women and the Blessing over Torah
Maimonides, in commandment 11, defines Torah study as the command “to learn the wisdom of the Torah and to teach it,” on the basis of “and you shall teach them diligently to your children,” and he cites the Sifrei: “that they should be sharp in your mouth.” The text points to the requirement that they be “sharp” as hinting that the goal of study is not only the final accumulation of knowledge, but a certain quality of engagement in study itself.
The text cites the Shulchan Arukh that women bless the blessing over Torah, and the Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah who explain that women are obligated in the blessing because they must learn “their own laws.” It concludes from this that study in order to know what to do is not called the commandment of Torah study, since women are exempt from Torah study and yet still obligated to learn the laws that apply to them. It notes that there are other answers as well, but presents this one as accepted by most halakhic decisors, and hints that the discussion of the blessing over Torah will continue and that there may be a different relation between the various formulations of the blessings.
The Rosh in Nedarim: “For the Sake of Their Maker” versus “For Their Own Sake”
The text quotes the Talmud in Nedarim: “A person should not say, I will read so that they will call me a sage… rather learn out of love, and honor will ultimately come,” and the words of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok: “Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake.” It brings the Rosh’s explanation: “Do things for the sake of their Maker” means for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His own purpose; while “speak of them for their own sake” means that all engagement in words of Torah should be “for the sake of Torah… to know and understand and add insight and analysis, and not in order to provoke or become arrogant.” It concludes that commandments are done for the sake of Heaven, but Torah study is done for the sake of Torah itself, “not even for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He.”
Nefesh HaChayim: For Its Own Sake Is Not Experiential Cleaving, and the Study Itself Is the Cleaving
The text presents Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin in Gate 4 of Nefesh HaChayim as opening with the words of the Rosh and emphasizing that the commandment of Torah study is done “for the sake of Torah” and not as a means to cleaving, love and fear, or spiritual experience. It cites the midrash about King David asking that one who occupies himself with Psalms be considered as one occupied with the laws of ritual afflictions and tents, and presents this as evidence against interpreting study for its own sake as experiential cleaving, since saying Psalms “properly all day” should then have been the highest form of cleaving. It adds that Nefesh HaChayim argues that if for-its-own-sake meant experiential cleaving, one tractate would have been enough for a whole lifetime, whereas the sages described Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai as one who left aside neither Bible, Mishnah, Jewish law, nor aggadah.
The text cites Nefesh HaChayim’s claim that there are laws whose analysis requires dealing with material matters like “bird-offerings and the openings of menstrual laws” and even laws of deception such as migo, and that it is almost impossible to accompany that with experiential cleaving; therefore the very engagement is the cleaving. It quotes Nefesh HaChayim instructing a person to prepare for study with pure fear of God and confession so that the Torah will be holy, but states that this fear is preparation for study, not that the study is a means to fear. It explains the idea that “He, blessed be He, and His will are one,” so that cleaving is realized through attachment to “the word of God — that is Jewish law,” and it even gives value to aggadah “which has no practical legal outcome whatsoever,” because everything “came forth from His mouth, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai,” while hinting at a hierarchy in which Jewish law is central.
The Tanya: Torah as Will and Wisdom, and the View of Jewish Law as Cleaving
The text brings from chapters 4–5 of the Tanya that the divine soul clothes itself in the thought, speech, and action of the 613 commandments, and that in Torah study “in speech he engages in explaining all 613 commandments and their laws, and in thought he grasps… the orchard of Torah.” It quotes the Tanya that the Holy One, blessed be He, contracted His will and wisdom into the 613 commandments and their laws so that the soul could grasp and fulfill them, and it brings the image of “embracing the king” even when the king is dressed in many garments, where Torah is “His right hand embraces me.”
The text quotes the Tanya explaining the language of “grasping,” whereby the intellect grasps the intelligible object, and illustrates that when a person understands a law “correctly and clearly,” his mind grasps it and his mind is clothed in it, and the law is “the wisdom and will of the Holy One, blessed be He.” It emphasizes that this is true “even if this case never was and never will be,” and connects that directly to the principle of the stubborn and rebellious son. It concludes that there is agreement here from both sides of the divide, Nefesh HaChayim and the Tanya, that Torah study is not about learning only in order to know what to do.
“Study Is Greater Because It Leads to Action” as a Form of Study and Not as a Means
The text closes with the Talmud in Kiddushin: “A question was asked… is study greater or action greater?… they all answered and said: study is greater, because study leads to action.” It argues that the usual reading turns study into a means to action and therefore does not fit with the statement that “study is greater,” and proposes another reading according to which what is “greater” is “study that leads to action.” It says that the very question, as though these were two separate things, is a mistake, because there is really one continuum: “study that leads to action.” It defines greater study as study that ends in a practical conclusion, not in order to make action the external goal, but in order to define the complete form of study, which begins with principles and ends with the bottom line of “what should be done.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, let’s just go back to the context. At the beginning of this topic of Torah study, I spoke a bit about the concept of study and argued that there are two ways to understand it. One possibility is to see study as a means of knowing what to do, like technology, say, in the scientific context. And the second possibility is to see it as an academic value, again like science as opposed to technology — meaning, study is a value in itself and not a means of knowing what to do. I brought a few examples from the analysis of yeshiva study, what’s called analytic learning, and I tried to show there that when you look at a Talmudic passage, the goal is not just to understand what it says, not only to understand what it says on the practical level, but to understand the ideas that stand behind it. Meaning, what principle is reflected through the laws before us, just as a scientist looks at facts in the world and sees in them a reflection of laws of nature — and what interests him is really the laws of nature, not the facts he is observing. And after I demonstrated this a bit with yeshiva analysis, with the analyticity of Brisk and how it continued onward, I came back and spoke about it in Talmudic contexts as well, and I wanted to argue that this is really what also stands behind the phenomenon of ukimtot. That in the phenomenon of ukimtot too, what we see is that when the Gemara sees some law that appears in the Mishnah, from its perspective it is completely obvious that the law is not really coming to state a law, but rather to state some abstract, general, theoretical principle of which that law is only an illustration. And because of that, it allows itself to place it in some very, very particular situation, because in that situation you see the theoretical principle in the purest, most refined way, even though apparently the Mishnah does not present it that way. “An egg laid on a Jewish holiday, Beit Shammai say it may be eaten and Beit Hillel say it may not be eaten.” So it says that an egg laid on a holiday may not be eaten. In the Gemara it is completely obvious that that is not what the Mishnah is trying to say. The Mishnah is trying to say a general principle: that on a holiday, when you eat something, it has to be prepared. We saw various other examples like that, and therefore it seemingly takes the Mishnah away from its plain meaning and places it in some very special situation, that same situation in which the abstract principle can be seen most clearly — just as in the scientific context, we as scientists look specifically at pathological situations. Situations that do not reflect what actually happens in the world: at zero temperature, in a vacuum, with no surrounding disturbances, as far as possible from what happens in reality. And strangely enough, precisely this distancing from real-life situations is what enables me to understand the principles behind the situations. Because realistic situations are very complex — many laws of nature appear there together — and if I want to really understand this, I have to isolate each law of nature separately, and I do that by looking at situations that are unrealistic, by looking, apparently, at situations that are far from reality. That’s why I think the phenomenon of ukimtot also reflects that same conception — the one people usually associate with the nineteenth or twentieth century, the yeshiva conception which says that Jewish law is only a reflection of general abstract theoretical principles, and not that Jewish law is the goal and the principles are only a means of understanding what the law is. So now I want to take that conclusion and continue with it, to look at things in a bit more detail, and then draw conclusions about what this says about the commandment of Torah study and about Torah study in general. Rashi at the beginning of the portion of Bechukotai — the Torah first says, “If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and do them.” So Rashi writes there, the famous Rashi — the mashgichim are always quoting it — “If you walk in My statutes — could this mean observance of the commandments? When it says, ‘and keep My commandments,’ observance of the commandments is already stated. So how do I uphold ‘if you walk in My statutes’? That you should toil in Torah.” This always appears in moral talks. So “and do them” already explains to us, reminds us of, observance of the commandments. So what is “if you walk in My statutes”? So you have to say that “if you walk in My statutes” means toil in Torah. What does toil in Torah mean? Here it seems to me that it does not mean what the mashgichim say, and what does it mean — effort? Or at least not in its simple form — not sleeping at night, bread with salt, water in measure, and all kinds of things like that; or at least that’s not the essence. Maybe it helps, but that is not the essence of toil in Torah. So what is it? Rashi says, “and keep My commandments” — that is the next Rashi. “And keep My commandments” — toil in Torah in order to keep and fulfill, as it says, “and you shall learn them and keep to do them.” So if we summarize those two Rashis, let’s go back to the verse: it says like this, “If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and do them” — three things. “And do them” means observance of the commandments, right? “And do them” means to do the commandments. What is “and keep My commandments”? “Keep My commandments,” Rashi says, means to toil in Torah in order to keep and fulfill. Meaning, to study in order to keep and fulfill — that is called “and keep My commandments.” So what is “if you walk in My statutes”? Rashi says there: that you should toil in Torah. Well, you already said that. “Keep My commandments” — that you should toil in Torah in order to keep and fulfill. What’s the difference? It’s a third thing. Toil in Torah means studying not in order to fulfill, studying in order to study. Toil in Torah does not specifically mean self-denial with bread and salt and water in measure; maybe those are indicators, maybe they help, but they are only indicators, not the thing itself. Toil in Torah means studying Torah for the sake of studying Torah, not in order to know how to fulfill, not in order to know the Jewish law, to know what to do — that is “and keep My commandments.” Rather, “if you walk in My statutes” means study for the sake of study.
[Speaker B] Maybe he’s distinguishing between statute and commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker B] He says commandment and statute — there’s a difference between them. There’s a difference between them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a difference? Yes, but here Rashi takes the word as a synonym, because he says “and keep My commandments” has already been stated, so what is “if you walk in My statutes”? “That you should toil in Torah.” You’re saying maybe it’s unrelated, maybe a statute is something else — Rashi didn’t
[Speaker B] learn it that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise he would have had to say this is “My statutes” and that is “My commandments.” So I’m speaking about Rashi right now, okay? So Rashi is basically saying that study contains two components. One component is study as an end in itself. That is “if you walk in My statutes” — that you should toil in Torah. The second component is “and keep My commandments.” What does that mean? Keep them so that you know what to do — meaning, learn well so that it will preserve you, yes, “an ignoramus cannot be pious,” meaning that you should know what has to be done. And “and do them” is the actual fulfillment. That has nothing to do with Torah study; it is commandment observance itself. So here we have that within study there is something beyond studying in order to know what to do. Rather, study is an end in itself, and if I connect this with what I said earlier, not only is it an end in itself, but the subject of the study is different as well. Meaning, study in order to know what to do is to study the laws. And study as toil in Torah, as an end in itself, is to study the ideas, the abstract principles behind the laws.
[Speaker B] Not just the Shulchan Arukh. Yes, meaning, the Shulchan Arukh is for
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] knowing — beyond that, we’ll maybe get to more of that later. I claim that even in Jewish law it isn’t right to study the Shulchan Arukh; even when learning Jewish law, it isn’t right to study the Shulchan Arukh, or not only the Shulchan Arukh, the way people usually understand it. But that will come later. So that’s the basic distinction I want to dwell on here a bit.
[Speaker B] Study and action — which is greater, study or action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I’ll get to that in a moment; I’m coming to that Gemara too. There’s an essay by Rabbi Yisrael Salanter in which he brings proof for this principle, an essay called “Chok U-Mishpat.” And there he speaks about this idea that study is really an end and not a means of knowing what to do. And he says — he brings the Gemara in Sanhedrin, the famous Gemara in Sanhedrin: “According to whom is this teaching taught: The stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be. So why was it written? Expound it and receive reward. According to whom? According to Rabbi Yehudah. And if you wish, say Rabbi Shimon. For it was taught: Rabbi Shimon says, because this one ate a tartemar of meat and drank half a log of Italian wine, his father and mother take him out to be stoned? Rather, it never was and never will be. So why was it written? Expound it and receive reward. Rabbi Yonatan said: I saw him and sat on his grave.” Yes, that’s the famous dispute. But Rabbi Yehudah basically says it never was and never existed and never will be. So why was it written? Study it and receive reward. Rabbi Yisrael Salanter asks about this: have we run out of verses in the Torah that we need these three verses about the rebellious son in order to receive reward? Have we already finished all the rest of the Torah? What is the meaning of this thing that these three verses are for “study and receive reward”? To fill up the extra time we had left, so they added another three verses? And all the rest we already finished? And if so, who says we won’t finish these too? It can’t be understood literally. So what he says is that we are reading it wrong. These verses were not written so that we should study them and receive reward. They were written to teach us the principle of “study and receive reward.” To teach us that when we study Torah, it is not in order to know what to do. How do we know that? Because the section of the stubborn and rebellious son is Torah study, and yet it never was and never will be. So why do we study it? If study were only in order to know what to do, why would it be necessary to study it? We study it because we understand that Torah study is an end in itself; it is not a means of knowing what to do. And that is what the section of the stubborn and rebellious son teaches. And the lesson of such a section, the Lithuanian lesson of the section of the stubborn and rebellious son, is not that a gluttonous and drunken rebellious son should be killed. The lesson is that Torah study is an end in itself and not a means of knowing what to do. Once I had a pilpul about this, because they say the same thing also about the condemned city. The condemned city never was and never will be — why was it written? Study it and receive reward. And now that’s already two verses that come as one, which do not teach a general rule. So the question is whether this teaches about the rest of the Torah, or whether really only those two were written so that we should study them for their own sake and not in order to know what to do. But he says this is a paradigm. Meaning, from here we understand that the whole Torah is like this. And the section of the stubborn and rebellious son was written to teach us the idea of “study and receive reward.” The idea that even sections that are applicable, that deal with laws we are supposed to implement, still when we study them we are not studying them only in order to know what to do, but because of the value of the study in itself — yes, the academic value, as I called it earlier. He explains with this structure the Gemara in Nedarim. The Gemara says there: Why is it not common for Torah scholars to have sons who become Torah scholars? Rav Yosef said: so that people will not say that Torah is an inheritance for them. Fine, there are various explanations. Ravina said — I’m skipping, there are five or six amoraim here — Ravina said: because they do not bless over the Torah first. For Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What is the meaning of that which is written, “Who is the wise man who can understand this”? This matter was asked of the sages and the prophets, and they did not explain it until the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself explained it: “And the Lord said: because they have forsaken My Torah.” That is the same as “they did not listen to My voice,” that is the same as “they did not walk in it.” Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: because they do not bless over the Torah first. Torah scholars do not commonly have sons who also become Torah scholars because they did not bless over the Torah first. Rabbi Yisrael Salanter again asks: what kind of strange evil inclination is this? Meaning, Torah scholars who engage in Torah and invest all their strength in Torah, and that’s their main purpose in life — but when it comes to the blessing over Torah they cut corners? Meaning, they don’t bless over the Torah first? Why specifically here do they have some strange inclination not to bless — and over the very thing that is the center of their lives? So he says this isn’t an evil inclination; it’s a mistaken conception of Torah study. He brings a Gemara in Menachot. The Gemara in Menachot says: rather, isn’t this the reason? Any commandment whose performance is the completion of the commandment, such as circumcision — even though it is valid if done by a gentile — if done by a Jew it requires a blessing. And any commandment whose performance is not the completion of the commandment, such as tefillin — even though they are invalid if made by a gentile — if done by a Jew it does not require a blessing. Meaning, when we bless over a commandment, that’s only when we are actually completing it. Over preparatory acts for a commandment, we do not bless. When building a sukkah — that’s part of the discussion there — in the Jerusalem Talmud it says that one blesses when building the sukkah. But in the Babylonian Talmud it seems not so; rather one blesses when sitting in the sukkah. Why don’t we bless when building the sukkah? Because building the sukkah is a preparatory act for the commandment; it is not the commandment. The commandment is to sit in the sukkah. And in order for you to have a sukkah, you have to build it. We do not bless over preparatory acts for a commandment. That is what the Jerusalem Talmud says and that is how all the halakhic decisors rule in practice. So what does that really mean? Rabbi Yisrael Salanter says: when those Torah scholars did not bless over the Torah first, what does that mean? They understood that Torah is a preparatory act for a commandment; it is not the commandment itself. It is a means. Over that you do not bless. Why? Because it is a preparatory act for the commandment, in order to know what to do. You study Torah so that you can fulfill. So if that’s the case, Torah study is only a means; it’s not a goal. But over a means you do not bless. You bless only over a goal. Therefore those Torah scholars understood Torah study this way — yes, this is the approach I once mentioned in the name of Rabbi Ovadia and his sons and students, that study is really in order to know what to do. So in such a situation, you are really not supposed to bless over it, since it is a preparatory act for a commandment. And because of that, those Torah scholars truly did not bless over the Torah first, and the result was that their sons did not become Torah scholars. Don’t ask me what happens in Rabbi Ovadia’s case. So this mistaken conception of Torah study is reflected in the fact that you conceive of Torah incorrectly, and therefore you do not bless, and because of that you do not succeed in passing it on. Because it is a mistaken conception of Torah. By the way, there are assumptions here that I’m not getting into now, and maybe we’ll discuss later — namely, that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments. Right? And that is basically what he assumes.
[Speaker C] But if they don’t bless, they’re keeping the Jewish law they learned in order to know how to behave. Why? They didn’t bless.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because they thought that, halakhically speaking, you really don’t need to bless.
[Speaker C] Is there a commandment to bless?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they argue that there isn’t. It’s a halakhic dispute. They argue that there is no commandment to bless, and that blessing over it would be a blessing over a commandment — but one blesses only over a commandment, not over a preparatory act for a commandment. So they argue halakhically that it isn’t correct to bless here. So the claim is that when you view Torah as a means, that is a mistaken way of understanding Torah study. And therefore you don’t succeed in passing Torah on, and if we return to the Gemara I read earlier, the Gemara in Nedarim, immediately after saying that they do not bless over the Torah first, it says: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What is the meaning of that which is written, “Who is the wise man who can understand this”? This matter was asked of the sages and the prophets, and they did not explain it until the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself explained it, as it is written in Jeremiah: “And the Lord said: because they have forsaken My Torah.” This is called forsaking My Torah. Why? Because Torah is an end in itself; when you turn Torah into a means, that is called forsaking Torah. And then immediately after that it says: that is the same as “they did not listen to My voice,” that is the same as “they did not walk in it.” Maybe that is some hint to the portion of Bechukotai. “If you walk in My statutes.” What is called “they did not walk in it”? “They did not walk in it” is “if you walk in My statutes,” right? That is what is called “they did not walk in it.” You did not fulfill “if you walk in My statutes.” What is “if you walk in My statutes”? We saw it in Rashi. “If you walk in My statutes” means that you should toil in Torah. That you should study Torah not as a means of knowing what to do — that is “and keep My commandments.” “If you walk in My statutes” means that you should toil in Torah. That is what those Torah scholars did not do. Because they did not understand the second thing, this distinction between study as an end in itself and study as a means of knowing what to do. But that
[Speaker D] doesn’t contradict it. I think I heard that study is for the principles.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I said — true, those are two different things, but I think there is a connection between them. There’s a connection because why am I really focusing on principles and not on practice? Just as people ask about a scientist: why is he focused on laws of nature when all we really want to know is how nature behaves? Why are you always busy with the question of general laws? You could say that’s as a means — the general laws are in order to know what happens in every situation. But I think that’s not a correct description of the…
[Speaker D] But isn’t that for its own sake?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that for its own sake?
[Speaker D] It very much is for its own sake. Because learning for its own sake means learning without any purpose. So if your purpose is to know the principles, isn’t that not for its own sake?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? But that is the study. To know the principles — that is learning for its own sake. That is the thing itself. It’s not an external purpose. I study in order to know. That is called learning for its own sake. The “in order to” here is not “in order to” achieve some external thing that I’m using this to attain.
[Speaker D] I study it because it has value in itself. The principles are the Torah. But if someone works from morning till night, like, nine
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to five, learning learning learning learning — that isn’t called learning; he’s not learning at all. It’s not that he hasn’t fulfilled the obligation of study — he isn’t learning at all. He didn’t learn. It’s not a question of whether he fulfilled the obligation or didn’t fulfill it,
[Speaker B] he didn’t do the act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First let him do the act, and then we’ll discuss whether he fulfilled the obligation or not. Because studying Torah means understanding the principles. That is what it means to study Torah. There is Maggid Mesharim by Rabbi Yosef Karo. It says in Maggid Mesharim that an angelic maggid appeared to him and told him that there is some great matter in reciting Mishnayot — yes, saying the Mishnayot like some kind of prayer. Strange things. On the face of it, that is not Torah study at all. There is nothing to bless over there as the blessing over Torah. Those are just mantras. Well, there are other strange things in that book too, so this isn’t the only one. The whole book is a strange phenomenon. But Rabbi Yosef Karo is a puzzling man, surprising. There are those who suspected that the book is forged, maybe
[Speaker B] he didn’t write it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there are such suspicions. But the claim of those who checked it is that it probably is his. I don’t know; I haven’t gone deeply into it.
[Speaker B] At least let him receive reward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wrote it so that we would learn why it isn’t right. It’s like in the Haredi worldview: the world was created in order to know what not to do. Meaning, what to stay away from. Yes, for that the world was created.
[Speaker E] Okay, fine, so Maggid Mesharim is important and the Shulchan Arukh is important too. What, now Rabbi Yosef Karo number two as well? And today we already said before that there’s also a problem with the Shulchan Arukh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? No — to study Jewish law, you don’t need to study the Shulchan Arukh by itself. I didn’t say the work is invalid. I said that when studying Jewish law, you shouldn’t study the Shulchan Arukh; that’s not called studying Jewish law. That’s like reciting Mishnayot — it’s the same thing. Anyway… In any case, the claim is that study is really an end in itself and not a means, and viewing it as a means is really a mistaken view. I’ll bring proof for this — I think very strong proof from the halakhic decisors. Maimonides writes in commandment 11: Commandment 11 is that we were commanded to learn the wisdom of the Torah and to teach it. And this is what is called Torah study. And that is His statement: “And you shall teach them diligently to your children.” And the language of the Sifrei is: “To your children” — these are your students. And so you find everywhere that students are called sons, as it says, “And the sons of the prophets went out.” And there it says “and you shall teach them diligently” — that they should be sharp in your mouth, so that when a person asks you something, you should not stammer to him but tell him immediately. And this command has already been repeated many times. By the way, why do you need not to stammer but to tell him immediately? If you tell him after a few seconds, what will happen? It is clear that the goal is not just knowledge. If the goal were knowledge, what difference would it make? The main thing is that in the end we know. There’s something here in the study itself. And this command has already been repeated many times: “and you shall learn and do,” “that they may learn,” and the urging regarding this commandment, and to be diligent in it always, is scattered in many places in the Talmud. And women are not obligated in it, from His statement “and you shall teach them to your sons,” and they said: your sons and not your daughters. Women are not obligated in Torah study. Okay? That’s the result — for its own sake, your level is even greater. So here — and so all the halakhic decisors agree, it’s a Gemara. In the Shulchan Arukh it says that women bless the blessing over Torah. So the halakhic decisors ask why. The Magen Avraham there on that section writes, and the Mishnah Berurah also brings him, that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah because they are obligated to learn the laws that apply to them, as written in Yoreh De’ah in such-and-such a siman. Because they are obligated to learn their own laws, they bless the blessing over Torah for that. Okay? So now we have to understand: are they obligated in Torah study or not obligated in Torah study? Right? This is what it means not to be obligated in Torah study. Someone who learns the commandments in order to know what he must fulfill — that is called not engaging in the commandment of Torah study. And that, after all, is what a woman is obligated in — to learn in order to know what to do. Okay? And that is called being not obligated in the commandment of Torah study. What does that mean? That learning in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study. Right? It’s mathematics. It’s obvious. What? Yes, exactly — it’s a preparatory act for a commandment. So in a preparatory act for a commandment, everyone is obligated in order to know what to do. But the commandment itself of Torah study is not that. Because if it were that, then women would also be obligated in Torah study.
[Speaker B] So why does she bless?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s an interesting question, and it brings me back to what Rabbi Yisrael Salanter said earlier, but I’ll discuss that later. I’ll just say in one sentence: because it’s not a blessing over commandments. If it were a blessing over commandments, she would be exempt — maybe — although that depends on the dispute over whether
[Speaker B] women bless over
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] positive time-bound commandments or something.
[Speaker B] What? Never mind — Ashkenazi women but not Sephardi women. No, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s regarding all commandments from which women are exempt, not only positive time-bound commandments. According to the opinions that they do bless — what?
[Speaker B] Sabbath candle lighting? So what, they don’t bless? Isn’t that a commandment? Isn’t that a blessing over a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is, why not?
[Speaker B] So when are women exempt from blessings over commandments they are obligated in?
[Speaker E] No, I didn’t say…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said they are obligated in it? They are exempt from Torah study. I don’t understand.
[Speaker B] No, from Torah study that leads to action they are not exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but that is not a commandment. But that is not a commandment — what would they bless over? There’s no commandment here. You have to buy a kilo of sugar. You don’t bless over the preparations; you bless over the commandment itself, not over learning how to fulfill or what to fulfill. That isn’t a commandment at all. It’s simply a necessity, because you need to know what to do. The commandment of Torah study is not that. That’s just simply to know what to do.
[Speaker B] Maybe according to that conception that’s still the source of the double blessing, “to engage in words of Torah”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. When I speak about the blessing over Torah, I really will talk about the relationship between the different blessings. It could be that one is for this and one is for that, and then according to that there would be a practical difference for women as to which of the blessings they need to say. Because maybe it’s that blessing.
[Speaker B] So I
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says, it could be that there’s a difference between the blessings over the Torah that we’re talking about. But let’s leave that for now; I’ll still talk about the blessing over the Torah. So basically, it seems to me that here this is really strong evidence from the words of the halakhic decisors, that learning in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study. Right? True, there are other answers on the table for this Shulchan Arukh, but the Mishnah Berurah, the Magen Avraham, and that’s the accepted answer among most halakhic decisors, and if so then it seems to me that from this itself it’s obvious that this is not called the commandment of Torah study. I want to go a bit into—I’m not sure if I mentioned this or not—Nefesh HaChaim in Gate 4 brings the words of the Rosh in Nedarim. The Talmud in… in Nedarim 62 says this: “It was taught: ‘To love the Lord your God, to listen to His voice, and to cleave to Him’—a person should not say: I will read so that they will call me wise, I will study Mishnah so that they will call me rabbi, I will review so that I will become an elder and sit in the academy. Rather, learn out of love, and honor will eventually come.” As it is said: “Bind them on your fingers; write them on the tablet of your heart.” And it says: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness,” and it says: “She is a tree of life to those who hold fast to her, and those who support her are fortunate.” This is an interesting point, by the way. In the yeshivot, in the name of the Chazon Ish, I think it’s commonly said that someone who studies for judgeship or for the rabbinate—that’s study not for its own sake. Now, people understand that simply because he’s studying for the profession. I don’t think that’s right. Meaning, not because that’s not the problem—that he’s studying in order to earn a living or for a profession—but that kind of learning in itself is learning not for its own sake. Not because you’re going to serve in office, but because you’re basically studying in order to know the bottom line and not in order to understand the ideas. That’s the point because of which it’s not really learning for its own sake. After that the Talmud says: Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok says: “Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake.” He brings the verse: “Do not make them a crown with which to glorify yourself, and do not make them a spade with which to dig,” and so on. Then what does it say? Maybe again: and all the more so. “And if Belshazzar, who used only sacred vessels that had already become secular vessels, was uprooted from the world, then one who uses the crown of Torah all the more so.” Yes, so you’re not supposed to study Torah for something outside it. And the Rosh on—you know that in Nedarim there’s a commentary of the Rosh on the page, besides the rulings of the Rosh. So the Rosh there on the page writes: “Do things for the sake of their Maker”—for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His own sake. “And speak of them for their own sake”—all your speech and negotiation in words of Torah should be for the sake of Torah, such as to know, to understand, and to add insight and analysis, and not to provoke or to become arrogant. So what is he saying? He says—the verse that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok brings says: “Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake.” “Do things for the sake of their Maker” refers to observance of the commandments. And what does it mean that one should fulfill commandments for the sake of their Maker, for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He? Yes—to fulfill one’s obligation, basically. You perform the commandment for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. This is a bit connected to what I once brought in the name of Maimonides in the Laws of Kings, chapter 8, at the end of chapter 8, where Maimonides writes that a resident alien who observed his commandments because reason compelled him—he is not among the pious of the nations of the world but among their wise. Meaning that he didn’t really perform a commandment here; he maybe did a good deed, but a commandment is when you do it for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, and not out of rational compulsion. “And speak of them for their own sake.” So “Do things for the sake of their Maker”—that speaks about action, about observance of commandments. And what is “and speak of them”? That’s Torah study, right? About Torah study it doesn’t say “for the sake of their Maker”; it says “for their own sake.” What’s the difference? That commandments you do for the sake of Heaven, for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He; Torah you do for its own sake, for the sake of Torah itself. Not for anything else, not even for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He—for the sake of Torah itself. And that’s what the Rosh writes: “And speak of them for their own sake”—all your speech and discussion in words of Torah should be for the sake of Torah. It’s like I said before: the “for” here is not “for the Torah” in the sense of for some purpose of Torah; it’s not really “for it” in that sense—it’s just a turn of phrase. The meaning is that Torah is an end in itself. There is no goal outside it for which I study Torah. And that’s the meaning of the verse, which makes a distinction between “Do things for the sake of their Maker”—that’s observance of the commandments, which should be for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He—and “speak of them”—the commandment of Torah study, which is for the sake of Torah itself, not even for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. And Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin—this is how he opens his Gate 4—basically says that. He brings this Rosh and says that the commandment of Torah study has to be done for the sake of Torah. Not for anything else—not even for love and fear, and not for anything else, meaning not even for an experience of cleaving. About this I did mention that Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin talks about how he comes out against the Hasidim, basically, who view learning as a means of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. And he argues against them that learning is not a means to cleaving; it is the cleaving. Yes, from there came Lithuanian yeshiva culture. Meaning that when you study “the ox that gored the cow,” it doesn’t create in you an experience of cleaving; rather, that learning itself is the cleaving. And that is what it means to be attached to the Holy One, blessed be He. And he brings this Rosh as proof of the point. Let’s continue here to a few more interesting sentences. Indeed, Lithuanian yeshivot, Lithuanian learning, where I started—basically here we’ve reached its root. “The matter of Torah study for its own sake,” chapter 2 in Gate 4. “The clear truth is that ‘for its own sake’ does not mean cleaving, as most people think. For our Rabbis of blessed memory said in the midrash that King David, peace be upon him, requested before Him, blessed be He, that one who engages in Psalms should be considered by Him, blessed be He, as if he were engaged in Nega’im and Ohalot.” Yes, and this is the kind of yeshiva proof-text. Meaning, King David asks the Holy One, blessed be He, that one who studies Psalms should be like someone who studies Nega’im and Ohalot. So the Hasidim would say: just look what greatness there is in studying Psalms. And the Lithuanians would say: you see? Psalms are not the main thing—you have to ask for them to be like Nega’im and Ohalot, but Nega’im and Ohalot are actually the core, the real core. It’s like “and he offered sacrifices to the God of his father Isaac,” and Rashi there brings a midrash of the Sages: from here we learn that a person is obligated in the honor of his father more than in the honor of his father’s father. Fine? So from the fact that one owes honor to one’s grandfather like to one’s father, you can learn how important honor of one’s grandfather is, but you can also learn—fine, true, that also matters—but honor of one’s father is really the main thing; that’s what the comparison is made to. “And if we say that ‘for its own sake’ means specifically cleaving”—he continues and says—“then engagement in the laws of the Talmud with analysis and effort is a matter more exalted and beloved before Him, blessed be He, than the recitation of Psalms.” Meaning, you understand already from this itself that clearly it’s not a means to know what to do, because otherwise what does it matter what reciting Psalms contributes? Reciting Psalms is something that maybe creates cleaving or something like that, but for it to have the value of Torah study is possible only if we understand that learning is not a means to know what to do. But even within that view—that learning is not a means to know what to do, but a means to cleaving—even there, Nega’im and Ohalot are more Torah study than Psalms. Even on the plane of cleaving. Why? Because Nega’im and Ohalot may not create an experience of cleaving, but they are themselves cleaving. That’s what he says here: “And if we say that ‘for its own sake’ means specifically cleaving”—the experience of cleaving—“and that on this alone depends the whole essence of Torah study, then there is no more wondrous cleaving than reciting Psalms properly all day long.” So that’s his proof. Yes, the proof the Hasidim would bring from King David is actually a refutation, he says. Meaning, from here there is proof against them. “And who knows whether the Holy One, blessed be He, even agreed with him in this?” Yes, he goes on in full yeshivish style. Meaning, yes, David asked the Holy One, blessed be He, that Psalms be like Nega’im and Ohalot, but it doesn’t say what the Holy One, blessed be He, answered him. Who says He agreed? “For we do not find in the words of our Rabbis of blessed memory what answer He, blessed be He, gave to his request. And also, for the matter of cleaving, one tractate or one chapter or one Mishnah would have sufficed for him to occupy himself with all his days in cleaving—why is there a need to learn the whole Torah? But not so do we find concerning our Rabbis of blessed memory in Sukkah, where they said about Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai that he left untouched neither Scripture, Mishnah, laws, nor aggadot. And this was because he constantly considered that he had still not fulfilled his obligation of Torah study for its own sake through what he had learned until then; therefore he labored all his days to add insight constantly, from day to day and from hour to hour.” In short, the value lies in the learning itself. It’s not a means to cleaving, and of course not to knowing what to do. He says: “And this also is plausible, for there are many laws in the Talmud such that when a person engages in them he must examine and deepen his thought and mind in the physical matters involved, such as bird offerings and the openings of menstrual impurity, which are the very essence of halakhic law, and the give-and-take of the Talmud, and the rules of migo concerning deception—what the deceiver could have claimed—and it is almost impossible that at that moment cleaving should also be present in full as fitting.” While you’re dealing with swindlers, thieves, and afterbirth and placenta, you’re supposed to be engaged in cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He? It doesn’t work, he says. So what is it? This engagement itself is the cleaving. Not that you have to feel cleaving while dealing with these things, but that this engagement is the cleaving. But the truth—this is chapter 3—“But the truth is that the matter of ‘for its own sake’ means for the sake of Torah.” And the idea is as the Rosh, of blessed memory, explained on the statement of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok in Nedarim—what I read before—“Do things for the sake of their Maker,” for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His own sake, “and speak of them for their own sake.” “All your speech and discussion and exchange in words of Torah should be for the sake of Torah, such as to know, to understand, and to add insight and analysis, and not to provoke or to become arrogant.” He was precise in explaining the change in Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok’s wording: concerning action he said “for the sake of their Maker,” and concerning speech he said “for their own sake.” Therefore, concerning action he explained it as “for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His own sake,” and concerning learning he explained it as “for the sake of Torah.” And his intention is clear, namely: the performance of a commandment certainly ought to be, as the choicest way to fulfill a commandment, with cleaving and with the purest of pure thought according to one’s intellect and comprehension, in order that there be supernal praise, to effect repair in the worlds and the higher forces and orders—that is ‘for the sake of their Maker,’ for ‘the Lord made everything for His own sake.’ And our Rabbis of blessed memory said: for His praise. But concerning a person’s conduct at the time of Torah study in the laws of the commandments and their rules, he said ‘and speak of them,’ meaning that speech in matters of commandments and their laws should be ‘for their own sake,’ that is, for the sake of the words of Torah, namely to know, to understand, and to add insight and analysis.”
[Speaker D] Don’t you think that’s subjective? He’s a gifted person, he enjoys all this activity, the intellectual engagement, so that’s how he feels it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says that that’s the choicest way to fulfill a commandment.
[Speaker D] But lots of people don’t feel that thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what—the question is, the fact that we feel something, why is that an indication of what’s true? Either way. So what if he feels it? What difference does it make?
[Speaker D] He was on—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yeah, on intellectual ecstasy.
[Speaker D] Okay, and therefore what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying he was high, so that’s why he said it.
[Speaker D] Because he also happens to be a halakhic decisor or something, so he gets to determine it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you can say that about any halakhic decisor. About the Hasidim, you can say—
[Speaker D] That, you can say that about any halakhic decisor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every halakhic decisor, what he says is really just because he was high and that’s how he felt. There’s no end to that. He brings proofs.
[Speaker D] He brings proofs. And we brought proofs earlier. What is that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I bring—one has to discuss things on their merits. If I say—if I bring proofs, apparently I’m right. Maybe I said it while high, but I’m still right.
[Speaker D] But truly, are the Jewish people actually attaining this holiness?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s why he writes the book? Yes.
[Speaker D] The possibility of this form of attaining Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But most of the people can’t get there.
[Speaker D] Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To that perfection of Torah.
[Speaker B] Yes. I’m saying, why make it confrontational? It’s not something that has to be confrontational.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What can you do? The fact that we feel something, connect to something, have a tendency toward something—that’s not an explanation, it’s not an argument. You can say—I once had some panel in Gush where they invited me with two other Jews. We spoke there. So one of them said that a halakhic decisor has to be original, I think, or something like that—I don’t remember exactly, some statement of that kind. So I told him that I think a halakhic decisor does not need to be original, and also does not need not to be original. A halakhic decisor needs to say what he thinks. Whether he is original or not original—that’s the business of the scholar who studies the halakhic decisor. Meaning, the scholar of the halakhic decisor will say whether this decisor was original, conservative, innovative, whatever you want. The halakhic decisor should not strive to be original, and also should not strive to be conservative. The halakhic decisor should say what he thinks is correct. Now, that doesn’t mean the scholar isn’t right. It’s just that the scholar is looking at how the decisor works, and he can say: this is a very original decisor, and this is a very conservative decisor, and this is a very liberal decisor, and this is a modern decisor, and this one is—I don’t know—one who relies on precedents, and all kinds of descriptions of halakhic decisors. But all those descriptions are not relevant to the work of the halakhic decisor. Not because they’re untrue, but because the decisor is not operating on that plane. He studies the topic, reaches a conclusion, and has to say what he thinks. It may be that what caused him to think this way is his character and his tendencies—I agree. I’m not saying that isn’t true. I’m only saying that it’s not the relevant plane of discussion. It’s not the relevant plane of discussion because the halakhic decisor has arguments, and I need to discuss the arguments. I don’t care where the arguments came from. Even in scientific theory, in philosophy of science, they make a distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Meaning, there’s some scientist who came to a very interesting theory and he says he heard it from his grandmother who appeared to him in a dream. Does that disqualify the theory? Of course not. If the theory stands up to the empirical test, then it’s a good theory. And if not, then even without his grandmother it’s no good. Meaning, the question of where he got the theory from—that’s called the context of discovery. That doesn’t interest us. And not because it isn’t true. It is true—it came from his grandmother. But it doesn’t matter. As far as I’m concerned, the theory has to be tested according to the empirical evidence, according to what it says, to see that it’s consistent, that it stands up to factual testing. That’s what checks these things. Now, also with arguments—this is actually a big lesson regarding how we relate to the words of halakhic decisors. Maybe I’ll mention something else. I think I mentioned this when I was once at some conference of rabbis with jurists—I think I told this not long ago. A conference of rabbis and jurists, and there was a judge there, Judge Englard. He was a Supreme Court justice. And of course the rabbis were attacking the Supreme Court—saying they do whatever they want. And Englard kept saying he didn’t understand what they wanted from them. It’s all completely professional, there’s no influence of worldview. It has nothing to do with that at all. Meaning, it’s all purely professional. Yes, it seems we got a few examples lately about that issue. But that’s what he claimed. I kind of mocked it, everyone sort of laughed under their breath, we didn’t believe he himself believed it. But at a certain point I suddenly realized that he actually does believe it. He’s not saying it brazenly—he really thinks that way. He’s a positivist, this Englard; that’s how those people think. So then I said to myself that I suddenly understood what he meant. Meaning, also when looking, say, at rabbinic rulings, there too you can basically see why Rabbi So-and-so forbids and Rabbi So-and-so permits. Why he recommends this and the other recommends that. Because this one has this worldview and that one has that worldview. Even though he brings arguments. He brings sources, he brings medieval authorities, Talmudic passages, whatever—reasoning, concepts. But it’s clear to us where he’ll usually end up and where the other one will end up, because that’s their worldview. So from the outside, when looking at the rabbi’s work, it somehow seems that he’s basically doing whatever he wants. Yes, many times people accuse rabbis even more than they accuse the Supreme Court—that they basically do whatever they want. Their worldview dictates the bottom line, not the halakhic consideration. I think that’s not correct. I think that’s not correct—or not that it’s not correct, but it’s not correct to deal with things on that plane. Not that it isn’t true. It is true. But it’s not right to deal with things on that plane because there is a halakhic discourse. And when we talk about halakhic rulings, we need to discuss the halakhic discourse. And if he brought proofs, let’s see whether his proofs are good or not good. Why he chose specifically those proofs, or why he arrived at those proofs because he is Religious Zionist or because he is Haredi or because he is conservative or because he is original—that will be explained to us by the scholar who studies him.
[Speaker D] Or that he’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A gifted person, doesn’t matter. It’s all the same to me. All of that is irrelevant. It’s irrelevant not because it isn’t true—it may be true—but it’s irrelevant because I need to discuss his words in light of the proofs he brings. If those proofs are good, fine; and if not, then not. Why do I care why he got there? It’s like—making a thousand thousand distinctions, of course—that the Nazis say about Einstein that his physics is Jewish physics. It may be true that Einstein arrived at his physics out of some Jewish mentality, culture, Jewish way of thinking—these and those are the words of the living God, relativity, I don’t know, you can make all kinds of little homiletic plays on this—but it’s irrelevant. Not because it isn’t true, but because discuss the theory of relativity: does it work or not? Why do you care why he got there, or how he got there? As far as I’m concerned, it doesn’t matter. That’s the context of discovery. I’m talking about the context of justification. Fine. So I’m not saying it isn’t true that a person’s tendencies affect, of course, what he thinks—but still, the correct plane on which to discuss it is the substantive plane. I want to see what his proofs are. Does it work, does it not work, and to see whether it—
[Speaker F] He’ll always bring proofs in line with his own position.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so you bring the opposite proofs and let’s see. It may be that you really will bring opposite proofs that he missed because of his tendency, and then you’ll understand that he isn’t right and you’ll formulate a different position for yourself. That’s fine. But you’ll do it not because he has some kind of line, but because you have counter-evidence. Perfectly fine. The relevant plane for halakhic discussion—or even intellectual discussion, in my view—is the plane of evidence. Not the plane of descending into the psyche of the speaker. It shouldn’t be about the person saying it but about the things themselves. And again, not because the person’s personality doesn’t affect what he says—of course it affects it—but I don’t think that’s the right plane on which to discuss these things. And then he devotes several chapters to this matter, that it’s obvious that fear of Heaven is also needed in order to learn, but that’s only a means in order to learn—not that learning is a means to that. And then he says, chapter 6: “Therefore the truth is that this is the true path which He, blessed be His name, has chosen: that whenever a person prepares himself to learn, it is fitting for him to settle himself before he begins, at least for a short time, in pure fear of God, with purity of heart, to confess his sin from the depths of his heart, so that his Torah may be holy and pure, and he should intend to cleave, in his learning of Torah, to Him, to the Holy One, blessed be He—that is, to attach all his powers to the word of God, namely Jewish law. And thereby he is truly attached to Him, blessed be He, as it were, for He, blessed be He, and His will are one.” And this is the way to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, since He and His will are one. So because He and His will are one thing, our way of cleaving to Him is basically to cleave to His will. What is His will? Those are the laws. In Jewish law it says what His will is. And therefore he says, as it is written in the Zohar, “Every judgment and law from the holy Torah is His will, blessed be He, for thus did His will decree that the law be such—whether invalid or valid, impure or pure, forbidden or permitted, liable or exempt.” And even if he is occupied with aggadic matters in which there is no practical relevance to any law, he is still attached to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, because the entire Torah, in its generalities and particulars and fine points—even what a young student asks his teacher—all came from His mouth, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai. It seems to me that I once brought this Nefesh HaChaim and noted carefully here—that in aggadic matters, what does it mean “even if he is occupied with aggadic matters in which there is no practical relevance to any law”? There’s some initial assumption here. He says: to study Jewish law—Jewish law is God’s will. When I study Jewish law I’m attached to Him because He and His will are one, right? When I study Jewish law, I’m attached to Him. What if I study aggadah? After all, aggadah is not God’s will. There are no practical instructions there about what He wants from me. So basically aggadah has no value—it’s not Torah study. Right? That’s basically the Lithuanian view, right? But he says no—even aggadah has some value. It’s not God’s will, it’s God’s word. It’s His speech. He and His will are one, and He and His speech are one. He said it. “Everything that an accomplished student will one day innovate was shown by the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai.” He said it in order to give it the authority of words of Torah. But of course words of Torah on a lower level. Meaning, the main thing is Jewish law, and aggadot are also words of Torah after the fact. Yes, like Nega’im and Ohalot and Psalms. And surprisingly, in the Tanya—which is of course the other side of the divide—it says exactly the same thing. Chapter 4, and it’s worth reading. I’ll just read a few key sentences. “And every divine soul has three garments: thought, speech, and action, of the 613 commandments of the Torah. When a person fulfills in action all the practical commandments, and in speech engages in the explanation of all the 613 commandments and their laws, and in thought grasps all that he can grasp in the Pardes of Torah, then all the 613 organs of his soul are clothed in the 613 commandments of the Torah, and specifically the intellectual faculties of his soul are clothed in the grasp of Torah”—yes, the head is clothed in the grasp of Torah—“which he grasps in the Pardes according to the capacity of his understanding and the root of his soul above. The traits, which are fear and love and their branches and derivatives, are clothed in fulfillment of the commandments in action and in speech, which is Torah study that is equivalent to them all.” That’s the speech. “For behold…” and so on, he goes on to love and fear. So he says that because truly the Holy One, blessed be He, is called Infinite, and “His greatness is beyond searching out,” and “no thought can grasp Him at all,” it’s impossible to grasp Him, impossible to cleave to Him, as Nefesh HaChaim said, “and likewise with His will and wisdom,” as it is written: “His understanding is beyond searching out,” and it is written: “Can you discover God by searching?” and it is written: “For My thoughts are not your thoughts.” Therefore on this they said: “In the place where you find the greatness of the Holy One, blessed be He, there you find His humility.” And the Holy One, blessed be He, condensed His will and wisdom into the 613 commandments of the Torah and their laws and into the combinations of the letters of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), and so on, so that every soul or spirit and life-force in the body of a person could grasp them with his mind and fulfill them as much as possible, and fulfill them in thought, speech, and action. And through this all ten of his faculties become clothed in these three garments. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, clothed His will in the words of Torah, in the laws, and then when we study it, think about it, and fulfill it, we cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, in thought, speech, and action. And basically what he’s saying is that learning is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He—exactly what his opponent on the other side, Nefesh HaChaim, says. By the way, these books are very similar to each other. It’s interesting, because they were written one against the other, yet they say almost the same thing. “And therefore Torah is compared to water”—no, it’s a very interesting phenomenon—they really write almost the same thing. The differences are tiny nuances that basically make all the… “And therefore Torah is compared to water: just as water descends from a high place to a low place, so Torah descended from the place of its glory, which is His will and wisdom, blessed be He, and ‘the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are entirely one,’ and no thought can grasp Him at all. And from there it traveled and descended through the hidden stages, from level to level, in the chainlike progression of the worlds, until it became clothed in physical things and matters of this world, which are most of the commandments of the Torah, almost all of them.” Yes, and so on—the ox that gored the cow, pits, indirect damages, thieves, and so on. And now he says—yes—“And there is no difference. Even though the Torah became clothed in lower physical things, this is like embracing the king.” Yes, I am attached to the king even if I embrace him through his garments, not only if I touch him directly. “By way of analogy, there is no difference in the degree of closeness and attachment to the king between embracing him when he is wearing one garment and when he is wearing many garments, since the king’s body is within them. And likewise if the king embraces him with his arm even though it is clothed within his garments,” as it is written: “His right hand embraces me,” which is the Torah given from the right side, which is the quality of kindness and water, and so on. And later in chapter 5 he writes: “And to explain well the expression ‘grasp’ that Elijah used, ‘No thought can grasp You’—behold, every intellect, when it understands and grasps with its intellect some concept, the intellect grasps the concept and surrounds it with its intellect. The concept is grasped and surrounded and clothed within the intellect that understood and comprehended it, and the intellect too is clothed in the concept at the time that it grasps and comprehends it with its intellect. By way of example, when a person understands and grasps some law in the Mishnah or in the Talmud properly and clearly, his intellect grasps and surrounds it, and his intellect too is clothed in it at that time. And this law is the wisdom and will of the Holy One, blessed be He”—exactly Nefesh HaChaim, almost in the same words—“for it arose in His will that when Reuven argues such-and-such, by way of example, and Shimon such-and-such, the ruling between them will be such-and-such.” This is a piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He—yes—that when this one comes like this and argues like this and that one argues like that, then the law is like this. “And this…” and also, “Even if this thing never was and never will be”—you see this with the stubborn and rebellious son—“even if this thing never was and never will be, that doesn’t matter at all. That’s not what gives the learning its value. What gives the learning its value is not the ability afterward to do what I learned, but that when I study this thing, some piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is in fact cleaving within me. That is the meaning of learning.” And therefore the goal of learning is not to know what to do, but the principles that find expression within the practical details. And so he continues in the same vein. So there is agreement here from both sides of the divide—the Hasidic side and the Mitnagdic side—on this point, that Torah study does not mean learning in order to know what to do. On the other hand, though, it says: “Study is great because it leads to action,” “to learn in order to do, to observe and fulfill”—so how are we to understand all those things? I’ll end just with this because today I have to run a bit. The Talmud in Kiddushin says: “Rabbi Tarfon and the elders were once reclining in the upper chamber of the house of Nitzeh in Lod, and this question was asked before them: Is study greater or is action greater? Rabbi Tarfon answered and said: action is greater. Rabbi Akiva answered and said: study is greater. They all answered and said: study is greater because study leads to action.” It was taught: Rabbi Yose says: study is great, for it preceded the commandment of challah by forty years—as the Talmud goes on there. What is the meaning of this matter? It’s a strange thing: “Study is great because it leads to action”? If study is a means to action, then action is greater, not study. Study is a means in order that we know what to do, so why is this a proof that study is greater? It seems to me that this should be read differently. What is great is study that leads to action. The question from the outset was this: we have study and we have action, and the question is which is greater. But that distinction is a distinction that doesn’t exist. There is a mistake in the question. There aren’t two things, study and action. There is study that leads to action. That whole chain—that is what is great. And what’s the idea here? Of course it also leads to action—you do need to act. And from the standpoint of study, this defines for us what “great study” is. Great study is study that ends in a practical conclusion. You begin from abstractions, from theories, from analytic learning, but in the end you arrive at the practical conclusion—that is called great study. The practical conclusion is not in order to know what to do. It is a criterion for how to study. And when I say “to learn in order to fulfill,” it’s not that the learning is the means and the fulfillment is the goal, because if so, then why is study greater? Rather, it defines the form of the learning. The form of the learning needs to be such that when you finish learning, in the end there will be a bottom line: what should be done? And with that you’ve completed the learning. And that already hints at what I said I’d get to later—why it’s forbidden to study the Shulchan Arukh as halakhic learning. Meaning, because you need to study in order to arrive at the bottom line, not study the bottom line itself. But I’ll talk about that later. I really have to run, so forgive me that I’m a bit—