Ketubot Chapter 2 Lesson 29

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. We’re starting. We had some kind of break. Last time we began this topic of combining a witness and a judge. We saw Rashi’s explanation, and today we’ll continue a bit with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who deal with Rashi and disagree with Rashi. But maybe before that I should really mention Menachem Kauzal, who passed away—truly a precious man, and he contributed greatly to the kollel and everything that happens in it. He also organized the matter of the pensioners, also all kinds of events that he organized with the film archive and all the other things that he maintained. Truly a man of many talents. Alas for those who are gone. Really a precious man. So may these words be for the elevation of his soul. So let’s return to the topic. We saw the Talmudic text bringing Amoraic opinions that a witness and a judge combine, and then later the Amoraic opinions of Rav Ashi and Rava, who disagree with those views and say that a witness and a judge do not combine, because what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to—what the witness testifies to, the judge does not testify to. What case are we talking about? So Rashi explains that we’re dealing with a situation where a document comes before us, a loan document, with two signed witnesses, and below it there is a validation certificate, an approval or validation, which is basically the court’s certification that the court says, “This document was brought before us, it was validated before us, and on that we sign.” And now the lender takes this document with him and is relaxed; he has court certification that this document is authentic, meaning that the witnesses’ signatures are authentic. It turns out he can’t be quite so relaxed, because the fact is that one can challenge it and claim that the document is forged despite the fact that there is a validation certificate on it. Even when there is a validation certificate on the document, we can claim against it that it is forged, and basically we say to the lender, “You forged both the loan document and the validation certificate. This whole story is altogether just your forgery.” That itself is a question the medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss here, and maybe we’ll touch on it later in future lectures: so what is the point of making a validation certificate at all? Once one can also claim that this too is forged, then it has no point. So we’ll still talk about that. In any event, for our purposes, the fact is that one can—at least according to Rashi and those who follow him—the fact is that one can. One can challenge it as forged. So what happens now? The Talmudic text says that if one validates the signature—that is, a witness comes and validates his own signature, he says, “I was signed on this document, I’m one of the witnesses signed on this document”—and a judge comes who validates his own signature on the validation certificate, then according to Rav Yehuda and those with him they combine and the document is considered validated. And Rav Ashi and Rava argue that no, they do not combine, because they are testifying to different things. I spoke a bit about the meaning of this; Rashi himself writes this, that this topic is basically connected to the previous topic. In the previous topic we saw the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis, and they deal with the question of what happens when a witness comes and validates his own signature on a document. Not two other witnesses—it’s he himself, the signed witness. According to Rabbi, this has no significance at all; that means the witness who testifies about his own signature is like any other witness, and therefore he must bring another witness with him so that there will be two witnesses validating the signature. According to the Rabbis, a witness who testifies about his own signature testifies to the sum written in the document. That’s a novelty. Meaning, he comes and testifies, “I recognize this signature,” and he doesn’t fully remember the loan—we discussed that a bit. Even so, from our standpoint that is considered testimony about the loan. That’s what the Rabbis say. Why? Because if I myself am the witness, then I basically have the power to activate my own signature, so to speak, out of the document, to place here a witness who is now testifying to what the signature testifies to. What does the signature testify to? That there was a loan. So I too, who testify, even though all I am actually saying verbally is, “I recognize this signature, this is my signature,” I am not testifying about the loan, and I also don’t remember it—at least not fully; we discussed that there are various views on this—but certainly not fully, I cannot testify to the loan. But if I testify about my own signature, that is considered halakhically / of Jewish law as testimony about the loan itself. That is the claim of the Rabbis. Meaning, we make some sort of jump here: the witness who comes to validate the signature is considered by us as testifying to what the signature itself testifies to—not that he testifies about the signature and the signature testifies about the sum, but he himself is considered as someone who… Why is this important? Because in a place where only one of the two witnesses comes and validates his signature, and the second witness, say, died, and another witness comes to validate the second witness’s signature, they cannot combine. Why can’t they combine? Because I am testifying to the sum written in the document, but he—he is not the signed witness, he is another witness. Now, another witness needs two people to validate the signature. And if he is only one witness, then the second signature is not validated, so that does not help. What if I myself join with the other witness? That also does not help, says the Talmudic text, because three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one mouth. Meaning, basically if I join with the second witness, it turns out that half the testimony—when my signature is based only on me, and in the other half too, half of it is based on me—meaning, it comes out that three-quarters of the force to extract the sum is based on me, and that doesn’t work. You need two witnesses, each of whom contributes at most half the force. Okay? Not more than half the force. And therefore even in a situation where I join with the second witness and together we validate the deceased witness’s signature, it will not help. That is the Rabbis’ claim. Back to our case. What happens here? One of the witnesses signed on the document comes and validates his own signature. A judge from those signed on the validation certificate validates his own signature. Okay? How can we understand the Amoraim who say this works? How can it work? What’s the connection? We don’t have two witnesses here to anything. The judge is not testifying to the sum; the witness is testifying to the sum and the judge is not testifying to the sum. That is exactly what Rav Ashi and Rava argue; therefore it does not combine. But how are we to understand Rav Yehuda and the group of Amoraim with him, who say yes? It’s quite reasonable—and we’ll examine this today—but it’s quite reasonable that this is connected to the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis in the previous topic, even though it’s not brought there in that context; it’s brought as an independent statement. But Rashi himself inserts it, and according to Rashi’s explanation it’s very reasonable. Why? Because basically what lies behind what Rav Yehuda says is that the judge testifies to his own signature. And according to the Rabbis as against Rabbi—and we rule Jewish law like the Rabbis—according to the Rabbis as against Rabbi, that is considered like testimony about what the signature itself testifies to. Right? Just as with a witness: when the witness validates his own signature, it is considered not that he testifies about the signature, but that he testifies to the sum written in the document. Meaning, he testifies to what the signature testified to, right? So let’s take the judge and make the same calculation. The judge testifies to his signature on the validation certificate, and once it is he himself, not an outside witness but he himself, then the Rabbis tell us this is as though he is testifying to the content of the signature. And what does the signature testify to? The signature testifies that the document is validated. So basically we have another witness that the document is validated, and therefore it combines. Okay? Except that it’s not so simple even then. Because even if we have another witness to the validation of the signature, still, one witness on the validation of the second signature and the witness himself testifying to his own signature do not combine. There is no choice except to say that we take one more step. After the judge validates his own signature and that is considered as though he testified to the validation of the document, now that too is considered as though he testifies to the sum written in the document. Meaning, we make the two steps according to the Rabbis as against Rabbi, even though the judge is not the signed witness. Right? The judge is not the signed witness. So that’s a privilege reserved for the signed witness. Only the signed witness, when he testifies to his own signature, is it considered testimony to the sum written in the document. If some other witness comes and validates the signature, that is not testimony to the sum written in the document, right? Here, according to Rav Yehuda at least, and those with him, it seems—I don’t think there is another choice—there is no choice but to say that they take the Rabbis’ position even further. They basically say: the judge testifies to his own signature. That itself is considered testimony to the validation. The testimony to the validation is considered testimony to the sum written in the document. And then we have two witnesses to the sum written in the document: the witness who validated his own signature, and the judge, after these two steps, who validated his own signature. And then we discussed why the other Amoraim disagree with this, yes, Rav Ashi and Rava, and that is also how we rule in practice, because there is a very… there are basically two problems here. Even if what I have described until now is correct—and it’s not fully correct—even if what I’ve described until now is correct, it’s still difficult for me: I can understand that the judge who validates his own signature is considered a witness to the validation, but how does he then become a witness to the sum written in the document? After all, at most he should be considered another witness testifying to the validation of the signatures of the witnesses on the document. He is not a witness of the document, right? How does it happen that he testifies to the sum written in the document? To combine, he has to testify to the sum. According to Rav Yehuda we make both steps. That’s very strange. That’s one of the problems that can explain Rav Ashi and Rava—why they don’t accept Rav Yehuda’s position. Why would we continue that far? Rav Yehuda himself might say that the judge has a special privilege, since the judge was part of the panel before whom the signatures were validated, the document was validated. It could be that we view him as though the witness of the document himself came and validated his own signature, because he is essentially testifying that the signature was validated. And therefore Rav Yehuda wants to claim that here too we take the second step, to the sum written in the document. That could be. But that is one problem. There is another problem here, and a harder one.

[Speaker B] In practice, basically Rabbi, it’s like today when a lawyer certifies that I identified the above-mentioned person and he signed in front of me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Today what happens is—right—today, legally, a lawyer’s certification by itself is perfectly fine; in law there is no need for two witnesses. In Jewish law the rule is that two witnesses are needed, and here the judge is only one. That’s the question: how does this work? So I said: if we make all the steps and get all the way to the sum written in the document, then there’s no problem, because regarding the sum written in the document he combines with the witness, so we have two witnesses to the sum written in the document and everything is fine. The only question is what justifies taking those two steps. The first step I understand: I validate my signature, that is considered as though I testify to what the signature testifies to. But what does the signature testify to? It testifies to the validation of the document. Very good—but how did we move to testimony about the sum written in the document and not about the validation? Because one witness who validates the second signature and one witness who validates his own signature do not combine. So that’s one problem. Here I said it could be that Rav Yehuda and his camp hold that a judge has a special status; it’s not like just any other witness who testifies to the second witness’s signature, where it certainly does not combine. But a judge has a special privilege; he is basically saying, listen, this document was validated before me. Therefore it’s considered like the witness himself testifying to the sum written in the document. It could be. But there’s another problem here. In fact, the picture I described is not accurate, or not complete. Really there are three steps here, not two. From the judge’s testimony about his signature on the validation certificate to the sum written in the document, it’s not two steps, it’s three. Why? What does the validation certificate testify to? The validation certificate does not testify that the document is validated. The validation certificate testifies that there was a legal act: two witnesses came before us who validated the document. The judge himself does not recognize the signatures. Right? All he can say is: witnesses came before me; there was a court proceeding in which we confirmed the validity of the document, the authenticity of the document. So notice, there are three steps here from validation of the judge’s signature to the sum written in the document. Stage one: we assume that the judge testifies to his signature. That’s just the fact; we don’t have to assume it—that’s what he is doing. Step one is to apply the Rabbis’ position against Rabbi and say: if he testifies to his own signature, that is considered like testimony about what the signature itself says. What does the signature itself say? Not that the document is validated. The signature says that there was a court act of validating the signatures. I can’t tell you that the document is validated; I can testify to a court event in which it was determined that the document was validated. Right? That is basically what I am saying. That’s step one. Step two says: if there was a court act in which the document was validated, then now I also claim the document is validated. I move from the act of validation, from the legal act, to the conclusion that the document itself is validated. That is step two. Step three: after the document is validated, I also determine that there was a loan. I’ve added another step in the middle, and that’s an important point. Why is it an important point? Because how many witnesses do we have that there was an act of validation? One. Right? Only the judge himself. He validates his signature, and if we take the Rabbis’ position against Rabbi then from our standpoint that is considered testimony about the act of validation, right? That there was a legal act of validation in some previous court. But one witness is not enough to bring something to our knowledge. So the present court, the one sitting now and hearing this judge and this witness, cannot write in its ruling: “We are convinced that a court session took place a month ago in which the document was validated.” They cannot write such a thing, because they have only one witness to that. So this stops here. If we could write that, then from our standpoint the document is also validated and one could continue, and that too would be testimony to the sum written in the document. But we can’t even reach the stage that the document is validated. All we know is that we have one witness about the act of validating the document, but we can’t even accept that because it is only one witness. If there were—if there were two witnesses to the act of validation, then we would know there was an act of validation, we would know the document is validated, and we would use the document; there would be no problem. Once it is only one witness, then it’s not even one—it’s zero. Why? Because one witness is one witness on the act of validation, but how many witnesses do we have on the validation itself? Zero. If we were convinced there had been an act of validation, that would tell us that the document is validated too, right? But we aren’t even convinced there was an act of validation, so as far as our knowledge of the validation itself is concerned—zero. After all, the judge himself can’t testify to the validation; he doesn’t remember it. He only testifies to his own signature; he recognizes his own signature, he says this is my signature. Right? That is what he says. And he does not constitute a witness to the validation itself. He cannot tell me, listen, I know this document is validated. He can tell me: I recognize my signature on the validation certificate. That’s all he says.

[Speaker B] Isn’t that a bit like closing your eyes? Because once the judge testifies that this is his signature, he testifies that this act happened, so basically…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, because we have one witness that there was an act of validation, but if we have not accepted that as a conclusion—that there was an act of validation—you can’t write in the protocol of the current court, “We are convinced there was an act of validation,” right? Because we have only one witness to that. Once we are not even—wait—once we are not even convinced there was an act of validation, then we have zero witnesses to the validation. Because we have one witness to…

[Speaker B] What point am I missing here? When the judge testifies, he testifies that the two signatures were before him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he testifies that his signature is his signature, that’s all, on the validation certificate.

[Speaker B] He doesn’t remember the validation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t remember the validation.

[Speaker B] What? But if he signed then, then what did he sign? After the two witnesses signed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no idea, I don’t know. I don’t know what he signed; maybe it’s forged. I don’t know what he signed.

[Speaker B] It seems to me a bit…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me give you another example. A document comes, okay? And we validated one of the signatures on the document. Sorry—one witness comes and validates both signatures on the document. Okay? Does the borrower become liable to an oath? There is one witness against him, right? I think the answer is no.

[Speaker B] I was on mute—yes, I agree with you, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the answer is no. Why no? Because we do not have one witness to the loan. We have one witness that the document is validated, but one witness is not enough to establish that the document is validated. So from the standpoint of the court now, I ask you: how many witnesses are there to the loan? Zero. A round zero. Not one—zero. Because the validating witness knows nothing about the loan; the witness only tells you these two signatures are authentic signatures. Fine—but that is only one witness. So we as a court cannot even determine that the signatures are authentic, right? Once we don’t even have the ability to determine that the signatures are authentic—even one of them—then how many witnesses do we have to the loan? Zero. Right? Now my claim is that it’s the same here. We have one judge who comes and says, according to his claim, that there was an act of validation that he was part of. Yes, he sat on the panel, okay? But he is only one witness to that. So now the present court that hears him—he is currently appearing as a witness before the present court. The present court that hears him asks itself: what can I write in the protocol as a ruling? Can I write, “I am convinced that there was an act of validation”? Of course not, right? Because it has only one witness to that.

[Speaker C] The moment…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it cannot write at all that there was an act of validation, then it doesn’t even have one witness to the validation. The judge is not a validating witness; the judge is a witness that there was an act of validation, but we were not even convinced of the existence of the act of validation. So the testimony about the validation is zero—we have no validating witnesses at all. Okay? And therefore Rav Ashi and Rava say Rav Yehuda is not plausible. Do you understand? Even if the dualistic picture with which I began the lecture were correct, I could maybe understand Rav Yehuda, and Rav Ashi and Rava would disagree because a judge is something special—fine. But according to what I’m saying now, this doesn’t even get off the ground. Rav Yehuda can’t be understood at all. What does Rav Yehuda even want? How can one possibly accept such a combination of judge and witness? We have zero witnesses to the second signature. Not one—zero. We have one witness who testifies to his own signature, and regarding the second signature we have zero witnesses. So how can they say that they combine? What is combining here? Okay? That is basically the problem with which, I think, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) are dealing—at least that’s how it seems to me. Let me now share the sources so we can read them inside. Let’s see what is said about this. Most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) follow Rashi here: the Ritva, Nachmanides, Tosafot, but each in a slightly different formulation. After that we’ll also see other approaches among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). So the Ritva says as follows; I marked it here. He says: Rami bar Hama said, “How excellent is this teaching!” Rava said to him, “And what is its excellence? What the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to.” Rashi explained: the witness testifies to the sum written in the document according to the Rabbis, and the judge testifies to his handwriting. That is Rashi’s explanation of Rava’s rejection. Why does Rava not accept the combination of the witness and the judge? Because the judge testifies to the signature of his hand, to his handwriting, while the witness testifies to the sum written in the document. By the way, “his handwriting”—that is a very interesting question: whose handwriting is meant? Does the judge testify to the judge’s handwriting, his own? Or does he testify to “his handwriting,” meaning the second witness on the document—just not to the sum written in the document? Because if we apply the Rabbis’ position…

[Speaker D] From the continuation of his words you can see that it’s about the witness. If we read another two lines we’ll see that it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About the witness’s handwriting. One moment—I’m making this introduction before I read the next lines, in order to sharpen the point. So I’m saying: here one could have said it in two ways, right? Simply speaking, it means the handwriting of the judge. The judge testifies to his handwriting, his own hand. But as we saw, that is not likely. Why? Because after all, we are going here according to the Rabbis’ position against Rabbi, right? That is how we rule in practice, and there’s no reason to assume that this topic follows a view that is not the practical Jewish law. So if we rule in practice like the Rabbis against Rabbi, then one must also apply the Rabbis’ principle against Rabbi to the judge. So if the judge testifies to his own signature, then that too is not merely his own signature but testimony about what his signature testifies to. And what does it testify to? To the handwriting of the witnesses. Only that this testifies to the handwriting of the witnesses and not to the sum written in the document. Therefore I think that “his handwriting” here is the handwriting of the witness, not the handwriting of the judge. Because the term “his handwriting” comes to exclude the sum written in the document, in the terminology of the previous topic. If this had been written detached from the previous topic, then “his handwriting” would straightforwardly mean the judge’s handwriting, because he is the subject of the sentence here. But we already know these are concepts that accompany us from the previous topic. We understand that “his handwriting” is the antithesis of “the sum written in the document.” So the meaning is: “his handwriting” is the handwriting of the second witness. And then what do we get? We have one witness—that is, the judge—on the handwriting of the deceased witness, right? And we have one witness—that is, the living witness—who testifies to his own handwriting, and we know from the previous topic that this does not combine. That is basically the simple understanding. And Tosafot objected: but even without that, there is not enough validation here, for regarding the second witness there is no one to testify to his handwriting except the judge, and we require two. Tosafot says—it’s not our Tosafot, but Tosafot that the Ritva cites—the problem that the Talmudic text brings as the reasoning of Rav Ashi and Rava, namely that the witness and the judge cannot combine because they are not testifying to the same thing—to that Tosafot asks: that is not the problem here at all. It’s not a problem of combination. The problem is that regarding the second signature we have only one witness. That’s all. What does this have to do with combination? We aren’t talking about combination at all. The second signature simply isn’t validated. We have only one witness on it. So why did Rav Ashi and Rava need this reasoning, that what the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to? That’s not the problem. The problem is that the judge is only one witness—even if we accept him, and even if we apply the Rabbis’ position against Rabbi and accept that when he validates his signature on the validation certificate, it is as though he testifies to the witness’s signature, to his handwriting, as I pointed out earlier—the handwriting of the witness, not of the judge—even then it is still only one witness to the handwriting of the second witness. So the problem is not the combination of the judge with the first witness. The problem is that with respect to the second witness’s signature, I simply don’t have two validating witnesses. It is simply not a validated signature. This is not an issue of combination at all. So that is somewhat difficult. Now, it’s not so terrible, because it could be that this itself is what Rav Ashi and Rava are saying. Since we have only one witness to the sum written in the document and one witness to the signature, they do not combine to make two witnesses. Each one of them is one witness, and they don’t do the job. Not so terrible. But it is true that stylistically I would have expected the Talmudic text to say: we have no validation of the second signature. Leave all these combinations aside—what does that have to do with anything? So the Ritva continues and says, or in the name of Tosafot: there is no one to testify to his handwriting except the judge, and we require two. And if, when the witness testifies, he also testifies to his fellow’s handwriting, then maybe we would say that the witness who validates his own signature also validates the second witness’s signature, and the judge validates his signature on the validation certificate and… joins him regarding the second signature. Even though Rashi of blessed memory did not explain it that way—Rashi of blessed memory did not explain it that way—this is what one would call the principle of charity in interpretation: when you encounter someone, you present his position in the strongest, most grounded form possible, even though he himself did not do so. Okay? So Rashi did not explain it this way, but perhaps one can explain Rashi’s view this way, and that would save him. Because now what do we have? We now have two witnesses to the second signature, right? One witness is the judge, and the second witness is the witness who validated his own signature, who also validates the second witness’s signature. So we have two witnesses and everything is fine. And then what’s the problem? So the second signature is validated, but the sum is not extracted. Why not? Three-quarters and one-quarter. Exactly—because three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one mouth. Because I, the living witness, validated my signature and that is half regarding the sum written in the document, and beyond that I also have half in the validation of the second signature—that is what the Talmudic text in the previous topic said. So three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one witness’s mouth. Okay? So that is what he says. Even though Rashi of blessed memory did not explain it that way, we still require two other witnesses. It still won’t help, says Tosafot, because two other witnesses are required on the second signature; it is not enough that he testify. For if not, then three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one witness’s mouth, as is stated clearly above, where we said that two outside witnesses are needed to testify concerning him. Okay? And then what basically emerges? So where are we now? Do we understand Rashi or not? Seemingly yes. Everything is fine, no? After all, now we understand: we’re talking about a case where the living witness validates both signatures. And the judge validates his signature on the validation certificate, okay? Now the judge is considered like one witness on the second signature—really he’s one witness on both signatures, but that doesn’t matter—on the second signature, okay? So what do we have here? So now we understand why Rav Yehuda basically says everything is fine, because we have one witness who validates his own signature and two witnesses on the second signature. And what do Rav Ashi and Rava disagree about? Oh, this can’t be, because three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one mouth. We know that if there is one witness on the second signature and I join with him, that won’t help to extract the money. That is Rav Ashi and Rava’s rejection. So Rav Yehuda is still problematic, but in any case he is problematic.

[Speaker D] But they don’t say that!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rava—

[Speaker D] He doesn’t say that, Rava says something else! Right, it doesn’t fit Rava’s words.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Therefore, in the end, what is written here in Tosafot is an objection to Rashi; it’s not an answer. Tosafot says: even if we explain not like Rashi, that indeed the living witness also validates the second signature, there is still a problem, because the reasoning should still have been that three-quarters of the monetary force comes out through one mouth, not because this one is not testifying to what that one is testifying to. Where will this have a practical implication? I’ll give you an example that we’ll see later in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). What happens if I—leave this whole case aside for a moment—I have two signatures on a document, Reuven and Shimon, two witnesses signed on the document. Reuven testifies to his own signature, and concerning Shimon’s signature two other witnesses come. Other ones. Does that help or not? It helps.

[Speaker B] Why shouldn’t it help?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it helps. Why should it help? After all, what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. Reuven testifies to the sum written in the document, and these two witnesses testify to the handwriting of the second witness.

[Speaker B] But you have witnesses on both signatures, so that means it is validated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m not validating my own signature, because I’m only one witness; I’m testifying to the monetary claim written in the document. Okay. So it’s as if: what this witness testifies to is not what that witness testifies to, okay? The same reasoning we have here in the passage. But there in the Talmud it says that it does help. If they bring two other witnesses, then there’s no “three-quarters of the monetary force coming from one mouth,” and therefore there’s no problem; it works. Why does it work? There’s no joining together here. It works because those two other witnesses revive the dead witness, and now from our standpoint we have a witness to the monetary claim in the document. Not them—they’re only validating the signature—but if I have two witnesses who validated the signature and the court is convinced that the signature is authentic, then from our standpoint the signed witness is standing here and speaking before us and testifying to the monetary claim in the document. And in that way he joins with the living witness, who is also testifying to the monetary claim in the document, and therefore it works. Okay?

That is, about something like this we won’t say: why, what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. There’s no problem of joining together here, right? And when there aren’t two witnesses on the second signature, when there’s only one, there too the problem is not a problem of joining together; the problem is that three-quarters of the monetary force comes out on the basis of one witness. So where do we ever find a joining problem at all? Why in our passage, with the witness and the judge, do Rava and Rav Ashi hang it on the claim that this is a joining problem? It’s not a joining problem. If the living witness testifies about the second signature, it’s a problem of “three-quarters of the monetary force.” If he doesn’t testify about the second signature, then I simply have only one witness for the second signature and it hasn’t been validated. In any case, the problem here is not a joining problem.

More than that: there is no joining problem. There is no such thing as a joining problem here, because the proof is that if I have two witnesses on the second signature, even though they testify about the handwriting of the dead witness, and the first witness who testifies about his own signature testifies about the monetary claim in the document, we have no problem—it joins together. Why? This one testifies about the monetary claim in the document and they testify about his handwriting. You see there is no joining problem. It’s actually a contradiction between the two passages. In short, this whole business is complicated.

So Tosafot explain this. I’m continuing to read: that is, our question of “what this one testifies to,” etc.—here Shmuel said that the witness who testifies about his own handwriting and about the handwriting of his fellow witness, and the judge who also validates the writing of the two witnesses, join together, and there are also two witnesses on each and every handwriting of the witnesses. And Rava asks that this cannot be, because what the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to: the witness testifies to the monetary claim in the document, and the judge testifies to the handwriting. And the witness does not need his own handwriting except through the judge, while the judge needs him regarding the second handwriting, and thus three-quarters of the monetary force comes out on the basis of one witness.

So Tosafot say this: really we are talking here—let’s say Rashi didn’t write this, but we say it within Rashi’s view with one additional point—really we’re talking about a case where the witness testifies about both signatures. Okay? And the judge also testifies about both signatures. Therefore, in fact, we have two validating witnesses on each of the signatures, and so Rav Yehuda says there is no problem at all: we have two witnesses on each signature, and therefore they join together, everything is fine.

And against that, Rava and Rav Ashi argue as follows: what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. Right? The judge testifies as a judge, and you yourself, when they validate the signature of the dead witness, are validating his handwriting, right? And you yourself testify to the monetary claim in the document. So it doesn’t join together. What will you tell me? You’ll say that you and the judge together revive the dead witness, and then he himself testifies to the monetary claim in the document and joins with me, and then we really are testifying about the same thing, all of us are testifying to the monetary claim in the document. But, he says, that’s not true, because there is here a problem that three-quarters of the monetary force comes out on the basis of one witness.

In short, he says what he said in the question, with one small addition. What’s the addition? You begin with the fact that they don’t join together at all. Meaning: if there is testimony on the second signature—two witnesses on the second signature—let me return to the example I gave earlier. Suppose there is just an ordinary document here; forget the validation clause and the judge and everything. There is just an ordinary document, Reuven and Shimon signed it. Reuven testifies to his own signature. For Shimon’s signature—Shimon has died—two other witnesses come, Levi and Yehuda. Levi and Yehuda clearly testify about Shimon’s handwriting, right? Not about the monetary claim in the document. Reuven testifies to the monetary claim in the document. So on the face of it there is a joining problem here, because they testify about Shimon’s handwriting and Reuven testifies about the monetary claim in the document. He cannot validate his own signature, right? He cannot validate his own signature because he is only one witness. He testifies to the monetary claim in the document, and therefore they cannot join. So why did the Talmud earlier say that they do join together? Because Levi and Yehuda bring Shimon back to life, and now Shimon is considered a witness to the monetary claim in the document. If so, Reuven and Shimon, the two signed witnesses, are two witnesses to the monetary claim in the document, okay? And therefore it works there.

But really there too it begins with the problem that what these testify to is not what that one testifies to, and therefore I have to continue and say: true, you are right, what we are testifying to is only Shimon’s signature, but once we have two witnesses, Shimon comes back to life, and now Shimon testifies to the monetary claim in the document, okay? So all this is when we have a document with two witnesses. But in our case that’s not the story. Here, after all, one of them is the judge and one is the witness, the living witness, right? So who do we have for the second signature? If there were no joining problem, okay, then we would say that I and the judge validate the signature of the second witness, and automatically the second witness comes back to life… right? And now he testifies to the monetary claim in the document together with me, and there are two witnesses to the monetary claim in the document. Except that then there is a problem that three-quarters of the monetary force comes out on the basis of one witness, because half of the one who revived him was me. So I am also one witness, and I am also half of the second witness. Okay.

Therefore at the beginning we say that it doesn’t join together. What will you tell me? You want to solve the problem of lack of joining by saying that we’ll join on the monetary claim in the document? But regarding the monetary claim in the document, I am three-quarters. You can’t do such a thing. If we weren’t doing this on the monetary claim in the document, then one could talk about joining. Because I and the second witness are half-and-half concerning Shimon’s handwriting, and that’s fine. No problem at all. Regarding Shimon’s signature I am only half. Now the court can write in its protocol for itself: Shimon’s signature is authentic. We have two witnesses for that. Now Reuven testifies to the monetary claim in the document, testifies to his own signature, and that too is fine. So we could have enforced the document, the monetary claim. But we can’t. Since the first testimony, the first witnesses, are testimony about handwriting, and Reuven’s testimony is about the monetary claim in the document, they don’t join together. What will you tell me? That Shimon comes back to life and now all the testimonies are only about the monetary claim in the document? Then the problem arises that three-quarters of the monetary force comes out on the basis of one witness.

Meaning: the fact that our Talmud uses the language of joining is simply because the issue of “three-quarters of the monetary force” is sitting in the background and was already explained in the previous passage. But obviously, you need that too. You need both things. I’m saying: I could have attacked this passage in two ways. I could have gone with—let’s say Reuven and Shimon are the signed witnesses. Shimon died. Reuven testifies to his own signature and to Shimon’s signature. Then the judge comes with the court validation clause, and we treat the judge as another witness to Shimon’s signature. Fine? I could have come and said that Reuven testifies to the monetary claim in the document as one witness, and he and Shimon together testify—he and the judge together testify—about Shimon. Now let’s split the case. Regarding the authenticity of Shimon’s signature, are we allowed to approve it? Yes, we have two witnesses. Right? Does Reuven have a disproportionate part here? No. He is half the story. That’s allowed. Right? So Shimon’s signature is approved. Okay? So in effect we now have another witness to the monetary claim in the document, and we could have approved it. No. Because at the moment you move to the monetary claim in the document, you remember that really Reuven is responsible for three-quarters of the force. If you had stayed only with Shimon’s signature and viewed it as a signature validating handwriting, then there would be room for this. But then there is a joining problem, because handwriting doesn’t join with the testimony of the other witness who testifies to the monetary claim in the document. What do you want? That that handwriting should revive Shimon so he can testify to the monetary claim in the document and then there will be joining? Then the problem of three-quarters of the monetary force on the basis of one witness will arise.

That’s what Tosafot explain—again, they go in Rashi’s direction, they just add that the witness also testifies about the second witness’s signature. Okay? Now the Ritva says—all of this is the language of Tosafot as brought by the Ritva. On this the Ritva writes: the language of the Talmud is forced according to this explanation. Why? Because they hang it only on joining, and nobody mentions the issue of three-quarters of the monetary force on the basis of one witness. I said, that’s not so terrible. It’s not so terrible because what they add here is simply the addition beyond what we already know from the previous passage. We already know the issue of three-quarters of the monetary force from the previous passage. So all they’re saying here is: you also can’t solve it by looking at the validation of Shimon and the testimony of Reuven as two separate testimonies, because it doesn’t join together. What the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to. And if you want to join them on the monetary claim in the document, then the problem from the previous passage—three-quarters of the monetary force—will come back. So in my opinion it’s not so difficult in the wording of the Talmud. But that is what the Ritva argues against Tosafot.

And furthermore: Shmuel and Rami bar Chama are great men—how could they have erred in this? The statement above, that they need two outsiders to testify about him, is an obvious statement and accepted by everyone. Yes, that is always the question that accompanies us: what was the initial thought to say what Rav Yehuda and Shmuel say? We all know the issue of three-quarters of the monetary force coming from one witness. What are you trying to say? What’s the novelty here? Fine, that’s a hard question in any case.

Therefore the Ritva explains it differently. He says this: therefore it seems right to say that here we are not strict about this. In a case like ours we are not strict about having two witnesses. Why? Because when we say that two outsiders are needed—what does that mean, two outsiders? For the second signature. After all, Shimon the deceased—I, Reuven, testify about my own signature. About Shimon’s signature… Shimon the deceased—I testify about my own signature, I am Reuven. About Shimon’s signature, since he died, we need two outsiders to come testify about it. Right? Why do we say that we need two outsiders? That is at the beginning of the validation clause, when we come to validate the document. At the session of the court that took place then, when they came before it to validate the document, they needed two witnesses for the signature of deceased Shimon. But a document that already bears a court validation clause is not commonly forged, because a person does not typically forge both witnesses and judges. And if he forges, he would forge the witnesses for both signatures, or the judges for both signatures. But to forge the signature of one judge and one witness—that makes no sense. You’re telling me that one judge is forged and one witness is forged? Not reasonable. So what? Since that is not reasonable, we can now say that if so, in fact one witness is enough to validate the second signature in this case.

In the case of a regular document, when I validate my own signature and need validation for the second signature, I require that two other witnesses come. Because there the whole concern is that you forged the document with the two witnesses. But here we have a document with witnesses and a court validation clause together. What are the odds?

[Speaker B] By one witness you mean on condition that the judge also testifies.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. Meaning, testimony of one witness plus one judge is enough for us. Even though they testify about two different things, according to Rav Yehuda that is enough, because the whole concern here is a remote concern. I want to remind you of the two possibilities I spoke about in the previous class. I said in the previous class: according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi, why would we say that if two witnesses come and each one testifies about his own signature, according to Rabbi that is no good, because we have only one validating witness on each signature. According to the Rabbis it is good. Why is it good? Because each one is considered as testifying to the monetary claim in the document, and regarding the monetary claim in the document we have two witnesses. It’s true that on each signature there is only one witness, but on the monetary claim in the document we have two, so they join together. Right? So I asked there: how does that help? At most it should be an oral loan. You proved to me there was a loan, there was a monetary obligation. But how did the document become validated? How can one collect encumbered property? After all, the result here should be that this is an oral loan, not a documented loan. But the Talmud says that because they testify to the monetary claim in the document, therefore the document is considered validated. This is a way to validate documents, not a way to prove loans. Okay? So the question is how the document suddenly becomes validated.

I offered two possibilities there. One possibility, somewhat formal, says that once we joined together on the monetary claim in the document, we are considered joined together also for the validation—but that’s just formalism, and I don’t really understand the logic behind it. And there is a more sensible line of reasoning, I said there. The more sensible reasoning is that once we have two witnesses testifying that there was a loan, then it is clear to us that there was a loan. Now tell me: what is the likelihood that a person who really gave a loan would forge a document for that loan when the loan actually happened? If the lender wanted a document, he could have made the loan conditional on it: write me a document for this. I won’t lend to you until you write me a document. So what are the odds that he decided to give an oral loan and then forge a document? Fine, a person may forge a document when he just wants to rob the other person, wants to get money from him that he doesn’t deserve. But here he does deserve it. He only wants to gain access to encumbered property? The principal he gets anyway; there was a loan. So you too agree that there was a loan. The only question is whether it was documented, right? What are the odds that he forged the document? Especially since the assumption that he forged the document basically means—and we know there was a loan—that the loan was originally oral. Meaning, you gave up on a document from the outset, decided that an oral loan was fine with you, and now suddenly you changed your mind? All of that is a very remote concern.

Therefore, what I argued is that after the two witnesses join together on the monetary claim in the document and we are convinced that the loan really happened, then I no longer care about document validation. So you don’t need to validate the document, or one witness is enough to validate the document, because the concern that the document is forged is very remote. The Ritva here says the same thing. The Ritva says that since I have a document on which there is a validation clause, okay, what are the odds that the holder of the document forged both the document and the validation clause—and more than that, one witness and one judge come and say they recognize their signatures, so it isn’t forged. Okay? So what are the odds that he had a document with one real witness because the second was forged, and that in court it was all validated by one real judge while he forged the signatures of the second and third judges? Come on, that’s absurd. The Ritva says: because this concern is so remote, Rav Yehuda and Shmuel and their school say that in this matter I am willing to combine a witness and a judge. That is enough for me, because once a witness and a judge tell me this, the concern of forgery has dropped away and there is no need to validate.

It’s not because the witness and the judge join together. The witness and the judge do not join together. Rather, the witness and the judge bring us to a situation where at least one signature we accept. Once one signature—we cannot say that there was a document with one witness’s signature and one judge’s signature validating a document that had only one witness on it. Okay? And now you forged one witness’s signature and forged two more judges’ signatures. That’s absurd. If there was only one witness, how was it validated in the first court? After all, one judge is in fact authentic, so what—he forged the other two judges? It is completely unreasonable. Therefore, says the Ritva: for me that is enough. There is no need to validate the document. This is enough validation—or not validation, or enough validation, or there is no need to validate, I don’t care. Once you brought me to a situation where the claim “forged” is such a weak, such an implausible claim, as we saw with the two witnesses in the case of Ravina bar Rav Idi, then for me that is sufficient validation.

And that really is the best explanation for why Rav Yehuda and Shmuel actually accept this combination. After all, it sounds bizarre—what is this business of three-quarters of the monetary force coming from one witness? So he says: it’s simply implausible. It has nothing to do with the previous passage. It’s simply implausible that with one witness on the court validation clause, one judge on the validation clause, and one witness on the document, the whole thing turns out to be forged. It simply cannot be.

[Speaker C] Therefore in such a case I accept it. Again? All the assumptions of two and three-quarters here are not relevant at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again? Which assumptions?

[Speaker C] The quarter and three-quarters and all that. Everything we discussed earlier in the previous passage, from his standpoint it’s just irrelevant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, because we’re not…

[Speaker C] Because you’re basically saying: fine, we’re easing the requirement regarding this witness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. We are not viewing them as witnesses of validation. From our standpoint, the document simply does not require validation. Not that it was validated. If the document had been validated, then I would say: here this witness has three-quarters, and that’s not okay. He says: no, we reached a situation in which there is no need to validate the document. I have no concern that it is forged. Or you have to remember all the time that really, by strict Torah law, a document does not need validation at all. When a document arrives, it is valid. It is only a rabbinic enactment to validate a document. In a place where the concern is so remote, the Rabbis never enacted it. There is no need; the document is considered a good document despite the challenge that it is forged. And then there is no room to talk about three-quarters of the monetary force coming from one witness, because we are not talking about validation. It’s not that Reuven, the witness, also validates Shimon’s signature. Reuven does not validate Shimon’s signature; Reuven validates only his own signature and the judge validates only his own signature. But after those two have spoken, the court reaches the conclusion that the claim of forgery is a very remote claim, and I don’t accept it. Such a document does not need validation. And therefore Rav Yehuda and Shmuel say: everything is fine. Okay?

[Speaker E] Why do you need the witness and the judge if the document is so good?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because it could be that he forged the entire validation clause. What do you mean? You have one judge telling you: look, one signature on the validation clause is genuine, it’s my signature. So now the Ritva says: then how can that be? So what, he forged only two additional judges on the validation clause? He had one real judge? How did a real judge sign a validation clause on a document that had only one witness? If everything is forged…

[Speaker F] Only if there is the beginning of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. If you can say that he forged everything—fine, he forged the three judges of the validation clause and one witness on the document—fine, maybe you can say that. But once you already have one judge telling you there was a validation clause—come on, then it’s implausible. Okay?

This connects very much to a passage we’ll see later. I’ll want to discuss it—I’m already bringing it in here so you can see the connection, even though apparently we won’t get to it today. There is a question: what exactly is the advantage of two witnesses over one witness?

[Speaker C] It’s a scriptural decree—what do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A scriptural decree” is nice, but why? “A scriptural decree” is not an explanation; it’s a source. I’m asking what the explanation is.

[Speaker C] In matters of prohibition you don’t have that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but why in monetary law, capital law, and matters of marriage do you?

[Speaker C] In monetary law it’s a scriptural decree that it requires two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What does “scriptural decree” mean? A scriptural decree means because the Torah said so. I’m asking why the Torah said so.

[Speaker C] Fine, that I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Especially in light of what you say—that in matters of prohibition one witness is enough—so why in monetary law, capital law, and marriage do we want two? So I say: there are those who want to say—we’ll see this later—the Netivot wants to say that it is simply increasing the likelihood that they are not lying. If you have one witness, there is a certain chance he is lying; if you have two witnesses, the likelihood that they are lying is lower. Okay? If so, then what the Ritva says here becomes even easier to understand. In fact these are not really two validating witnesses, but in order to say that this document is forged you have to assume that both of them are liars. There is a chance that one witness lies, but there is no chance that two witnesses lie. So true, they are not testifying about the same thing—this one testifies about his handwriting and that one testifies about the monetary claim in the document. I don’t care. In order to say the document is forged, you now have to assume that two witnesses lied. Okay? And that we do not do—so say Rav Yehuda and Shmuel. The likelihood that the document is forged is as if there were two witnesses who validated the document. Fine? That is basically what I want to say.

Now, that is what the Ritva says: and since the handwriting of the witness and the handwriting of the judge have been validated, that is enough, because document validation is rabbinic. And this is what Rami bar Chama meant when he said: how excellent is this teaching, that here we do not require two outsiders to testify about the second one. Fine? That explains the view of Shmuel and Rav Yehuda. But what do we now do with Rava? If it’s so good, then what are Rava and Rav Ashi saying? And Rava said to him: what excellence is there here? For even though we are not strict when there is no full validation, for the reason we said, nevertheless it is not proper that they should join together, since they are not aligned in the content of their testimony, because what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. That is how it appears to me according to Rashi and according to the language of the Talmud.

He says: I do not accept this leniency, because in the end you are still combining here two things that are about different matters. One testifies about his handwriting and the other testifies about the monetary claim in the document, or about the handwriting of the witness—it doesn’t matter. If we return for a moment to the Netivot, which I mentioned earlier, who said that combining two witnesses is meant to reduce the chance that there is falsehood here—so now Rabbi Shimon Shkop asks him, and we’ll see this later: what happens if one witness comes and says that I damaged another person, and one witness comes and says that I desecrated the Sabbath? Or that I betrothed a woman. Fine? By the same logic one could say that the chance that two witnesses lie is negligible, right? One witness can lie, but two witnesses do not. So now there is a doubt whether I either betrothed a woman or damaged another person. Should we conduct ourselves according to the laws of doubt? In terms of probability, that’s what comes out. Obviously not. We’ll see later why not. Because probabilities are calculated only when the two witnesses are speaking about the same thing. When two witnesses come and both say that I owe so-and-so a maneh, then I say: one of them lying is possible, but both lying is not reasonable. Okay? But two who speak about different things—I do not combine their probabilities. That is what Rava and Rav Ashi argue against Rav Yehuda and Shmuel. They say: combining probabilities is all very nice, but they are talking about different things. This one talks about the validation clause, that one talks about the document. It is like one witness testifying about desecrating the Sabbath and another testifying about betrothing a woman. You do not combine probabilities when they speak about different things. If they were talking about the same thing, you would be right, but they are not. What the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to. That is exactly their claim against them, and therefore we do not combine probabilities. Okay? That is essentially what the Ritva claims.

Now look at the Nachmanides. “Rava said to him: what excellence is there here? What the judge testifies to is not what the witness testifies to.” Rashi explained that the judge testifies about the validation of the court certification, and the witness testifies about the monetary claim in the document, according to the Rabbis. You see again—pay attention to the wording—“the judge testifies about the validation of the certification.” What does that mean? He testifies about the validation of the court validation clause, not about validating the document. Right? I’ll remind you of the wording in which the Ritva brought Rashi. Rashi explained that the witness testifies to the monetary claim in the document according to the Rabbis, and the judge testifies to his handwriting. And we inferred there, also in light of the continuation of the Ritva, what does “his handwriting” mean? The validation clause? No. “His handwriting” means the handwriting of

[Speaker D] the witness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the witness. Of the witness. We apply the Rabbis’ view against Rabbi to the judge, and when he testifies to his own signature, that is as if he testifies to what the signature attests to—namely, to the validation. Right? Nachmanides reads it differently, or at least so it appears from his wording. And both bring Rashi; they simply interpret him differently. He says: Rashi explained that the judge testifies about the validation of the certification—not about the validation of the document, but about the validation of the court clause—and the witness testifies to the monetary claim in the document according to the Rabbis. Notice: he too brings the judge as testifying about the validation of the certification, but here he doesn’t mention the Rabbis against Rabbi, right? And the witness testifies to the monetary claim in the document according to the Rabbis. Why does he not mention the Rabbis against Rabbi in the first part? Because he does not apply the Rabbis against Rabbi to the judge. Right? In the Ritva’s formulation we applied the Rabbis against Rabbi to the judge too, not only to the witness. What did we say there? That the judge testifies to the handwriting of the second witness. But he doesn’t testify to that; he testified to his own handwriting. Yes, but according to the Rabbis against Rabbi, if a person comes and testifies to his own signature, that is considered as if he is testifying to what the signature testifies to—that is, to the validation. Right? That is what the Ritva said. Nachmanides says no: we do not apply the Rabbis’ position to the judge, only to the witness. Therefore the witness testifies to the monetary claim in the document—that is according to the Rabbis against Rabbi. The judge does not even testify to the handwriting of the witness. The judge testifies only to his own handwriting.

[Speaker C] But his own handwriting is stronger, because he testifies about the validation clause, so something was there, they stood before him. There was what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one witness. Maybe he’s lying. It’s one witness. But before I get into the law, first we have to understand that behind what looks like the same wording—both of them bring Rashi and in a very similar style—it seems that there is a different conception here. And do you know why? At least it seems to me, because Nachmanides is sensitive to the addition I made at the beginning of the class: that even if we accept the Rabbis against Rabbi with respect to the judge, that still does not bring me to say that the judge is one witness to the validation of the document. That one witness is one witness to a legal act of validation that was performed. I still do not know whether the document itself is validated. All I know is that a court sat and approved the document, and for that I have one witness. I do not have one witness that the document is validated. I have one witness that a court sat and approved the document. But since regarding the fact that a court sat I have only one witness, then in fact I cannot say at all that I have one witness to the validation of the document. I have one witness to the validation of the court certification. And if you want to apply the Rabbis against Rabbi to the judge, at most I have one witness that there was an act of court certification, an act of validation, but not one witness to the validation itself. Meaning, Nachmanides does not see the…

[Speaker D] Yes? According to what the Rabbi is saying now, then Nachmanides’ question is not understood. After all, he wants to compare the two passages—we haven’t yet read it, Nachmanides’ question on Rashi—but he wants to compare the two passages. According to what the Rabbi is saying, now there is nothing to compare, because here it’s a judge and there it’s a witness. Let’s see.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, that at least is how it appears if I’m reading carefully the way Nachmanides presents Rashi. Fine? The wording in which Nachmanides presents Rashi is different from the wording in which the Ritva presents Rashi. And somehow it seems that Nachmanides is unwilling to accept that we apply the Rabbis against Rabbi to the judge. Again, it may be that we do apply it to the judge, but it still would not bring us to the point where the judge is considered a validating witness for the document, because there is another stage in the middle. There are three stages in this process, not two. That is basically the claim.

And one can reject this. I continue reading Nachmanides: if so, then even if two testify to the signature of one witness, and one says “this is my handwriting,” should we say that what this witness testifies to is not what those others testify to? What does that mean? You are basically telling me that we do not combine witnesses because they are not joined, that’s what Rava and Rav Ashi say, right? Because otherwise what’s the problem? I could combine them. It is true that I have a judge regarding… I have… the judge counts as one witness that there was an act of validation, and if there was an act of validation then the document is validated, and if the document is validated then there is also one witness regarding the loan, so in fact the judge testifies about the loan. That is one witness regarding the loan. And Reuven also testifies regarding the loan. So no problem—combine the two and there’s no issue of three-quarters of the monetary force coming from one witness. Each comes by his own route. So why don’t we do that? Because the judge testifies to something else. He does not testify to the monetary claim in the document. He testifies to the validation of the certification, the court clause. Right?

If so, then we don’t combine them? Then Nachmanides asks: so why do we combine two witnesses who validate Shimon’s signature with Reuven who validates his own signature? They too are not testifying to the same thing. If there is a rule that you don’t combine, then don’t combine there either. And if you do combine there, why not combine here? The judge is indeed only one witness, and Reuven is also one witness, but if you combine them even though they are not testifying to the same thing, then you have two witnesses to the monetary claim in the document. What’s the problem? That’s what Nachmanides asks, and that is a legitimate question. This question is fine even according to his own approach.

[Speaker D] No, one can distinguish. One step we take, but two steps—even three steps—we do not take. That’s the difference between the passages. In the previous passage it was only one step, and in our passage it’s more than one step.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or put differently—

[Speaker D] In another way I’ll say it: what we allow ourselves to do with a witness, we do not allow ourselves to do with a judge. Meaning, one can find a distinction; it’s not such a difficult question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you’re looking for distinctions, then you’ll find distinctions in the answers. First of all the question is whether there is a question. The question is a question; the fact that you can find a distinction—so what? First the question, afterwards we’ll see whether there are distinctions or not. On the face of it there is no reason to make distinctions. The judge in this context is one witness—what difference does it make?

No, the point is this, look. I explained earlier why there is no combination problem there. When two witnesses come and testify to Shimon’s signature, why do I combine them with Reuven who testifies about himself? I do not really combine them. Rather, those two witnesses revived Shimon. Now that it has become clear to the court that Shimon is an authentic signature, the witnesses signed on the document are considered as though their testimony had already been examined in court. So now it is as if Shimon is speaking in court and saying: there was a monetary claim in the document. Well then of course it joins together. Because who joins with Reuven? Not Levi and Yehuda who validate Shimon—Shimon joins with Reuven. Levi and Yehuda only bring him back to life. Once they prove to the court that Shimon is an authentic signature, now Shimon is the second witness to the monetary claim in the document, not Levi and Yehuda. No problem. Therefore there is no joining problem there. That’s what I explained there.

Apparently Nachmanides does not accept that in his question. So Nachmanides says: from there you see that there is no problem of combining. If there is no problem of combining, then why do you care if you combine here too? It’s only a distance. So what if it’s a distance? Make as much distance as you want. The distance doesn’t change anything, as long as you can combine different testimonies. Okay? That is Nachmanides’ question. If I’m right in what I said earlier, then the answer is very simple. Two who come and validate Shimon’s signature really do not join Reuven. Shimon joins Reuven; they merely awaken him. But here, who validates Shimon’s signature? Only the judge. That is one witness. So he cannot awaken Shimon. Then Shimon does not wake up and testify to the monetary claim in the document. Right? If so, then there is no one to join Reuven. Therefore, what the witnesses testify to is not what the judge testifies to. That is the simple explanation. Okay?

So Nachmanides says: and that is not correct. Because there, once they say “this is so-and-so’s handwriting,” then certainly this is his handwriting. And that writing itself testifies to the monetary claim in the document and joins with its fellow, because the witnesses signed on the document are considered as though their testimony had already been examined in court. And once the document is validated, money comes out by their word automatically. Exactly what I said before. By divine inspiration he saw what I said before, and he simply says it. He says: the one who joins Reuven is not Levi and Yehuda, it is Shimon. Levi and Yehuda only awaken Shimon and make him into one whose testimony has been examined in court. Now we have two witnesses to the monetary claim in the document who join together, that’s all.

But as for the judge, he is not testifying at all that the document itself is valid, because he does not know. Perhaps it is forged. Rather, it depends on the mouth of others. And the handwriting of the witness is not validated through this testimony of the judge, because even if two outsiders testified about the judge, there still would not be complete testimony to validate the signature of that second witness. Therefore there is no joining here to the monetary claim in the document. What is he saying here? What he is saying here is exactly what I told you before. He says the judge is not considered at all a witness to the validation of the document, not even one witness. He is considered zero witnesses to the validation of the document. Why? Because if there were not the intermediate stage that I told you about—if the judge’s signature testified to the validation itself, and not to the act of validation that was done in court—then he would count as a lone validating witness. But here even that does not exist. After all, he testifies only to an act that was done in court to validate the document, right? But regarding the fact that there was such an act in court, we have only one witness. So from the standpoint of the current court, I cannot accept even that.

So now I ask you: how many validating witnesses can I derive from the judge—not witnesses to the court validation clause, but witnesses to the validation, witnesses that the document is authentic? How many? Zero. Zero. That is exactly what Nachmanides says. Therefore there is not even one witness to the validation here. Nachmanides says more than that. Let’s say that two witnesses came and validated the judge’s signature on the court certification. Would that be enough? Is the problem only that it is a lone judge? Or even if two witnesses come and validate his signature? And the answer is: even that would not help. Why? Because all those two witnesses are saying is that there is one judge here who tells me that there was an act of validation. But the witnesses are not saying that there was an act of validation. The signed judge says that there was an act of validation, and he is only one witness to that. So I am not convinced that there was an act of validation, and therefore how many validating witnesses can I get from here? Zero. I have no validating witnesses. Okay?

So therefore throughout Nachmanides you can see that he feels that the process is really a three-stage process and not a two-stage one. The move from the testimony of the judge to the monetary claim in the document is not two steps, but three. Step one: I testify that there was an act of validation. Step two: if there was an act of validation, then the document is validated. Step three: if the document is validated, then there was a loan, so I testify to the monetary claim in the document. Nachmanides says the problematic step is step two, since there I have only one witness. If now, for example, two judges came—let me ask you something—suppose two judges came now, each validating his own signature in the court certification, out of the three who are signed there.

[Speaker D] Then there are two witnesses to the fact that there was an act of validation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right.

[Speaker D] In that case, and therefore one can say that we have two witnesses to the act of validation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? Let’s go through the whole chain one step after another. These two judges, according to the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute, are considered to be testifying about an act of validation, not just about their own signatures, because they themselves signed, right? So we have two witnesses to an act of validation. Right? If we have two witnesses to an act of validation, then we know that a validation act took place. We have two witnesses to that. Ah, if there was a validation act, then it’s clear to us that the document is validated. If the document is validated, you can collect with it even without that witness altogether. If two judges had come and testified about their signature on the court certification, we wouldn’t have needed Reuven at all; even without him we could collect. But if there is one judge, then even with Reuven it won’t help. That’s what Nachmanides says. And you’ll see that this is very precise in his wording, because already when he cites Rashi, as I showed you above, I already showed you there that he does not treat this judge as a witness to the validation of the document. From his perspective there is another stage along the way. According to the Ritva there isn’t; according to Nachmanides there is another stage along the way. So the whole story now unfolds differently. And then what comes out is that the statements of Rava and Rav Ashi are completely understandable. Okay, the difficulty was: how do you explain Rava and Rav Ashi? After all, it’s obvious that we don’t need them to join regarding the same thing; even if they testify about different things, because if there were two witnesses to the second signature, that would help. A sign that there is no joining problem, so why are you confusing me with all this talk about joining? Nachmanides says: not true. There, there is no joining problem because there really is joining. Shimon joins with Reuven. Levi and Yehuda, or Rav Huna bar Hiyya, join with Reuven. But there is a joining issue. And that is what Rav Ashi and Rava are saying against Rav Yehuda and Shmuel. Okay?

Of course, the problem that remains is: so what do Rav Yehuda and Shmuel hold? Yes, all those views that are not the practical ruling. So now we understand very well the position of the practical ruling. Still, there are five distinguished Amoraim here, some of whom were really enthusiastic about this approach, and in the end we’re talking about complete nonsense. So how—what did the Ritva ask? How can one understand the position of Rav Yehuda and Shmuel? It’s much harder according to Nachmanides. There’s no choice but to say what the Ritva said in explaining Rav Yehuda and Shmuel. And Nachmanides may be able to accept that. Nachmanides only argues that with Rava and Rav Ashi, the Ritva says something too novel. Rav Ashi and Ravina are much simpler than what the Ritva says, because there is another stage along the way. Meaning, he only strengthens the explanation of Rava and Rav Ashi, but in terms of how to learn Rav Yehuda and Shmuel, it will probably be like the Ritva. Or Tosafot, what we brought there, or the Ritva, but one of those two explanations. Okay?

All the medieval authorities we’ve seen until now, all the medieval authorities until now, basically go with Rashi’s approach. They just explain him, each one adding another layer, but all of them are explaining Rashi’s view. Okay? The Rashba attacks the view of Rashi and Nachmanides with three objections, which there is no point getting into because in my opinion they are weak objections. But I just want to see the Rashba’s approach. In light of those objections, the Rashba proposes a different approach in the passage, and he says as follows: Rather, it seems to me that this is the explanation: two people came and testified about the signature of one of the witnesses on the document and about the signature of one of the judges of the validation. Okay? Meaning, the story here is not that one witness testifies about his own signature and a judge testifies about his signature on the court certification, but rather two witnesses—two other witnesses come, not the witnesses signed on the document. They testify that they recognize one of the signatures of the document’s witnesses and one of the signatures of the judges. The setup is like Rashi in the sense that there is a document here with a court certification, and testimony about one of the document’s witnesses and one of the judges of the court certification. The only claim is that this is not the witness of the document and the judge themselves, but two other witnesses testifying about the document witness and one of the judges of the court certification. Okay? And with this he resolves various questions he asks against Rashi—not important right now, but that’s his claim.

In parentheses there is another version: that here the case is of two who testified about the handwriting of one witness and the signature of one judge. Yes, because these are not witnesses of validation; the point is the signature. I think that is the more correct version. And this is what it means—I’m continuing to read the Rashba—this is what it means: that which the witness testifies to, the judge does not testify to. Since there are two who testify about the witness, and we know that it is his signature on the basis of two, it becomes as if his testimony was examined in court, and as though the witness himself testified before us to the maneh stated in the document. But the other one, since his signature has only not been established to us except on the basis of one witness, we do not regard his testimony as if it was examined in court, for validating the signature of a judge is no better than one witness testifying to his signature. For that witness who is signed on the document is of no significance, since he is only testifying about his signature and not about the maneh in the document; for the maneh in the document is not validated by one witness testifying about the witnesses’ signatures—in other words, the maneh in the document is not thereby established. Therefore the testimony of a single judge neither raises nor lowers anything, even though he himself recognizes the signatures of the witnesses. Yes, if he himself recognizes the witnesses’ signatures, that’s irrelevant, because he is not here before us. The ones before us are two witnesses who testify about his signature. Okay?

So what is the Rashba actually saying? The Rashba is really making the following claim: first of all, the setup is different from what we have learned until now. All the medieval authorities until now spoke about the same setup, except for the question whether Reuven also validates Shimon’s signature or not, but the setup was the same setup. The Rashba says no: the witness and the judges all died; there was a terrible disaster in that place, everyone died. Two other witnesses come who recognize the signature of one of the witnesses. They are not the document’s witnesses; they are other witnesses. And they recognize the signature of one of the judges. Now let’s do the accounting: what do we have here? We have two witnesses who validated the witness’s signature, and therefore we have one witness to the maneh in the document, says the Rashba. Does he need the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute here? The expression is “the maneh in the document,” right? That’s the expression of the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute.

[Speaker D] Even Rabbi would agree to that, because there are two who testify to the signature. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The expression—don’t get confused—the expression he uses here, that he testifies to the maneh in the document, does not need the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. It has nothing to do with the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. According to the Rashba, this passage here has nothing to do with the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis, no connection whatsoever. And in that respect he differs from all the medieval authorities we’ve seen until now. What he writes here, that the witness testifies to the maneh in the document, is what I told you earlier in Nachmanides. If I have two witnesses who validated Reuven’s signature, then from my perspective Reuven is testifying to the maneh in the document, not the two witnesses. The novelty of the Rabbis is that if Reuven himself comes and testifies about his own signature, he is considered as testifying to the maneh in the document. But that’s not what we’re talking about here. Two other witnesses came and validated Reuven’s signature. Here this is the regular rule—even Rabbi agrees to this—that if we validated his signature, then his signature becomes as if his testimony was examined in court, and now from my perspective Reuven is standing here and testifying to the maneh in the document. Okay? So therefore we have one witness to the maneh in the document. What happens with the second witness? Two witnesses testify about the judge’s signature. How many witnesses do we have to Shimon the witness? What do you say? I have two witnesses validating the signature of the judge on the court certification. What does that mean in terms of my knowledge of witness Shimon’s signature on the document? How many validating witnesses do I have on that?

[Speaker B] There are two witnesses testifying to the signature of one of the witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the signature of the judges. No. As for the signature of the first witness, we already agreed about that. So that one is approved in court, and the witness testifies to the maneh in the document. I’m asking what happens with the signature of the second witness.

[Speaker D] According to what we said before, then basically we have two witnesses testifying that there was a validation act here. That’s all. But they testify to nothing about Shimon’s handwriting. We know there was a validation act, that’s all, but no more than that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we don’t even know that.

[Speaker D] We don’t even know that? No. Because only the judge testifies about the act of validation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. How many witnesses do we have that there was a validation act? One. The signed judge. Meaning, those two witnesses revived the signed judge. The signed judge constitutes one witness that there was a validation act. Therefore I have zero witnesses validating Shimon’s signature. Look how this steps down. I have two witnesses to the judge’s signature. I have one witness to the act of validation. And I have zero witnesses validating Shimon’s signature. So I also have no witnesses to the maneh in the document. Okay? And then what basically comes out here is that they cannot join, because I have one witness—that’s what Rav Ashi and Rava say—that I have only one witness testifying to the maneh in the document, and that’s all. The other witnesses are testifying to the signature of the judge; there is nothing to join them to. Okay. On the conceptual level this is very similar to what we saw earlier, except that we do not need the opinion of the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. It has nothing to do with the whole issue of the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. And therefore we replaced each signer validating his own signature with two other witnesses validating the relevant signatures. That neutralized the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi. This works even according to Rabbi. From there onward the whole explanation is as it was.

[Speaker D] But then how do you explain Rav Yehuda? If this is so good, then why does Rav Yehuda…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the big question. How can you explain Rav Yehuda here? How can you explain Rav Yehuda here? After all, in the end I have one validated witness here, and the second witness—nothing. There is no choice but exactly as I said in the Ritva or in Tosafot, or everything I said earlier. Same thing. Rav Yehuda will say either that there is a very remote concern for forgery of a document that has both a court certification and a judge, and now the judge is validated by two witnesses. Meaning, it is clear that this judge is not forged. Right? So what are the odds that the whole story was forged? Everything we said earlier in Rav Yehuda’s view will probably remain true also according to the Rashba. Meaning, the Rashba’s move is very similar to what all the previous medieval authorities said, except for one thing: he is unwilling to apply the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute here. So he recruits two witnesses to testify about the judge’s signature, not that the judge himself validates his own signature. Okay?

Why not bring in the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute? In principle, with a document witness there’s no problem, because that really is the law. Apparently the Rashba is unwilling to accept the application of the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute regarding a judge’s signature on his own signature. The Rashba apparently claims that this cannot work. Only with document witnesses was this novelty introduced: that if a document witness comes and validates his own signature, he is considered as testifying to the maneh in the document. But if a judge validates his own signature, that is not considered as testifying to the maneh in the document. That was not said about judges; it was said about document witnesses. You can suggest all kinds of explanations for why. Either simply because it is part of the laws of documents, while court certifications belong to the court, which is something else. Or because—or this joins what we saw earlier—after all, why do the Rabbis say that you are considered as testifying to the maneh in the document? Because the other one also testifies to the maneh in the document and the two of us join together. But here, since we do not join, you also cannot say that I am testifying to the maneh in the document. Because we do not join. Even if you apply the Rabbis’ position to the judge, it still won’t help; it will take you one step forward, but you’re still missing two more. Right? Therefore you cannot say that they join. So in any case it is not relevant regarding a judge to say that we view him as testifying to the maneh in the document. Okay? So there are various possibilities. I don’t know, it’s not… it’s left unclear in the Rashba’s words. Okay?

However, there is a difficulty against him. First, the language of the Talmudic text, because according to Rav Ashi and Rava it says that they do not join because the content of the testimony is different, and here again what we asked on the Ritva applies: the reason they are ineffective is that we do not have validation for the second witness, not because they do not join. Right? It should have said simply that the second witness is not validated, and therefore it doesn’t help—not because what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. But we already answered that above; it’s not so terrible. We said that they do not join, and if they did join then we would have half of the required monetary testimony on the basis of one witness. So it begins with the fact that they do not join. Okay? And the second difficulty is what the Rashba himself asks: On the contrary, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty: what did Rav Yehuda see here? I explained: you challenge me about Rava and Rav Ashi, but Rava and Rav Ashi I explain easily. But I don’t know how to explain Rav Yehuda—that is the hard part. What you asked, or Doron. And really, Rav Yehuda cannot be explained according to this. And perhaps that was his view: since the judge derives from the testimony of two who testified before him, it is as though two are testifying to it before us, and that is the superiority they are speaking of. And even though this is a far-fetched reasoning, since Rava came and refuted it, we do not examine it further. He says: if there are two witnesses validating the judge’s signature, then from our perspective that is considered like an additional validating witness through the document. And he joins the other validating witness among the document’s witnesses. And maybe also with the Ritva’s reasoning—that it is unlikely that there would be both a court certification and all that we said earlier, because otherwise we have only one witness—then it still would not help. Or there is some superiority to the judge, that we follow through with him all the way and treat it like testimony to the content in the document; I don’t know. But he says this is a far-fetched reasoning, says the Rashba, but since this reasoning was rejected anyway, it was rejected; there isn’t much room to play with it.

And so basically the Rashba’s claim is very similar to what we saw earlier, except that he is unwilling to drag in the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute here. The Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute are unrelated to the previous issue of the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. At the end he continues and says as follows: According to my explanation, one witness who testifies to the signatures of the two witnesses on the document, and two who testify to one of the judges of validation—the witness and the judge join together, because with regard to each and every signature of the witnesses on the document there are two witnesses: the one witness who is now testifying about both of them, and the validating judge. This is a nice novelty. The Rashba says as follows: what would happen if there were an external witness? We spoke earlier about two witnesses validating one of the signatures and one of the signatures on the court certification. Now he says another setup: one witness testifies to the signatures of the two witnesses on the document, and two witnesses validate the signature of a judge—what he mentioned earlier. That would help. Why would it help? Because the two witnesses who validate the judge’s signature revive the judge, and the judge becomes a validating witness for the two witnesses on the document. And after all we have one more witness who is a validating witness for the two witnesses on the document. Neither of them is one of the document’s witnesses themselves. These are two external witnesses testifying to the validation of the document’s witnesses, and that joins. Two witnesses validating both signatures join together. That is what comes out according to my explanation, says the Rashba.

According to Nachmanides, that is not true. Why not? Because according to Nachmanides there is another stage in the middle. Even if there are two witnesses validating the judge’s signature, the judge is not considered a validating witness to the document. The judge is considered a witness that there was an act of validation of the document in court. But from there you have zero witnesses to the validation of the document. In other words, Nachmanides would not agree to this law of the Rashba. The Rashba claims that these are actual validating witnesses. And why? The Rashba is not speaking at all about the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute and how many steps forward we go; that is not the point at all. According to the Rashba—sorry—the moment two witnesses come and validate the signature, the signed witness comes back to life. And now the signed witness who came back to life says: I recognize the signatures of the two witnesses. I was a judge there; I’m telling you that I recognize them. So he is a validating witness. The whole discussion of Nachmanides earlier began from the fact that we were speaking according to the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute, where the judge himself validates his own signature, and then you have to see how that continues to unfold. According to the Rashba there is no unfolding, because we do not use the Rabbis in Rabbi’s dispute. The law is simply that their signatures were recognized in court. The moment they validated the judge’s signature, the judge is basically standing here saying: this document is validated. So no problem—he is a validating witness, and we have another validating witness.

In that situation it is only as if he testifies to the act of validation; he is not really testifying, because I did not revive him, right? After all, I did not really validate the judge’s signature; I don’t have two witnesses to the signature. So it is considered as though he testifies to the act of validation, but he is one witness to the act of validation, and therefore this cannot move forward any further. That is the difference between Nachmanides and the Rashba. In that sense, the Rashba is like the Ritva and not like Nachmanides. In the Ritva we saw that there is no such intermediate step. Okay? In that sense the Rashba is like the Ritva and not like Nachmanides. Good. Just one second. Okay. I just copied the attendance list. So we’ll stop here, okay? See you next week. I’ll also send a summary, and you can go over it. Goodbye.

[Speaker B] Thank you very much, more power to you. Thank you very much, thank you very much.