Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 30

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end I understand—no, no, no—in the end I understood.

[Speaker G] That in the end it’s a different picture.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, leave the end for later; we’ll get there.

[Speaker E] There’s an assumption that two witnesses weakens the testimony of the judge, and that’s exactly the opposite of what the Rashba thinks. Maybe specifically two witnesses are something that gives it more force. So even though, yes, in our way of thinking it sounds strange—as if, why is it better to bring two other people instead of the person himself testifying about himself? But maybe, maybe it clears away some kind of noise—I don’t know—because the judge, once the judge signed the authentication, he was sitting in a religious court, it was in a religious court. And then maybe that gives it more force. Maybe it doesn’t really bypass the other judges, but it adds something to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’ll explain, I’ll explain what it adds—maybe that’s what you mean, Yael. Look, I said this before too: if the judge himself comes and validates his own signature, aside from the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi, right? If we looked at this simply, then the Rashba is certainly right. Because when the judge comes and validates his own signature, he doesn’t himself remember the testimony of authentication, right? Otherwise he should come and say, “I know this document is authenticated, I myself remember.” No—he looks at the signature, and what he says is: “This signature is mine.” That’s what he knows; he doesn’t remember. The event—or are they only drawing from the signature they see before their eyes? So let’s assume for a moment that the judge who comes, according to Rashi, and validates his own signature, does not remember the event that happened there, but says: “What’s signed here is me, that’s my signature.” Now it’s obvious that that’s less good than two witnesses who validate his signature. Obviously it’s less good. Why is it less good? Because if he testifies about his own signature, he’s only one witness. When two witnesses come and validate that signature, they are two witnesses.

[Speaker G] But isn’t he testifying about the authentication?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—that’s what I’m saying. Wait, wait—that’s exactly what I said. I said: without the Rabbis against Rabbi. If we look at it simply, then the judge comes—what is he testifying to? He validates his own signature, that’s all. How many witnesses do I have on that signature? One. So what if it’s he himself? It’s still one. By contrast, in the Rashba’s case, there are two witnesses who validate that signature, so that signature is validated. Once it’s validated, now the question is what it says. What it says is that there is one witness to the fact that there was an act of authentication. The signed judge becomes a witness testifying that there was an act of authentication. But in the case where the judge validates his own signature, I don’t even have that. Because as for the signature, I have only one witness, so he can’t even bring the signature to life and turn it into a witness testifying to the authentication, because he’s only one witness for that. Only because of the Rabbis against Rabbi—because the Rabbis against Rabbi say that if a person validates his own signature, it’s as if he has come back to life and is now giving us the testimony anew. Then it really is the same as the two witnesses. But if you don’t accept that, then the Rashba is certainly right. That’s a partial answer to what you asked earlier, Noa.

[Speaker G] No, I don’t understand—the witnesses the Rashba brings are about one of the authentication witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—about the judge, about the judge’s signature.

[Speaker G] But—

[Speaker B] Rabbi,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Another wording in parentheses—look at the wording.

[Speaker B] Otherwise, the Rabbis wouldn’t accept the judge’s testimony according to their view, because they accept the testimony of the signatory witnesses because both of them join to the monetary content of the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—I’m not yet talking about accepting the testimony. First I’m talking about what happens with the judge’s signature. After that we’ll see what to do with it.

[Speaker B] But according to the Rabbis—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one thing at a time. What?

[Speaker B] According to the Rabbis they wouldn’t accept the testimony of the judge—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about the question of what—

[Speaker B] —to do with it,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about the question of what this is… he doesn’t join with anything else… but I’m not talking about that, Udi, I’m talking right now about something else. There are now two situations. One situation: a judge comes to validate his own signature. Fine? That’s one situation. Second situation: two witnesses come and validate the signature of one of the judges. I’m asking: which of these two is better? I don’t care—even the better one, wait, even the better one doesn’t join.

[Speaker H] I’m not interested right now in what we do with it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking which of the two is better. My answer is: two witnesses validating the signature is better. Why is it better? Because for the second one you need the Rabbis. Exactly. For example, Rabbi wouldn’t disagree in such a case, right? And there Rabbi would disagree. Because Rabbi doesn’t accept that if you testify about yourself it’s like testimony about the monetary content of the document. Here even Rabbi wouldn’t disagree, and it is certainly stronger. It’s just that all along, when we were following Rashi’s view, we assumed that we were applying the Rabbis’ view also to the judge’s signature, not just the witness’s signature, right? It could be that the Rashba—and this is the answer to your question, Noa—moved to this case precisely because he doesn’t think you can take the Rabbis’ principle about the signed witness and apply it also to the signed judge. It doesn’t work the same way. The signed witness relates to the monetary content of the document, but there is no such rule with a signed judge. If it’s a signed judge, then validate the judge’s signature.

[Speaker G] But that wasn’t his problem with Rashi—he had a different problem with Rashi. The way I understood it, his problem was that he’s not testifying about the document, he’s testifying about the authentication. He wasn’t there testifying that the judge himself really was there. Exactly, exactly. What bothered him in Rashi was something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but really there is—

[Speaker G] So he didn’t solve—he didn’t solve anything in Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he did solve it.

[Speaker G] I mean, I understood that he moved us more in Rashi’s direction, but still he himself—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—seemingly that solves the problem. Because if two witnesses come and validate the judge’s signature, then from our perspective it’s as if the judge is standing here and testifying that the document is authenticated. Exactly.

[Speaker G] Because after all, that’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is testimony about the monetary content of the document in the Rashba’s sense, not in the sense of the Rabbis against Rabbi. Once we brought the signature to life, it’s as if there is a judge standing here authenticating the document.

[Speaker G] But he still had the problem that the authentication witnesses don’t testify about the document but rather about the authentication, and he got the testimony from someone else, maybe from a religious court—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he testifies about the document—the judge testifies about the document. Because it’s his signature. But if I bring the signature itself to life, then from my perspective it’s as if I am entering the situation in the religious court that was there when they signed.

[Speaker G] But that religious court there was only a court for authentication; it wasn’t a court—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. But the religious court determined that the document is authenticated. So from our point of view that is testimony about authentication. After all, the religious court… My problem with the judge in Rashi’s approach was that there is no testimony here about authentication, because with the judge I wasn’t able to return the judge to the situation in which he served as a judge and authenticated the document. All he does is testify to me about an event that happened there—that there was an event of authentication. And for that I have only one witness. Now I’m saying: no, we brought the signature itself to life. If we brought the signature to life—

[Speaker G] —of the authentication judge. Right. But then he wrote: “And they do not join, because judges of authentication do not testify about the valid document itself, but from the mouths of others, and perhaps this second witness is forged.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No—but that’s only when the judge validates his own signature. If two witnesses come and validate the judge’s signature, then it is not correct to say what he said there. Since what happens now is that the judge—it’s like… after all, what did he say at the beginning? What happens if the two witnesses validate the signature of a witness on the document? Right? Those two witnesses validate the signature of the document witness and the signature of the judge. Regarding the signature of the document witness, he says that this is considered like testimony about the monetary content of the document. Right. Why? After all, it’s authentication testimony, not testimony about the monetary content of the document. They’re testifying about a signature.

[Speaker G] No, but we said it’s not about the monetary content of the document; it’s about the document itself. I want to authenticate the document itself, not the loan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we didn’t say that. I said no. I said it’s about the monetary content of the document. When two witnesses come and validate the signature, it’s not that the witnesses testify about the monetary content of the document; rather, they bring to life—wait—they bring to life the signed witness, and now the signed witness is as if he is standing in the religious court and saying, “There was a loan.”

[Speaker G] Right, but that authenticates the document. It doesn’t validate the loan in the sense of an oral loan; it’s a loan with a document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, right, that too. When two witnesses come and validate the signature, it does two things. First, it brings the witness to life, and now the witness comes and testifies… he’s as if standing and testifying in the religious court: “There was a loan.” So that is testimony about the monetary content of the document. Besides that, of course the document is also authenticated, so this is a documented loan and not an oral loan. But I’m interested in the first part. Now take that same thing with the judge’s signature. Two witnesses come and bring the signed judge to life. Fine? What does it mean to bring the signed judge to life? It means that from my perspective I am now in that religious court which authenticated the document, and I receive the ruling that the document is authenticated. This is not proof that there was an act of authentication; this is testimony that the document is authenticated—really. Exactly parallel to what happens with a document witness, that’s what happens with the judge too. And it’s not true—

[Speaker G] And that was exactly his problem in Rashi’s case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. His problem in Rashi’s case was only because there I had no testimony about the judge’s signature; rather, the judge himself came and testified about—

[Speaker F] —the event.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if the judge himself comes and testifies about his signature—and after all he doesn’t remember the event, and he is also only one witness about the signature—then you can’t say we brought that religious court to life. All I know is that I have one witness that there was an event in that religious court. And that was the Rashba’s problem. But if two witnesses come and validate the signature, then from my perspective the judge who signed there is now standing here and telling me: “This document is authenticated.” That is testimony about the authentication, not about the event of authentication. It is testimony that the document is authenticated. Exactly like when two witnesses validate the signature of a document witness: then from my perspective the document witness now comes and says—not “I signed a document,” but “There was a loan.” That is testimony about the monetary content of the document. It starts with authentication, but the whole idea of authentication is to bring the signed witness to life, and from my perspective he is now basically signing the document in front of me. And what is signing the document? It is testimony that there was a loan, right? That’s what the signature on the document is. A signature on the document is testimony that there was a loan. So this witness is now signing the document. When two witnesses validate his signature, then from my perspective it is considered that the witness is now standing before me and signing the document. He testifies about the loan. And the same thing with the judge. And it’s not the same as a situation where the judge comes and validates his own signature. Because when he validates his own signature, if we had the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi, then there would be room to say that this is as if he testifies about the monetary content of the document, and then maybe indeed this would count as testimony of authentication, and that’s all the discussions we had there. But the Rashba doesn’t accept that. The Rashba does not apply to the judge’s signature the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi. He doesn’t accept it—that is exactly his claim against Rashi. And therefore the Rashba says: so let’s solve the problem—let’s take two witnesses who will validate the judge’s signature, not that the judge himself validates his own signature. Then everyone will agree that this is testimony about the monetary content of the document, where the “monetary content of the document” here is of course not the loan but the authentication, because that is the content of the testimony of the signed judge. So if two witnesses come and validate his signature, then from my perspective it is as if the judge is now standing before me and ruling: “This document is authenticated.” All right? And I’m saying this without the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi. The Rashba has to be understood as follows—maybe this is a point that needs emphasis—according to the Rashba, this whole topic has nothing to do with the Rabbis and Rabbi in the previous topic. Until now we kept assuming that this topic is a continuation of that one, and that it all goes according to the Rabbis against Rabbi. Therefore, when the judge comes and validates his own signature, that is considered like testimony about the authentication, and then there’s a dispute between Rava and Rav Yehuda. But all that is within the Rabbis against Rabbi. We are applying the idea of the Rabbis against Rabbi also to the judge’s signature, not only to the witness’s signature. The Rashba doesn’t accept that. The Rashba says: the Rabbis against Rabbi spoke about the witness’s signature, validating the witness’s signature. They are not speaking about validating the judge’s signature. Therefore with the judge’s signature we remain with the ordinary reasoning—we go with Rabbi, or with everyone; there is no special reasoning of the Rabbis disagreeing with Rabbi regarding a judge’s signature. And therefore the Rashba says: when the judge comes and validates his own signature, what have we done? We’ve done nothing. We have one witness to that signature; it’s worth nothing. We have to say that there are two witnesses who validate the judge’s signature, and then even Rabbi would agree.

[Speaker G] From his perspective, two witnesses validating the signature of one judge is like two judges themselves coming, because he said that the solution to all the claims against Rashi was that if two judges come, they can do the authentication, they can testify about the authentication. Now he’s saying that according to Rav Yehuda’s approach, I can say: I’ll bring two people for the signature of one judge, and that will be enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You slipped Rav Yehuda in there without noticing.

[Speaker G] Exactly—only Rav Yehuda, only—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Yehuda—

[Speaker G] That’s exactly the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If two judges had come, then of course it would help. It would help because I have two witnesses that the document is authenticated. But the Rashba claims that if two witnesses come and validate a judge’s signature, that is not like two judges, because here Rava says that it doesn’t help. With two judges, even Rava would say it helps—I’m talking within Rava’s view, not Rav Yehuda. If two judges had come, then clearly we have testimony that this document is authenticated, two witnesses that this document is authenticated—that is certainly good.

[Speaker G] From two judges we wouldn’t derive it. So when he says only two judges, then even according to Rava he says that would be fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. Everything he said here is according to Rava. He had a comment about how to explain Rav Yehuda, which he doesn’t know—but everything he’s saying here is in Rava’s view, after all that’s the Jewish law. Fine. Now look—now we’ll continue reading the end. “And according to my explanation, one witness who testifies to the handwriting of the two witnesses on the document, and two who testify about one of the judges of authentication—the witness and the judge join together, for with each and every signature of the document’s witnesses there are two witnesses: the one witness who now testifies about both of them, and the authentication judge.” Here is the practical difference. This is not the Rashba’s own view, Noa; this is a consequence that emerges in light of the Rashba’s view explained earlier. And now he says like this, and this is exactly the implication. He says: look, I explained to you that there are two witnesses validating the signature of a judge, and what am I claiming? That after they validated the judge’s signature, the judge himself becomes an authentication witness regarding the signatures. He testifies about the monetary content of the document; this is not the Rabbis against Rabbi—even Rabbi would agree here. Why? Because the judge’s signature comes to life, and it is as if there is now a judge standing here and saying: “I rule that both signatures are reliable,” right? That’s what the two witnesses who validated the judge’s signature did for me—as if there is now a judge standing here saying: “Both signatures are reliable.” What was the problem? The problem was that regarding the second witness’s signature, I have only that judge saying that it is authenticated, right? That’s why it didn’t work, says the Rashba. But what happens if the witness who validates the first signature is not two witnesses—if it is one witness—but he validates both signatures, not only the first witness. According to the Rashba, that will work. Why will it work? Because I have two authentication witnesses on both signatures, right? The judge is an authentication witness on both signatures, and the witness is also an authentication witness on both signatures. So two witnesses who know both signatures—that is a normal process of authentication. And that will work, says the Rashba; that’s the practical difference. Meaning, the Rashba claims that if two witnesses come and validate a judge’s signature, then from our perspective we have an authentication witness on the document. That’s the Rashba’s claim—we have an authentication witness on the document. And that is not true if the judge comes and validates his own signature. The Rashba does not accept that. That is what Rashi says according to Rav Yehuda. The Rashba is not willing to accept that, because the Rashba does not apply the view of the Rabbis against Rabbi to the signature of the judge. Therefore the Rashba does not see this whole topic as connected to the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis at all. It’s not connected at all; it’s a completely different discussion. The question here is: if two witnesses come and validate the signature of a witness and the signature of a judge, do they join or not join? Just a plain question in the laws of document authentication, unrelated to Rabbi and the Rabbis, unrelated to whether it is the monetary content of the document or not. Not related at all. It applies both according to Rabbi and according to the Rabbis. Why? Because the Rashba’s assumption is that Rabbi and the Rabbis are not talking about a judge’s signature, only about a witness’s signature. Therefore it has nothing to do with their dispute at all. It is a new topic. Everything we said until now was only in Rashi’s view and the medieval authorities who follow him. The Rashba says: not connected to the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis. And all that he writes here about the monetary content of the document—which sounds like the Rabbis’ expression—he does not mean the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi. That’s not the point. When he says “the monetary content of the document,” he only means to say that if I have two witnesses testifying about a signature, then from my perspective the signed witness now rises to life and gives his testimony before us right now. That is called testimony about the monetary content of the document. And even Rabbi agrees to that; it has nothing to do with the Rabbis against Rabbi. Rabbi also agrees that there is testimony here about the monetary content of the document, because that is true in every ordinary document-authentication process when two witnesses come and validate the document’s witnesses. What happens there, really? There is testimony here about the monetary content of the document. Not the testimony of the validating witnesses, but the testimony of the signed witnesses. Once the witnesses validated them, the signatures now become human beings standing here and speaking before the religious court and testifying about the monetary content of the document. So—

[Speaker C] So in practice, the fact that he’s a judge doesn’t really have much significance? It’s just a title he has, that’s all? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The only significance is for the worse. If he is a judge, then the reasoning of the Rabbis against Rabbi was not said about him. The Rabbis against Rabbi, who say that when the witness validates his own signature it is considered as though he testifies about the monetary content of the document—that applies only to a witness signed on the document. A judge who validates his own signature—that won’t work. Meaning, the fact that he is a judge actually works against the story, not in its favor, according to the Rashba.

[Speaker G] That’s really convincing. Convincing me now. Really convincing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. The question is, though—the question is how to explain Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda now seems to become completely unintelligible. But he says: fine, it’s a reasoning that was rejected, and it’s not terrible if we don’t understand it. And I’ll say even more than that: the wording is also difficult, as I said before. Because the wording “what this one testifies to, that one does not testify to, and what that one testifies to, this one does not testify to”—that’s not the problem. The problem is that I do not have two authentication witnesses on the second signature. Therefore I don’t validate it. Not because of some joining problem or another. I’ll say it again: these are two sides of the same difficulty. It’s not two difficulties; it’s two sides of the same difficulty. Because that is exactly why Rav Yehuda is not understood.

[Speaker E] Because one testifies about this and the other testifies about that, therefore I had two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, not because of that. Not true, not because of that. Both are giving authentication testimony, only with respect to the second signature I have only one witness. That’s all, therefore it isn’t accepted. It’s not a problem of joining. The second witness is simply not established because he is not authenticated; I have only one witness on him, so he is not authenticated. It’s not because he doesn’t join. A joining problem is when I accept both testimonies but they don’t connect together—they’re not speaking about the same thing. Here that’s not the problem. The first witness was authenticated; the second witness simply was not authenticated. That’s all. Not because he doesn’t join.

[Speaker G] It’s difficult in the language of the Talmudic text, and more than that: this explanation doesn’t work, because it says “a witness and a judge,” not “two witnesses about a judge.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not so terrible. He means to say that testimonies about a witness and a judge do not join.

[Speaker E] Yes, you can phrase the Talmudic text that way—add the word “testimonies” to the Talmudic text, and then it sort of works with the explanation the Rashba brings. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text is terse. So now I’m moving on. We already saw the Rif; we’ll do this quickly. So he brings: “And our Rabbi Alfasi, of blessed memory, explained in Bava Batra”—here, this is the passage, yes—“explained in Bava Batra: a witness who testified that he saw the loan, and a judge who testified that in his court he was found liable on the basis of witnesses, they join together.” And this really has nothing at all to do with Rabbi, nor with the Rabbis, the whole difficulty… at all. We’re talking here about a witness who testifies that he saw the loan at all—not connected to an authentication witness or anything like that. There isn’t even a document here; it isn’t even clear whether there is a document here at all. And a judge who testified that in his court he was found liable on the basis of witnesses. This is all an oral loan; it has nothing to do with a documented loan. Fine? The question is whether they join or do not join, “and Rava concluded that they do not join, because the witness testifies about the loan, and the judge testifies only that in his court he was found liable. But he does not know whether he was truly found liable or falsely.” And again I say: here too, the Rif does not mean to cast doubt on the testimony of the witnesses who came before that religious court. He only means to say that the judge who is testifying now about the event that happened there cannot testify about the loan itself. He testifies that there were two witnesses who testified about the loan. So this is not the same thing as the testimony of the first witness, and therefore it does not join. Fine? The problem is not that maybe the two witnesses in that religious court lied. That’s not the point. Rather, he means to say: you cannot know that they didn’t lie. So in the end what you are testifying to is only that they came and testified. You are not testifying to the monetary content of the document itself. Since that’s so, you do not join. “And according to his explanation,” I continue reading, “this is not similar to an acknowledgment after a loan, where they do join.” This is a point in monetary law where we combine what is called partial testimony. If one witness comes and testifies that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels—on Sunday he borrowed from him—and another witness comes and says that he borrowed from him a different loan of one hundred shekels on Wednesday, they join together, even though they are not talking about the same case. Why? Because both testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels. Why should I care why?

[Speaker E] So how much does he owe—one hundred or two hundred? One hundred.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two witnesses that he owes one hundred shekels. Not that we accept that there were two loans, because on—

[Speaker E] —each—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —one of the loans there is only one witness. But on the fact that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels—on that there are two witnesses. So that we accept. This is a rule in monetary law: we accept partial testimony.

[Speaker E] Wait, and if one said one hundred, and the second on Monday said one hundred, and the other said on Wednesday—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —one hundred—would you hold him liable?

[Speaker E] So he owes him one hundred—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because on one hundred there are two witnesses.

[Speaker E] You take the intersection of the testimonies.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because on one hundred I have two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like intersecting circles. You take only what is common to the two testimonies.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On one hundred I have two witnesses, so for that I hold him liable. This is called—the rule of partial testimony. There is another form of partial testimony: when two witnesses see the loan through two different windows. In a murder case that is not accepted, because who knows—maybe they saw two different acts. They need to stand together and see, so that it is clear that both are seeing the same situation. That too is called in the Talmudic text partial testimony, and in monetary law too we accept partial testimony from two different windows. And why? Precisely because even if these are two different events, in monetary law I don’t care. Because even if it is testimony about two—like Sunday and Wednesday. After all, testimony from two windows—why isn’t it accepted in murder? Because maybe they saw two different murders, and then for each one I have only one witness. I want to be sure that these two witnesses are testifying about the same act, so that I have two witnesses on the act, and then I accept it. So let’s go back to testimony from two windows in monetary cases. So what is the concern, why shouldn’t we accept it? Because maybe they are testifying about two different loans. But in monetary law, two witnesses about two different loans are also accepted. Therefore from two windows too they are accepted. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then it’s clear to me that one definitely existed? Yes. That one hundred definitely existed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there is a liability of one hundred shekels—that is clear to me. That is what I know: that there is a liability of one hundred shekels, and therefore this is accepted. So in monetary law—

[Speaker E] Why in such a case are we not concerned that each witness separately is lying about the very fact of the loan? When two witnesses come together to a religious court, there’s some kind of force to the fact that they come together as one group to give testimony. Why in this monetary case are we not concerned about the possibility that each one—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the assumption here for now—and this is what will lead us to Rabbi Shimon Shkop and the Netivot, we’ll get there soon—the assumption here for now is that the need for two witnesses is not because of the concern that one witness is lying. Rather, I need to have two witnesses about the event. And if I have two witnesses that he owes one hundred shekels, that is enough for me to extract one hundred shekels from him. It may be that there were two loans, but on each of those loans I do not have two witnesses, I have only one. So I cannot rule that there were two loans. I can rule that he owes one hundred shekels. Because on that I have two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s like two half-testimonies, no? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Two half-testimonies is something else; we’ll see that soon—Rabbi Shimon Shkop deals with that. So the Rashba says, apparently what? After all, what is the Rashba’s subtext? Apparently according to this it’s not clear what the Rif wants. Why should Rav Ashi and Rava say that a witness and a judge do not join? At most, you’re telling me they testify about different things—but each one testifies that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels, no? So what’s the problem? You have two witnesses that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels. Why shouldn’t you accept them?

[Speaker B] Because the judge doesn’t know which—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Exactly. So that’s his answer. So he says this is not similar to partial testimony. Why? “Because there, both of them testify truthfully. This one saw that he counted out one hundred to him, and this one saw that he acknowledged before him regarding that one hundred. But here, perhaps those who testified against him in the religious court were giving false testimony, and the judge testifies only to what he heard—only to what he heard—and we hold like Rava, who says they do not join.” Meaning, he says: the judge is not a witness that so-and-so owes money. If the judge were testifying that so-and-so owes money, then even if I had a concern that the judge is talking about a different event, not the event of the witness, that wouldn’t matter—that would be partial testimony. And in monetary law I would accept it, because I have two witnesses that so-and-so owes one hundred shekels. But the judge does not testify that so-and-so owes one hundred shekels. The judge testifies that there was testimony that so-and-so owes one hundred shekels. Therefore this is not partial testimony, and it is not accepted. That is what the Rashba claims in explaining the Rif’s approach. And that is exactly what brings me to the discussion of Rabbi Shimon Shkop. So let’s see the first part, because this actually connects to the second part of Rabbi Shimon Shkop. But let’s first see the first part. “Rava said: what advantage is there? What the witness testifies to, the judge does not testify to, and what the judge testifies to, the witness does not testify to. See the Shitah Mekubetzet, who wrote in the name of the Rashba”—yes, they didn’t know the Rashba itself; all this came through the Shitah Mekubetzet. Today manuscripts have been published, all the books came out, we know the Rashba. “He says that perhaps the witnesses lied when they testified about the handwriting. And similarly he wrote regarding one witness testifying to the reality of the act, and one witness testifying that before him witnesses were examined about that same act—that they do not join, because perhaps the witnesses lied in their testimony.” What is this? This is of course the Rif. This is what the Rashba brings from the Rif, yes. So he says that on this too the Rashba wrote the same thing; this is in the name of the Rif. “And it seems to me the explanation of the matter,” says Rabbi Shimon, “that joining witnesses helps only if both direct the testimony toward the reality of one act. But if with respect to each act there are not two witnesses, then it is not trusted at all. Now in the case of one loan after another”—meaning, what is he basically saying? We accept two witnesses only when both witnesses testify only if both witnesses testify about the same act. Only then do we accept both of their testimony. But if there are two witnesses—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —about two different acts—

[Speaker E] —that we do not accept. That’s his claim. Now of course that’s difficult because of the partial testimony we saw earlier, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the Rashba points out is that disjoint testimony refers to a loan on Sunday and a loan on Wednesday. Those are two different acts. So that’s what he immediately goes on to say. He says: now then, in the case of one loan after another, combining the testimonies does work, even though we do not believe them with respect to any single act of lending. A loan on Sunday and a loan on Wednesday—one witness on this and one witness on that—we do accept that, even though here we do not have two witnesses on either one of the acts. So why do we accept it? He says: because they are trusted regarding the existence of a right to a lien of one hundred. What does that mean? It means there is—exactly—on the very fact that he owes one hundred shekels, I have two witnesses. Therefore that is enough in monetary testimony, even though it is not about the same act of lending, it is about the same matter. Both testify that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels, so you can collect one hundred shekels from him. Since according to both of them, Reuven has a claim of one hundred against Shimon. That is why, with six witnesses on distinct times—this is in the Shulchan Arukh, you saw it, I hope—with six witnesses on distinct times, we collect only three hundreds. Because if there are six witnesses and each one testifies about a loan on a different day—one on Sunday, one on Monday, one on Tuesday—how many hundreds do we collect? Three. Right? Like three groups of witnesses on three distinct occasions. Meaning, if the six witnesses are from Sunday through Friday, then there are two witnesses that from Sunday through Tuesday Reuven acquired a right of one hundred against Shimon, and likewise from Tuesday through Thursday I have two witnesses that he acquired one hundred. And that is why, in the case where one witness testifies that he saw a loan, and one witness testifies that witnesses were examined in his presence, there is no combining. There we do not combine the two testimonies—that is what the Rif says. Why? Because with respect to the reality of the act of examination and the act of lending, there are not two witnesses, since on each act there is only one witness. On each act there is only one witness. And with respect to the reality of the obligation as well, there are also not two witnesses, because the witness who saw that they were examined does not know that Reuven really owes anything, because perhaps the witnesses lied. And again, this is not really a concern that the witnesses lied. It only means: you yourself cannot know. Exactly—you cannot testify about the event. You testify about what the witnesses said. We have no concern that perhaps they are lying. But that is not the point; you are not testifying to the event itself, so I do not have two witnesses on the act. And where there were two witnesses testifying that their testimony was examined, that is as if the witnesses testified before us, because any two are trusted regarding their report. But in this kind of case, where there are no witnesses to the reality of the act, and regarding the reality of the obligation the witness testifying about the signature of the witnesses or the examination of the witnesses knows nothing, because any two are trusted only by Torah law, but a witness who sees how they were examined in court does not thereby know it the way he would through direct seeing, because perhaps they lied in their testimony—and this is clear.

Okay, that is basically what he explains. He is just explaining what we saw earlier in the Rashba: in order to combine the two witnesses, why is this not like one loan after another? Because with one loan after another I have two witnesses to the fact that there is an obligation of one hundred here. But with a witness and a judge, I do not have two witnesses that there is an obligation of one hundred here. I have one witness to an obligation of one hundred, and one witness to the fact that there were witnesses to an obligation of one hundred.

Now notice: this may resolve the language of the Talmud according to the Rashba. Because what did we ask according to the Rashba? The language of the Talmud does not fit. Because according to the Rashba it turns out—what does the Talmud say? Why do Rav Ashi and Rava not accept this? Because what the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to. But why on earth? That is not the reason. The reason is that we do not have two witnesses to the validation of the second signature. So why are you telling me that what the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to?

Rabbi Shimon Shkop, I think, comes to resolve that difficulty. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says as follows: true, but still, I do have disjoint testimony here. I have, twice over, one witness that Reuven owes Shimon one hundred shekels. Why should that not combine even without validation? Rabbi Shimon says no, because what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. You testify to the one hundred in the document; he testifies to the validation. He is not testifying to the obligation. Had he testified to an obligation, I would accept it, because that would be disjoint testimony. But he is not testifying to an obligation at all; he is testifying to the validation. So what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to, and this is not disjoint testimony. That is what the Talmud means according to the Rashba.

In other words, Rabbi Shimon is really completing the picture. He does not present this as a difficulty on the Rashba and a solution to the Rashba, but after he explains the Rashba this way—and notice, the Rashba himself, when he cites the Rif, mentions the issue of disjoint testimony. It is not that Rabbi Shimon is forcing this into him; the Rashba himself was aware of the connection to disjoint testimony. And what I am claiming now is that, in light of Rabbi Shimon’s explanation, the difficulty we asked on the Rashba from the Talmud falls away.

Incidentally, in my view both difficulties fall away. What did we ask on the Rashba? First, what did the Rashba say? The Rashba said: how are two witnesses better than the judge himself? No, that is clear—I explained that. What did I ask on the Rashba? I asked: fine, two witnesses are better; you have validated the signature of the judge, right? So in the end, why is this not accepted according to Rava and Rav Ashi? Because for the signature of the second subscribing witness, only this one judge validates it—there is only one witness. So why do Rav Ashi and Rava explain their position by saying that there is no combining here, that this one does not testify to what that one testifies to? They should have explained: I have only one witness, and therefore the signature is not validated.

The answer I give is simple: why should I care that I have only one witness? Disjoint testimony in monetary matters is accepted. So what is the problem? The Talmud says: this is not disjoint testimony. Disjoint testimony is when each of the two witnesses separately testifies that he owes one hundred. But here, what this one testifies to is not what that one testifies to. What the witness testifies to is the one hundred in the document. What the judge testifies to is the act of validation. There is no disjoint testimony in such a case; this is not disjoint testimony. And therefore the Talmud needed the explanation that there is no testimony here. It is not a problem of combining in the sense that they do not combine because they testify to separate hundreds; rather, it is that this does not fall under the category of disjoint testimony. That is the point.

And now, in my opinion, this also resolves the Rashba’s second difficulty. Yes?

So is the case being described the same as in the Rashba?

I can’t hear.

Is the case being described the same as in the Rashba?

I am talking about the Rashba, I am talking about the Rashba.

Yes, but does Rabbi Shimon Shkop think it is the same case as in the Rashba?

He is explaining the Rashba.

I can’t hear what he thinks; he is explaining the Rashba. Fine. So according to the Rashba, that is the case.

What was the second difficulty I asked on the Rashba? What was it? He himself asked: how can one understand Rav Yehuda? How can one understand Rav Yehuda? Rav Yehuda has only one signature on the testimony, one validation on the second signature. So how can he combine such a thing? This is not just a problem of combinations, where you connect two things. You do not have validation at all—that is the whole issue.

Now we can understand it. Rav Yehuda claims that even such a thing is disjoint testimony. Why? Because at the end of the day, what is this judge saying? He is saying that two witnesses came before him and validated the signatures. So from his standpoint, what follows? That Reuven owes Shimon one hundred shekels. Right? That is what comes out of his testimony. Once he validates the signatures, what is he really saying? He is really saying that Reuven owes Shimon one hundred shekels. So why should that not combine?

The one hundred in the document is also what the judge is testifying about.

Exactly. Therefore Rav Yehuda says: this is disjoint testimony. What is the problem? That is why I combine it.

The Rashba—now from the other direction this sounds more reasonable, because in the end the judge really is testifying about the document, and the document testifies to the one hundred. So in effect we are going back to my question from two classes ago—but in the end that is what he is testifying to.

No, but look, it is not so simple. In essence, that is what he testifies to; maybe not technically, but in essence, that is what he testifies to.

No, no, it is not so simple. Because, as I said, everything I said earlier is not thrown in the trash. Meaning, the judge validates the signatures, fine. But he is still only one witness. If he had succeeded in validating the signatures completely, then it really would be testimony about the one hundred in the document. But since he is only one witness regarding the validation of the signatures, then as far as I am concerned, regarding the one hundred in the document there is not even one witness. There is nothing. Because I am not even convinced that the signatures are authentic, since I have only one witness to that. If you had managed to convince me that the signatures are authentic, but only one of the signatures were authentic, then I would say I have one witness to the one hundred in the document. But I am not convinced at all that the signatures are authentic, because even on that point I have only one witness. So as far as I am concerned, on the one hundred in the document I have zero witnesses.

And therefore Rav Yehuda’s words can be understood, but they are still far from simple. And incidentally, the Rashba himself, when he raises the difficulty on Rav Yehuda, says this is forced. He does not offer this explanation. He says it is forced, but what can you do—they rejected that opinion, so I do not care so much that it is forced. But even he himself does not use this explanation to explain Rav Yehuda. So I am saying: but perhaps this is a possibility—if Rabbi Shimon Shkop is really correct, and this is what lies behind the Rashba’s approach. I am not sure of that, but maybe it could also explain what Rav Yehuda holds.

And now Noa can be completely convinced about the Rashba’s approach. Now even these two difficulties, once you complete the picture with Rabbi Shimon Shkop, become a really wonderful explanation. Okay?

Then you have to pay close attention, because in fact the Talmud here does not mention at all the connection to Rabbi and the Rabbis. What is the connection? Nobody mentions it. And according to the Rabbis they should have said, “and according to Rabbi, what can be said,” or “according to the Rabbis.” The whole discussion about Rabbi and the Rabbis does not refer to the case that appears immediately afterward. Why not? So Rashi really does bring that in, because Rashi understands that this discussion does refer to the position of the Rabbis against Rabbi in the previous passage. And all the medieval authorities follow him, but in the Talmud itself there is no hint of this. In the Talmud itself it appears like another new case, also dealing with the laws of validation of documents. They are discussing the laws of validation of documents. According to the Rashba this is very understandable. That is another reason to support the Rashba’s approach, because in fact, yes, it really does not refer to the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis. Very true. It is unrelated. It is a different case. Okay, so there is definitely a new direction here.

Now Rabbi Shimon Shkop continues. I am going to skip all the Netivot and all those stories and go straight to the second passage in Rabbi Shimon Shkop. Did you manage to see the Netivot and all those things? The Sema?

Yes.

Yes? Okay. So I will just give some general background, but let us read.

In Netivot HaMishpat, section 145—this is simply a continuation of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s words—section 145, paragraph 2, he wanted to say that the reason for combining witnesses is because any two do not lie, and only one lies. And with six witnesses, we assume only one to be lying. And on that basis he strained himself concerning six witnesses on six hundreds at distinct times: why do we not collect five hundreds? See there.

What is the Netivot saying? The Netivot says: what is the advantage of two witnesses over one? Apparently, according to the Netivot, it is a probabilistic advantage. Meaning, if with one witness the chance he is lying is, I do not know, fifty percent, then with two witnesses the chance they are lying is twenty-five percent, say—or twenty percent, or ten percent, okay? And therefore, we prefer two witnesses over one witness simply because the cumulative chance that both are lying is smaller. That is the advantage of two witnesses.

And therefore, Rabbi Shimon says, according to this—and the Netivot himself senses this problem—what happens if I have six witnesses on six hundreds? How many hundreds should we have collected? We saw above: three, right? Every two are disjoint testimony on one hundred. If I have six witnesses on six loans, we collect three hundreds. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: why? Five hundreds. Not three—five, according to the Netivot. Because after all, the possibility that more than one witness is lying, we do not accept, right? One witness lying is possible. But more than that, no. So five hundreds. If you give him four hundreds, you are assuming that two witnesses lied. But we do not assume that two witnesses are lying. We assume only that one is lying. So with six witnesses you should have collected five hundreds, not three. According to that calculation.

There should be one witness lying, so now five witnesses remain, but every pair testifies to one hundred.

No, because it is on different days. All different days—six different days.

But the five witnesses that remain combine in pairs on one day.

No, no, no, not in pairs. Why not? Because according to what we saw, with six it is three. I will explain again.

The Netivot says as follows: in order to reject testimony, you need—you reject testimony only—you accept testimony only where if you reject it, it will turn out that there are two lying witnesses. Therefore, if one witness comes, you can choose not to accept his testimony. Why? Because even if you do not accept his testimony, what follows is only that you are assuming one witness lied. That you can assume. But if two witnesses come and you do not accept their testimony, since if you do not accept their testimony it comes out that there are two liars here—and two liars we do not assume.

If we understand things that way, now suppose six witnesses come—wait, wait, wait. Now six witnesses come. If I accept the testimony only for three hundreds, then I am assuming that three of them lied. Right? But we are not willing to assume that three are lying, only one. From two and up we do not assume they are lying. Therefore you should have given him five hundreds.

No, you are looking at it as if we are combining witnesses. According to the Netivot there are no questions of combining here. Why do I need two? Not because I need testimony of two on the matter, but because I need two so that the option of rejecting the testimony becomes so far-fetched, since you would be assuming there are two liars. And that is not plausible. If that is the conception of why two are needed—not that you need combinations, but that is the conception of why two are needed—then here you should have accepted five hundreds in the case of six testimonies.

And this is very nice, because this sugya leads us straight into the foundation of what two witnesses are. It is a specific sugya, but suddenly we see that from it emerges the whole discussion: what are two witnesses in general, in Jewish law? What are two witnesses?

So according to that, with one witness it comes out to three, and that does not fit the approach at all.

Wait, wait, we will get to that in a moment. So Rabbi Shimon Shkop cites the Netivot and argues this way. Then the Netivot gets pushed into a corner—the Netivot himself senses this difficulty, and he struggles there; it does not matter.

Now Rabbi Shimon Shkop continues:

But anyone who looks carefully sees that his words are far from the line of truth. For if so, if one witness testifies that Reuven betrothed a woman, and one witness testifies that he caused damage, we should conclude that one of them certainly did not lie, and there should be a doubtful betrothal and a doubtful monetary liability. Since according to Netivot HaMishpat, just as with one hundred, so too with two hundreds, there is likewise no combining at all between them, and they do not direct their testimony to one thing.

Meaning, the Netivot basically begins from something like disjoint testimony in monetary law. The Netivot is basically claiming: why is disjoint testimony in monetary matters accepted? Not because we combine them on the claim that so-and-so owes one hundred, but because if we say that so-and-so owes nothing at all, we will be rendering both of them liars. And that we do not do. At least one of the two loans must have occurred, because otherwise it comes out that both lied, and that is not plausible.

Do you understand the difference from the regular conception? The regular conception says that I accept disjoint testimony because there is something on which the witnesses do combine. True, they are speaking about loans on different days, but there is something on which they do combine. What is that something? That so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred shekels. Right?

The assumption that two witnesses—wait, wait a second, Yael. Yael, just one second. The regular conception is that we need a combination of two witnesses on something in order to accept that something. That is how I explained Rabbi Shimon, that is how I explained things all along. So I said: why is disjoint testimony accepted? Because there is a combining here—not on the act, true, but on the very fact that he owes him one hundred.

The Netivot says: not at all. It does not work that way. You do not need any combining of two witnesses at all. All you need is that if you reject the testimony, it comes out that two people lied. That we do not do. Therefore even if these two witnesses do not combine at all on anything, still you have to assume that one of the two loans occurred. Because if you say that neither loan occurred, it comes out that two witnesses lied. And if one of the two loans occurred, what difference does it make which one? Let him pay one hundred shekels. Therefore he pays one hundred shekels—not because they both combine on the point that he owes one hundred, but because the alternative is that there are two liars here. Logically that may look equivalent, but it is not the same thing.

Now Rabbi Shimon says: come see the difference. What Rabbi Shimon is really saying is: why is disjoint testimony accepted only in monetary matters? It should be accepted also in capital cases and in all sorts of other areas. For example, let one witness come and testify that he betrothed a woman, and another witness say that he caused damage. Fine? So what—are we not going to accept it? Because on each of those testimonies there is only one witness. But what do you mean? Two lying witnesses? We do not assume that two lie. So either he betrothed a woman or he caused damage. I have a doubt, so she should be doubtfully betrothed and he should be under doubtful liability for damages. There is no such thing, right? We do not do that.

Disjoint testimony is accepted in monetary matters; disjoint testimony is not accepted in other contexts. From here, Rabbi Shimon says, there is proof that the Netivot is not right. Disjoint testimony combines because they truly do combine on the point that he owes one hundred—not because the alternative is that there are two liars, as the Netivot says. Fine? That is the idea of two witnesses.

He asks another question: furthermore, how can this sugya be sustained? For if only one of them is testifying truthfully, we ought to obligate in any event, just like two who testified about a loan or about the examination in court. He returns to our sugya. How did Rabbi Shimon explain our sugya, the Rif and the Rashba? There is a judge testifying to the validation, and there is a witness testifying to the one hundred in the document, right? We asked: why is this not disjoint testimony? So he says: because they are not testifying to the same thing. This one testifies to the validation and that one to the one hundred.

Rabbi Shimon says: according to the Netivot, why should I care? If you want to claim that he does not owe the one hundred, then you have made both of them into liars. And we are not willing to do that. According to the Netivot, they do not need to combine on the same thing. I remind you: all that is required is that rejecting the testimony would render both of them liars. That happens here too. So why, according to the Netivot, do we not accept this testimony? That is a strong question.

And I would add another question: what about “we would end up extracting money by the mouth of one witness”? That is what Ruti asked earlier. What about that? I asked that on the page too. Why does the Talmud say that this does not combine? To say that he owes nothing at all, we would have to make both of them into liars.

Let me remind you of the case. One witness comes who validates his own signature and the signature of the second witness, and another witness validates the signature of the second witness—the second witness died, yes? The Talmud says this is not accepted. Why? Because I have three-quarters of the force here, right? According to the Netivot, there are no words for this at all; you cannot say it. Why not? Because if—so what do you want to say? That we do not accept this testimony? Then what follows? That two witnesses lied. But we are not willing to accept that two witnesses lie. So why should I care now about this division of three-quarters and one-quarter? The whole idea of three-quarters and one-quarter speaks precisely in the language of combining. I want to combine two witnesses, and only that way do I accept their testimony together. To that the Talmud says: combining has to be equal, each one contributing half of the total. But according to the Netivot, we are not dealing with combinations at all. We are dealing with combined probabilities, not combinations of force. So why should I care if “money would be extracted by the mouth of one witness”? In order to reject this testimony, you have to tell me that both of them are liars, and that is not acceptable.

So we have seen the Netivot through Rabbi Shimon’s lens. We did not actually see the Netivot inside. But through Rabbi Shimon’s lens—

Wait, wait—what?

Through Rabbi Shimon’s lens, the Netivot says that you can—that we reject—he agrees that one witness can lie but all the others cannot. But at least from the language Rabbi Shimon quotes from the Netivot, I do not see that the Netivot is talking about every possible testimony on anything. I mean, it could be that the Netivot was talking about the specific case where we are speaking, say, about the loan—that Reuven—

What do you mean, a specific case? The Netivot states a general principle. A general principle that says—

Okay, we need to see him inside.

Then go look at him inside. Or you do not have to. Rabbi Shimon saw him inside and you did not. So if you want to say Rabbi Shimon is not right, then look at him inside and say he is not right. But right now this is still through Rabbi Shimon’s lens. Fine, through Rabbi Shimon’s lens. And it could be that he is overextending here, that Rabbi Shimon interpreted the Netivot in an overextended way.

Look inside if you think he interpreted him that way. What is written in the Netivot is what Rabbi Shimon says. What is written in the Netivot is that the calculation is a probabilistic one and not a legal one of combinations; rather, it is a probabilistic calculation. And on that Rabbi Shimon asks him a good question.

The point is this. Regarding those two in the monetary case, it seems to me that one could resolve it. Because regarding those two in the monetary case, who are the two witnesses that I am deciding lied? The witness and the judge? No—those two in the monetary case. Those two in the monetary case means when there are two document witnesses, Reuven and Shimon. Reuven is alive, Shimon is dead. Reuven testifies about his own signature, and for Shimon two witnesses come and validate his signature. Fine? Yes.

No, sorry—one witness validates his signature, and I join him to that one witness, okay? Now I ask: I did not accept the testimony. Who turns out to be a liar? Shimon and Reuven? Not true.

No, Reuven and the second witness. Levi—does Levi turn out to be a liar? Levi says that this is Shimon’s signature; it may well be Shimon’s signature. I am only saying that there was no loan. Levi does not become a liar; it has not been proven that this is not Shimon’s signature. I am only claiming that I cannot extract the money; there was no loan. At most it comes out that Shimon is a liar. Assuming that we both validated him, it comes out that Shimon is a liar. If I assume that the signature is not Shimon’s signature, then indeed both Reuven and Levi would turn out liars. That cannot be assumed. But it could be that if I accept that the signature is Shimon’s signature, I am only claiming that maybe Shimon is lying when I do not rule on the basis of this testimony.

So what follows? Then I am basically saying that Shimon is lying and Reuven is lying. Now Shimon is dead, meaning he is not actually standing here testifying. The question is whether even on that the Netivot would say that I am unwilling to assume that Reuven and Shimon—when Shimon is not even the one currently testifying—both come out liars. Maybe not, I do not know. It may be different. Although on the face of it, it is a question.

And one could also say that because he is already dead, then he no longer cares about being a liar.

What?

He is already dead, so what difference does it make if he is exposed as a liar?

He is not the witness testifying before me. In fact, let me ask an even harder question on the Netivot. Fine? Let us go with Rabbi Shimon Shkop. Throughout all of history, whenever only one witness came, we never accepted his testimony, right? Only two. How can that be? After the first case where we did not accept the one witness’s testimony, then from that point onward all later one-witness testimonies should have had to be accepted, because one witness has already been declared a liar. How can you declare that there is another liar? Is that serious?

But that is what Yael was trying to say before—that he means the probability of two on exactly the same case.

Exactly. I think Rabbi Shimon is mistaken in his understanding of the Netivot, because otherwise what the Netivot says really is unreasonable—it cannot be. And therefore all of Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s questions are not correct.

I would formulate the question I just asked; it is even stronger. Obviously it is completely absurd, and that shows that the Netivot cannot possibly mean that literally. The Netivot probably means to say something additional. He means that there is a combining of two witnesses on one act. And the assumption is that on that same act, or on that same matter, there will not be two who lie. What—throughout all of history there were never two witnesses who lied? What kind of nonsense is that? Of course there were. Rather, I do not assume that on a certain act, when two witnesses come, both are lying.

Again, the principle the Netivot says is a correct principle. Rabbi Shimon understood him correctly in that sense. I am not saying what Rabbi Shimon says; I am not merging the Netivot with Rabbi Shimon. The Netivot does not require combining of two witnesses on one act. But the Netivot is speaking about the statistical consideration when it concerns the same content. It is not possible that in the same case there are two liars—not that it is impossible that there are two liars, period. So if one witness comes to me about betrothal and one witness about damages, what is the connection? The Netivot will not say that we are now in doubt whether this is true or that is true. If two witnesses come on the same case, it is not plausible that two witnesses are lying about the same case. That is not plausible.

I would say even more than that. I do not have enough time to get there, but it seems to me that an even more plausible thing to say is that the reason this is not possible is not merely that it is not possible for two witnesses to lie, but because we cross-check testimonies. They are talking about the same case. We check: wait, wait, when was it, how was it, where, exactly where were they standing, what was the amount—and we cross-check the testimony of the two witnesses. And if it matches, that is an indication that they are not lying. When one witness comes, I have nothing against which to cross-check what he says. In other words, two witnesses are not just twice one witness; they are ten times one witness, because it is two times one witness plus the cross-check between them. One plus the cross-check I perform between the two of them, which further strengthens each one individually.

So there is indeed a probabilistic consideration, but the probabilistic consideration is relevant only when we are talking about the same case. Because if one witness comes about betrothal and another witness comes about damages, how can I cross-check the testimonies? They are not talking about the same case at all.

But the probabilistic consideration still will not explain disjoint testimony. Why? Because if I say the probability is weak that they are talking about the exact same case, not the same situation—

No, that is exactly the novelty in monetary law: that even saying so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred is a case. The case is not the loan; it is not the process of lending, but the debt that exists.

Exactly. In other words, a debt has some probabilistic profile, some mechanism we activate. The probabilistic consideration really does make sense that in the same case two people would lie. The probabilistic consideration says that in the same situation it is not plausible that two people would lie. Now what counts as the same situation is of course not only probabilistic, but it is connected to probability. Two people come and say that Reuven owes Shimon one hundred, even if from different loans. What, they both latch onto him, exactly him, for exactly the same amount? That is not plausible. So it still combines in that sense. It is not like one testifies to damages and one testifies to betrothal.

And if one says two hundred and the other says three hundred, then it is plausible they are lying?

No, no, no, because there is still someone here trying to obligate him to pay money. So I say it is a little less implausible, but still it is two witnesses. Where exactly the line is drawn—fine, here it really is somewhat arbitrary. But it is true that there is greater plausibility here. It is different from, say, one witness saying he betrothed a woman and one witness saying he caused her damage, or caused someone else damage. So I say: where the line is drawn can be debated. But it is clear that even according to the Netivot there is a line. Meaning, it has to be somehow within the same context. It is not just a probabilistic consideration of two independent testimonies where I multiply the probabilities of error or lying and therefore get a lower number. That is a simplistic way of looking at it.

If that were true, then after one witness was once rejected, from then on throughout history we would have had to accept one-witness testimonies. That cannot be. The Netivot certainly does not mean that. Okay?

So good, I do not even have enough time to get to it. I will just say one sentence, with your permission, about an objection to a court certification. We talked about this—you asked it many times in the first classes. What is the point of making a court certification if afterward the borrower can say the whole thing is forged, and we will have to validate the certification? So leave the document without a certification; you will need to validate it, and everything is fine. What does it help me that you validated it, wrote and signed a certification, and now the person has a document with a certification?

So one answer is that according to the Ritva, we saw that objecting to a certification is more difficult. Because to assume that the forgery is both on the signature of the document and on the signature of the certification, that is a far-reaching assumption. Therefore the evidence needed to uphold the certification can be less demanding. So already there is significance to a certification.

A second possibility is that, even regardless of combining the certification with the document witnesses, validation of a certification can be done at a lower threshold. Maybe one judge would be enough, for example—according to Rav Yehuda, for instance. Why? Because to say that a certification is forged is really a far-reaching claim for several reasons. First, as the Ritva says. But beyond that—why would a person forge a certification? He forges a document. But to forge the certification too—that is not reasonable.

Like the migo of Nachmanides.

Yes, exactly. Especially since we say that the signatures of the judges are also usually a seal, something much more recognizable. It would be much easier to identify. Therefore forgery there is not plausible. With the signatures of private witnesses, who knows whether you will find someone who recognizes the signature. A religious court is a public institution. You can easily find other documents that the court signed and validate it. It is not plausible that someone would forge such a thing. Okay?

So an objection to a certification—what does that mean, really? It means: perhaps—

It is implausible, and therefore what? Therefore you do not need to validate a certification? Or it is implausible, and therefore there is still a reason to make a certification even though one can claim against it that it is forged? Those are two different conclusions.

You could say that it is implausible that a person would forge a certification, and therefore one cannot raise a forgery claim against a certification. And that is of course not Rashi and not the other medieval authorities, because they argued that one can claim forgery against a certification and then we need to examine how to validate it, right?

That could be the Rif’s view.

That could be the Rif’s view, because the Rif really says we are not talking here about forgery of a certification. Why did he really go in that direction? Maybe because he was not willing to accept that one can challenge a certification—it just cannot be.

Exactly, that is what leads him there. But there is another possibility. We asked: according to Rashi’s view, what is the point of making a certification? In the end one can still challenge it as forged. So what have you gained by making the certification? The answer is: of course I gained something. Because a certification is a recognizable seal, it will be much easier for me—

To validate it.

Meaning, even if he challenges it as forged, I will quite easily find witnesses or parallel signatures to compare it with and validate the matter. And therefore there is a point in making a certification even though one can claim forgery against it.

So what I want to say, in one closing sentence, is this: according to the Rif, one really cannot claim forgery against a certification, and then the question never arises. That is exactly why the Rif does not accept the direction of Rashi and all the other medieval authorities. Because he says: what do you mean? Then what would be the point of making a certification? You make a certification because against that one cannot claim forgery. That is the Rif’s view.

The Ritva says: one can claim forgery against a certification, but we will make do with a lower standard of proof to validate the certification, at least according to Rav Yehuda and those with him. And as for Rashi, I claim—and those with him, and most of the medieval authorities—who explain that here we really are talking about an objection to the certification, meaning it seems that one can challenge a certification, still what is the point of making a certification? There is a point, because after there is an objection it will be easier for me to validate it. It is a public seal; everyone recognizes it. Even if there is an objection, I will validate it easily. Therefore there is a point in making a certification. It is worth doing.

And one final note. When the Rashba asks this question—look here, everyone asks this question: why make a certification? The Ritva and the Rashba and so on. The Rashba says: “And according to Rashi’s explanation, we learn from here that the judges’ attestation”—the judges’ approval, the certification—“requires validation.” As though one can claim against it that it is forged, and that would require validation. Why does he say “according to Rashi’s explanation”? All the others—look, for example, at the Ritva—“and incidentally we hear from our sugya,” it appears from the Talmud, not from Rashi. It appears from the Talmud that a certification requires validation. The same in Nachmanides—everyone says the same thing. Why does the Rashba say “according to Rashi’s explanation” and not “according to the Talmud”? Because the Rashba also cites the Rif. According to the Rif’s explanation, this does not emerge from the Talmud; that is, it is not correct to infer this from the Talmud.

True, the Rashba himself does understand it this way in the Talmud, because the Rashba himself explains it as a claim against the certification, and the other medieval authorities say so too. But it is not proof from the Talmud; it is proof from Rashi on the Talmud. Fine? The other medieval authorities learned the Talmud that way. They did not know of another explanation of the Talmud, so for them it emerges from the Talmud. Okay, we will stop here, and we will move on to the next sugya.

A comment?

Yes.

Can I ask something not related to the class?

Yes, yes.

I want to know when I can consult with you about the paper.

Sure, now is fine. Sunday is also fine.

Okay, is Sunday possible?

Yes, Sunday is possible too.

Okay, and at what time?

Sunday—it does not really matter to me. Just tell me.

In the morning?

Morning is fine, yes.

At 10:00?

Okay.

Great, thank you.

Thank you very much, Sabbath peace.

Sabbath peace. And we need to hear what is happening on Tuesday, right?

What is on Tuesday?

We are going back to classes, no?

We are not going back to classes—what are you talking about? I do not know, we will get a message.

Third grade.

I understand. Okay, I am in my third year, and I have learned that it is foolish to return to classes based on third grade. They should wait another two weeks and then decide. But we will not open that here.

No, no—there are people who have to go back to work, there is nothing to do.

Okay, Sabbath peace.

Thank you very much.

Goodbye, thank you very much, Sabbath peace.