Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 31

This transcript was produced automatically באמצעות artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot says this even in the final conclusion, unlike the Rashba. We’ll see that in just a moment. Wait, one second—since the page is already in front of me, I’m already noticing things I want to correct. Okay. But in the end the Rashba rejects this explanation, and he says as follows: “And this is not clear to me, because according to what you initially thought to say, that we are concerned about something appearing false, it’s impossible to say this.” Later in the Talmudic passage there is a discussion about what happens if they signed—wrote the validation document—before they even knew of the validation at all. Okay? So he says that since there is a problem there of “it appears false,” you see that the problem here is not the concern of having a personal stake in the matter, but that the signatures themselves appear false. And therefore he really arrives at Rashi’s conclusion. That’s what he says in the second bolded line here: “And it seems, as Rashi of blessed memory explained, that before they signed, they may testify before him—even they themselves—and certainly others may. But those who already signed may not testify before him, neither they nor others.” We saw earlier in Rashi that according to Rashi, others won’t help either. “Because the first signature was false, since there were not three who knew it.” Okay? So in the end he goes back to Rashi’s explanation—not like Tosafot, who remains with that explanation—but rather he retracts from that explanation and ultimately explains like Rashi.

And now he explains what Rashi means. So he says: “An explanation of his explanation: at the time they signed”—he explains why it is false—“at the time they signed, the third was not joined with them, because he did not know that this was their signature, the witnesses’ signature. And by the time they testified before him, their signing had already been completed,” meaning they had already signed. “What was, was.” Meaning, what they signed, they already signed, and there is no retroactive joining. Meaning, if he didn’t sign with them then, the signature he gives now will not join the first two signatures retroactively, and therefore there is no court of three that signed this validation document. It turns out that there were not three here fit to validate, and they were not judges but witnesses. And so too explained the Ra’ah of blessed memory.” So he says: therefore there are not three judges fit to validate, and so the signature is in effect false. But notice that he adds one more sentence here, something I pointed out earlier as a possibility. He adds: “and they were not judges but witnesses.”

I said earlier, when I explained Rashi, what is Rashi saying is false here? Basically it’s an argument of “whichever way you take it.” If I view you as judges, that’s false, because you are testifying that you were judges—but you are only two. A religious court is three. You can’t say that you are judges. There is another option: that you are witnesses. You are two witnesses, so the signatures are validated. That’s true. But if you are functioning as witnesses, then this is testimony from their written statement, and testimony from their written statement is not valid, because witnesses cannot testify in writing. If they came and testified orally, everything would be fine. So these signatures have to be understood as signatures of judges, not signatures of witnesses. And I think that’s what he’s adding here—that sentence. Meaning there is a kind of whichever-way-you-turn-it problem here, okay? Because that’s always the natural move. You say to me: as judges we signed falsely? Fine, then treat us as witnesses. The answer is: as witnesses too you can’t be accepted, because it is “from their writing and not from their mouths.” In short, either way it doesn’t work. If you are witnesses, it’s testimony from writing; if you are judges, it’s false.

[Speaker C] Why say “from their writing”? Just say that they can’t sign, because they are still in the status of witnesses, so they can’t sign a validation document as though they were judges.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then look at this validation document as testimony, not as a court ruling. There is testimony here from two witnesses that the signatures are validated. So the point is that it can’t be testimony, because testimony has to be given orally, not in writing. A validation document is a special innovation of a court. A court can give its stamp in writing. You don’t always have to summon the judges orally if some doubt arises so that they can tell us what they rule. A court has the privilege of presenting its ruling in writing, and the validation document is a court ruling. But if you want to treat it as witnesses, then testimony cannot be given in writing; testimony has to be given orally.

Now another comment of the Rashba: “And if you should say: how is their statement called a statement? After all, they testified only before one person. And a statement is only before a court.” That’s what I pointed out earlier. Yes—what he’s really asking is: how can that be? Testimony has to be received before three. So I would ask him: what about capital cases, where testimony is received before three even though the court required is twenty-three?

[Speaker B] Because only the final ruling needs to be with twenty-three.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then here too, say that the final ruling must be before three, but testimony can be given before a single judge. The Rashba assumes not. Why not?

[Speaker D] Maybe because three is already a small court, so it already counts as something. That’s different from one judge.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like you said earlier: in a court of twenty-three, if you receive testimony before three, still the one who received the testimony was a court. But here, one out of three is not a court for any purpose at all. A practical difference, for example: according to the one who says you can receive testimony before three in capital cases, could testimony also be received before one or two? The answer is no. Why not? Because that isn’t a court.

[Speaker B] Meaning even in capital cases—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re willing to relax things and receive the testimony before a smaller panel, but it still has to be a court panel. It can’t be something that is not a court at all. So that’s what the Rashba assumes here. In other words, the Rashba says testimony has to be given before a court. How can it be that they are giving testimony before a single judge?

Now there are those of you who may want to say that validation of documents is rabbinic. Validation of documents is testimony that can even be given before a single judge; it’s some kind of leniency, because we know that strictly speaking a document does not need validation at all. It’s only a rabbinic enactment that documents be validated, so the Sages also agreed that it could be done before one. It’s some kind of rabbinic leniency. But that is a bit difficult, at least according to Tosafot on page 28, which we saw last semester, because Tosafot said there that if the borrower claims against the document that it is forged, then the obligation to validate it is Torah-level, not merely a rabbinic enactment. The rabbinic enactment is to validate it in every case, but if the borrower claims that the document is forged, then the obligation to validate it is Torah-level. Now here we don’t see any distinction. It doesn’t say here that only if the borrower does not claim forgery can this procedure be done. So according to Tosafot that approach definitely doesn’t work.

And therefore the Rashba himself gives two answers here. He says as follows: “One can say that it is where he was an expert and judges even alone,” what Ruti mentioned earlier, “and judges even alone like other monetary cases. And thus their statement before him is like a statement before a court of three ordinary judges.” You have to understand that this answer is not trivial, because in the end we are talking about all three signing. Now if he is a lone judge… we are talking about one who was an expert, who could sign even by himself. So why… then what is the whole story here with a witness becoming a judge? What proof is there at all that a witness can become a judge? You tell me: I have proof that a witness can become a judge. Why? Because after we testify before the third judge, we join him and together form a panel of three judges. So there is the proof that even though we started as witnesses, we can become judges. Not true. According to Nachmanides, we don’t join him at all. We testify before him, and he signs alone as an expert judge, and everything is fine. No witness here turned into a judge. In our passage it is obvious that those two join him and sign together. But according to Nachmanides, if we are talking about such an expert that he can judge alone, why do we need this? Let him sign alone, and then the whole question of how you infer from the Talmud here that a witness becomes a judge never even arises. That is really strange. I think that what…

[Speaker C] Maybe because at first they sat as a court and then they got up as witnesses?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but again, they didn’t sit as a court. They planned to. That’s irrelevant; it has no significance. They testified and afterward became judges. And according to Nachmanides they don’t need to become judges at all.

It seems to me that in order to write a validation document—two possibilities, I’m saying. First, in order to write a validation document you need three, even if the judge is an expert. He won’t be able to write a validation document alone. Because when this comes before another court that doesn’t know him, how will I know whether he is an expert or not? How can I trust this validation document? Now I need to search for witnesses to determine whether the judge who signed here alone was really an expert and therefore able to sign alone. That’s not efficient. If you want to write a validation document so that it will be accepted in any future court, get three judges to sign it. And then it turns out that even if the receiving of testimony is done by a lone judge because he is an expert, when he comes to sign the validation document it has to be done with three. That is one possibility for reconciling the Talmud.

Another possibility is to say that Nachmanides means this: in truth, the judge here is not an expert judge, and therefore you need three to sign the validation document. So why is it nevertheless possible to receive the testimony before one? Since in monetary law, because an expert judge can decide monetary cases alone, even one counts as a reduced form of court. So receiving testimony before one is like receiving testimony before three in capital cases. Do you understand what I’m saying? So basically he is an ordinary judge, not an expert judge, and therefore he may not judge alone. The decision here will have to be made by three judges, and the three judges sign the validation document. But why can the two judges testify before him when he is just one judge? If he is not a court, then he cannot receive testimony—and he is not an expert, we already agreed.

[Speaker B] So in monetary law we have a situation where one is a court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Because in monetary law even one is a court—true, only if he is an expert, but still, there is a situation in which even one is a court. So the Talmud says: regarding receipt of testimony—not the ruling itself—regarding receipt of testimony, I am willing to allow even one who is not an expert to receive the testimony, just as I am willing for testimony in capital cases to be received before a court of three. Because in capital cases even one expert cannot judge, so one is out of the question there, but three is still a court. Therefore I am willing to allow the testimony to be received even before three. And perhaps there is room to discuss, according to this, whether a lone expert judge could receive testimony even in capital cases. Maybe. I don’t know.

In any event, that is the first answer. “One can also say,” says the Rashba, “that they seated others from among their colleagues next to the lone one, and they testified, and afterward they themselves become judges with him.” What does that mean? It means that we testify before him, and while he is sitting opposite us, we add two more people to him—meaning, there are three sitting opposite us. Okay? We finish testifying, those two fellows leave, we sit down in their chairs, and then the three of us sign the validation document.

[Speaker B] Wait—who is “we”? Additional other judges?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—the two judges who testified. Otherwise this is not a case of a witness becoming a judge. How does the Talmud learn from here that a witness becomes a judge? It’s obvious that in the end the ones signing are the witnesses who testified. That’s why I’m saying: the case here is very convoluted. Both of the Rashba’s answers are very far from simple. The Rashba’s second answer is not simple because it’s obvious we are talking about a situation in which the ones who sign in the end are the two witnesses who testified together with the third judge, not two others. Only at the stage of receiving testimony, when they testify before the third judge, they ask two others to join him so that the testimony will be received before a court of three. But then why shouldn’t those two remain seated and sign as well? Why do they have to leave, and now we—who had been witnesses—sit down in their seats and sign?

[Speaker B] That’s very forced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that, I’ll ask it differently: how does the Talmud know to prove from here that a witness becomes a judge? If they added two others to the third in order to receive the testimony, then maybe those two also signed with him, and that’s all. Then we were only witnesses and did not become judges. How does the Talmud infer from here that a witness becomes a judge?

[Speaker B] But beyond that, it could be that… again, one at a time. Yael. It could be that the judge who is the witness—and never mind exactly who—but how can he be a judge if he doesn’t have the proper qualifications or ordination?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, the qualifications are there.

[Speaker B] If so, then the people here who are talking about this group of Rav Chisda and Rav Huna and Rav Sheshet—these are all judges in some sense. Right? There are five judges here. Exactly. Okay, so that’s fine. If they are all judges to begin with, then it’s fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, for our purposes they are all judges.

[Speaker B] So why say “a witness becomes a judge”? It’s simply unnecessary. That’s an objection to the Rashba.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, obviously.

[Speaker C] And in tractate Rosh Hashanah it says explicitly that they join together. If here it doesn’t say that they join, then why…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that later. Tosafot already raises that point.

[Speaker C] But you should know, because that’s what Tosafot…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot here… Tosafot already notes that, and we’ll see it shortly. But right now, what is the problem? The problem is that if I seat two others together with the judge who receives our testimony, it could be that those two are also the ones who signed with him.

[Speaker B] So why do I need one of the witnesses to sign?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. No—not only why do I need that; who said that is really what happened there? Meaning, the Talmud proves from there that a witness becomes a judge. Who says so? Maybe the witness really did not become a judge, and the ones who signed here were the two who heard our testimony together with the third judge.

[Speaker C] And we—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —did not become judges.

[Speaker C] Wait, then even then you also can’t prove that seeing is greater than hearing. Right. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that wasn’t proven from here, so there’s no problem. The point is that this answer of Nachmanides is very difficult, because how can you prove from here that a witness becomes a judge? I think the way to understand it is that indeed two join the one in order to receive the testimony. But if they themselves were also going to sign, then what is the novelty? Fine—two people who know the signatures come, they validate the signatures before three judges, and the three judges sign. So what is this saying coming to teach? Since this saying comes to teach something—since it is not just some trivial point—we apparently understand that it comes to teach that a witness becomes a judge. Meaning, the witnesses who testified before the third judge afterward join and sign with him. We only still have the question how he received their testimony as a lone judge. Apparently he added two more to hear the testimony. But clearly in the end those others left and we signed, because if not, there would be no novelty here at all. Therefore they proved from here that a witness becomes a judge. Okay? Fine.

And then I continue in the Talmud. “And do we write it?” the Talmud asks. “But Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: this certification by judges that is written before the witnesses have written their signatures is invalid, because it appears false. Here too it appears false.” Yes—there is a question there whether we can write the wording of the validation document before we have even received the validating testimony.

[Speaker C] But not only the signing—even the whole writing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning, three judges sit to validate the document, and none of them knows the signatures. Wait—maybe the reverse?

[Speaker C] They wrote the text before the signing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one second. We’re rushing. Three judges sit and are about to validate a document, and we do not know the signatures. Not the exact case in our Talmud here—a regular case. We are waiting for two witnesses to come before us and testify that the signatures are valid. In order to save time, we already write: “We, the three judges, sign here that the signatures were validated before us.” We don’t sign yet; we only write the wording. We wait for the validating witnesses to come; the validating witnesses will validate the signatures; after we hear that, we sign at the bottom of the validation document, and that’s all. “Certification” and “validation document” are the same thing, yes? The judges’ approval. So Rav Pappi says it is forbidden to do such a thing, because it appears false. Meaning, you cannot write such a thing before you know it. Even though you only sign in the end, still, that writing is false writing—it looks false.

[Speaker C] Why? You can’t keep prepared forms in the judges’ hands?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Prepared forms, exactly—

[Speaker C] With space for signatures.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Prepared validation forms with space for signatures—you may not do that. Exactly so. Okay? That is what Rav Pappi says.

So the Talmud says: if so, then what about our case? In our case, the two witnesses signed the document, okay? And afterward they testify before the third. Sorry, wait. Had the witnesses already signed? Yes, the witnesses signed the document. One possibility is that the witnesses signed the document and then came and testified before the third judge. We do not accept that, right? What happens if the two witnesses have not yet signed? Then we say they can testify before the third judge and then sign together with him.

[Speaker B] But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As far as the writing goes, has it already been written?

[Speaker B] Yes, that’s how it sounds. Huh? Yes. Why? They testify orally, and then they sign. But the text of what they are going to sign has already been written. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we are talking only about postponing the signing. The wording is already written. Because otherwise, in the second case—when they signed and then came to testify, and that is invalid—there it is obvious that it had already been written. Such a thing appears false. Rather, say this: “Before they wrote it, they testify before him and he signs. Those who wrote it may not testify before him and he signs.” Meaning, not only after they signed may they not testify before him, but even after they wrote it they may not testify before him. Why not? Why can’t they testify before him after they wrote it? After all, the signing was not false, because it had not yet happened. The signing they will do together with the third. What exists in the meantime is only the wording.

Exactly—and because that too is considered something that appears false. True, it is not actual falsehood, it only appears false. But if writing can appear false, then the writing of the two witnesses before the third judge knew also appears false, and that too is forbidden. Okay? That is how they ultimately explain it. And if you saw Tosafot, then you already know that Rav Pappi’s statement is itself disputed. Rav Pappi is not an agreed law; there is a dispute there, Rav disagrees with him and various other things. But still, at least according to Rav Pappi, that is what the Talmud is saying.

Now let me go back for a second to what we saw in the Rashba above. The Rashba wanted to prove from here—from the fact that it appears false—against Tosafot’s explanation and in favor of Rashi’s explanation. Remember? Why, once they have signed, can they no longer go and testify before the third? Rashi said because it is a false signature, right? And Tosafot said because the testimony before the third is testimony of witnesses who have a personal stake in the matter.

[Speaker C] Not Tosafot—the Rashba.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rashba brought it, but as I already noted, that is the explanation Tosafot gives. In the end the Rashba rejects it. Tosafot remains with it. Okay? So for the sake of the discussion I’ll call it now Tosafot’s explanation. So Tosafot basically explains that the testimony is problematic testimony, but the signature is not, right? What was the Rashba’s proof from here? I think it’s not an absolutely compelling proof, but that really is the implication. The Rashba’s proof from here is that you see from this Talmudic discussion that the problem is in the signature itself. It appears false—not in the testimony given afterward, where they have a personal stake in the matter. And to that we ask: wait, if the problem is in the signature itself, then why not in the writing? And then the Talmud moves it back and says: also in the writing. But the original problem we see is a problem in the signature; it is not a problem in the testimony that comes afterward. Right? And that is exactly Rashi’s explanation, not Tosafot’s. I’m saying it’s not necessary, because one could say that the inference is only linguistic—the problem is really in the testimony that comes afterward, only there is still a question: why don’t you see a problem in the writing itself? Why is the problem only in the testimony afterward? Then the Talmud says: because it was before the writing. Okay…

Tosafot, on the words “Rav Pappa said”—I brought it here, and you can also look at it in your text if you want: “And Rav Pappa said, this document…” “You might say that he raises an objection from Rav Pappa, but in the chapter ‘The one who writes’ it concludes that he does not hold like Rav Pappa from Rav Nachman. And further, in the chapter ‘All bills of divorce’ in tractate Gittin it concludes that Rav does not hold like Rav Pappa. So how can he raise an objection here from Rav Pappa against a statement of Rav?” Right? First, we rule not like Rav Pappa. Second, even if we did rule like Rav Pappa, Rav himself does not hold like Rav Pappa. And I remind you of the version in our Talmud above, where the author of the statement is in the name of Rav. All these speakers are saying it in the name of Rav. So Tosafot says, first answer: “Nevertheless, one can answer the second objection, that he is asking according to the wording ‘they said it in the name of Rav Huna.’” We saw that there is a version that does not bring Rav into the picture. Only according to the second version do we say that this statement was said in the name of Rav. So here the objection is only according to the first version. Fine? I mean the second objection, yes. The first objection is not resolved that way, because the first objection says this is not the law at all; it has nothing to do with whether it is Rav or not Rav—it’s simply not the law. And then he says: “And one cannot say that this is the objection: since it says ‘those who signed may not testify before him and sign,’ evidently we are concerned about something appearing false, so too those who wrote before they signed, since writing too appears false”—which is exactly what the Rashba says. From the signature we infer to the writing. “For if so, there would be a contradiction from Rav to Rav, because here he is concerned about something appearing false, while in the chapter ‘All bills of divorce’ he is not concerned about something appearing false.” Therefore he does not accept the Rashba’s reasoning—that is exactly his point. Rather, the reason is that “those who signed are like people with a personal stake in the testimony,” somewhat like what he explained in the booklet regarding “world, year…” That is already something else. This is the explanation the Rashba brought and rejected; this is Tosafot’s explanation. Okay? It’s less important for our purposes, just to show that the explanation the Rashba rejected remains in Tosafot.

What is the halakhic conclusion? The practical conclusions. The Talmud says as follows. Maybe before we move on—where are you holding in terms of the preparation page?

[Speaker B] I finished.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I went over Rosh Hashanah.

[Speaker B] Me too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking about Rosh Hashanah.

[Speaker B] About Ketubot and Rosh Hashanah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In terms of the Rashba, for example—the Rashba and Tosafot, did you see them?

[Speaker B] But I didn’t finish the Rashba because it was more complicated for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So let’s continue in the Talmud here. There are three conclusions. “Learn from this three things.” We learn three conclusions from this. First: “Learn from this that a witness becomes a judge.” We saw that. How do we know from here that a witness becomes a judge? First, from the first law, because we see that they testified and afterward become judges. But also from the second case. Because in the second case we see that what bothers us is not at all that they testified and afterward become judges. What bothers us is that the first signature is considered false. So in the second case too, implicitly, we see that a witness becomes a judge.

And “learn from this,” second novelty: judges who know the signatures of the witnesses do not need the witnesses to testify before them. Meaning, seeing is greater than hearing, right? In other words, we see from here that if the judges know and recognize the witnesses’ signatures, then there is certainly no requirement that the witnesses testify before them. The requirement of testimony is only to inform the judges. It is not some formal requirement that testimony specifically be delivered here.

[Speaker C] And here are we talking about all three judges knowing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If all three judges know, then there is no need at all. But here, even if only two judges know, testimony is needed before the third—but not before the first two. Okay?

[Speaker B] And is this only in monetary matters, or also in capital cases, if we learn it that way?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. Seemingly also in capital cases.

[Speaker B] Meaning if there are three judges who saw a murder, they don’t need to bring witnesses. That’s it. But Tosafot says there that they can’t be witnesses in order to reverse it in favor of the murderer—not because they…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a different passage. We’ll still talk about that. Okay? So the second novelty is that seeing is certainly greater than hearing. And again, that’s a comment against what Yael said earlier—Yael Eisenberg. What she said earlier: you see from here that the Talmud understands that the judges who testify before the third judge are not at that moment functioning as judges. Because if they were functioning also as judges at that moment, then this proof too could not be brought, because then it would come out that the testimony was given before them as well—they themselves testified before themselves. From the fact that the Talmud learns that there is no need to testify before judges who know the truth, you see that the Talmud understood this as two witnesses standing before one judge, not that these witnesses are simultaneously also functioning as judges.

And the third novelty: “Learn from this that judges who do not know the witnesses’ signatures need testimony before each and every one.” What does that mean? You cannot make a judicial decision validating the document on the basis that only two out of the three judges know the signatures. I might have thought to spare the testimony before the third judge and simply tell him: listen, we know the signatures; the fact that you don’t know doesn’t matter. We did not give testimony before you—forget it. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that a witness cannot become a judge. So what still follows? In the end, since two of us know the signatures, the three of us will sign that the document is validated. The Talmud says: from here we see that this is not true. You cannot do that. When three judges sign that the document is validated, all three need to know that the document is validated. You can’t add a third judge just to fill out the number—come join us so we have a quorum, sign with us. There is no such thing. If he does not know that the document is validated, he cannot sign, because all the judges need to know that the document is validated. Ruti, you wanted to comment?

[Speaker C] But if it says that testimony is needed before each and every one, that shows that testimony can be received by one person, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what we saw above—that here testimony can be received by one. And I said that the answers there are either that they add two more to him, or that a lone expert judge can receive testimony on his own. Now, afterward, Rav Ashi comes.

[Speaker D] What does it mean that when the judges serve as witnesses before the third, then according to the last thing you said they are now—or the reverse, say the reverse—if the two judges know the testimony, they know the testimony now. If they tell the testimony before the third judge, then all three know the testimony. But if they don’t tell it, and yet they sign the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the document—so now the third judge knows the testimony because of that? No, he doesn’t know, because that is testimony from writing. That is not considered testimony before him. They cannot function as witnesses merely through their signature. They must testify before him. At most, what they can do is add him to the quorum: come be the third and sign too. And the Talmud says: that you cannot do. If he does not know for himself that the signatures are valid, he cannot sign. There is no merely making up the number here. The requirement for three is not a formal requirement; it is a substantive one. It is not that you need three signatures so that formally we count as a court; you need three who know the signatures. Only then do the three sign. It is not just some formal requirement to complete a quorum. Okay? That’s the point.

So now Rav Ashi comes and sharpens the issue regarding these novelties, and later we’ll see that this is more a sharpening than a disagreement. “Rav Ashi objected”—I continue reading in the Talmud—“Granted, we learn from this that a witness becomes a judge. But do we really learn from this that judges who know the witnesses’ signatures do not require the witnesses to testify before them? Perhaps I could always tell you that they do require testimony, and here it is different because some testimony was in fact made before one.” Rav Ashi says: what do you mean, that seeing should be greater than hearing? You basically want to tell me that even if there were three judges—three judges who know the signatures—then they could sign directly and no one would have to say anything before them at all, right? Rav Ashi says: that inference you cannot necessarily make from here. It could be that what we are willing to accept here—the signature of the first two without anyone testifying before them—is only because, at the end of the day, there was at least some testimony here: they did testify before the third. So since in this judicial process there was some testimony, then maybe I am willing to relax and say: fine, that was done before the third, and the first two sign even though testimony was not given before them. But if you had a situation where three judges want to sign only on the basis of personal knowledge, maybe we would not accept that. Maybe there must be some formal giving of testimony—a judicial process has to be based on testimony being presented, some record, something orderly—not just “we know, so let’s rule that way.”

[Speaker C] So then all three of them can’t—

[Speaker B] —stand—

[Speaker C] —and testify before another judge?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—before whom would they testify? Maybe any two can testify before the third. Maybe yes.

[Speaker C] So in his view, then, seeing is not greater than hearing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct—that’s what he wants to claim. Don’t prove from here that seeing is greater than hearing. In a case of two, I’m willing to accept it. Why? Because there was testimony presented. In a case of three, maybe not. He’s not saying definitely not. He’s saying maybe not—there is no proof from here for a case of three judges who know the signatures. But notice carefully: he is not really challenging the rule that seeing is greater than hearing,

[Speaker C] because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because otherwise, even in the case of two, you couldn’t do it, since testimony was not presented before those two themselves. So how do they sign? Only because their seeing is as good as hearing. So what is he actually challenging? He is challenging a formal rule. It could be that in every judicial process there has to be a formal stage of presentation of testimony. Not because seeing is not greater than hearing—do you understand? It’s a subtle difference, but an important one. Rav Ashi does not disagree that seeing is greater than hearing. That is not the point of disagreement. He agrees—because otherwise, even in the case of two, you could not allow them to sign without testimony having been given before them. On what basis would they sign? There was no testimony before them. Do you need hearing and seeing is not enough? No, clearly seeing is greater than hearing. That you see from here in any case. But what Rav Ashi says is: not when there are three. Why not with three? Because then there was no presentation of testimony in this process at all, and it could be that there is a formal requirement—not because hearing is greater than seeing, but because there is a formal requirement that you do not issue a ruling before there has been a process of receiving testimony, even if all three judges know the truth.

And this basically means that Rav Ashi is suggesting here a certain formalistic view of the purpose of presenting testimony. Rav Ashi is in fact challenging everything we’ve seen here, because that is what we have seen all along: that what emerges from this statement is that presenting testimony is not important in itself. Presenting testimony is merely about informing the judges—simply bringing the information to the attention of the one who doesn’t know. There is no special need that there specifically be a formal presentation of testimony. That itself is what Rav Ashi is challenging. Rav Ashi says: who told you? Maybe there is a formal requirement that there is no judicial ruling without prior presentation of testimony. Therefore only here, where there was presentation of testimony at least before the third judge, am I willing to allow it. But if there were a case of three judges who themselves know the truth, there I would not be willing to waive the requirement of presenting testimony. So notice the subtext here. The assumption Rav Ashi is offering against the Talmud is that presenting testimony is a formal matter. The dispute is a halakhic dispute—whether we accept it or not—but what lies behind it? What lies behind it is the question whether every ruling must begin with a process of presenting testimony or not.

[Speaker C] Or—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or is presenting testimony only a matter of informing the…

[Speaker C] So could that strengthen itself from tractate Rosh Hashanah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again?

[Speaker C] Could he strengthen this view from tractate Rosh Hashanah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? In the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah you see that hearing should not be greater than seeing. On the contrary—there you see that even with three, that is so.

[Speaker C] That with three they need presentation of testimony? No. Yes. Because if in a court of twenty-three they saw—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If three who saw can sanctify the month, the whole problem there was only at night. We’ll see that shortly when we get there. So on the contrary, from there you see that hearing should not be greater than seeing—that is what the Talmud says there. Even with three it says that hearing should not be greater than seeing. According to Rav Ashi, what does “hearing should not be greater than seeing” mean? You’re right: hearing should not be greater than seeing. But there is a formal condition that there must be a process of receiving testimony. So why does the Talmud waive that there? That is difficult for Rav Ashi. Okay? So maybe here it is again because validation of documents is rabbinic, or because of some other leniencies. But on the face of it, it is difficult for Rav Ashi. But that is what Rav Ashi proposes here.

Now Rav Ashi continues and also challenges the third novelty. The second novelty—yes, that a witness becomes a judge—he accepted. But the other two novelties he challenges. “And judges who do not know the witnesses’ signatures need testimony before each and every one”—that is the third novelty. Rav Ashi says: what do you mean? That too is not necessary. “Perhaps I could always tell you that they do not need testimony before each and every one, and here it is different because otherwise there would be no presentation of testimony at all.” Basically, you do not need to testify before the third judge. It’s just that in this case, if we do not testify before the third judge, then there will be no presentation of testimony at all. Therefore I require testimony before him. But if there were some judge before whom testimony was given, so that there would be no problem of total absence of testimony, then perhaps there could be a judge who doesn’t know and still doesn’t need to hear it. He could simply join us to make up the quorum, in short.

And again we see in Rav Ashi a formalistic approach, right? Rav Ashi is basically suggesting, against the Talmud’s substantive approach, that everything we do in court—both the ruling and the testimony—is not required for its own substantive sake. In the Talmud’s approach, it is required simply because we need to know. These are not formal requirements that you need three formally and that’s it, to make up the quorum. Here Rav Ashi says: what do you mean? Maybe the third can simply join the quorum. The need for three is merely a formal requirement. So why in this case do we testify before him? Because there is also a formal requirement that there be a reception of testimony. That too is a formal requirement. And where there was no reception of testimony at all, we have no choice—we must testify. Theoretically, according to Rav Ashi, it could be that these two witnesses testify before a third judge who also knows, and then the judge who doesn’t know joins them and signs. The main thing is that there was some presentation of testimony, because the purpose of presenting testimony is not to inform. Presenting testimony is a formal stage that is required in the judicial process.

So all the way through Rav Ashi, you can see that there is some formal requirement here. Rav Ashi does not view either the presentation of testimony or the requirement of three judges as a substantive requirement. I remind you of the Netivot that we saw last class, who explains why two witnesses are needed: to increase the probability that they are not lying, right? Now I’ll ask a parallel question: why do you need three judges? According to our Talmud, to increase the probability that the decision is correct, because three people stand behind it. According to Rav Ashi—what do you mean? Because there is a decree of Scripture that you need three judges. Why? Because if one of the judges doesn’t know, according to Rav Ashi he can still join. But that doesn’t increase the chance that the decision is correct. He simply doesn’t know; he’s just attaching his signature to the two previous ones. That doesn’t increase the chance they are right in any way. So why add his signature? Because you need three, because the Torah said you need three judges.

So basically Rav Ashi wants to say that the requirement for three judges is a formal requirement, and the requirement that there be presentation of testimony is also a formal requirement, and not something meant to inform the judges. In other words, all the way through Rav Ashi is presenting a formal alternative, whereas the Talmud learns that both the requirement for three judges and the requirement for presentation of testimony are substantive requirements. They are not formal requirements. You need them so that we know the truth—so let’s increase the probability.

[Speaker C] And if the judge doesn’t need at all to be connected to the matter he is judging? Again? If the judge doesn’t need at all to be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rav Ashi, is it connected to the case he is judging? Right. He joins the quorum for the blessing invitation. It’s like someone who didn’t eat and still joins the quorum for the blessing invitation. So the judge also joins; he doesn’t know anything, but we need three, so come join. It’s as though—let me phrase it a little less alienatingly, okay?—the Talmud says, “God stands in the congregation of God,” and a congregation means ten, and then the Talmud says there: it depends. There is a congregation of twenty-three, there is a congregation of ten, and there is a congregation of three. Also regarding the blessing invitation, the Talmud says there is a congregation of three, and “God stands in the congregation of God” means I need three in order to bring the Divine Presence here, and then I can make the blessing invitation to bless the Holy One, blessed be He, because He is here. So I can bless Him because you need to bless Him in His presence. The claim is—and the Talmud brings proof for this from a religious court—that the Talmud says a religious court consists of three and God’s presence rests in the court, watching over them so that their decisions, assisting them, watching over them so that their decisions will be correct, and therefore you need three. So what does that mean? Rav Ashi basically requires the three so that the Holy One, blessed be He, will rest here—not in order to increase the chance that the ruling hits the truth, but in order for the Holy One, blessed be He, to be present here, because you need the indwelling of the Divine Presence, and the Divine Presence rests only among three. So it’s not just joining for the blessing invitation and a formal scriptural decree; rather, we want the Holy One, blessed be He, to be present here and to receive some heavenly assistance. Okay.

[Speaker C] But to receive heavenly assistance, that’s when you make an effort and understand what’s going on—but not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just three random people doing nothing. No, so I understand what’s going on: the two made the effort. Now they want that despite their effort—

[Speaker C] Why the third?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The third—no, the third just helps—

[Speaker C] me so that the Holy One, blessed be He, will appear here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And why should there be heavenly assistance for him? Why not? I’m bringing in the Holy One, blessed be He. He didn’t do anything, he didn’t do anything—it’s a requirement for heavenly assistance. I’m bringing in the Holy One, blessed be He; we did do something, the two of us, so he did nothing? No—the third one doesn’t receive the heavenly assistance; the first two do. The first two clarified things as best they could, and they know the truth. They just know that the Holy One, blessed be He, rests only when there are three Jews, so they add one more person, the Holy One, blessed be He, comes here, and since we made the effort and the Holy One, blessed be He, is here, then He will help us. All right? So that seems to me to be the explanation of Rav Ashi’s view.

[Speaker B] I already asked how this relates to the question of whether it’s formalistic or substantive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. I think that’s the dispute between Rav Ashi and the other Amoraim. Now, in Jewish law the halakhic decisors do not rule like Rav Ashi; Maimonides is also that way. Look at the Rashba—I brought you the Rashba, which is why I’m quoting from him—and “we do not hold like Rav Ashi,” says the Rashba. “In this matter of Rav Ashi, it is merely a rejection, and lest you say that from here we cannot infer it because one can reject it in this way—and perhaps he himself also did not hold this way, but was merely rejecting it. And so too ruled Rabbeinu Alfasi,” the Rif. What is he saying? He is basically saying this: we do not rule like Rav Ashi. By the way, it’s a little difficult that we don’t rule like Rav Ashi, since Rav Ashi is the last generation of the Amoraim, and the rule from Abaye and Rava onward is that Jewish law follows the later authority. Meaning, the later the Amora belongs in the chain of generations, the more the law should follow him. Not because there is necessarily decline of the generations—or not necessarily—but because he knew the earlier generations and nevertheless decided to disagree with them, whereas the earlier ones did not hear him, so he has a certain built-in advantage, and therefore we rule like him. The Rashba says—do you have a question about this topic? What?

[Speaker B] I’d like to ask a question not related to the class, if I may. I’ve really been torn about this for years: what is the deciding rule? On the one hand, we have the rule that Jewish law follows the later authority; on the other hand, we do know that, say, an Amora does not disagree with a Tanna, and so on. So there is some underlying assumption of decline of the generations. When do we decide according to this rule, and when according to the other?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—the rule is this: the principle of decline of the generations exists; that’s an assumption, at least in the Talmud, and it exists all along the way. Both between the Mishnah and the Talmud and between the generations of the Amoraim within the Talmud. “If the earlier ones were like angels, we are like humans”—that’s an Amoraic saying about earlier generations of Amoraim, not specifically about Tannaim. So the assumption that there is decline of the generations is, I think, correct throughout. But still, despite the decline of the generations, if I hear—as “a dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant,” as is said in the responsa of the Ri”d, who says this in two places, and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) write this too—if I hear the view of an earlier authority, someone before me, then even though he is greater than I am, I hear his reasoning, and I think he is not right, and I take into account the fact that he is greater than I am, and nevertheless decide that he is not right, then I have a built-in advantage. Therefore, even though he is greater than I am, the law will follow me, because I heard his reasoning and nevertheless decided not to rule like him. By the way, just like Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: even though Beit Shammai were sharper, we rule according to Beit Hillel because they presented Beit Shammai’s words before their own. They considered Beit Shammai’s position before deciding to rule against them.

[Speaker B] In that situation they have an advantage, even though Beit Shammai are sharper, and we rule according to them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The only question now is: so why, when an Amora disagrees with a Tanna, do we rule like the Tanna and not like the Amora? Here the Kesef Mishneh already asks this in the Laws of Rebels at the beginning of chapter 2, and the Kesef Mishneh argues that it is simply because we accepted upon ourselves the rulings of the Tannaim. That is basically the difference between us and the Conservatives. Maybe. That we accepted upon ourselves—yes—we accepted upon ourselves the rulings of the Tannaim. After that, we also accepted upon ourselves the rulings of the Amoraim once the Talmud was sealed. But that is only a matter of acceptance. In principle, were it not for that acceptance, the Kesef Mishneh says explicitly, were it not for that acceptance, there would be no problem disagreeing—not with Tannaim, not with Amoraim, not with anything. It is simply a matter of acceptance. All right? Okay, so what does the Rif say? The Rashba, sorry. And also the Rif. He says that even though Rav Ashi is the latest, and seemingly—and again, this is not against the Mishnah, this is against earlier Amoraim. Rav is first-generation Amoraim, or perhaps a Tanna perhaps an Amora. And Rav Ashi is the last generation of the Babylonian Amoraim. Okay, so seemingly Jewish law should have followed Rav Ashi. But here, in this case, it is apparent from Rav Ashi’s wording in the Talmud that Rav Ashi is not really coming to disagree. Rav Ashi is giving a mere rejection. He is saying: the proof for your innovations from here—I do not accept that. You cannot bring proof. It may be that you are right, but you cannot bring proof, because I could reject it in some way, especially since the way is a formal one. Meaning, the logic goes with Rav. Rav Ashi raises an alternative that is only a formal alternative. Why accept formalism when there is logic? Why rule like someone who raises a formalistic alternative when someone else is telling you something that has logic? There is no reason. If I have a verse that goes against logic, I say fine, then the verse introduced here a formal scriptural decree. But I don’t have a verse. Here there is a possibility of saying it this way and a possibility of saying it that way. So why choose the formalistic alternative when I have an alternative that is understandable on the basis of reasoning? Therefore, says the Rashba, that is why we rule like Rav and not like Rav Ashi. But he added more than that. He says that from the Talmud itself one could definitely have said that Rav Ashi is not even coming to disagree with Rav. Rav Ashi does not necessarily disagree with Rav. He is only saying: from here you cannot bring a proof. It may be that your law is correct, but I do not accept your statement that there is a proof from here for that law. There are no proofs for that law. All right? Or in other words, Rav Ashi does not disagree with Rav at all. Rav he may well accept. He only argues that you cannot prove from Rav these three laws. And it is the Talmud that does that, not Rav. The Talmud proves these three laws from Rav. Okay? And then Rav Ashi is really disagreeing with the Talmud, not with Rav. This is not a dispute at all; it is only a question of whether there is a proof or there is no proof. Okay? Now look here, I’ll just read this passage. “And as for what was assumed here,” says the Rashba—yes, this is again the Rashba—“that according to Rav Ashi we require testimony to be stated”—right? What did I say the Rashba says? That Rav Ashi’s words are merely a rejection. He is not really expressing a position here; he is only saying: I could have rejected your proof, and therefore there is no clear proof here, even though maybe he agrees with the law. He says this is difficult from the Talmud in Sanhedrin: as it was taught, ‘If the Sanhedrin saw a person who killed someone, Rabbi Tarfon says: some of them become witnesses and some of them become judges. Rabbi Akiva says: all of them become witnesses, and a witness cannot become a judge.’” Yes, this appears later.

[Speaker C] All of them become—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] witnesses, sorry, and a witness cannot become a judge. “And in chapter HaChovel we established that the reason they do not all become judges is when they saw it at night. But if they saw it by day, they become judges, for hearing should not be greater than seeing.” Apropos the previous comment. “From this it is clear that we do not require testimony to be stated even in capital cases, which are more severe, and certainly not in monetary cases, which are lighter.” What is he saying? We see “hearing should not be greater than seeing” both in the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah and in chapter HaChovel. We see that if there are three people who know the truth, nobody needs to testify before them, because hearing should not be greater than seeing. The Rashba says: okay, I understand hearing should not be greater than seeing—but still, Rav Ashi says there is a formal requirement that there be an act of testimony. Where does that happen here? After all, that is Rav Ashi’s claim: that even if there are three here who know the truth, and I agree that hearing should not be greater than seeing and therefore in principle they can rule based on that, nevertheless there is a formal requirement that there must be a process of testimony along the way.

[Speaker C] So then how do you explain the Talmud there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—so how do you explain the Talmud there and the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah? That is what the Rashba asks. All right? It is difficult for Rav Ashi’s initial assumption from the Talmud there. What is the Rashba really saying? I can’t even understand the initial assumption Rav Ashi raises; after all, he himself does not hold that way. He is only raising such a possibility. The Rashba says: not only is it merely a possibility and he himself does not hold that way, but even the possibility itself does not hold water. There is a Talmudic passage against it. Therefore the whole thing is obviously not for Jewish law. All right? What did you ask, Ruti? Never mind. Okay. So he says, one can say—so there is a difficulty on Rav Ashi. What difficulty is he raising here? Yes, this of course proves that Jewish law is not like Rav Ashi, because we see there in the Talmud not so. He says: what does Rav Ashi himself hold? “One can say that Rav Ashi does not agree with that explanation, that they saw it at night, but rather with the other explanation that we established there, that even if they saw it by day, according to what Rav Ashi initially assumed here…” He says that in the Talmud there, our establishing it as a case where they saw it at night because hearing should not be greater than seeing—that is only one explanation. And we have another explanation, and Rav Ashi in the initial assumption here may be assuming the other explanation. And then he brings the Ba’al HaMaor, yes, the Razah solved the main difficulty here: that here it is a case where they saw the witnesses’ signatures completed at night, or at a time when they were relatives and unfit for testimony, in accordance with the solution stated in Sanhedrin. In short, he gives another answer. But for our purposes, the main principle is that Rav Ashi’s words are some sort of formalism that does not really hold water; there are counter-passages that go against him, and therefore the Rashba says it is likely that even Rav Ashi himself did not think this way. So what was he doing? He was only making a conceptual point, trying to sharpen the students. So he says to them: you think you can prove this law from here? I tell you, no. This law is correct—that we see in the passage in chapter HaChovel. The law is correct. But you will not succeed in proving it from here. And we find many times that sages say things only to sharpen the students. You present me with an argument that proves some conclusion. The conclusion is correct. But notice: the argument you presented is not correct. The conclusion is correct, but the argument you presented is not correct. And by the way, this is a common issue. Many times we see such a thing: someone brings an argument in favor of a correct conclusion, and we do not bother checking his argument, because clearly the conclusion is correct, so what is the problem? And that is a bad habit, because many times all kinds of nice little sermon-points people say on festive occasions end with: yes, and one must be righteous and humble and fulfill commandments and fear Heaven. Then everyone applauds: wonderful, wonderful, marvelous words. But when you examine how he proved these empty theses, you see the proofs do not hold water, the arguments are terrible. But nobody checks the arguments when the conclusion is correct.

[Speaker C] What happens when three judges saw it at night? So? They don’t sit as a court at night?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, therefore you need testimony to be stated.

[Speaker C] So by day they need testimony to be given?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that is exactly what the Talmud says. But only because they saw it at night. If they had seen it by day, then there really would have been no need for testimony to be stated. So you see that stating testimony is only for conveying knowledge. And if we know, then we do not need testimony to be stated—against Rav Ashi’s proposal that this is simply a formal requirement that there be a statement of testimony, not something needed in order to convey knowledge. All right? I’ll just say that, to me, Rav Ashi teaches us a very important lesson here. He is basically saying: even if your conclusion is correct, that does not exempt us from checking the argument that leads to it. An argument has to hold water. The fact that the conclusion is correct does not justify raising a failed argument. All right? If your argument is not a necessary one, then it is worth checking. Whether the conclusion is correct or not, that we will check independently.

[Speaker B] What is the difference between a nice homiletic idea and dialectical Talmudic analysis? When the line of reasoning is correct, or when the conclusion is correct?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s dialectical analysis versus homily, right. A homily is when the conclusion is correct and the argument is crooked. That’s what happens in homily. In dialectical analysis, it’s when the conclusion is not correct and the argument is good. Okay. In any case, I’m now moving to our passage—at least we’ll begin it. I see this has taken us a little time, but this whole business of going step by step is very important to me, because otherwise everything here gets tangled up. So I’m going step by step. Up to now we’ve seen the background of the passage here, and now we’re going to approach the question of whether a witness can become a judge. So the first discussion—the first novelty, sorry—that a witness can become a judge is actually not disputed at all. Right? Rav Ashi does not challenge it. Rav Ashi himself says that the novelty that a witness can become a judge really does emerge from here. Regarding the other two, I have reservations. Which is a little strange. Because later in the Talmud we suddenly see that precisely this thing is what really requires clarification. Here there are actual contradictory passages; it’s not just a matter of some reasoning that could reject you and we don’t care about it. Here there are genuinely contradictory passages. Therefore it is clear that the distinction is a didactic one. At the beginning, the Talmud clears away all the unserious rejections. These innovations are certainly correct, and what Rav Ashi raises are just rejections to sharpen the students, to teach them to make proper arguments, but it doesn’t really hold water. On the contrary, “a witness can become a judge” is a novelty that has to be discussed seriously—not just some initial assumption and rejections. Therefore we left it for the end, not because it is the clearest, but because it is the least clear. Okay? It remains to the end because it is the least clear, and we want to devote a separate space to it. That is what the second part of the passage deals with. So that’s why it remains to the end—not because it is the clearest. Okay. “Rabbi Abba sat and stated this teaching, that a witness can become a judge.” Right? Rabbi Abba sat in the study hall and told people: yes, I heard that the rule is that a witness can become a judge. Rav Safra objected to Rabbi Abba: “If three people saw it, and they are the court”—that is the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah—“two should stand up and seat some of their colleagues next to the remaining individual, and they should testify before them, and they should say, ‘The month is sanctified, sanctified,’ because an individual is not accepted on his own.” What does that mean? Basically, suppose three people saw the new moon. Then “two should stand up and seat some of their colleagues next to the remaining individual,” meaning that there should be three who receive the testimony. Two will serve as witnesses, and then they can say, “The month is sanctified.” All right? Because one person alone—that is what it says here, “because an individual is not accepted on his own”—the meaning is that one individual cannot sanctify the month. You need three to sanctify the month. All right? So the two, who serve as witnesses, testify before three others, and the three sanctify the month. Notice, the novelty here is seemingly not that this can be done—obviously it can be done—but that it must be done, and that without it, it does not work. In a moment we’ll see this with Rav Ashi. That without it, it does not work. All right? They cannot testify there merely on the basis of their own knowledge; they have to perform a statement of testimony before three. Now there can be various explanations for this: either because there is a formal requirement, like Rav Ashi, that there be a statement of testimony, or because it was at night and therefore there is some problem here, and it is not considered that they know. And the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah discusses all these possibilities. We’ll see it in a moment. So the Talmud says—I’m still in our Talmudic passage for now—our passage now says this: until here that was a quotation from the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah. Now Rav Safra asks Rabbi Abba: “And if it enters your mind that a witness can become a judge, why all this? Let them sit in their place and sanctify it!” What does that mean? If a witness can become a judge, then why do they need to testify before anyone at all? Notice, here it is not like our case. Here all three know the truth, not just two out of the three. So this is not connected to our passage. All three know the truth, so the Talmud asks: what is the problem? A witness can become a judge, so let all three sit and sanctify it! What is the subtext, by the way? That hearing should not be greater than seeing—that is obvious. Our passage does not even comment on that. Right? And it is obvious that if they know the truth, they are allowed to rule on that basis. Right? That is certainly true. The only question is just whether a witness can become a judge. So the Talmud says: then why can’t all three switch roles and sit? After all, you infer in our passage from our statement that a witness can become a judge, so why do they need all these maneuvers? Now I’ll already make a comment here. In the passage in Rosh Hashanah—in the passage in Rosh Hashanah, look here, see? The continuation of the passage in Rosh Hashanah: “Does this mean that a witness can become a judge? Shall we say that our Mishnah is not like Rabbi Akiva?” Do we see from here that a witness can become a judge? So our Mishnah is not Rabbi Akiva! The exact opposite—180 degrees opposite—to our passage. Because in our passage, what do we prove from there? That a witness cannot become a judge. Right? What do we prove in our passage from the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah? That a witness cannot become a judge, contrary to what emerges from the statement about validating documents, where we see that a witness can become a judge. And then how does the Talmud answer? That there it is Torah-level, and therefore a witness cannot become a judge, whereas in validating documents, which is only rabbinic law, there a witness can become a judge. Meaning, our passage concludes at the very end—even according to the final conclusion, not only in the question—that in the Rosh Hashanah passage it says a witness cannot become a judge. Look what the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah says: “Does this mean that a witness can become a judge?” It is clear in that passage that it comes out that a witness can become a judge. And then it raises a difficulty from Rabbi Akiva there in Sanhedrin, whom we also saw in the Rashba. The exact opposite of our passage. Another question—I’m moving upward now. The Talmud in Rosh Hashanah says: “If the court saw it, two should stand and testify before them.” And why? “Should hearing not be greater than seeing?” Yes, sorry. In other words, in Rosh Hashanah the simple assumption is that hearing cannot be greater than seeing. Right? In contrast, what happens in our passage? I’ll read Tosafot’s answer. Tosafot on the words “and infer from it.” Tosafot says, “And infer from it that judges who recognize the signatures of witnesses do not require testimony before them.” Right? What is the novelty? Obviously they do not require testimony before them—they know. The novelty is that hearing should not be greater than seeing. Meaning, we had an initial assumption that hearing is greater than seeing, and you need a novelty to say that it is not. And indeed, maybe Rav Ashi himself even entertains that, although I said that on the plain reading, not so. So Tosafot says: “For one might have thought that they require testimony before them even though hearing should not be greater than seeing, because they appear more like a court when there is testimony before them; otherwise it appears only like hearsay testimony. And for this reason they required three in validating documents.” So what do we see? Once again, the opposite in our passage from the passage in Rosh Hashanah in that aspect too. First of all, on the question whether it follows from the Mishnah there that a witness can become a judge or that a witness cannot become a judge. In the Talmud there it seems to follow from the Mishnah there that a witness can become a judge. In the Talmud here it says that from the Mishnah there it follows that a witness cannot become a judge. Tosafot also notes that on the matter of “hearing should not be greater than seeing” there is also a reversal. In the Talmud there it is obvious that hearing should not be greater than seeing; seeing is certainly no worse than hearing. Here we need to introduce that as a novelty. There was an initial assumption that hearing would be better. The novelty is that seeing is also fine. That implies that hearing is greater than seeing; it is only a novelty that seeing is also acceptable. Right? These two passages really seem to be running on opposite tracks. Okay? And therefore I also asked you on the sheet whether the passages can be reconciled with each other on these two aspects, and to try in the end to reconcile the overall picture: what emerges from the passage there, what emerges from the passage here, and whether there are distinctions or reconciliations. Does it fit together or not fit together? All right, we’ll stop here. I just—if there is some question, you can ask.

[Speaker C] Yes? Rabbi, on Thursday when will you add more instructions? Yes. So would it be possible to send it already by tomorrow morning? Because on Thursday I don’t have time…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll try. I’ll try. If I manage today, then I’ll do it, okay? Without a vow.

[Speaker C] I also have another question about my topic that I sent…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so maybe we’ll do that separately. No point keeping everyone here. All right? So okay, I’m stopping the recording.

[Speaker C] Okay, thanks. Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye. So you can head out. Ruti still wants to talk to me, so I’ll speak with her here. All right? Yes.

[Speaker C] I wanted to ask: according to the rule that someone who has fulfilled an obligation can enable others to fulfill it…