Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 28

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[0:03] Introduction and meeting details
[0:03] Opening and announcements about Memorial Day
[1:26] The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis about testimony validating a signature
[1:26] The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis about written signature validation
[2:27] A signed witness who validates his fellow’s signature
[2:37] The case of deceased witnesses and signatures
[4:16] A case of a deceased witness and secondary signature validation
[9:48] Entering the Talmudic text and presenting the topic of witness and judge
[9:48] Beginning the study of the Talmudic text about the witnesses
[12:07] The discussion of whether a witness and a judge can combine
[12:07] Witness and judge combine—what does that mean?
[15:54] Rashi’s explanation of “a witness and a judge combine”
[15:56] A validated document and the joining of judges
[23:23] The dispute among the Amoraim about combining a witness and a judge
[29:23] A witness regarding his own signature combining with another witness
[31:08] The function of the validating judge and his joining
[36:15] Rava’s argument regarding the judge’s testimony
[50:40] The marketplace story: witness and judge combine
[52:13] Summary of the Jewish law and its determination according to the later generation
[57:06] The Talmudic text and the dispute about applying the logic
[57:06] The determinations of the Talmudic text and the differing views of the Amoraim

Summary

General Overview

The text presents the course of a lecture on a Talmudic passage dealing with validation of legal documents, beginning with a review of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis over whether a witness signed on a document, when he comes and validates his own signature, is testifying about his handwriting or about the monetary claim in the document, and the implications this has for combining witnesses and for the disqualification of a case in which “three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness.” After that, a new passage opens on “a witness and a judge combine,” through Rashi’s explanation of a document that includes judicial validation; the enthusiasm of certain Amoraim for this teaching is presented alongside Rava’s and Rav Ashi’s rejection, and a conceptual explanation of the dispute is built through understanding the Rabbis’ mechanism of “testifying about the monetary claim in the document” and whether it also applies to a judge signed on the validation.

Memorial Day, absence at the university, and progress through the chapters

Memorial Day is defined as a vacation day at the university, and the option is raised of meeting on Thursday instead. The lecturer notes that because of a long break and four classes leading up to Passover, he prefers to move on to the next chapter rather than complete another detailed review, while emphasizing that the new passage still touches on points from the previous one.

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis regarding a witness validating his own signature, and the implication of “three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness”

The dispute is presented as follows: according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the witness testifies about his handwriting, whereas according to the Rabbis, the witness testifies about the monetary claim in the document. According to the Rabbis, when each of the two signed witnesses validates his own signature independently, they combine because both are testifying about the monetary claim in the document; according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there is no combination, because two testimonies are required for each signature. In a case where one witness also validates the signature of his fellow who died, according to the Rabbis a problem arises of “three-quarters of the monetary claim emerging on the basis of one witness,” because three-quarters of the money is extracted on the basis of one witness, and the testimony is not accepted. The text states that the Talmudic text assumes this according to the Rabbis, and that this is how Jewish law is ruled.

The quantitative question about dividing testimonial force, and its implications for understanding the combination of witnesses

A question is raised as to why testimony is treated “quantitatively,” such that a division of three-quarters and one-quarter is problematic, if in practice every detail has the evidentiary force of two witnesses. It is said that this passage has ramifications for understanding how witnesses combine into one group, and in this context reference is made to Rav Shimon Shkop; it is also noted that Netivot wants to argue that the joining is quantitative in the sense that one witness may be suspected of lying while two will not be, but the implication of the passage is otherwise.

The preparation framework and how far the participants reached in the sources

A question is asked about how far they got in the preparation sheet, and the answer is that some reached up to Nachmanides and some also covered Rashba, and it is stated that Rav Shimon has not yet been studied.

Opening the passage: “Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine,” and distinguishing it from “a witness becomes a judge”

The statement “a witness and a judge combine” is presented as related to document validation, but not as a case of “a witness becomes a judge” or “a judge becomes a witness” within the same litigation; rather, it is the combination of one witness and one judge into testimony. It is said that a judge can later testify about what took place in court, and testimony about a court event is not disqualified as hearsay because it is testimony about a situation the witness saw.

Rashi’s explanation: a document with judicial validation, the borrower’s objection, and combining a witness to the document with a judge from the validation

According to Rashi, the case is a document on which a judicial validation is written and signed by judges, and afterward the borrower objects and claims “it is forged” regarding both the document and the validation. Then one of the document’s witnesses comes and testifies to his handwriting, and one of the judges comes and testifies to his handwriting on the validation, and it is said that they combine to validate it. It is emphasized that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss whether one can challenge a judicial validation at all on grounds of forgery, and it is said that this discussion will be postponed to the next lecture.

An attempt to explain the reasoning behind those who allow combination, and its connection to the Rabbis’ mechanism in the previous passage

The text suggests that the precise wording “witness and judge” hints that this is a special rule in which the judge has force that an ordinary witness would not provide, and it proposes the reasoning that a judge, in testifying about the validation, is considered to be testifying in a way that connects to the Rabbis’ logic in the previous passage. It is explained that according to the Rabbis, “testifying about the monetary claim in the document” is not necessarily literally testimony about the monetary claim, but rather a mechanism that allows acceptance of the signed witness as one who validates his signature even though he is only one person, so that the result is a documented loan with a validated document, rather than an oral loan.

Maimonides’ difficulty regarding combining a witness who validates his own signature with two other validators, and the answer framed in terms of “validation testimony”

A point is raised that appears in the context of Maimonides: in a case where one witness validates his own signature and two other witnesses come to validate the signature of the deceased witness, that is valid because there is no problem of three-quarters. The text explains that this validity is understandable because the testimony of the signed witness is accepted as validation testimony regarding his signature and not as testimony about the monetary claim, and therefore all parties are operating on the level of validating signatures, so the combination is not problematic as “testifying about different things.”

The words of Rami bar Hama: “How excellent is this teaching,” as enthusiasm for the expansion

Rami bar Hama praises the teaching with the words “How excellent is this teaching,” and the text explains the enthusiasm as arising from the understanding that the rule is an elegant extension of the Rabbis’ mechanism, such that even a judge testifying about his own validation can be considered part of the system of validating the document in a way that combines with the witness to the document.

Rava’s rejection: “What is so excellent about it?” and defining the gap between the witness’s testimony and the judge’s testimony

Rava rejects the teaching with the phrase “What is so excellent about it?” and explains that “what the witness testifies to is not what the judge testifies to, and what the judge testifies to is not what the witness testifies to.” According to Rashi’s explanation, the witness testifies about the monetary claim in the document in line with the Rabbis, whereas the judge testifies that “it was validated before us,” and the text emphasizes that the point is that the judge is not considered as validating the signatures themselves but rather as testifying to an event of validation that took place in court, and the testimony of a single judge about such an event is not enough to create validation of a document.

Clarification: two judges as witnesses to a judicial act versus one judge, and the connection to hearsay

It is said that if two judges came and testified about the validation, that would help, because there would be two witnesses to a court act, and such testimony is not hearsay. By contrast, when there is only one judge, there is not even a basis for accepting that a validation event occurred, and therefore this is not validation testimony that can combine with the witness’s testimony on the document.

An additional rejection tradition: Rami bar Yechezkel and Rav Ashi against the praising coalition

Rami bar Yechezkel, the brother of Rav Yehuda, says, “Do not listen to these general rules that my brother Yehuda formulated in the name of Shmuel,” and the possibility is raised that either he disputes Shmuel or claims that Shmuel never said this. Another story is brought about Ravinai, the brother of Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba, who bought sesame and said in the name of Shmuel that a witness and a judge combine; Ameimar again praises it, saying “How excellent is this teaching,” and Rav Ashi rejects Ameimar on the grounds that “Rava has already sent it flying away.”

Rashi’s note on variant readings and chronology, and a proposal for understanding the structure of the story

Rashi comments that some read “he happened to come” without the letter dalet, and that it is impossible to attribute to Rami bar Hama a statement about Ameimar and Rav Ashi, because Rav Ashi was several generations later; a source is cited from tractate Kiddushin: “On the day Rav Yehuda died, Rava was born; on the day Rava died, Rav Ashi was born.” The text raises the possibility of a transmission error or literary doubling in which the same narrative pattern recurs with different names, and alongside that presents the understanding that the later story was brought in order to establish that Rava’s ruling had been finally accepted, especially when transmitted in the context of Rav Ashi.

Lecture summary: the axis of dispute over applying the Rabbis’ logic from a signed witness to a validating judge

The conclusion states that the fundamental dispute is whether the Rabbis’ logic—through which a signed witness can validate his own signature—is also applied to a judge signed on the validation. The text concludes that the Jewish law tends toward rejecting the combination following Rava, but there remains a need to understand the view of the Amoraim who praised the rule, and it is said that this analysis should make it easier to understand the medieval authorities (Rishonim) in preparation for the next lecture.

Full Transcript

[Speaker B] Memorial

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Day is a vacation day at the university, so you’re welcome to come on Thursday instead if you want. Okay, what’s here in the chat? Iris, yes, I see, fine. You can’t see, you only see the black square. Okay, as I wrote to you, because of this long break and the four classes before Passover, I thought we’d already move on to the next chapter, rather than start going back into all the details there just to make up roughly the one more class we still had left. I thought that was already unnecessary, especially since we’re going to touch on some of those things in this passage too. So we’re not completely disconnecting from the previous passage; we’ll enter it a bit here too. I’m already sharing the page here, the summary I’m going to send, and I’ll also use that to look at the sources. So first I’ll begin with a short summary, as I also wrote to you on the page: the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis about what happens when a witness who himself signed the document comes and validates his own signature. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he testifies to his handwriting, and according to the Rabbis, he testifies to the monetary claim in the document. We saw the implications there: if each one testifies to his own handwriting alone, then according to the Rabbis that’s fine, because they combine, since both are testifying to the monetary claim in the document. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, no. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you need two testimonies on each signature, because they are validating the signatures, and every matter that must be accepted in court requires two witnesses. So if the issue is the signatures of the witnesses, then for each and every signature you need two witnesses. If the issue is the monetary claim in the document, then once I have two witnesses on the monetary claim in the document, they combine. We also saw there a point that will accompany us here as well: what happens if that witness, the signed witness, also validates the signature of his fellow—for example, if the fellow died. So he and one other person want to validate his fellow’s signature. In that case the picture reverses; that is, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says they testify to the monetary claim in the document, that would be fine in such a case—well, actually, in such a case I have two witnesses validating each signature and everything is fine. And according to the Rabbis, who say they testify—sorry—according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi they testify to their handwriting. And according to the Rabbis, who say they testify to the monetary claim in the document, the Talmudic text says that it turns out that three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness. Three-quarters of the money is extracted on the basis of one witness, because through his own signature he testifies halfway on the monetary claim in the document, and besides that he also constitutes half of the second signature. And therefore, in effect, we have three-quarters of the monetary claim coming out on the basis of one witness and one-quarter on the basis of another witness, and that is not accepted. The Talmudic text assumes this according to the Rabbis, and that is how Jewish law is ruled. We discussed whether Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maybe also agrees to that principle or not; there were two ways to understand what exactly Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disputes with the Rabbis about. But in any case, in practice we rule like the Rabbis—the Talmudic text says so explicitly—and according to the Rabbis it follows that we do not accept testimony that is not divided equally between the two witnesses. Meaning, if three-quarters of the monetary claim relies on one witness and one-quarter on another, we do not accept that testimony. That’s an interesting claim—why? And maybe we’ll get to that in this passage, because in the previous passage I hardly dealt with it. In any case, that’s the summary of that earlier passage. I’ll already note something here to save time later on: when I, together with another witness—I’m the signed witness, and the other signed witness died. Now another witness comes to validate the signature of the deceased witness, and I join with him. So of course he could also testify to my signature, except that regarding my signature we don’t need him, because I testify to the monetary claim in the document, so I’m enough by myself. But regarding the second signature, where the second signed witness died, then one has to testify about the signature; you can’t testify about the monetary claim in the document, and for the signature two witnesses are required. I can’t be one of them, because then it would turn out that three-quarters of the testimony is based on me. But what would happen if not for the problem that three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness? Meaning, if there are two witnesses on the second signature, what would the law be in such a situation? I testify to my own signature, and two witnesses come regarding the signature of the deceased witness. In such a case we can—since we’ve left microphones open, because here we have only a few participants, so we can work more naturally. So what happens in that case? Seemingly, from the Talmudic text quite clearly—right, it is accepted.

[Speaker B] Yes, because each one is testifying to something else. What? I, who am testifying to my handwriting, and the witness who testifies to his handwriting—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] testifies—

[Speaker B] to the monetary claim in the document, and the two other witnesses testify to the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that’s an excellent comment. You’re all right. You’re all right. Meaning, those who said it’s fine are also right—why? Because it emerges clearly from the previous passage. After all, in the previous passage it comes out that the whole problem is only because three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness. Meaning, if there were two witnesses on the second signature and my testimony on the second signature wasn’t needed, then it would indeed be accepted, right? Because then I would be extracting half, and the other witness, whose signature is validated by two other witnesses, would also be extracting half, and everything would be fine. That’s on the one hand. On the other hand, in our passage it seems, at least from Rava’s rejection—we’ll get there in a moment, I’m getting ahead of myself—it looks from our passage as though there’s some problem here regardless of half and quarter, because they are testifying to different things. The two witnesses who validate are testifying to the handwriting of the deceased witness, not to the monetary claim in the document, while I testify to the monetary claim in the document. So how can you combine those two things at all? Seemingly, from the reasoning in our passage it ought to come out that such a thing is no good. Okay? So here we basically have what Nachmanides asks. Right, I’m just getting ahead of myself; I also asked you on the page: how is Nachmanides so certain that this ought to combine? He asks on Rashi: according to your view, why doesn’t it combine? It should combine. I asked you: how does he know? Maybe in fact it doesn’t combine—what’s the problem? Clearly he knows it from the previous passage. Because in the previous passage you see clearly that the whole problem is that on the second signature there is only one validating witness. But if there were two validating witnesses on the second signature, and then I would be extracting only half the money and not three-quarters, that would be fine. Why? After all, those two witnesses validate a signature, and I testify to the monetary claim in the document. So why is that fine? Well, actually that touches a bit on things we discussed in the previous passage, so I’ll just remind you briefly. I talked there about the fact that it’s pretty clear that even the Rabbis, who say that when I testify to my own signature I am in effect testifying to the monetary claim in the document—ultimately, that is not really testimony about the monetary claim in the document. Rather, because I testify to the monetary claim in the document, I am considered a witness who validates his own signature by himself. Even though I’m alone, I validate my own signature. It’s just a mechanism that comes to explain why they accept me alone as validating a signature. But in the end, the conception is—at least, it seems to me this is what emerges from the simple reading of the Talmudic text there; we said it could be a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but from the simple reading there it emerges that this is not really testimony about the monetary claim in the document. Because if it really were, then what’s the problem? I could say: I am not testifying to the monetary claim in the document, I want to testify only to my handwriting. That’s what I declare and testify. Then what? Then of course only half the money would emerge on my basis, because I validated my signature, and the signature of the second witness is validated by the second witness, and everything is fine—so it’s half and half. Why did the Rabbis say that three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness? Because they understand that it’s not that the claim is that I am testifying to the monetary claim in the document, but rather halakhically, since it is considered as though I testify to the monetary claim in the document—and we discussed the conditions, whether I have to remember or partially remember, all those things—but since halakhically it is considered as though I testify to the monetary claim in the document, therefore my testimony is sustained, my testimony is accepted, as validating testimony even though I’m just one person. But in the end it is considered validation testimony. Now if that’s so, then there is no problem at all. Right? Because I validate my own signature, and the two other witnesses validate the signature of the second witness, and there is no problem—we combine, because we are both speaking about validation of signatures. The monetary claim in the document is not really the subject of my testimony. It’s not that I testify to the monetary claim in the document and they testify to validation of the signature. I too am really testifying to validation of the signature. Okay? So I said that there, and I said maybe that is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but it can explain—you already mentioned that this is Nachmanides’ question, so we’ll get to it when we get to Nachmanides—but I’m already noting it here so as to get ahead of myself. Good, so now I’m entering the Talmudic text. Sorry?

[Speaker B] I have a question for a second. Yes. Why isn’t testimony something qualitative, and why is it quantitative?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker B] The difficulty of Nachmanides—we’ll get to it when we get to Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m already noting it here to get ahead of myself. Good, so now I’m entering the Talmudic text. Sorry, Rabbi, I have a—

[Speaker B] question. Yes. Why isn’t testimony a qualitative thing? Why is it quantitative? What do you mean? Why is testimony considered something quantitative? Why—what’s the problem with someone giving three-quarters? Why is a witness’s testimony considered something quantitative? Why is testimony considered something quantitative? What’s the problem with someone giving three-quarters? Why is a witness’s testimony considered something quantitative?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re asking what the problem is with three-quarters of the money emerging on the basis of one witness—that the division is three-quarters and one-quarter rather than half-and-half?

[Speaker B] Testimony should be something essential, not something quantitative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said that we’ll get to that later, but since you’re asking, I’ll sharpen that question even more. Basically, the claim is this: if what I need is the evidentiary force of two witnesses regarding the money, then I do have the evidentiary force of two witnesses regarding the money. Why do I care how that is divided up? Practically speaking, on every detail in this testimony I have the force of two witnesses. So why should it bother me now that internally it’s divided as three-quarters and one-quarter? There’s no detail in the testimony for which I don’t have the force of two witnesses as evidence. Seemingly, from the Talmudic text here it emerges that this is not the conception of how two witnesses combine, and I told you on the page that this passage has ramifications—Rav Shimon Shkop talks about this—for how we understand at all the combining of two witnesses into one group. Netivot wants to argue that this is a quantitative combination: one witness may be suspected of lying, two will not lie. From the passage here it sounds otherwise. It sounds not like Netivot. But as I said, we’ll get to that later. Maybe this is just the opportunity to ask: where are you holding with the preparation sheet? How much did you get through?

[Speaker B] Up to Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Up to Nachmanides? Did anyone get farther than that?

[Speaker B] Yes, yes, also Rashba. What? Also Rashba.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashba, okay. Fine. In any case, I understand you haven’t gotten yet to Rav Shimon. No. Fine. Good. So let’s begin with the Talmudic text. I marked the passage; I’m just moving through—if you have a Talmudic text in front of you, you can look there. I’m just marking it here on my page because it’s more convenient for me. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine. On the face of it, this is a new passage. That is, they are dealing with validation of legal documents, so they bring another discussion that relates to the laws of document validation. And here he says: a witness and a judge combine. It’s not entirely clear what the situation is. What does it mean, a witness and a judge combine? There is a certain law that talks about whether a witness can become a judge—does a witness become a judge or not? That discussion will come up later in the passage and we’ll deal with it. But that is apparently not what is being discussed here. Because the question of whether a witness becomes a judge has its own terminology, and the passage and the Talmudic text discuss it. Can a witness turn around, sit down in the judge’s chair, and adjudicate the case in which he served as a witness? That is the question in the later passage. Here we are not talking about that. We are talking about a witness who does not himself become a judge, but rather one witness and one judge who come together and combine to constitute a group of witnesses. And a judge becomes a witness. Exactly. And a judge becomes a witness. Exactly. Here it’s a judge—right. That may perhaps, if anything, be a discussion of whether a judge can become a witness. But even that is not precise. Because “a judge becomes a witness” means that in the same case in which you are serving as a judge, you turn around and stand as a witness before the judges. Here that’s not the case.

[Speaker D] He was a judge in the past, and now—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he comes and testifies about what happened there. He is not functioning simultaneously as judge and witness in the same case. Okay? Therefore this is not really the passage of “a judge becomes a witness.” Okay? So in any case there is some statement here that a witness and a judge combine.

[Speaker D] How can he be a judge on the document? He can’t be a judge on the document; he can only testify about what really happened in the court case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it could be that he can also be a witness on the document, but afterward—not while he is adjudicating that document. There could be a case about the document, and afterward he comes as a witness to validate the signatures, even though he was a judge on that document a year ago.

[Speaker D] He can later be like just some person from the marketplace, so to speak.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, why not? “A witness becomes a judge,” or “a judge becomes a witness,” is when within the very same litigation one person serves in two roles: both the role of witness and the role of judge. The fact that he once was a judge and now testifies about what happened there—there’s no question that he can do that; there are explicit Talmudic texts about it. Meaning, it is certainly the case that a judge can do that. The Talmudic texts even say—maybe we’ll see this later on—that in such a case we do not disqualify him as hearsay. Usually, if I testify about someone who testified, that’s hearsay. But if I testify about someone who testified in court, and I testify about the event that occurred in court, then I am not—I am not considered hearsay; I am considered first-hand testimony, because testimony given in court is the same as testifying about a situation. I’m simply testifying about the situation that occurred in court; I’m not testifying—

[Speaker D] But that’s not testimony about the document. What? But that’s not testimony about the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and the Talmudic text will soon get to the point that this is not testimony about the document. But I mean at the conceptual level: not only can a judge testify about a case in which he served as judge, but this is even testimony that is accepted where an ordinary witness might not be accepted. Because an ordinary witness might be hearsay. But here the judge testifies about what happened in court—that is not hearsay. He is not testifying about a situation because he heard about it from someone else, but rather about what happened in court, and such a thing is not disqualified as hearsay. But that’s only a side comment. So that leaves us with the question: what exactly is the case that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, where a witness and a judge combine? So Rashi on the spot—I brought him here—Rashi on the spot writes as follows: witness and judge—a document on which there is written a validation. Validation means a certification of authentication, and the judges signed on its validation. By the way, usually the validation is not a separate document, but rather on the document itself one adds the judges’ certification, like a kind of notarized signature—the judges’ certification that we checked the signatures and they are authentic signatures, not forged. So that is what’s called validation: a document on which a validation is written. You see, within the document the validation is written, okay? And the judges signed on its validation—they signed below. And after some time, when the lender produced it in order to collect, the borrower objected, saying it is forged. The borrower says: what are you talking about, the whole business is forged—the document and the validation together, everything is forged.

[Speaker B] Then what needs to be done—validation? Or can he already proceed with the claim that it’s forged?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The medieval authorities (Rishonim) here discuss that question, and I hope we’ll get to it in the next lecture. And one of the witnesses to the document came and testified to his handwriting, and one of the judges testified to his handwriting, and they combine to validate it. Meaning, one of the witnesses to the document comes to validate his own signature, yes, like in the previous passage—the monetary claim in the document, his handwriting—the discussion in the previous passage. And in addition to that witness, now it’s not that there is a witness on the second signature, not that there are two witnesses on the second signature, but rather there is a judge on the validation. Meaning, he testifies to his own handwriting, the handwriting of the judge. Okay? In this document there is a validation section and a section that is the original document. In the original document only one signature was validated; one of the signed witnesses there came and said: this is my handwriting. In addition to that, together with him comes a judge and says: I am one of the judges who signed on this validation, and I’m telling you that this validation is not forged. Okay? That’s the case. So on that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said—Rav Yehuda is a student of Rav and Shmuel, just to place the chronology because it will come up later in the passage. Rav and Shmuel are the first generation of the Amoraim of Babylonia. Rav is actually regarded as half a Tanna; Rav still sat in the court of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and afterward went down to Babylonia. It says “the nephew descended to Babylonia,” as Rabbi Chiyya says there to Rabbi. So Rav and Shmuel are really the end of the period of the Tannaim and the beginning of the period of the Amoraim, the first generation of the Amoraim. Rav can even dispute Tannaim; he is considered half a Tanna, and Shmuel was his disputant. Now Rav Yehuda is a student of both of them; he would regularly bring teachings both in the name of Rav and in the name of Shmuel. So that means this teaching is situated in the first generation of the Amoraim of Babylonia, perhaps transmitted by a second-generation Amora who studied under the first generation. I’m saying that because later there is another story that is later. Okay? So he says they combine. Meaning, even though the judge testifies to his own handwriting as a judge and the witness testifies to his own signature as a witness—that is, the judge testifies about the validation and the witness testifies about the document—they combine.

[Speaker E] What we just said is only according to Rashi; we don’t have to say it that way, right? Again? We don’t have to say that the case is like Rashi says, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t have to say anything. If you have another explanation, then please. If you saw the Rif—

[Speaker E] Maybe in testimony, say, if the judge was also a witness to the document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then what needs to combine? Then why does the judge matter? Just two witnesses.

[Speaker E] Because he happens to be sitting in the judge’s seat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What here? It can’t be. No, a judge can’t turn into a witness. So on the plain reading, that’s the story. I brought you the Rif as quoted at the end of Rashba, where he explains it differently. But for now, most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) go in Rashi’s direction, and the claim is that in such a case they combine. A few comments. What happens if another witness comes and validates the judges’ signature on the validation—then he’s like witness and judge, so—

[Speaker B] Why, then why do you need one more witness to validate it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why talk about the judge?

[Speaker B] The witness who testified to his own handwriting testifies to the monetary claim in the document, and the witness who testified about the judges is not testifying to the monetary claim in the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not asking whether it would be invalid or valid. At this stage—maybe the opposite. I’m speaking according to the view of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel that a witness and a judge combine. What would happen if it were witness and witness? I’m asking you. No problem, it’s the same thing—so why does he speak specifically about a witness and a judge?

[Speaker D] Because the judge testifies—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and also signed. First of all, from the very setup of the case: why does he speak specifically about a case of witness and judge if the same would apply with witness and witness?

[Speaker D] The judge is essentially confirming the authenticity of the document. Meaning, the document already went through some court process.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he already confirmed it long ago, a year ago; now he comes and testifies about that.

[Speaker D] Right, but once the judge was involved, then the judge can say, hold on, this document has already been validated and there’s ostensibly no room for objection here.

[Speaker B] No, but maybe I—

[Speaker D] think that here you need two witnesses—

[Speaker B] to testify about the validation of the document from a year ago.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if one additional witness came regarding the judge’s signature, it wouldn’t be good; that’s why Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel specifically sets it up as the joining of a witness and a judge, and not the joining of a witness and a witness. And why? Maybe it really is something similar.

[Speaker B] Maybe there needs to be finality to the proceedings—you can’t keep reopening things like this all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] The witness and the judge who signed the validation—he is sort of confirming the act of the loan that took place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, it could be indeed—

[Speaker B] he testifies to his own handwriting, he testifies to his own signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, come on, slowly. Look, what I want to say is this: when I first look at the wording, before the reasoning—before the reasoning—it seems that if you’re talking about a witness and a judge who combine, this is probably some special statement, right? Meaning, a special statement means that if it were just a witness, the second one would not combine; only because it’s a judge does he combine. And now I can ask myself, okay, that’s what is inferred from the language of the Talmudic text. What reasoning could stand behind that?

[Speaker B] Maybe the judge testifies to his own handwriting as a court act, like the signatures of the witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So maybe indeed, similar to the reasoning of the Rabbis, who say regarding the witness who validates his own signature that he testifies to the monetary claim in the document, it could be that when the judge comes and testifies to his own handwriting, that is not the same as a witness testifying to the judge’s signature. Rather, the judge himself is considered as testifying to the monetary claim in the document in a doubled way, yes? And therefore, according to the Rabbis—and we follow the Rabbis, because that’s the Jewish law—the witness and the judge really do combine. That can basically be the reasoning of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel. Okay? I’m saying this because, again, there’s a methodological lesson here. Later in the Talmudic text there is a whole lineup of very distinguished Amoraim—or really there is some categorical assertion that this whole thing doesn’t even get off the ground. On the other hand, there is a very distinguished lineup of Amoraim who say this and are even enthusiastic about this rule, as if it’s obvious to them that it’s correct. And the Talmudic text doesn’t devote even a word to explaining what they thought. Why did they think this is correct? After all, Rav Pappa says this is absurd, what kind of nonsense is this? And the other one doesn’t even answer him—as though it’s a knockout. Still, there are four or five respected Amoraim here who say this very forcefully and enthusiastically. So we need to understand what they had in mind. So for example, the line of reasoning I worked out here can give us some indication. What may basically be happening here—from the very fact that he sets it up as the combination of a witness and a judge, and not just a witness on the signature and a witness on the validation, a witness on the document and a witness on the validation, where there it would apparently be invalid—that hints to us that this is, all in all, an extension of the Rabbis’ statement against Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the previous passage. Just as the Rabbis say in the previous passage that the signed witness, when he testifies to his own handwriting, is considered as though he testifies to the monetary claim in the document, maybe they are saying—Rav Yehuda and Shmuel—that if a judge comes and testifies about his own validation, that too is considered testimony about the monetary claim in the document. And if that’s so, then it’s obvious why he combines with the witness, right? Just as according to the Rabbis, each of the two signed witnesses who individually validates his own handwriting also combine. Why? After all, on each signature there is only one witness, because they are considered to be testifying about the monetary claim in the document. And if there are two witnesses to the monetary claim in the document, then everything is fine. Ah, now I also remembered what I told you at the beginning, so I’ll add one more word. I told you that it’s pretty clear that even according to the Rabbis, the witness who testifies to his own handwriting is considered as though he testifies to the monetary claim in the document. It’s clear that this is not literal testimony about the monetary claim in the document. It’s only a mechanism that explains why I accept his testimony as validation testimony even though he is just one person. How can I prove that to you? I proved it in those earlier classes. Because if it were testimony about the monetary claim in the document, then it would be an oral loan, not a documented loan. Because after all, the document itself was not validated, right? He alone cannot validate his own signature. But since he testifies to the monetary claim in the document, he combines with the second witness. So what do I have? I have here the combination of two witnesses on the loan, on the monetary claim in the document. But the document itself is not validated. So if that’s the case, this should have to be an oral loan, not a documented loan. If we say that it is a documented loan, then it is obvious from that that we’re talking only about a mechanism. And the fact that I testify to the monetary claim in the document is only the mechanism that explains why my testimony is accepted as validation testimony. But now it is validation testimony; the document itself is a validated document, and the lender is holding a documented loan, not an oral loan. Is what I’m saying clear?

[Speaker B] Not so much, I was in the middle. The dispute between Rav, Shmuel, and Rav Yehuda and Rava—is it within the words of the Rabbis?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything is within the words of the Rabbis. We rule the Jewish law like the Rabbis, and the passage here goes according to the Rabbis. But that’s in just a moment. Look, I’ll go back again, because this is an important point for the passage here too.

[Speaker C] But does that mean that the judge really has two stages? He testifies to the validation, in practice that projects onto the monetary claim in the document, and then it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] goes back to the judge, once as a witness—

[Speaker C] and twice as a judge?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My answer is yes. But in another moment I want first to go back to what I said about the previous topic. It’s important to sharpen this so that it will be clear to us. What I said in the previous topic is that when the Sages come and disagree with Rabbi and say that if the witness testifies to his own signature, he is regarded as testifying to the amount in the document, you can’t read that literally. If we read it literally, the meaning would be that if one witness comes and testifies to his own signature, and the second signed witness also testifies to his own signature, and each one only about his own, then according to the Sages they combine, and according to Rabbi they do not combine. Rabbi is very clear, right? Because according to Rabbi, in the end there is only the testimony of one witness on each signature; you need two witnesses on each signature, so the document is not validated. Why according to the Sages do they combine? Because each of them is regarded as testifying to the amount in the document, and regarding the amount in the document, if so, we have two witnesses. So then it has been proven that there was an amount, there was a loan. That is apparently the Sages’ view. Why can’t that be right? Because if that were the Sages’ view, then the result of such testimony would be that this loan would be confirmed or recognized as an oral loan, not as a loan by document. Because we have two witnesses on the amount in the document, but we do not have validation of the document. Because as far as the document itself is concerned, I have only one testimony on each signature, so the signatures are not validated. So if so, there is no document here; there is only testimony about the amount. And therefore it is clear, or almost clear—I said this is probably a slight dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—but it is almost clear that when the Rabbis say that he testifies to the amount in the document, what they mean is: it is as if he testifies to the amount in the document, and therefore we accept his testimony as validating testimony on his signature. And now the signature is validated even though the validator is only one person. If the validator is the signer himself, the validation is valid even though it is only one witness. And the same is true of the second witness. And in the end we have a documented loan, not an oral loan. Okay? The document is now validated.

Now I return to our issue. If that is so, what happens in the view of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel concerning a witness and a judge? Why do they combine, while witness and witness do not combine? So I say the same claim. The witness who testifies to his own signature on the document testifies to the amount in the document, and therefore he is enough to validate his own signature. The judge testifies to the certification. If it were another witness, nothing would help, right? Exactly like another witness on the signature together with my testimony on my own signature—it certainly does not help. Okay? So clearly a judge testifying to his own signature on the certification should also not help. But it could be that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel holds—or they hold—that a judge testifying to his own signature is like a witness testifying to his own signature. Essentially he testifies to the amount in the document, or to the signature in the document if you like, and therefore they combine. In other words, there is here an extension of the Sages’ view against Rabbi. When the judge testifies to his own certification, that is not like another witness validating the signature. He is regarded as testifying to the content of the certification, not to the signature of the certification, and therefore he combines with the second witness. Okay?

I’ll go back again to Nachmanides’ difficulty, which was already mentioned earlier, so I’m saying the later point in advance: what happens when I have two witnesses—two witnesses come and validate his signature. Not me; two other witnesses. Clearly that is valid, right? That’s written there in the Talmudic text. The whole problem is when I am one of the two others, so then three quarters of it comes out based on me; but if there are two besides me on the second signature, there is no problem at all. That is certainly valid. Why? After all, they testify to the signature of the dead witness, and I testify to the amount in the document, so based on the reasoning coming out here it should have turned out not to be valid. The answer is: no. Because as I just explained, I am not testifying to the amount in the document, but since I am considered as one who testifies to the amount in the document, my testimony is accepted as validating testimony on the signature, and then I testify to validating the signature, and the two other witnesses testify to validating the second signature, so this is ordinary validating testimony and the document is validated and we combine. And therefore Nachmanides is not right in his difficulty according to what I’m explaining now, because it’s obvious why this combines.

By contrast, regarding the judge: the judge who signs the certification—so the judge who signs the certification signs his own certification, as we’ll soon see, and therefore this does not combine with the witness who testifies to his own signature or to the amount in the document, whichever explanation you prefer. It’s simply not the same thing. There is no basis to compare it to the case of witnesses who validate the second signature. But all this is, of course, according to Rava’s position, which is the view ruled as Jewish law here in the passage. Right now we are dealing with the initial statement of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, that they hold that even the judge combines. Why does the judge combine? The natural possibility is to say that a judge who testifies to the signature of his own certification is regarded as testifying to the amount in the document.

Now this can be understood in two ways: either he really testifies to the amount in the document—that is, this goes through two steps, as if he testifies to the signatures that he approved as a judge, and one who testifies to the signatures is as if he testifies to the amount in the document. Okay, but that is a bit forced, because the second step is not clear—why should it be made? After all, he isn’t a witness who saw the amount in the document; he’s a judge. The first step I understand why we do, because he testifies about something that happened directly before him; he was the judge there. So even if he testifies to an approval affirming what happened, that counts as if he is testifying anew to what happened—but that’s about the validation, not about the amount in the document, right?

[Speaker D] But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to what I just said, there is no problem at all. Why? Because Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel says: right, in fact we make only the first step. The judge who testifies to his signature on the certification is regarded as a validating witness for the document, not for the amount in the document—for validating the document. He testifies to the event in which he was involved as a judge, okay? He does not testify to the loan, because he did not see the loan. Okay, now what does the second witness do? The second witness who testifies to his own signature, we said, testifies to the amount in the document, but I explained: this is not really testimony about the amount in the document. Rather, because it is as if he testifies to testimony about the amount in the document, his testimony is accepted as validating testimony about his own signature. Right? If so, then it is obvious why Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel says that a witness and a judge combine, because the judge too testifies to validation of the signatures.

[Speaker B] But only when there are two who joined on the amount in the document can it come back to his signature, but here there weren’t two who joined on the amount.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that that is Rava’s claim; we’ll soon see. But I’m explaining Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel wants to claim that since the judge who testifies to his signature on the certification is regarded as a validating witness for the document—not for the amount in the document, but a validating witness for the document—and the second witness who testifies to his own signature is of course also a validating witness for the document, therefore they combine. That is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel says.

[Speaker D] Wait, so we have combination for validating the document? Right. But we don’t have, as it were, proof of the amount?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You do—the document itself is proof. Once you validated the document, then the document proves that there was a loan; it’s a documented loan. On the contrary, that’s the best case. If I testify only to the amount in the document, it may be that I supported the loan, but the document itself is still not validated, so it would be an oral loan. But if I validate the document, that does both things: it also proves that there was a loan, because the document itself is regarded as witnesses whose testimony was examined in court, and the loan is also by document because the document is validated. So it does the whole job. All right? So that is the view of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, that a witness and a judge combine.

Now Rami bar Hama said—I continue in the Talmudic text—Rami bar Hama said: how excellent is this teaching; what wonderful things we have heard here from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel. A marvelous law. I think what amazes him here is exactly the move I just explained. The move I just explained is basically saying: look, you got to the heart of the Sages’ reasoning against Rabbi, and you produced here a beautiful extension of the law of the Sages against Rabbi. If one understands the Sages against Rabbi correctly, now I really can understand that you are right. Hence the amazement, because he really understands that he got properly to the heart of the Sages’ reasoning against Rabbi. This truly is a natural conclusion if we understand how the Sages against Rabbi work—not only in the sense that the Sages against Rabbi say that the witness testifies to the amount in the document, but as I said earlier, more than that: that in fact it is not really that he testifies to the amount in the document, but since it is as if he testifies to the amount in the document, therefore he is considered a validating witness on the signature. And now that we understand the Rabbis that way, then indeed a witness and a judge combine. That really is correct. This is the full explanation in the view of the Sages against Rabbi. That is the nice implication of the matter. Another implication is of course that the loan in the previous topic is a documented loan, not an oral loan. That is another implication of the fact that this is not about the amount in the document but only about validating the signatures. But here there is an additional implication: a witness and a judge can combine.

Rava said: what excellence is there here? Why are you so excited? What kind of excellent teaching is this? What the witness testifies to, the judge does not testify to; and what the judge testifies to, the witness does not testify to. So Rashi says there—let’s read Rashi. “What the witness testifies to”: the witnesses of the document testify to the amount in the document, in accordance with the Sages, and the judges testify, “it was validated before us.” Here one has to understand where the focus is. If I read the first part of Rashi’s words, then where is the focus—or where is the focus? No, where is the focus. What is the focus? Rashi says two things here: the witnesses of the document testify to the amount in the document, and the judges testify, “it was validated before us.” These are two things, both of which do not fit what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel said. Because Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel agrees neither with the first part of Rashi nor with the second part of Rashi. Right? Because what does Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel say? The witnesses of the document do not testify to the amount in the document; they testify to the validation. It is only that because he is considered as testifying to the amount in the document, that helps us accept his testimony as validating testimony. But in the end, bottom line, it is validating testimony, not testimony about the amount in the document. Right? That was the condition for saying what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel said. After all, I want both of them to be on the same plane, that all of them should be validating witnesses.

Rashi tells us, explaining what Rava’s view is: no. The witnesses of the document testify to the amount in the document; no, this is not validating testimony, it is testimony about the amount in the document. And the judges testify, “it was validated before us.” Meaning, the judges are not really testifying—even validating the document they are not doing. They testify to the act of validation, yes, to the proceeding of validation that took place before them. So there is a gap of two steps between the content of the testimony of the document’s witnesses and the content of the judge’s testimony. Not a gap of one step, a gap of two steps. Right? Because the witness testifies to the amount in the document, and the judge does not even testify to validation of the signatures, but rather testifies that the signatures were validated before him—not to the validation itself. He cannot validate the signatures. He only testifies that the signatures were validated before him.

Now the question is: what is the focus Rashi intends to say? After all, it would have been enough to say just the first part, right? The witnesses of the document testify to the amount in the document, and the judge testifies to the validation of the document. So they do not combine because it is not the same plane. Right? Why does he need to say that the judge testifies, “it was validated before us”? The judge testifies about validation, about the signatures, and you testify to the amount in the document; therefore it does not combine.

[Speaker C] The answer is that he doesn’t accept this mechanism at all, so if he doesn’t accept it regarding the witnesses, he also won’t accept it regarding the judge. Exactly. The mechanism is exactly what we said earlier.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Therefore Rashi cannot suffice with the first statement. If he had sufficed with the first statement, it would come out that even in the previous topic you could not combine a witness who testifies to his own signature together with two others who validate the signature of the second witness. You could not combine them. Because I testify to the amount in the document and they validate a signature. But we saw earlier that in the previous topic it is clear that they do combine. Why? Because I am not really testifying to the amount in the document, but since it is as if I testify to the amount in the document, this is considered validating testimony—but all of us are on the plane of validation, and therefore we combine.

Therefore Rashi says: the witnesses of the document testify to the amount in the document in accordance with the Sages. What does “in accordance with the Sages” mean? And therefore this is validating testimony. But then, for Rava’s opinion to be understood, he has to add: and the judge doesn’t even do that. The judge does not testify validating testimony. He testifies that it was validated before him. He does not validate the signatures themselves, but testifies that they were validated before him. Therefore this does not combine. And why? Because he does not accept applying the Sages’ principle regarding a witness on the document to the judge. That is what Rava, according to Rashi, does not accept. After all, the Sages say that the witness on the document is considered as testifying to the amount in the document, and from that he is also considered a validating witness concerning himself. And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel wanted to say the same idea about the judge who testifies to the certification. Rava apparently does not accept that. Rava claims: we say that about a witness on the document; we do not say that about a judge on the certification. The judge on the certification testifies to us that the document was validated before him; he does not testify that the document is validated. In other words, the Sages’ words apply only to a witness on the document and not to the judge of the certification. That is what Rava claims against Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, and therefore they do not combine.

[Speaker E] I didn’t quite understand what the difference is between “it was validated before us”—what exactly is the difference in what the judge says?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The judge in fact does not know whether the signatures are validated or not, right? He only knows that there were witnesses who validated the signature before him. Right? There were witnesses who validated before him; he does not know if the signatures are validated, and certainly does not know about the amount in the document.

[Speaker E] But that’s the whole meaning of validating signatures—what does it

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] mean

[Speaker E] “I validated the document”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In an ordinary document, in the end validation of the signatures also proves the amount in the document, but in a certification—that is what Rava does not accept—in a certification, if you testify that it was validated before you, that does not help. It is not considered testimony about the validation itself, that the document is validated. I’ll say even more than that—or not more than that, but I’ll qualify it a bit. If two judges come, yes, this also comes up later among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), if two judges come and say, “We were there at the certification, and we testify that this certification is reliable,” meaning not forged, that will certainly help. Why? Because we have two witnesses that there was validation in court, and then it comes out that the document will be validated because we have two witnesses, so the document is validated, and this is not hearsay, because they testify to a court act, as I said earlier. Okay? That is clear. The whole problem here is that this is a single judge. A single judge cannot even testify to us that this really happened. If we were convinced that this really happened, then that too would count as validation of the document itself. But since on the point that this really happened we have only one witness—we do not have two witnesses, right?—on the fact that this document was validated.

[Speaker E] I’ll ask more generally: the whole point of validating the document, of bringing witnesses to validate the signature, is to give it authority. You can always open it up another step and another step and each time come and argue, and then there is no end to it—you have to give authority to something.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the question Maly Ruti asked earlier: if one can challenge a certification and say the certification is forged, then what good is the whole certification? It never ends. Exactly. We discussed that, and I said we would talk about it in the next class. Okay? I’m leaving that aside for now. At the moment the assumption is that one can claim forgery even against a certification. That is what emerges from Rashi here, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss it at length. For next time you will already see this in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), if you haven’t seen it already—the Rashba and the Ritva and Nachmanides, all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) I referred you to in the sections I didn’t show, all discuss this point. Okay? In any case, leave that for now; I hope that’s for next class.

So what I’m saying is basically this: the judge who comes and testifies, “there was an event of validation of the document before me”—I will not accept from him that there was such an event. Why? Because he is one witness. Since when do we accept testimony about an event from one witness? If there were two judges who said there was an event of validation, I would accept it. But here there is one judge, so in any event I do not actually know that there was an event of validation. If I do not know that there was an event of validation, then you cannot say that I have here one witness that the document is validated. I do not even have one witness that the document is validated. Do you understand what I’m saying?

[Speaker C] According to Rava, the witness and the judge—if a witness came and said, “I was in court when the document was validated,” that would be the same thing as the judge himself testifying. Right. And according to Shmuel, the judge himself is like “I testify to my own handwriting,” and therefore it is different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly. That is why I said in advance that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel focused on the combination of witness and judge, and not witness and witness. Because for witness and witness, even Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel says it is invalid. Why? Exactly for the reason we said here. Because that single witness who says, “I saw an act of validation that was done in court,” is one witness on that event. One witness is not enough to convince us that there was such an event. But if we were not convinced that there was such an event, then he is not considered even a single validating witness. My claim is that he is not considered even one validating witness. It’s not that I have one validating witness on the second signature—I don’t have even one. I have nothing, because I do not know that there was a validation event. All right? Rava’s claim against Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel is: you made a distinction between witness and judge; I do not accept that distinction. In my eyes, the judge has the same status as a witness. The judge who testifies to his signature on the certification is the same thing as another witness who comes and testifies about a signature on the certification. And why? Because he is only one witness about an event. One witness about an event is not accepted. And in any event, what Rava says is that the result—and this is the point of the dispute. What he says in the end is only the implication of the dispute. In any event it turns out that what this one testifies to, that one does not testify to; because the witness on the document testifies to the amount in the document—that is, to validation of the document—and the judge testifies to the event of validation. You cannot combine them. I have one witness on this and one witness on that. They are not talking about the same thing. Okay?

So what Rava says, that what this one testifies to, that one does not testify to, is a result of this dispute, not the point of the dispute. The result of the dispute is that since I am not willing to see in the judge what the Sages see in the witness—namely, that the judge essentially testifies to the signature itself, not to the event of validating the signature—it is not that the judge validates the signature, but that the judge testifies that there was an event of validation of a signature. Since that is so, the judge’s testimony and the witness’s testimony deal with different things. In any event, on neither of these two things do I have two witnesses. And in order to accept something in court, I need two witnesses on it. That is what Rava claims against Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel. All right? And the truth is that there is a lot of logic to that. There is a lot of logic in saying that the judge, even according to the Sages against Rabbi, does not work in the same way as the signed witness. Because the judge really testifies about an event, an event of validation. Why should we suddenly accept that there was an event of validation if we have only one witness for it? All right? But if there came—if—

[Speaker C] If there did come one witness of the validation—meaning, after all there are two validating witnesses signed on this thing. If one witness of the validation came—what is validation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two who are signed; they are witnesses to the loan, not to validation.

[Speaker C] Wait, now I got confused. There is a validation, right? There were validating witnesses and they left. There were validating witnesses and they left.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The judges wrote a certification following their testimony.

[Speaker C] But suppose one of the validating witnesses came, not the judge—one of the validating witnesses. Yes. Then maybe Rava would agree to this story, because the witness—he was a judge.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He would not agree, because then we’ve gone back to the previous topic.

[Speaker C] No, because if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am the witness—

[Speaker C] of the validation, we went back to the previous topic. If I am the witness of the validation, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The witness of the validation does not testify to his own handwriting. He is a witness of validation. He is not the signed witness.

[Speaker C] No. I testify to the validation, meaning I testify that this is his handwriting and that a certification is written on the document. Now they come to collect with the document, and instead of the judge who wants to testify, “there was a certification before me,” I am the validating witness who says I validated the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the validating witness is not signed on this document. The validating witness is not signed here. The one signed here is the judge. The judges write: two validating witnesses appeared before us, and we confirm that these signatures are authentic. The validating witnesses were there and disappeared; they are not signed here.

[Speaker D] Suppose one of them comes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it makes no difference. If one of them comes, it will not help, because if one of them comes, then all he can do is validate the signature of the second witness. But unless he is the signed witness himself validating the signature, it is not enough; you need two witnesses to validate a signature.

[Speaker C] But the validating witnesses are not recorded on the certification document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The judges are recorded there. That is also why the Talmudic text brings the judge coming and testifying, “I am the one who signed here.”

[Speaker D] But the judge is signed on the document in which the validating witnesses are found.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.

[Speaker D] In which there are signatures.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Those are not validating witnesses. Those are the signed witnesses—witnesses to the loan. Okay. Witnesses to the loan. Okay. Okay. All right? Okay, so I think that is the simplest explanation, at least according to Rashi, of the dispute—both according to the view of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel and why Rava does not accept it. All right? And for this one needs to understand very, very well what the Sages are saying in the previous topic. Okay? Because essentially the dispute is rooted there. And this also gives us an explanation—something that does not appear in the Talmudic text, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) also hardly deal with it—where this opinion of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel and all the Amoraim who join him came from.

Moving on. Now Rami bar Yehezkel arrives—Rashi says this is Rav Yehuda’s brother, right? “Rather, when Rami bar Yehezkel came”—meaning here too we are dealing with the second generation of Amoraim—“he said: do not obey these rules that my brother Yehuda laid down in the name of Shmuel.” Do not listen to these rules that my brother Yehuda brought in the name of Shmuel. In short, he draws the conclusion from Rava’s argument and says Rava is right. Correct. There is room to wonder here whether he claims that Shmuel never said this at all, or whether he comes to disagree with Shmuel. Fine. I don’t know. The question is, on the side of the Amoraim who do accept this law—do we place there Memer and Rav Yehuda and all the enthusiasts, Rami bar Hama and so on—do we also place Shmuel there? Or not—regarding Shmuel, maybe he never said it at all, and that is the dispute. Fine, but it is not important for our purposes.

Now the Talmudic text continues with exactly the same story. “Ravnai, the brother of Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba”—yes, Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba’s brother was called Ravnai—“happened to come to buy sesame seeds,” he came to buy sesame seeds, “and he said: this is what Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine.” Yes, these people went to the market to shop, and while doing that they exchanged experiences about what Shmuel had said regarding witness and judge and all sorts of things of that kind.

[Speaker B] There are posts here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s actually very nice. It’s really lovely. I mean, Rabbi Yitzhak Nappaha and all those people in the market and so on, and the Oral Torah is being transmitted like this while I’m weighing out the sesame seeds I’m selling you, I tell you gossip from the study hall of Shmuel in Nehardea, yes? What Shmuel in Nehardea said. “And he said: this is what Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine.” Meaning, Ravnai joins Rami bar Hama and Rav Yehuda and maybe Shmuel too in saying the same thing, and says that a witness and a judge combine.

And now Ameimar also joins this sacred coalition. Ameimar said: how excellent is this teaching. Exactly the same move. Fine? How excellent is this teaching. So now we already have some five Amoraim—if we also take Shmuel into account—who support the idea that a witness and a judge combine. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: just because your mother’s father praised it—that is Rami bar Hama—are you praising it too? Rava already refuted it. Yes? Just because he praises it, you praise it too? Rava already knocked it down; why are you confusing us here. In short, Rav Ashi joins Rava here and they reject it, and in the end the Jewish law is apparently that this was refuted. But still, as I said, there are four or five respected Amoraim here who make this claim; it is a claim that requires explanation.

Now, the question is whether there really are four or five such Amoraim here. Look at Rashi. First of all, there is a very interesting historical coincidence here. Exactly the same chain of events happens again several generations later. We are talking about Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel—that is first-second generation of Amoraim. Rav Ashi is already the eighth generation, the last generation—the one who sealed the Babylonian Talmud, okay?

[Speaker E] Meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are talking about many years later, in effect hundreds of years later. The claim is that Rav Ashi was born on the day Rava died, and Rava too is already about fifth generation, I think, or something like that. So in short, this is some kind of intergenerational story where it is not entirely clear who here spoke with whom and who praised and what happened. But something here repeats itself in a very surprising way a number of generations after the first story, with exactly the same stages. Meaning, someone arrives, the second is enthusiastic, and the third says you’re talking nonsense. And on this Rashi says the following.

[Speaker D] “Happened to come”—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Ravnai,” etc.—we read it without the prefix meaning “that he happened to come.” In other words, he drops that letter. Why? If it were written “that he happened to come,” then this would—

[Speaker B] not be Rami bar Hama’s story—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] yes, meaning—

[Speaker B] that Rami bar Hama brought him. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is not a story brought as proof in the earlier section of the passage; this is a new story. All right? “And Rami did not say it,” because it is impossible to say so. This is not that Rami said this about Ameimar and Rav Ashi, for Rav Ashi was many generations after him. As we say in tractate Kiddushin: on the day Rav Yehuda died, Rava was born; on the day Rava died, Rav Ashi was born. Fine? A story not related by Rami bar Hama himself.

The truth is, I don’t know. Of course there are two possibilities here. Either to say that indeed one reads that letter there, and then the names of the Amoraim are not precise, or not to read that letter and keep the names of the Amoraim, because these are later Amoraim. In short, there is some confusion around the second story. It is not entirely clear in what context it arrived. Whether it came in the first story, whether it happened independently several generations later. It could be—I am raising a possibility which of course needs to be checked; researchers can surely check it better than I can—that perhaps the second story never happened at all. It is some historical corruption of the first story. Because in fact it is exactly like the first story; only the names have changed. That’s all. So somebody else retold this story and somehow now suddenly attached it to a tradition.

[Speaker D] But why? That’s a little hard to explain, because I would say that literarily one can divide it into two: the first part tells about the market, and the second part tells about the next generation to whom the same story happened.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, maybe. But then it is a strange coincidence, and Rashi also points out that there is some confusion in the textual versions. So I’m saying that he says—

[Speaker B] to him, “Are you praising it because your grandfather also praised it?” There’s intertextuality here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but once you do not accept that this really happened with the later Amoraim, then the whole give-and-take here is unclear—what of it actually happened and what didn’t. It could be that we are putting this into their mouths because we know that his grandfather also said it and that the other one said it, and we complete the story ourselves. After all, it is a kind of—I don’t know—aggadic literature perhaps, or something like that. I don’t know. Because this coincidence, that precisely in this case exactly the same chain of events happened—I said maybe, I am just raising a possibility—maybe it is simply the same story that went through some transformation that corrupted it, the names or the sequence. Or maybe, by the way, there really was a similar story—the meaning is, there was a discussion of the same topic, but not that this one actually said this, and the second praised him, and the third said “it never was.” That sequence that was brought from the first story—maybe there was a discussion there with Ameimar whether a witness and a judge combine or do not combine, but not that everything that happened happened exactly as in the first story; somehow it got dragged in from the first story. That’s just as a possibility, just a side note.

[Speaker B] But even if it happened again, why not say there’s no novelty there at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind, it’s an interesting anecdote. In any case, for our purposes I’ll summarize—

[Speaker B] Maybe Rav Ashi wants to stress that Rava’s opinion was accepted and Rav Yehuda’s was rejected?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, clearly it is brought in order to say that this was settled definitively, and especially since it is Rav Ashi, who marks the end of authoritative ruling, so clearly this fixes the Jewish law for our purposes irrespective of the history. The Jewish law is of course fixed; that is, the Talmudic text determines very clearly what the law is. But still, as I said earlier, since there are four or five Amoraim here who take a different approach and are even enthusiastic about what they hold—meaning, it seems very correct to them, they understand that there is some innovative mechanism here and still they agree with it—we are not exempt from trying to understand their view as well, not only the view that was ruled as Jewish law.

And I think that at least according to Rashi, the explanation really is that the dispute, the explanation of the dispute, is the question whether we apply the logic of the Sages, who said it regarding the witness signed on the document, also to the judge signed orally—sorry, signed on the certification. All right? That is essentially the point of the dispute, and with that I’ll end today’s class. I see we really haven’t yet reached the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but once we’ve done this analysis here, I think with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) it will already be much simpler. If you go over them again now, I think things will already be much clearer. For next time, continue with this page. Maybe I’ll send you a little more reinforcement, but of course we continue from here. Okay.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much. Goodbye. Thanks.

Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 28

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Memorial Day, absence at the university, and progress through the chapters

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis regarding a witness validating his own signature, and the implication of “three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness”

The quantitative question about dividing testimonial force, and its implications for understanding the combination of witnesses

The preparation framework and how far the participants reached in the sources

Opening the passage: “Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine,” and distinguishing it from “a witness becomes a judge”

Rashi’s explanation: a document with judicial validation, the borrower’s objection, and combining a witness to the document with a judge from the validation

An attempt to explain the reasoning behind those who allow combination, and its connection to the Rabbis’ mechanism in the previous passage

Maimonides’ difficulty regarding combining a witness who validates his own signature with two other validators, and the answer framed in terms of “validation testimony”

The words of Rami bar Hama: “How excellent is this teaching,” as enthusiasm for the expansion

Rava’s rejection: “What is so excellent about it?” and defining the gap between the witness’s testimony and the judge’s testimony

Clarification: two judges as witnesses to a judicial act versus one judge, and the connection to hearsay

An additional rejection tradition: Rami bar Yechezkel and Rav Ashi against the praising coalition

Rashi’s note on variant readings and chronology, and a proposal for understanding the structure of the story

Lecture summary: the axis of dispute over applying the Rabbis’ logic from a signed witness to a validating judge

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Memorial Day, absence at the university, and progress through the chapters

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis regarding a witness validating his own signature, and the implication of “three-quarters of the monetary claim emerges on the basis of one witness”

The quantitative question about dividing testimonial force, and its implications for understanding the combination of witnesses

The preparation framework and how far the participants reached in the sources

Opening the passage: “Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: a witness and a judge combine,” and distinguishing it from “a witness becomes a judge”

Rashi’s explanation: a document with judicial validation, the borrower’s objection, and combining a witness to the document with a judge from the validation

An attempt to explain the reasoning behind those who allow combination, and its connection to the Rabbis’ mechanism in the previous passage

Maimonides’ difficulty regarding combining a witness who validates his own signature with two other validators, and the answer framed in terms of “validation testimony”

The words of Rami bar Hama: “How excellent is this teaching,” as enthusiasm for the expansion

Rava’s rejection: “What is so excellent about it?” and defining the gap between the witness’s testimony and the judge’s testimony

Clarification: two judges as witnesses to a judicial act versus one judge, and the connection to hearsay

An additional rejection tradition: Rami bar Yechezkel and Rav Ashi against the praising coalition

Rashi’s note on variant readings and chronology, and a proposal for understanding the structure of the story

Lecture summary: the axis of dispute over applying the Rabbis’ logic from a signed witness to a validating judge

Full Transcript

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